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0  Stuart  Waiton.  2006 Abstract 
Through  a  re-examination  of  the  issue  of  moral  panics,  with  particular  reference  to 
sociological  work  around  ideas  of  'risk'  and  a  'culture  of  fear',  this  thesis  attempts  to 
examine  the  emergence  of  the  social  problem  'antisocial  behaviour'.  Situated  in  part 
within  the  changing  political  terrain  of  the  1990s,  the  emergence  of  the  politics  of 
behaviour  is  related  to  the  dirninution  of  the  human  subject  and  the  development  of  a 
therapeutic  culture  -  both  trends  helping  to  lay  the  basis  for  an  engagement  by  the 
political  elite  with  the  'vulnerable  public'.  These  developments  are  traced  through  the 
1980s  and  1990s  to  illustrate  the  construction  of  the  problem  of  'antisocial  behaviour', 
with  particular  reference  made  to  the  shift  in  left-wing  thought  from  radical  to  'real'. 
Using  the  example  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  in  the  west  of  Scotland,  empirical  research 
with  adults  and  young  people,  and  media  coverage  of  this  safety  initiative,  are  examined 
to  explore  the  idea  of  a  'culture  of  fear'.  The  legitimation  of  the  curfew  justified  by 
various  claimsmakers  is  examined  to  indicate  the  emergence  of  the  new  'amoral'  absolute 
of  safety.  The  experience  of  the  curfew  for  the  local  people  is  also  analysed  and  the 
contradictions  between  local  concerns  and  those  of  the  authority  are  contrasted.  Finally, 
through  exploring  the  changing'  meaning  of  the  term  'antisocial  behaviour'  and  its 
growing  politicisation,  the  emergence  of  this  social  problem  is  related  to  the  deterministic 
and  managerial  form  of  politics  that  emerged  at  the  end  of  the  20th  century. Acknowledgments 
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222 Chapter  1:  Introduction 
The  demandfor  law  and  order,  which  atfirst  sight  appears  to  attempt  a  restoration  of 
moral  standards,  actually  acknowledges  and  acquiesces  in  their  collapse.  Law  and 
order  comes  to  be  seen  as  the  only  effective  deterrent  in  a  society  that  no  longer 
knows  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  (Lasch  1977:  187). 
Initial  Concerns 
The  idea  for  this  thesis  originated  in  1996  when  I  was  running  a  youth  drop-in  centre 
in  Lanarkshire.  Following  Strathclyde  Police's  Operation  Spotlight  initiative  I 
discovered  that  every  young  person  who  attended  the  drop-in  centre  had  been  stopped 
and  searched.  A  colleague  giving  a  talk  on  children's  rights  at  a  nearby  school  found 
that  all  the  teenagers  in  the  class  had  been  stopped  and  searched.  And  when  he 
discussed  this  with  the  teacher  of  the  class,  he  found  that  all  the  young  people  that 
went  to  her  Sunday  School  had  also  been  stopped  and  searched. 
With  an  existing  awareness  of  works  on  moral  panics  by  Stanley  Cohen  (1972)  and 
Geoff  Pearson  (1983),  1  started  to  look  into  the  issue  of  youth  crime,  antisocial 
behaviour  and  the  developing  concern  with  the  fear  of  crime  -  and  to  look  at  this 
development  within  the  framework  of  a  moral  panic. 
Following  the  election  of  a  Labour  government  in  1997  and  what  appeared  to  be,  if 
anything,  an  acceleration  of  the  focus  on  youth  crime,  my  interest  in  the  issue  of 
antisocial  behaviour  was  reinforced  -  most  particularly  by  the  Hamilton  Child  Safety 
Initiative  or  what  became  know  as  the  Hamilton  curfew. 
My  concerns  were  directed  initially  by  a  sense  that,  whatever  the  problem  of  youth 
behaviour,  the  stopping  and  searching  of  all  the  young  people  in  the  area  I  worked  was 
excessive.  But  also  when  looking  at  the  curfew  in  Hamilton,  I  was  curious  to  observe 
not  only  an  element  of  'yob'  bating,  but  also  a  more  'caring'  approach  and  concern 
about  the  safety  of  the  children  and  young  people  in  the  area. With  this  in  mind  I  decided  to  study  the  Hamilton  curfew  in  an  attempt  to  understand 
how,  if  at  all,  this  initiative  could  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  modem  day  moral  panic. 
The  problem  of  antisocial  behaviour 
In  October  1997  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  launched.  Intended  to  create  'safer 
communities'  the  curfew,  officially  named  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  (CSI),  was 
targeted  at  young  people  under  the  age  of  16  who  were  to  be  moved  off  the  street  if 
they  did  not  have  a  'good  reason  to  be  out  after  dark'.  This  initiative  was  one  of  the 
first  significant  attempts  by  a  local  Labour  council  to  deal  with  the  'social  problem'  of 
antisocial  behaviour  following  the  election  of  the  Labour  government  in  1997.  With 
the  backing  of  the  government,  the  'success'  of  the  curfew  was  used  to  justify  the 
extension  of  these  police  powers  in  1998  with  the  passing  of  the  Crime  and  Disorder 
Act.  The  Hamilton  curfew  has  subsequently  and  repeatedly  been  discussed  as  a  key 
example  of  Labour's  new  approach  to  crime  and  disorder! 
By  2002,  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  had  become  so  central  to  British  politics 
under  Labour  that  prime  minister  Tony  Blair  used  the  Queen's  Speech  to  attack  what 
he  saw  as  the  main  social  problems  facing  British  society:  -  graffiti,  vandalism  and 
fly-tipping  -:  while  the  Labour  MP  Frank  Field  described  the  antisocial  behaviour  of 
young  people  on  estates  as  a  form  of  tefforism  (Field  2003). 
This  thesis  attempts  to  explain  why  the  use  of  curfews  and  antisocial  behaviour 
initiatives  has  developed.  What  is  at  the  heart  of  these  initiatives  and  new  laws?  Who 
has  helped  to  construct  the  'social  problem'  of  antisocial  behaviour?  Ultimately,  what 
does  the  issue  of  'antisocial  behaviour'  tell  us,  not  about  the  behaviour  of  young 
people,  but  about  society  itself? 
The  'reality'  of  crime 
The  trend  within  social  science  research  -  and  to  a  degree  within  criminology  -  over 
the  last  decade  or  so,  has  been  to  recognise,  rather  than  reject,  the  reality  of  crime  as  a 
social  problem.  This  is  a  major  shift  from  the  radical  days  of  the  late  1960s  and  70s, 
2 when  Marxist  and  labelling  perspectives  were  develoPed2,  and  even  from  the  1980s 
when  'crime  panics'  continued  to  be  understood  as  part  of  a  moral  backlash  (Pearson 
1983).  Today,  feminist  (Pain  1995,  Kersten  1996,  Smith  and  Torstensson  1997)  and 
new  realist  perspectives  (Lea  and  Young  1984  and  Young  1988)3  line  up  alongside 
child  and  social  psychology  (Farrington  1997  and  Rutter  1998),  to  expose  the  'real' 
and  growing  problems  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  of  young  people. 
However,  the  'epidemic  of  crime  and  disorder'  (Labour  1996)  remains  open  to 
question.  How  society  experiences  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  is  related  to  the 
objective  existence  of  the  problem,  but  this  can  never  be  the  whole  story.  Individuals 
and  organisations  have  a  significant  impact  upon  the  promotion  of  certain  social 
problems,  while  the  way  in  which  a  problem  is  experienced  by  the  public  will  always 
depend  in  part  upon  the  political  and  cultural  framework  within  which  it  occurs. 
Understanding  these  'subjective'  factors  is  perhaps  more  important  than  ever  today, 
when  there  is  no  systematic  opposition  to  the  idea  that  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour 
are  serious  social  problems. 
The  concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  has  grown  alongside  the  fear  of  crime  and 
remains  closely  associated  with  the  issue  of  crime.  However,  even  when  studying  the 
'objective'  nature  of  crime,  this  social  problem  is  far  from  clear-cut.  The  'reality'  of 
the  rise  in  crime  can  be  seen  in  the  offences  recorded  by  the  police.  Here  crime  is 
shown  to  have  been  increasing  slowly  from  the  1930s  and  accelerating  from  the  mid- 
1950s  and  late  1980s  before  declining  from  the  mid  1990s.  A  similar  trend  is  also 
4  indicated  by  the  British  Crime  Survey  (Maguire  et  al  2002).  However,  there  remains 
some  questioning  of  these  crime  statistics,  both  from  conservative  critics  like  Simon 
JenkinS5  and  from  those  on  the  left,  including  John  Muncie  (1999),  who  argues  that 
crime  statistics  are  both  partial  and  socially  constructed.  6 
Examining  conviction  statistics  for  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  when  reported  and 
recorded  crime  figures  were  reaching  an  all-time  high  within  both  the  police  and  the 
British  Crime  Survey  reports,  we  find  that  convictions  of  burglary,  for  example,  fell 
by  one  third  (Rose  1996a:  102-3).  Looking  at  youth  crime  during  this  period,  a 
Bamardos  survey  concluded:  'Even  taking  account  of  the  number  of  unrecorded 
3 offences,  demographic  changes  and  the  growth  of  strategies  to  divert  young  people 
from  prosecution,  there  is  little  evidence  that  youth  crime  has  actually  increased' 
(Roberts  and  Sachdev  1996).  Similarly,  research  published  by  the  Trust  for  the  Study 
of  Adolescence  concluded  that,  'there  is  little  evidence  of  any  great  increase  in  the 
level  of  crime  committed  by  young  people  during  the  last  decade'  (Coleman  1999: 
81).  Even  Michael  Rutter,  whose  book  Antisocial  Behaviour  by  Young  People,  is 
predicated  on  the  notion  that  the  problem  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  amongst 
young  people  is  on  the  increase,  recognised  that,  'the  number  of  juveniles  found  guilty 
or  cautioned  for  indictable  offences  per  100,000  of  the  population  fell,  between  1984 
and  1994,  by  44%  for  males  aged  10-13  and  by  19%  for  males  aged  14-17'  (Rutter  et 
al  1998:  70).  7 
With  the  shift  in  focus  of  once  radical  criminologists,  backed  up  by  the  development 
of  the  British  Crime  Survey,  there  is  a  greater  acceptance  of  crime  as  a  'real'  problem. 
However,  the  myth  and  reality  of  crime  remains  a  contested  area.  This  thesis  does  not 
propose  to  disprove  the  'reality'  of  crime.  But  the  question  of,  when  and  why  crime, 
and  more  particularly  antisocial  behaviour,  became  a  'social  problem',  in  part  depends 
on  it  being  defined  as  such  by  significant  groups  and  individuals  who  act  as 
claimsmakers  for  this  particular  problem  (Spector  and  Kitsuse  2001).  In  this  respect,  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  development  of  the  British  Crime 
Survey  in  the  early  eighties  was  not  to  prove  the  high  level  of  crime,  but  rather  the 
opposite  -  to  show  that  the  fear  of  crime  was  an  exaggerated  concern  (Hough  and 
Mayhew  1988). 
The  rise  and  rise  of  crime  over  the  last  fifty  years,  at  least  as  far  as  statistics  are 
concerned,  could  have  led  to  conservative  and  radical  thinkers  to  have  highlighted  the 
'problem'  of  crime  at  almost  any  point  within  this  time  period.  But  it  was  not  until  the 
1970s  and  then  the  1990s  that  political  parties  associated  with  the  right  and  then  the 
left  adopted  the  posture  of  the  party  of  law  and  order,  and  not  until  the  mid-1980s  that 
some  radical  criminologists  became  'realists'. 
Particularly  for  radical  criminologists  and  sociologists,  the  'problem'  of  crime  was 
questioned  to  a  far  greater  extent  in  the  past  than  it  is  today  -  despite  the  constantly 
4 8 
rising  crime  figures  (Cohen  1972,  Hall  1978,  Pearson  1983).  The  justifications  for  the 
growing  acceptance  of  crime  as  a  social  problem  are  wide  and  varied,  often  referring 
to  economic  and  social  changes  (Lea  and  Young  1984,  Campbell  1993).  This  thesis,  in 
contrast,  will  attempt  to  locate  the  concern  about  crime  and  particularly  antisocial 
behaviour  within  the  changing  ideological  and  political  outlooks  of  those  who  have 
helped  elevate  these  concerns. 
Whereas  studies  in  the  past  have  explored  conservative  reactions  to  societal  changes 
in  formulating  what  were  defined  as  moral  panics,  few  British  studies  have  been 
carried  out  to  look  at  the  more  radically-based  'panics'  of  the  1980s  and  1990s.  With 
the  emergence  of  the  Labour  party  as  a  party  of  law  and  order,  9  and  the  increasing 
importance  being  given  by  the  government  to  issues  of  crime,  the  fear  of  crime  and 
antisocial  behaviour,  the  emphasis  of  this  thesis  will  be  on  uncovering  the  strands  of 
thought  and  the  active  claimsmakers  who  have  helped  to  situate  concerns  about 
'behaviour'  at  the  centre  of  much  social  policy.  10 
It  is  worth  pointing  out  at  this  stage  that  what  is  under  study  here,  and  what  is  defined 
as  antisocial  behaviour,  is  not  what  would  traditionally  have  been  understood  as  crime 
-  theft  or  burglary,  crimes  often  associated  with  economic  gain,  and  seen  as  being  an 
affront  by  the  'crook'  to  the  state.  Rather,  with  the  elevation  of  the  problem  of 
antisocial  behaviour,  it  is  the  'petty'  incivilities  of  noise,  rowdy  behaviour  and 
dropping  litter,  or  petty  crime  like  graffiti  and  vandalism,  that  are  understood  to  be  a 
problem  for  the  individual  and  ultimately  for  society. 
Unlike  crime,  which  has  had  a  relatively  long  shelf-life  as  a  perceived  social  problem, 
the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  has  only  emerged  and  become  understood  as  a 
serious  problem  in  the  last  decade,  and  particularly  since  the  election  of  the  Labour 
government  in  1997.  Many  of  these  'antisocial'  acts  create  'victims'  not  in  a  physical  or 
economic  sense;  rather,  it  is  the  perceived  'emotional  victimisation'  and  a  sense  of  fear 
and  anxiety  that  is  being  addressed.  For  example,  if  the  presence  of  a  group  of  young 
people  is  creating  fear  within  a  community,  regardless  of  their  activities,  this  very 
presence  can  be  interpreted  and  labelled  as  being  antisocial  behaviour. 
5 At  a  time  when  crime  figures  are  shown  to  be  falling,  with  a,  '25  per  cent  fall  in  crime 
measured  by  the  BCS  in  the  five  years  between  1997  and  2002/03',  it  is  still  the  case 
that  'three  quarters  of  the  public  still  believe  that  the  national  crime  rate  has  been 
rising'  (Home  Office  2002/2003).  This  anomaly  is  explained  by  some  as  being  caused 
by  the  day-to-day  incivility  of  antisocial,  sexist,  racist  and  ageist  behaviour,  often  by 
young  people,  which  undermines  the  sense  of  wellbeing  of  both  the  individual  and  the 
community  (Field  2003,  Young  1999,  Smith  and  Torestensson  1997,  Pain  1995  Junger 
1987,  Lea  and  Young  1984).  Here  the  high  level  of  fear  of  crime  is  explained  in 
relation  to  various  forms  of  harassment  that  do  not  show  up  on  the  crime  statistics. 
The  understanding  of  these  problems,  and  the  impact  that  they  have  on  individuals, 
have  been  influenced  by  claimsmakers  who  help  formulate  the  problems  within 
certain  parameters:  parameters  that  have  increasingly  been  set  by  what  Joel  Best 
describes  as  the  'victim  industry',  and  which  have  a  particular  ontology  (Best  1999). 
Equally,  and  more  generally,  the  understanding  of  these  problems  and  the  impact  they 
have  on  individuals  and  society  will  be  influenced  by  the  specific  political  and  cultural 
climate  of  the  day  -a  cultural  climate  that  Furedi  has  labelled  a  'culture  of  fear' 
(Furedi  1997). 
Antisocial  behaviour  of  adults  and  especially  young  people  is  generally  understood  to 
be  the  cause  of  much  of  the  fear  in  society.  However,  following  the  work  of  Best  and 
Furedi,  the  fear  of  disorder  is  examined  as  part  of  a  cultural  process  based  on  a  more 
generalised  sense  of  risk  and  insecurity,  a  social  and  political  process  that  has  helped 
create  a  sense  of  vulnerability  amongst  the  public.  How  this  sense  of  vulnerability  has 
been  encouraged  and  institutionalised  is  examined  through  the  case-study  of  the 
Hamilton  curfew. 
The  politics  of  'safe'  behaviour 
From  the  early  1990s  onwards,  law  and  order  has  become  a  key  issue  for  all  political 
parties.  More  specifically,  the  'non-criminal'  behaviour  of  antisocial  youth  - 
behaviour  that  in  the  recent  past  would  have  been  described  as  'mischievous"'  -  has 
become  one  of,  if  not  the,  major  concern  in  law  and  order  policies  and  debates.  12  In 
6 Scotland  for  example,  part  of  the  Strathclyde  Police's,  'Operation  Spotlight  Initiative', 
launched  exactly  one  year  before  the  introduction  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  targeted 
young  people  causing  a  public  nuisance,  which  included  dropping  litter  outside 
schools  and  being  noisy  (The  Scotsman  2  October  1996). 
'Nuisance  behaviour'  has  also  become  a  concern  for  the  public,  and  in  the  same  year 
that  Operation  Spotlight  was  launched  in  Scotland,  the  Audit  Commission  in  England 
and  Wales  noted  that  between  10  and  20  per  cent  of  phone  calls  to  the  police  were  for 
nuisance  behaviour.  This  definition  of  'nuisance  behaviour'  specifically  relates  to  non- 
criminal  activities  -  shouting,  swearing,  hanging  around  and  fooling  around  in  groups, 
sometimes  outside  other  people's  homes  (Audit  Commission  Report  1996:  13). 
Other  types  of  behaviour  have  also  been  criminalised.  For  example  in  1996,  Glasgow 
City  Council  introduced  a  street  drinking  ban  covering  the  whole  of  the  council  area. 
Anyone  found  drinking  outside  now  risked  being  fined  and  labelled  as  antisocial. 
Today,  local  authorities  have  defined  'community  safety'  as  one  of  the  core  strategic 
objectives  that  directs  council  activities.  The  antisocial  behaviour  of  young  people  is 
one  of  the  main  concerns  raised  within  this  community  safety  framework,  and  local 
initiatives  costing  hundreds  of  millions  of  pounds  aimed  at  tackling  the  behaviour  of 
antisocial  youth,  have  been  set  up  across  the  UK,  13  with  the  involvement  of  almost 
every  council  department,  education  department  and  voluntary  organisation  (Waiton 
2001:  31).  Even  trade  unions  have  developed  their  own  policies  to  deal  with  the 
antisocial  behaviour  of  the  public,  with  monitoring  and  research  being  produced 
annually  to  assess  the  'growing  problem'  of  this  behaviour  (Waiton  2001:  39). 
The  assumption  that  the  preoccupation  with  antisocial  behaviour  simply  reflects  the 
real  changes  in  behaviour,  and  particularly  that  of  young  people,  is  challenged  in  this 
thesis.  This  is  not  to  argue  that  there  is  no  Problem,  or  even  to  reject  the  idea  that  some 
problems  of  behaviour  may  have  got  worse.  But,  to  understand  the  significance  of 
'antisocial  behaviour'  to  political  and  public  life,  an  examination  must  be  made  of  the 
changing  nature  of  politics  itself.  the  loss  of  any  opposition  to  the  politicisation  of 
crime;  the  emergence  of  'micro-politics'  that  has  transformed  social  issues  into 
1 problems  of  individual  behaviour;  and  the  changing  relationship  between  the  state, 
other  institutions  like  the  trade  unions,  and  a  fragmented  and  more  insecure  public. 
Safety  and  the  desire  to  be  safe  is.  not  a  new  concern  for  individuals  or  for  society. 
What  is  new  is  the  extent  to  which  being  safe  has  become  an  all-encompassing 
organisational  principle  for  society.  This  is  often  seen  most  clearly  in  relation  to 
children  and  young  people,  where  the  prefix  of  'safe'  is  now  automatically  added  to 
any  activity  that  involves  youngsters.  How  this  focus  upon  safety  has  come  about  is 
examined  below,  as  is  the  impact  that  this  has  had  upon  social  policy  and  the 
regulation  of  young  people's  lives. 
From  moral  panics  to  amoral  anxieties 
Beginning  from  an  understanding  of  the  moral  panic  studies  of  the  past,  this  thesis 
attempts  to  modernise  the  concept  of  'moral  panic',  a  concept  that  was  developed  at  a 
time  of  conflicting  beliefs  and  visions  of  society  by  those  generally  labelled  as  'left 
and  right'.  Today,  when  society  is  understood  by  some  to  have  moved  beyond  left  and 
right  (Giddens  1994,  Furedi  2005),  the  following  question  is  posed:  What  impact  has 
this  had  on  moral  panics  in  society,  and  how  are  these  changes  to  be  conceptualised? 
Much  of  the  key  critical  work  examining  crime  panics  in  the  UK,  particularly  work 
carried  out  prior  to  the  1990s,  was  done  within  the  broad  framework  of  moral  panic 
studies  (Young  1971,  Cohen  1972,  Hall  1978,  Pearson  1983).  In  this  framework,  fears 
about  Mods  and  Rockers,  or  muggers,  was  understood  to  be  generated  by  a 
conservative  reaction  to  cultural  and  economic  changes  from  the  1960s  onwards. 
However,  whereas  these  studies  were  examining  occasional  'panics'  within  a  society 
that  was  generally  'calm',  today  a  growing  body  of  social  science  research  has 
attempted  to  describe  and  understand  society  with  reference  to  a  more  permanent 
sense  of  risk  (Simon  1987,  O'Malley  1991,  Feeley  and  Simon  1992,  O'Malley  1992, 
Beck  1992,  Furedi  1997,  Glassner  1999).  14 
Rather  than  panics  occasionally  erupting  within  a  society  that  is  otherwise  at  ease, 
government  policies  and  institutional  arrangements  appear  to  be  both  initiating  panics 
8 and  institutionalising  practices  based  upon  a  cultural  sense  of  anxiety  (Fitzpatrick 
2001,  Burgess  2004).  Concerns  about  the  'behaviour  of  youth',  for  example,  are  no 
15  longer  the  preserve  of  conservative  groups  and  'outsiders"  but  involve  a  wide 
spectrum  of  opinion,  institutional  practices,  and  every  political  party,  focusing  on 
issues  related  to  drugs,  drink,  sex,  smoking,  bullying,  peer  pressure,  antisocial 
behaviour  and  so  on.  Concerns  about  'youth'  are  not  new,  but  rarely  in  the  past  were 
they  so  widely  felt,  and  they  did  not  take  such  a  central  place  within  society.  Panics 
continue  to  erupt  in  society,  but  it  will  be  argued  here  that  it  is  more  accurate  to 
classify  society  as  being  in  a  constant  state  of  anxiety. 
Where  panics  once  took  the  form  of  a  conservative  reaction  to  changes  in  society, 
expressed  through  the  promotion  of  moral  values,  more  recently  panics  have  been 
generated  by  more  'radical'  thinkers,  around  such  issues  as  the  environment,  child 
abuse  and  ADDS  (Cohen  1988:  260-3,  Jenkins  1992,  Fitzpatrick  2001).  Indeed  the 
basis  of  many  of  today's  panics  and  anxieties  are  more  commonly  formulated  through 
the  morally  neutral,  'scientific',  or  amoral  language  of  risk  and  safety.  Previously 
panics  took  place  within  a  contested  political  context,  within  which  traditionalists, 
would  promote  the  ideal  of  the  past  -  of  the  family  and,  the  'British  way  of  life'  - 
while  radicals  would  challenge  these  panics,  embracing  changes  in  society  within  a 
more  positive  vision  of  the  future.  Today  neither  traditional  conservative  moral  values 
appear  to  be  central  to  the  promotion  of  many  panics,  and  nor  is  there  a  radical 
opposition  to  them.  However,  moral  panic  research  is  still  often  framed  within  this 
paradigm  (Thompson  1998),  and  as  such  remains  somewhat  one-sided.  Rather  than 
attempting  to  understand  contemporary  anxieties  as  an  expression  of  traditional 
moralising,  this  thesis  will  endeavour  to  formulate  an  explanation  for  the  rise  of 
amoral  anxieties  that  cut  across  the  political  spectrum. 
With  the  introduction  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  by  the  newly-elected  Labour 
government  in  1997,  the  issue  of  child  safety  merged  with  the  fears  about  young 
people  who  hang  about  the  streets.  Here  the  development  of  a  curfew  was  largely 
understood,  not  as  a  panic  reaction,  but  as  a  necessary  initiative  to  protect  the  public 
from  perceived  risks  ý  and  more  specifically  to  protect  them  from  this  fear.  This 
9 safety-based  initiative  is  understood  and  discussed  within  this  thesis  as  an  example  of 
the  institutionalisation  of  arnoral  anxieties. 
Anxious  Authoritarianism 
The  Hamilton  curfew,  like  many  crime  and  safety  initiatives,  should  be  understood, 
not  simply  as  a  police  initiative  to  deal  with  crime  and  disorder,  but  also  as  a  relatively 
new  form  of  state  legitimation  predicated  upon  the  political  elite's  attempt  to  reengage 
with  an  anxious  public. 
How  the  Hamilton  curfew  became  an  acceptable,  indeed  celebrated,  initiative  can  only 
be  understood  with  reference  to  the  emerging  culture  of  control  that  is  identified  as 
developing  most  systematically  from  around  1993.  This  trend  towards  directly 
regulating  public  space  and  cver-more  areas  of  life  is  situated  within  the  loss  of 
direction  of  both  left  and  right,  and  with  the  growing  disengagement  of  the  public 
from  politics.  How  the  political  elite  reacted  to  these  developments  and  attempted  to 
reengage  a  more  fragmented  public  is  of  central  importance  here  in  attempting  to 
understand  the  preoccupation  with  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour. 
Within  the  discussion  about  antisocial  behaviour,  there  are  differing  explanations  of 
the  cause  of  this  problem.  In  political  writings,  for  example,  Labour  MP  Frank  Field 
(2003)  has  described  the  significance  of  the  declining  influence  of  evangelical 
Christianity  that  framed  the  actions  and  civility  of  everyday  life  within  the  working 
class.  The  Conservative  Alexander  Deane  (2005)  has  examined  the  'great  abdication' 
of  the  middle  class  who,  he  argues,  have  given  up  on  the  standards  of  good  behaviour, 
that  influenced  the  whole  of  society.  Both  of  these  perspectives  accept  that  antisocial 
behaviour  is  a  major  -  indeed  the  major  problem  facing  society;  a  contention  that  is 
questioned  within  this  thesis. 
Rather,  this  thesis  argues  that  the  central  development  in  the  last  two  decades  in 
understanding  the  significance  of  antisocial  behaviour  as  a  social  problem  is  the 
4collapse'  of  politics,  which  reflects  the  loss  of  belief  by  the  political  elites  in  their 
own  capacity  to  direct  social  changes.  Lacking  a  political  dynamic  and  an  ability  to 
10 engage  the  public,  the  result  is  a  political  elite  with  an  exaggerated  sense  of  society 
being  out  of  control.  This  is  coupled  with  a  profound  sense  of  pessimism  amongst  the 
public  about  not  only  political  life,  but  about  public  life  and  ultimately  about  other 
people.  In  this  respect,  rather  than  antisocial  behaviour  being  understood  as  a  major 
social  problem,  the  rise  of  the  concern  with  this  problem  is  seen  here  as  a  reflection  of 
a  widespread  sense  of  society  being  out  of  control,  and  a  more  pessimistic,  indeed 
fearful,  perception  of  the  actions  of  others. 
C.  Wright  Mills  has  described,  what  he  considered  to  be  the  emergence  of  a  'mass' 
society,  where  there  is  a  loss  of  an  active  public  and  a  resulting  preoccupation  with 
personal  troubles  rather  than  public  issues.  Following  this  idea,  this  thesis  argues  that 
the  concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  -  or  indeed  of  incivility  (Deane  2005)  -  is  a 
reflection  not  of  a  loss  of  concern  about  'politeness'  by  the  public,  but  the  opposite:  a 
more  exaggerated  preoccupation  with  personal  behaviour.  If  politics  really  has  all  but 
'collapsed'  -  if  we  are  living  in  an  age  where  we  face  the  'end  of  ideology'  (Bell 
1962),  the  'end  of  utopia'  (Jacoby  1999),  or  what  Rose  has  described  as  the  'death  of 
the  social'  (Rose  1996)  -  then  the  intense  concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  is 
perhaps  less  to  do  with  the  behaviour  itself  than  due  to  the  fact  that  polite  contact  with 
other  individuals  is  all  we  have  left? 
Therapeutic  vulnerability 
The  development  of  a  'culture  of  control',  and  of  authoritarian  initiatives  like  curfews, 
has  been  understood  as  part  of  a  neo-liberal  agenda  that  engages  with  the 
'individualistic  morality  of  our  consumer  culture'  (Garland  2002:  198).  However, 
while  accepting  the  significance  of  the  'individual'  to  social  policy  developments,  the 
nature  of  this  individual  does  not  appear  to  be  the  'individualistic'  or  'greedy' 
character  that  is  often  portrayed  as  having  emerged  out  of  'Thatcher's  Britain'.  Rather, 
the  contemporary  human  condition  can  more  accurately  be  described,  and  is  addressed 
within  this  thesis,  as  being  founded  upon  a  fragile  sense  of  vulnerability. 
Throughout  this  thesis  an  attempt  is  made  to  identify  the  nature  of  the  subject  being 
engaged  with  and  promoted  within  society.  In  so  doing,  the  broader  moral  system  of 
11 belief  underpinning  state  actions  is  examined  (Beetham  199  1:  11),  and  the  basis  of 
modem  day  claimsmaking  is  explored.  Where  previously  individuals  were  understood 
in  relation  to  the  Enlightenment  vision  of  the  active  and  rational  'man',  today  the 
relationship  being  developed  between  the  individual  and  society  is  predicated  upon 
the  cultural  sense  of  diminished  subjectivity  (Heartfield  2002).  This  cultural  sense  has 
led  to  the  emergence  of  'safety'  as  the  new  'morality'  for  an  anxious  age.  As  Furedi 
notes: 
Today,  the  fear  of  taking  risks  is  creating  a  society  that  celebrates  victim-hood 
rather  than  heroism 
...  The  virtues  held  up  to  be  followed  are  passivity  rather 
than  activism,  safety  rather  than  boldness.  The  rather  diminished  individual 
that  emerges  is  indulged  on  the  grounds  that,  in  a  world  awash  with  conditions 
and  crises  and  impending  catastrophe,  he  or  she  is  doing  a  good  job  just  by 
surviving  (Furedi  1997:  12). 
The  new  basis  for  state  legitimation  that  developed  systematically  towards  the  end  of 
the  2&  century,  both  Nolan  (1998)  and  Furedi  (2004)  argue,  was  a  form  of 
therapeutic  legitimacy.  16  Rather  than  engaging  the  public  with  a  political  or  moral 
programme  -  an  outlook  that  connected  the  individual  to  society  and  its  values  - 
government  instead  attempted  to  relate  directly  to  the  individual  and  the  emotional 
self  -  an  emotional  self  that  was  understood  as  being  profoundly  vulnerable. 
The  most  recent  example  of  the  government's  'respect  agenda'  is  significant  in  this 
regard.  This  agenda,  which  at  first  sight  appears  to  resemble  a  more  traditional 
demand  for  morality  and  decency,  when  examined  further  exposes  the  more 
vulnerable  and  therapeutic  nature  of  government  interventions  today.  For  example, 
what  are  the  moral  standards  underpinning  this  idea  of  respect?  Few  if  any  institutions 
have  been  held  up  as  deserving  of  respect,  nor  indeed  has  the  old  adage  of  'respect  for 
the  elderly'  been  seriously  promoted.  Rather  it  seems  that  respect  is  something  that 
everybody  -  adults  and  children  alike  -  should  be  given  or  perhaps  more  importantly 
should  feel.  17  Where  previously  the  idea  of  respect  was  in  some  way  associated  with 
adult  society,  its  values  and  institutions,  today  it  appears  to  relate  more  to  the 
vulnerability  of  individuals  and  their  interactions  with  other  people.  Respect  is  now 
12 demanded  by  the  government  as  a  form  of  protection  of  the  emotionally-constituted 
public. 
The  significance  of  the  understanding  of  the  public  as  being  fundamentally  vulnerable 
is  explored  in  the  thesis  with  reference  to  the  changing  nature  of  claimsmaking,  and 
the  formation  of  social  problems  predicated  upon  what  Garland  has  correctly 
described  as  the  universalised  notion  of  victimhood  (Garland  2002:  11).  How  this 
sense  of  vulnerability  that  has  emerged  is  explored,  in  order  to  understand  the  cultural 
framework  within  which  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  established.  This  engagement  in 
society  with  the  public,  through  the  prism  of  vulnerability,  will  be  shown  not  simply 
to  be  a  reactive  process  that  connects  to  a  more  fragmented  individual,  but  a  'creative' 
one  that  helps  to  form  and  inform  the  nature  of  individual  subjectivity,  people's 
actions  and  expectations  of  themselves. 
The  Hamilton  Curfew 
The  case  study  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  is  used  to  explore  the  themes  discussed  above 
and  to  examine  how  the  cultural  and  political  trends  identified  impacted  upon  a 
working-class  estate  in  Scotland.  This  is  done  through  the  use  of  semi-structured 
interviews  with  young  people  affected  by  the  curfew,  and  by  examining  the 
representation  of  the  problems  being  addressed  by  the  key  claimsmakers  within  the 
media. 
The  semi-structured  interviews  with  children  and  young  people  in  the  targeted  area  are 
used  to  help  explore  how  the  curfew  impacted  upon  these  young  people.  More 
broadly,  these  interviews  help  us  to  examine  the  broader  concerns  and  fears  held  by 
young  people  and  adults  alike.  Rather  than  simply  reflecting  'real'  dangers 
experienced  by  local  people,  the  fear  within  the  curfew-targeted  areas  is  also  studied 
as  part  of  a  broader  culture  of  fear  -a  culture  of  fear  that  has  arguably  been 
encouraged  with  the  criminalisation  and  politicisation  of  antisocial  behaviour.  Much 
of  what  is  being  examined  is  the  justificatory  process  of  the  curfew,  the  central  themes 
that  were  used  to  give  legitimacy  to  the  police  and  council's  actions  and  the  'warrants' 
or  values  that  underpinned  the  arguments  used. 
13 Through  this  research,  a  number  of  themes  are  uncovered:  the  centrality  of  the  idea  of 
the  'vulnerable  public'  and  the  'victim'  of  both  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour;  the 
emergence  of  the  'amoral  absolute'  of  safety  and  particularly  child  safety,  which 
dominated  the  discourse  of  those  both  for  and  against  the  curfew;  and,  in  relation  to 
the  above,  the  promotion  of  'rights'  as  a  form  of  protection  of  the  vulnerable  adult, 
child  and  young  person. 
Discussed  with  reference  to  the  development  of  zero  tolerance  policing  in  Strathclyde, 
the  dual  elements  of  the  criminalisation  of  young  people  and  the  'victimisation'18  of 
adults  and  young  people  is  explored.  In  essence  it  is  argued  that  the  increasing 
understanding  of  both  adults  and  young  people  as  potential  victims  has  led  to  the 
criminalisation  of  young  people  in  public  space.  In  this  respect,  the  curfew  is 
discussed  less  as  a  'right  wing'  authoritarian  initiative  than  as  a  logical  progression 
from  the  developing  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  individual,  predicated  upon 
the  notion  of  individual  vulnerability,  the  unquestioned  centrality  of  'community 
safety'  and,  in  part,  the  therapeutically-oriented  understanding  of  the  need  to  protect 
the  emotional  well-being  of  the  public. 
Following  from  this,  the  idea  of  the  diminished  subject  is  explored.  Rather  than  'risks' 
being  understood  as  challenges  for  ordinary  people  to  face,  the  public  were 
encouraged  by  those  promoting  the  curfew  to  have  a  passive  relationship  with  these 
'social  problems'.  This  observation  raises  the  question  of  what  is  meant  by  the  notion 
of  'responsibility'  and  'active  citizenship',  when  a  more  passive  relationship  is 
encouraged  between  members  of  the  public,  and  fear  becomes  institutionalised 
through  public  safety  initiatives. 
The  process  of  legitimation  adopted  by  the  authorities  in  their  promotion  of  the  curfew 
raises  questions  about  the  basis  of  government  and  political  legitimation  -a  form  of 
legitimacy  that  relates  less  to  social  institutions  and  public  morals  than  to  individual 
safety  and  feelings  of  fear.  Here  the  extent  to  which  a  therapeutic  approach  influenced 
the  development  of  the  curfew  is  explored  (Beetham  1991  and  Nolan  1999). 
14 Through  this  research  the  myth  and  reality  of  'kids  running  wild'  is  examined  and  the 
impact  of  the  curfew  at  a  time  when  overprotected,  'cotton  wool  kids'  was  becoming 
recognised  as  an  alternative  social  problem.  19  Equally,  the  ideas  of  safety  and  risk  that 
were  promoted  by  the  authorities  are  questioned,  and  the  notion  of  perceived  and 
projected  risks  are  compared  to  the  cultural  sense  of  insecurity  in  the  area.  By 
exploring  the  use  made  by  the  authorities  of  the  issue  of  safety  and  fear,  the 
potentially  detrimental  effect  that  this  had  upon  individuals  and  the  community  is 
raised. 
Finally,  the  contradictory  attitude  of  young  people  to  the  curfew  is  explored.  Often 
annoyed  by  their  own  personal  experience  of  the  police,  the  young  people  of  Hamilton 
nevertheless  were  generally  supportive  of  a  more  policed  and  regulated  environment. 
In  the  newspaper  coverage,  before  the  Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative  was  launched, 
the  concern  was  raised  about  how  a  curfew  would  create  an  'us  against  them' 
mentality  amongst  angry  young  people.  However,  given  the  'culture  of  fear'  in 
society,  the  question  addressed  here  is  to  what  extent  can  it  be  argued  that  young 
people  have  themselves  adopted  the  safety-first  mentality  often  understood  to  be  the 
preserve  of  elderly  adults.  In  this  respect,  again,  questions  are  raised  about  the 
detrimental  'impact  that  'risk  awareness'  has  upon  young  people  and  upon  the 
interactions  between  themselves  and  others  within  a  community. 
Conclusion 
The  research  in  this  thesis  looking  at  the  impact  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  originally 
developed  in,  an  attempt  to  examine  Furedi's  understanding  of  the  emerging  'culture 
of  fear'  (Furedi  1997).  This  remains  central  to  the  thesis  but  has  been  developed 
further  with  reference  to  the  idea  of  a  'therapeutic  state'  (Nolan  1998),  and  through 
the  study  of  the  nature  of  the  individual  and  the  culturally  promoted  idiom  of 
vulnerability  (Furedi  2004). 
The  emergence  of  the  culture  of  fear  is  analysed  in  Chapter  2  through  a  study  of  past 
moral  panic  theories,  and  here  the  transformation  of  both  the  traditional  'moral' 
framework  of  these  concerns,  and  also  the  'panic'  based  nature  of  these  now  more 
15 generalised  public  anxieties,  is  questioned.  Rather,  it  is  argued,  the  recognition  of  an 
all-encompassing  culture  of  fear  is  useful  in  helping  to  explain  the  amoral  safety- 
based  'panics'  that  have  arisen  in  the  late  2&  and  early  21"  century. 
Following  this  chapter,  the  thesis  develops  chronologically  by  analysing  the  way 
crime  and  the  fear  of  it  have  changed  within  politics,  social  institutions  and  also 
within  academia.  Chapter  3  ultimately  attempts  to  explain  the  'politics  of  antisocial 
behaviour'  and  the  growing  centrality  across  the  political  spectrum  of  the  idea  of  the 
vulnerable  public  that  has  informed  this  development  and  lies  at  the  heart  of  the 
emerging  preoccupation  with  antisocial  behaviour. 
Having  established  the  background  to  what  are  described  as  amoral  anxieties  prior  to 
the  introduction  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  this  'Child  Safety  Initiative'  is  explored,  with 
reference  to  official  justifications  of  it  and  to  the  experience  of  local  young  people. 
Finally  the  thesis  looks  more  generally  at  the  meaning  of  the  politically-loaded  idea  of 
antisocial  behaviour,  and  attempts  to  unearth  the  essence  of  this  term.  This 
penultimate  chapter  examines  the  concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  both  historically 
-  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  curfew  -  and  also  with  reference  to  its  growing 
significance  to  society  today.  Tracing  the  recent  rise  in  the  political  and  public 
concern  about  'antisocial  behaviour',  this  chapter  asks:  What  does  it  mean  to  be 
antisocial  at  a  time  when  common  'social'  values  are  less  coherent  and  society  is  more 
individuated?  With  this  in  mind,  the  meaning  of  being  'antisocial'  and  also  of  the 
more  psychologically-formed  understanding  of  'behaviour'  is  explored. 
In  conclusion,  this  thesis  reinterprets  the  idea  of  moral  panics  and  explains  how  the 
very  basis  of  the  amoral  anxieties  that  have  been  institutionalised  today  express  the 
problem  not  of  antisocial  individuals,  but  of  an  anti  'social'  society. 
16 Chapter  2:  From  Moral  Panics  to  Amoral  Anxieties 
It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  this  is  the  age  of  the  moral  panic  (Tbompson  1998:  1). 
Introduction 
The  concept  of  the  moral  panics  grew  out  of  the  1960s  to  explain  a  conservative 
reaction  to  a  perceived  threat  to  'sacred  and  fundamental'  values  of  society  (Cohen 
1972).  However,  what  today's  fundamental  values  are  is  less  clear  than  ever  before. 
The  promotion  of  The  Family  has  become  replaced  by  an  acceptance  of  families, 
Britishness  now  embodies  the  idea  of  multiculturalism  and  even  the  Conservative 
Party  rarely  campaigns  around  traditional  moral  values.  Despite  these  shifts,  we  do 
indeed  appear  to  be  living  in  an  age  of  panics.  How  do  we  account  for  this? 
In  the  1970s  and  1980s  moral  panics  were  understood  to  be  a  right-wing  reaction  to 
economic  and  social  changes  at  a  time  when  the  hegemony  of  the  capitalist  elite  was 
breaking  down  (Hall  et  al.  1978).  Moral  panics  were  in  part  about  class  and  class 
conflict.  Today,  however,  this  conflict  is  at  an  all  time  low.  The  once  powerful  British 
labour  movement  has  all  but  disappeared  from  the  political  stage  and  a  key  basis  for 
the  moral  panics  of  the  past  appears  to  have  vanished. 
At  the  same  time,  panics  have  emerged  in  society,  generated  not  by  traditional 
conservatives  but  by  radical  thinkers  and  groups.  Child  abuse  (Jenkins  1992),  AIDS 
(Fitzpatrick  and  Miligan  1987),  and  the  environment  (Cohen  1988:  260-3),  for 
example,  are  just  three  areas  that  have  been  identified  as  sites  of  radical  panicking. 
Concerns  about  crime  and  youth  disorder,  which  would  historically  have  been 
conservative  preoccupations  that  were  challenged  by  radicals,  have  also  become  more 
mainstream.  Indeed  not  only  crime,  but  also  the  often  non-criminal  behaviour  of 
young  people,  has  become  a  significant  social  problem  for  conservatives  and  liberals 
alike  -  viewed  as  the  problem  of  'antisocial  behaviour. 
Also,  whereas  panics  in  the  past  were  often  occasional,  short-lived,  focused  on 
specific  groups  and  activities,  and  generated  by  conservatives,  today  almost  all 
17 sections  of  society  are  involved  to  some  degree  in  panicking  about  an  ever-wider  array 
of  issues,  from  MMR  to  bird  flu,  the  millennium  bug,  paedophiles,  binge  drinkers, 
sexually  transmitted  diseases,  passive  smoking  and  global  warming.  Whatever  the 
myth  and  reality  of  these  'panics',  the  language  of  'epidemics'  and  'chaos'  used  to 
describe  them  depicts  a  society  that  is  out  of  control,  and  expresses  a  deep  sense  of 
pessimism  about  the  future.  Rather  than  panicking  being  the  preserve  of  reactionary 
traditionalists,  it  seems  that  to  one  degree  or  another  we  are  all  in  a  panic  about 
something. 
Today,  many  panics  are  not  only  promoted  by  less  predictable  groups  and  individuals, 
but,  like  the  MMR  panic  (Fitzpatrick  2004),  have  helped  to  undermine  rather  than 
shore  up  the  authority  of  the  political  elite  (Ungar  2001). 
To  make  sense  of  these  changes,  the  framework  of  understanding  contemporary 
panics  in  relation  to  conservative  moral  reactions  to  societal  changes  needs  to  be 
reassessed.  Historical  specificity  is  required  to  re-conceptualise  this  'age  of  moral 
panic'  and  to  understand  what,  if  anything,  are  the  sacred  and  fundamental  values  of 
society  today  that  are  being  defended  by  those  promoting  these  panics.  The  following 
chapter  will  attempt  to  do  just  that,  firstly  by  analysing  moral  panic  literature  of  the 
past  to  ascertain  what  these  theories  achieved,  and  then  by  studying  the  social 
constructionist  methodology  that  will  be  adopted  within  the  thesis.  The  chapter  as  a 
whole  aims  to  show  that  the  left/right  framework  within  which  moral  panics  have 
been  understood  is  no  longer  valid:  rather,  it  is  the  collapse  of  this  moral  and  political 
contestation  that  helps  to  explain  the  more  ever  present  state  of  anxiety  across  society. 
Finally,  theories  of  'risk'  (Beck  19.92)  and  especially  'fear'  (Furedi  1997)  will  be 
examined  to  explain  the  rise  not  of  moral  panics  but  of  what  is  a  more  accurate 
concept  within  today's  'liquid  modernity'  (Bauman  2000)  of  amoral  panics  and 
anxieties. 
18  - Introducing  moral  panics 
British  moral  panic  research,  beginning  with  Stanley  Cohen  (1972)  and  developing 
with  Stuart  Hall  (1978),  was  stimulated  by  a  'radical'  belief  that  reactions  to  certain 
social  problems  were  disproportionate  to  the  reality  of  them.  For  Cohen  and  Hall  the 
attack,  by  certain  conservative  groups  in  society,  on  sections  of  British  youth  was  new 
and  told  us  less  about  'the  youth  of  today'  than  about  the  conservative  elite  and  British 
society  more  generally.  The  development  of  moral  panic  theories  is  explored  below, 
not  only  as  an  approach  that  explained  the  moral  and  class  dimension  of  these  panics, 
but  also  one  that  acted  as  an  opposition  to  them 
Since  Jock  Young  (1971)  coined  the  term  'moral  panic',  and  Stanley  Cohen  (1972) 
developed  the  concept  in  his  work  on  Mods  and  Rockers,  the  term  has  become  one  of 
the  few  sociological  concepts  to  become  part  of  modem  political  language.  General 
explanations  of  who  causes  moral  panics  and  why  have  been  developed  by  a  number 
of  researchers.  For  Cohen  the  main  promoters  of  the  moral  panic  around  Mods  and 
Rockers  were  'interest  groups'  -  middle  cI  lass  professional  groups  -  and  the  media, 
although  the  role  of  the  police  and  politicians  and  other  'right  thinking'  individuals 
was  also  explored.  Hall  (1978),  in  his  work  on  'muggers'  in  the  1970s,  developed  a 
critique  of  the  'elite'  interest  group  -  although  a  key  focus  was  again  on  the  media  and 
their  role,  something  that  has  become  an  increasing  focus  for  more  recent  writers 
(McRobbie  1995,  Thompson  1998).  Pearson's  work  looked  largely  at  the  anxiety  of 
the  elite  in  times  of  national  and  democratic  crisis  (Pearson  1983);  while  others  on  the 
left  have  identified  a  similar  emergence  of  moral  panics  at  times  when  'society  has  not 
been  able  to  adapt  to  dramatic  changes,  such  as  the  Industrial  Revolution  or  the 
modernising  trends  of  the  1960s  (Furedi  1992).  Social  problem  theorists,  particularly 
those  from  the  US,  have  also  focused  upon  'interest  groups'  as  the  key  to  moral  panics 
(Jenkins  1992,  Best  1993  and  1999),  but  they  have  also  examined  the  role  of  those  at 
the  'grassroots'  of  society,  examining  the  role  of  'the  public'  in  generating  moral 
panics  (Best  1993,  Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994). 
Class  conflict  and  the  interests  of  the  elite  in  relation  to  the  working  class  has  been  a 
major  factor  in  British  moral  panic  research.  From  Pearson,  who  studied  panics  in 
19 Victorian  England  onwards,  to  Hall,  who  looked  at  the  emerging  class  conflict  in  the 
1970s,  moral  panics  were  often  understood  as  an  expression  of  a  conservative  reaction 
to  the  perceived  threat  from  sections  of  the  working  class.  For  most  writers  on  moral 
panics  -  UK  writers  more  than  those  from  the  US  -  part  of  the  motivation  for  this 
work,  and  part  of  the  explanation  for  the  rise  of  moral  panics,  has  been  a  questioning 
of  traditional  conservative  values  and  more  recently  a  challenge  to  the  rise  of  the  new 
right. 
Cohen  and  Hall 
20  Stanley  Cohen  carried  out  the  first  major  work  on  moral  panics  in  Britain  in  1972  . 
Cohen's  analyses  of  the  scare  surrounding  the  Mods  and  Rockers  fights  in  the  early 
1960s  looked  at  moral  panics  in  terms  of  what  the  Mods  and  Rockers  represented  in 
society.  Rather  than  their  actions  being  significant  in  themselves,  Cohen  argued  that 
the  Mods  and  Rockers  were  seen  and  treated  as  a  symbol  of  Americanised  affluence 
and  youthful  hedonism.  Developed  from  an  understanding  of  disaster  research,  Cohen 
saw  moral  panics  as  an  expression  of  social  anxiety,  brought  to  the  surface  by  a 
particular  event  or  action.  For  a  once  'great  nation'  such  as  Britain,  this  influence  of 
the  USA  upon  young  people,  Cohen  argued,  was  seen  as  problematic  -  both  in  the 
values  they  were  seen  to  uphold,  or  those  they  were  seen  to  reject,  like  the  ethics  of 
sobriety  and  hard  work  (Cohen  1972). 
Cohen  not  only  launched  the  term  moral  panic,  but  also  was  the  first  to  recognise  the 
spontaneous  collective  behaviour  involved  in  these  panics,  which  were  short-lived  and 
developed  outside  of  societies'  key  institutions  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994).  The 
media  exaggerated  the  problem  (Cohen  1972:  32-3);  the  police  and  courts  were 
activated  and  pushed  for  more  powers  to  deal  with  the  problem,  thus  escalating  the 
issue  (Cohen  1972:  88-91);  politicians  denounced  the  fighting  as  'evil'  and  called  for 
new  laws  (Cohen  1972:  138);  local  action  groups  emerged  -a  'germinal  social 
movement'  (Cohen  1972:  120)  -  to  demand  tougher  remedies  (Cohen  1972:  125);  and 
the  public  reacted  to  all  of  the  above  developments.  The  result:  a  fullY-fledged  moral 
panic.  - 
20 Stuart  Hall's  examination  of  the  panic  surrounding  'muggers'  in  the  1970s  suggested 
that  news  about  crime  was  becoming  a  moral  tale  reinforcing  what  is  right  and  wrong 
(Hall  et  al  1978).  Hall's  analysis  adopted  and  developed  elements  of  Cohen's  work  on 
moral  panics,  analysing  key  concerns  about  affluence  and  changes  to  the  'traditional' 
ways  of  life.  21  Elements  of  social  change  and  changes  in  attitudes  amongst  the  young, 
took  on  a  'folk  devilish'  form  in  the  black  mugger  -a  reflection  of  an  alien  who  has 
no  sense  of  respect,  hard  work,  morals  or  family  values  and  who  is  making  the  streets 
into  a  no-go  area.  The  mugger,  Hall  explained,  was  a  symbol  of  social  decay  that  was 
first  imagined  and  then  discovered  (1978:  16  1). 
Hall's  analysis  both  looked  at  structural  reasons  for  the  rise  of  the  mugging  panic  and 
also  adopted  Gramsci's  concept  of  hegemony:  the  birth  of  the  'law  and  order  society' 
in  the  1970s  being  an  expression  of  the  inability  of  the  state  to  win  the  hearts  and 
minds  of  society,  reflected  in  the  more  overt  use  of  power  to  control  sections  of  the 
population.  As  Hall  explained,  'A  crisis  of  hegemony  marks  a  moment  of  profound 
rupture  in  the  political  and  economic  life  of  a  society,  an  accumulation  of 
contradictions'  (1978:  217). 
The  development  of  this  panic  and  a  more  openly  coercive  state  occurred  at 
'exceptional'  moments,  triggered  in  the  late  1960s  by  the  'exhaustion  of  consent'  in 
society  (1978:  219).  Here  the  'control  culture'  and  the  media,  followed  by  the  police 
and  courts,  reacted  more  quickly,  without  much  pressure-from  below,  to  events  in 
society,  creating  a  'general  panic'  about  social  order  (1978:  222).  22 
The  media  coverage  of  mugging,  Hall  believed,  reflected  firstly  a  sense  of  social  loss, 
concern  about  family  breakdown  and  moral  decline;  and  secondly  an  image  of  the 
decaying  inner  city  as  a  'ghetto'.  Here,  the  concern  about  social  decay  was  mixed  with 
a  sense  of  loss  in  the  family  and  was  expressed  in  relation  to  not  only  youth,  but  an 
alien  body  of  youth.  Black  youth. 
A  key  focus  within  Cohen  and  Hall's  moral  panic  research  was  not  so  much  the 
problem  raised  by  these  panics,  but  the  reaction  to  them.  As  Stuart  Hall  explains  in 
Policing  the  Crisis: 
21 We  want  to  know  what  the  social  causes  of  'mugging'  are.  But  we  argue  that 
this  is  only  half  -  less  than  half  [my  italics]  -  of  the  mugging  story.  More 
important  is  why  British  society  reacts  to  mugging  [original  emphasis],  in  the 
extreme  way  it  does,  at  that  precise  historical  conjunction  -  the  early  1970's 
(Hall  et  al  1978:  vii). 
American  social  constructionists 
As  Cohen  was  developing  his  work  on  moral  panics  in  the  UK,  in  the  USA  similar 
work  was  being  carried  out  by  sociologists  looking  at  the  issue  of  deviance  from  a 
'labelling'  perspective  (Best  2004).  This  work  took  as  its  starting  point  a  questioning 
of  the  accepted,  official,  objective  description  of  crime  and  deviant  behaviour.  Rather 
than  drug-takers  and  other  deviants  being  simply  deviant  by  nature  of  their  behaviour, 
it  was  argued  that  they  were  deviant  because  their  behaviour  was  labelled  so  by 
others,  especially  those  in  authority.  Therefore  rather  than  viewing  deviant  behaviour 
as  an  objective  activity  or  fact,  as  positivists  had  done,  the  labelling  of  deviant 
behaviour  was  investigated. 
For  constructionists,  subjectivists  or  relativists,  social  problems  and  therefore  moral 
panics  are  seen  as  problems  that  have  been  identified  and  collectively  defined.  These 
social  problems  and  panics  are  therefore  not  objective  realities  in  and  of  themselves, 
but  rather  are  constructed  (Becker  1991,  Best  1993,  Jenkins  1992,1998  and  Spector 
and  Kitsuse  200  1).  23  Indeed,  Cohen  himself  also  believed  that  'it  is  the  perception  of 
threat  and  not  its  actual  existence  that  is  important'  (Cohen  1972:  22). 
American  social  constructionist  Philip  Jenkins  argues:  'It  is  impossible  to  define  a 
problem  in  an  objective  or  value-free  way,  since  talking  about  a  "problem"  or  a 
"crisis"  ipso  facto  implies  that  there  is  a  solution,  that  change  of  some  kind  is 
necessary  and  desirable'  (Jenkins  1998:  4).  For  Jenkins,  the  very  way  a  problem  is 
discussed,  and  solutions  developed,  implies  a  certain  value-laden  view  of  the  problem 
and  of  society.  However,  while  maintaining  a  critical  approach  to  'objective'  social 
problems,  Jenkins  and  most  social  problem  researchers  also  attempt  to  examine  the 
22 strengths  and  weaknesses  of  objective  evidence  -  rather  than  seeing  the  objective 
world  as  purely  a  subjective  construction. 
The  approach  adopted  by  American  sociologists  Philip  Jenkins  (1992;  1998)  and  Joel 
Best  (1993;  1999)  grew  out  of  Social  Problem  Theory  in  the  1970s.  24  This  approach, 
known  as  contextual  constructionism  is  more  flexible  methodologically  than  the  strict 
constructionism  of  Spector  and  Kitsuse  (2001)  as  it  allows  for  the  usefulness  and 
examination  of  objective  'facts'  and  statistics,  while  retaining  a  critical  understanding 
of  them  (Best  2001a). 
In  this  way  these  contextual  constructionists  are  able  to  explain  in  more  depth  why 
certain  social  problems  or  moral  panics  emerge  when  they  do  by  examining  in  more 
detail  the  values  and  rhetoric  used  by  certain  groups  and  situating  them  within  broader 
patterns  of  social  problem  construction. 
Social  problem  or  moral  panic? 
Social  problem  theory  is  raised  here  because  it  is  a  more  flexible  methodology  than 
that  associated  with  moral  panics,  in  terms  of  examining  social  problems,  and  will  be 
adopted  in  examining  the  construction  of  issues  associated  with  antisocial  behaviour 
later  in  the  thesis.  Indeed  as  Cohen  himself  notes: 
Folk  Devils  and  Moral  Panics  was  informed  by  the  sixties  fusion  of  labelling 
theory,  cultural  politics  and  critical  sociology.  Today's  students  of  moral 
panics  do  not  have  to  engage  with  this  theoretical  mix-up.  They  can  go  straight 
into  the  literature  on  social  constructionism  and  claimsmaking.  This  is  a  well 
developed  model  for  studying  the  contested  claims  that  are  made  -  by  victims, 
interest  groups,  social  movements,  professionals  and  politicians  -  the 
construction  of  new  social  problem  categories  (Cohen  2002:  xxii). 
Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda,  while  recognising  much  overlapping  in  moral  panic  theory 
and  social  problem  theory,  also  point  out  that  there  are  'at  least  three'  basic 
differences  between  them.  Social  problem  theory,  unlike  moral  panic  theory,  need  not 
23 have  a  'folk  devil',  in  that  it  need  not  show  a  discrepancy  between  the  degree  of 
concern  and  the  actual  problem.  Disproportionality  is  not  necessarily  relevant,  and 
while  'moral  panics'  imply  a  substantial  change  in  the  mood  of  a  group  or  groups  in 
society  towards  a  particular  issue,  social  problem  theory  can  study  any  problem 
regardless  of  the  'panic'  surrounding  it  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994). 
For  social  problem  theory,  issues  that  become  institutionalised  are  in  fact  perhaps 
more  important  to  study  than  those  that  erupt  and  then  disappear.  This  is  of  particular 
relevance  today,  as  we  shall  see,  with  the  emergence  of  a  'risk  society'  or  'culture  of 
fear'  within  which  anxiety  about  social  problems  appear  to  be  a  permanent  rather  than 
a  fleeting  phenomenon. 
Moral  panic  theory  generally  starts  from  a  belief  that  an  issue  is  being  exaggerated, 
that  Mods  and  Rockers  are  not  such  a  threat,  that  mugging  is  not  as  widespread  as 
assumed,  or  that  the  concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  is  unjustified  and  not  based  on 
a  'real'  increase  in  this  problem.  For  social  problem  writers,  the  myth  or  reality  of  a 
social  problem  is  not  necessarily  important.  Crime  may  be  high  but  this  doesn't 
explain  why  it  has  become  a  'social  problem'  in  and  of  itself.  For  a  social  problem  to 
be  constructed  someone  must  raise  it  as  a  problem  and  campaign  around  this  issue, 
and  politicians  and  key  social  institutions  must  pick  up  on  this  issue  and  help  promote 
it.  Social  issues  like  crime,  even  when  on  the  increase,  need  not  become  'social 
problems'  around  which  campaigns  are  built. 
Another  difference  between  moral  panic  theory  and  social  problem  theory  is  the 
political  nature  of  moral  panic  theory.  Jenkins  has  noted  that  the  vast  majority  of 
moral  panic  research  has  been  developed  within  a  left/liberal  framework  (Jenkins 
1992:  145),  a  framework  within  which  outbursts  of  traditional  conservative  morality 
and  issues  associated  with  the  new  right  are  challenged. 
However,  moral  panic  work  is  not,  argue  Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda,  inherently  political 
and  ideological.  Jenkins  (1992:  173)  has  used  moral  panic  theory  to  explore  the  work 
of  'radical'  feminists  in  the  UK  and  the  USA  who  helped  to  create  and  promote  a 
moral  panic  around  child  abuse.  Similarly,  Cohen  has  argued  that  the  methods  used  in 
24 the  1960s  and  1970s  to  explore  the  crusades  against  marijuana  and  homosexuality 
could  equally  be  used  today  to  examine  modem-day  moral  panics  that  have  been 
promoted  by  left/liberal  activists  around  issues  concerning  industrial  pollution, 
smoking  and  pornography  (Cohen  1988:  260-3). 
It  is  true  that  moral  panic  theory  could  be  used  to  examine  panics  on  the  left  and  the 
right.  However  in  practice  -  especially  in  the  UK  -  this  has  not  materialised.  Rather 
moral  panic  research  has  tended  to  remain  within  an  'anti-new  right'  framework.  25 
This  has  been  less  the  case  in  the  USA,  where  moral  panic  work  has  also  examined 
radical  and  feminist  panics,  for  example  over  the  issue  of  -child  abuse  (Jenkins  1992 
and  1998).  The  British  research,  by  focusing  on  'right-wing'  panics  that  often  take  a 
traditional  moral  form,  is  unable  to  examine  more  recent  panics  that  take  a  non-moral 
or  amoral  form.  The  oxymoron  of  'value  free'  moral-panics  or  the  idea  of  'amoral' 
panics  can  perhaps  help  examine  these  modem  panics  and  will  be  explored  later. 
In  general  it  is  still  true  to  argue  that  moral  panics  emerge  and  are  generated  at  times 
of  social  change  by  conservative  elements  in  society  made  insecure  by  this  social 
change.  However,  one  explanation  for  the  rise  of  the  'age  of  moral  panic'  today  may 
be  that  there  are  simply  more  groups  and  strands  of  thought  that  have  become 
conservative',  even  while  they  appear  to  be  situated  on  the  liberal  left. 
Who  makes  moral  panics? 
The  question  of  who  makes  moral  panics  or  social  problems  has  been  contested  over 
the  years  and  has  often  been  connected  to  issues  and  questions  of  morality  and 
ideology,  material  interest,  and  status  interest  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994:  124- 
143). 
The  Marxist  approach  adopted  by  Hall  (1978)  locates  the  rise  of  moral  panics  with  the 
elite.  Other  researchers,  especially  those  from  the  USA,  identify  interest  groups  as 
being  central  to  the  claimsmaking  process.  26  Alternatively,  others  argue  that  moral 
panics  emanate  from  the  public  themselves,  or  from  the  grassroots  of  society  (Goode 
and  Ben-Yehuda  1994). 
25 Most  studies  of  moral  panics  incorporate  elements  of  all  three  theories,  related  to  the 
elite,  interest  groups,  and  the  grassroots.  For  example,  moral  panics  cannot  exist 
without  an  element  of  grassroots,  support;  however,  these  panics,  even  if  originating 
within  the  public,  only  become  defined  as  social  problems  when  interest  groups  or 
elite  groups  take  up  the  issue.  In  the  end,  the  study  of  moral  panics  must  recognise 
that:  'No  moral  panic  is  complete  without  an  examination  of  all  societal  levels,  from 
elites  to  the  grassroots,  and  the  full  spectrum  from  ideology  and  the  morality  at  one 
pole  to  crass  status  and  material  interests  at  the  other'  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994: 
143). 
Within  this  thesis,  this  combined  approach  is  adopted,  although  the  central  role  of  the 
elite  is  identified,  particularly  in  the  role  they  have  played  in  institutionalising  panics 
and  anxieties  through  new  laws  and  social  policies  associated  with  youth  crime  and 
antisocial  behaviour. 
The  question  of  who  makes  moral  panics  and  social  problems  has  recently  become 
more  difficult  to  answer..  Not  only  because  the  traditional  conservative  basis  for  panics 
no  longer  appears  to  be  central  to  many  of  them,  but  also  because  radicals  who  in  the 
past  denounced  panics  are  now  more  inclined  to  support  panics  and  policies  based  on 
what  would  previously  have  been  seen  as  conservative  concerns.  Below  the 
explanation  for  the  emerging  age  of  panics  is  connected  to  the  collapse  and 
convergence  of  left  and  right  wing  thought. 
The  changing  face  of  contemporary  panics 
Both  the  rise  of  moral  panics  within  conservative  sections  of  society,  and  the 
interpretation  of  them  by  radical  thinkers  as  moral  panics,  emerged  at  a  specific 
moment  in  history  and  reflected  a  certain  clash  between  the  'left  and  right'.  However, 
by  the  early  1990s  the  conflicting  understanding  and  approach  to  moral  panics  was 
becoming  confused.  At  this  time  of  political  change,  the  left  appeared  to  accept  more 
readily  the  'reality'  of  certain  'panics',  while  at  the  same  time  the  right  began  to 
question  the  traditional  moralising  that  had  once  been  the  bedrock  of  these  panics. 
26 Rather  than  this  development  simply  reflecting  objective  changes  in  society  -  it 
reflected  more  significantly  a  change  in  the  outlook  of  both  the  left  and  right. 
Analysing  the  language'  of  moral  panics  Hunt,  in  his  study  of  broadsheet  newspapers, 
identified  a  number  of  developments  in  the  use  and  understanding  of  the  term  'moral 
panic'.  A  term  that  had  previously  been  used  by  the  left  to  challenge  the  exaggerated 
reactions  of  conservatives  was,  by  the  end  of  the  1980s,  being  questioned  by  liberal 
and  left-wing  individuals  and  newspapers:  for  example  the  Guardian  in  1989 
challenged  the  idea  that  concerns  about  crime  were  a  form  of  moral  panic  (Guardian 
28  August  1989).  Crime,  it  was  argued,  needed  to  be  accepted  as  a  'real'  problem,  and 
as  Hunt  noted:  'A  succession  of  similar  articles  appeared  in  both  left-wing  and  right- 
wing  papers  throughout  1993,  attacking  'progressive  criminologists'  for  dismissing 
the  crime  epidemic  and  crisis  in  values  as  "moral  panic...  (Hunt  1997:  642). 
At  the  same  time,  the  term  'moral  panic'  was  being  embraced  by  some  more  radical 
voices  to  support  the  condemnation  of  certain  groups,  like  'feckless  fathers'.  while 
alternatively  articles  in  the  right  wing  presi  emerged  where  the  term  moral  panic  was 
used  to  attack  radical  panics  around  issues  of  satanic  abuse  and  smoking  (Hunt  1997). 
Finally,  while  there  was  a  trend  amongst  liberal  and  left-wing  thinkers  to  accept  rather 
than  challenge  what  would  previously  have  been  seen  as  panics,  simultaneously  many 
of  those  on  the  right  were  becoming  uncomfortable  with  the  use  of  morality  to  attack 
groups  in  society.  Questioning  moralistic  reactions  by  the  Conservative  government 
under  John  Major  to  the  killing  of  toddler  James  Bulger  by  two  10-year-old  boys,  and 
also  challenging  the  moral  campaign  to  get  'back  to  basics',  both  the  Times  and 
Sunday  Times  expressed  a  concern  that  the  government  'was  losing  sight  of  reality'. 
'The  ambivalence  about  moral  panic,  '  Hunt  noted,  'illustrates  the  writers'  doubts 
about  the  popular  credibility  of  moral  language'  (Hunt  1997:  642). 
A  new  'language'  was  needed  at  this  point  in  time:  a  language  that  could  endorse 
panics  as  real,  but  without  the  traditional  moral  framework  of  previous  panics.  As  part 
of  this  linguistic  project,  Hunt  observed,  'the  term  'moral  panic'  itself  had  to  be 
27 redefined  as  a  form  of  civic  consciousness,  an  expression  of  public  anxiety  rather  than 
a  conspiracy  of  elites  and  interest  groups'  (Hunt  1997:  646). 
What  would  previously  have  been  seen  by  radicals  as  a  panic  was  now  more  readily 
seen  as  being  'real'  -  an  objectively  legitimate  social  problem  that  needed  to  be 
addressed.  However,  at  the  same  time  the  moral  basis  for  panicking  was  becoming 
problematic. 
Loss  of  moral  authority 
A  central  element  to  moral  panic  studies  has,  as  the  name  suggests,  been  focused  on 
the  morality  of  those  panicking  and  promoting  these  panics.  However,  when  looking 
at  the  construction  of  social  problems  in  the  1990s,  the  question  of  what  moral  values 
were  being  defended  is  less  clear.  The  'class  war'  may  have  been  won,  but  as 
American  conservatives  quickly  recognised,  the  'culture  war'  was  being  lost  and 
traditional  conservative  values  that  had  been  the  basis  of  moral  panics  up  to  this  point 
were  in  decline. 
Part  of  the  'tradition'  of  moral  panics  has  been  the  concern  about  nationhood  and 
national  decline.  In  Pearson's  book,  Hooligan,  he  explains  how  crime  and  violence  in 
Britain  has  often  been  portrayed  as  un-British  and  a  threat  to  the  'British  way  of  life'. 
Even  the  word  'hooligan'  developed  from  an  Irish  name  and  has  been  counterposed.  to 
the  'English  national  character'.  27  The  'Victorian  values'  espoused  by  the 
Conservative  Party  in  the  1980s  were  a  high  point  in  post-war  Britain  for  the 
politicisation  of,  and  moralising  about,  traditional  Britishness.  Similar  values  had  been 
expressed  in  a  more  embryonic  form  in  the  early  1960s  and  laid  the  basis  for  the  panic 
over  Mods  and  Rockers  and  the  subsequent  work  by  Cohen. 
As  well  as  a  concern  about  nation,  the  family  has  also  been  a  core  concern  within 
moral  panics.  Britishness  was  seen  as  being  under  threat  from  'muggers'  in  the  1970s, 
for  example,  and  here  black  youth  symbolised  not  only  a  racial  threat  but  also  a  threat 
to  the  family.  As  Hunt  (1999)  explains,  the  main  anxieties  over  youth  and  crime  were 
linked  by  the  mugging  panic  to  a  deeper  layer  of  anxieties  about  parental  relations, 
28 fragmenting  communities  and  the  end  of  neighbourliness.  Many  of  these  concerns  can 
still  be  seen  today  when  issues  to  do  with  youth  antisocial  behaviour  are  raised. 
However  key  differences  exist  in  the  moral  language  that  would  be  seen  as  acceptable 
today.  The  use  of  'racial  language',  for  example,  and  the  traditional  defence  of 
Britishness  and  the  British  way  of  life,  are  more  problematic,  while  even  the  defence 
of  'family  values'  is  more  difficult  than  previously. 
A  significant  moment  in  the  declining  usefulness  of  'moral'  panics  can  be  seen  in 
1993,  when  John  Major's  'Back  to  Basics'  speech  was  widely  ridiculed.  This  reflected 
not  the  end  of  moralising,  but  rather  the  growing  difficulty  that  even  a  Conservative 
Prime  Minister  had  in  using  traditional  morals  for  political  purposes.  Following  this 
moral  campaign,  The  Independent  condemned  Major's  attack  on  single  motfiers, 
noting  that:  'Conservative  politicians  are  subjecting  them  to  a  vilification  that  would 
be  illegal  if  addressed  to  racial  minorities'  (Cohen  2002:  xxviii). 
The  loss  of  faith  in  the  moralising  of  the  elite  was  clearly  expressed  by  Roy  Chapman, 
chairman  of  the  Headmasters'  Conference,  who  in  attacking  Major's  campaign  against 
'yobs'  stated  that: 
The  family  no  longer  provides  either  the  cohesive  force  or  the  base  line  in 
standard  behaviour.  The  church  seems  prepared  to  accept  anything  except 
intolerance,  while  the  government  seems  to  operate  on  the  basis  of  political 
expediency,  rather  than  on  coherent  policies,  much  less  principles  (Calcutt 
1996:  33). 
In  the  USA  a  similar  trend  was  in  evidence,  as  traditional  morality  was  seen  to  decline 
as  a  source  for  cohering  the  elites  and  for  gaining  public  support.  As  Goode  and  Ben- 
Yehuda  noted,  in  1992  the  Republican  presidential  campaign  in  the  United  States  was 
initially  and  substantially  based  on  'family  values'  -  with  its  attendant  attacks  on 
homosexuality,  abortion,  divorce  and  other  presumed  Democratic-tolerated  vices  -  'a 
theme  which  failed  to  catch  fire  with  the  American  voter'  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda 
1994:  35). 
29 The  reason  for  this  'failed  campaign'  is  partly  due  to  the  confusion  of  moral  absolutes 
-  even  amongst  traditionally  conservative  elites  in  society,  as  American  writer  Katie 
Roiphe  points  out  in  her  book  Last  Night  in  Paradise:  Sex  and  Morals  at  the 
Century's  End: 
In  the  fifties,  there  were  curfews  on  college  campuses  and  social  taboos 
against  getting  a  "bad  reputation"  or  losing  your  virginity  before  you  got 
married.  But  now  we  have  no  popularly  accepted  moral  attitude  about 
sexuality  that  can  be  passed  down  from  one  generation  to  the  next.  Is  it  all 
right  for  teenagers  to  have  sex,  or  isn't  it?  Is  it  morally  wrong  or  just 
physically  dangerous?  We  don't  have  answers.  It's  not  just  that  different 
people  have  different  answers,  but  that,  for  the  first  time  in  recent  memory,  we 
don't  have  an  official  answer,  an  answer  that  extends  from  Oprah  to 
Hollywood  to  the  editorial  pages  of  the  New  York  Times  (Roiphe  1997:  163). 
Traditional  morals,  based  on  conservative  notions  of  the  nation  and  the  family,  which 
had  been  the  basis  of  most  moral  panics  up  to  this  point,  were  becoming  more 
problematic  by  the  early  1990s.  Problematic  not  only  in  terms  of  their  relevance  to  the 
public,  but  even  in  terms  of  the  cohesion  and  coherence  they  generated  within  the  elite 
itself.  Crucially,  this  loss  of  moral  certainty  or  absolutes  helped  to  exaggerate  the 
sense  of  panic  amongst  the  elite.  The  decline  in  the  capacity  of  traditional  morality  to 
promote  absolute  values  against  perceived  threats  did  not,  however,  result  in  the 
reduction  of  panics  in  society.  Rather,  panics  escalated  and  were  increasingly  engaged 
with  and  even  promoted  by  government  -  in  part  because  of  its  own  loss  of  moral 
authority.  Conservative  moralising  remained,  but  was  becoming  less  significant  as  a 
basis  for  anxieties  and  panics  that  from  this  point  on  were  taking  a  less  moral  form. 
The  convergence  of  left  and  right 
The  desire  to  control,  regulate  and  limit  individual  behaviour  has  historically  been  a 
preoccupation  associated  with  conservative  thinkers  and  groups.  However  over  the 
last  few  decades,  social  problems  that  focus  upon  problematic  behaviour  and 
explicitly  or  implicitly  promote  the  need  for  more  regulations  in  society  have 
30 increasingly  come  from  'radical'  individuals.  Within  a  critical  understanding  of 
society,  but  with  a  focus  on  individual's  'abusive'  behaviour,  this  radical  approach 
often  portrays  the  problem  as  being  far  more  serious  and  widespread  than  previous 
conservatives  ever  did. 
Writing  in  The  Sunday  Times  in  1994,  Gertrude  Himmelfarb  bemoaned  the  decline  in 
morality  associated  with  the  family,  while  perceptively  recognising  that  the  new  moral 
-  or  amoral  -  absolute  of  the  late  twentieth  century  was  developing  around  the  issue 
.  of  child  abuse. 
As  deviancy  is  normalised,  so  the  normal  becomes  deviant.  The  kind  of  family 
that  has  been  regarded  for  centuries  as  natural  and  moral  is  now  seen  as 
pathological,  concealing  behind  the  faqade  of  respectability  the  new  'original 
sin',  child  abuse  (The  Sunday  Times  II  September  1994). 
The  above  quote  is  used  by  Kenneth  Thompson  in  his  study  of  Moral  Panics  (1998: 
92),  in  which  he  discusses  panics  in  the  1990s  that  he  believes  were  generally 
articulated  around  'neo-liberal  individualism  and  neo-conservative  nostalgia  for  a 
moral  golden  age  -  an  imagined  national  community  unified  by  common  values, 
(Thompson  1998:  141).  However,  while  this  was  true  to  some  degree,  the  panics  being 
generated  by  radicals,  like  that  of  child  abuse  (Jenkins  1992;  1998),  are  not  seen  by 
Thompson  within  the  framework  of  moral  panic  studies.  By  focusing  on  the 
traditional  moral  basis  of  panics,  the  new  trend  for  individuals  and  groups  on  the  left 
to  pathologise  relationships  and  to  generate  panics  themselves  is  lost. 
In  reality,  the  tendency  to  panic  in  the  1990s  was  becoming  more  general  across  the 
political  spectrum,  reflected  in  the  move  by  those  on  the  left  to  become  more 
preoccupied  with  issues  of  crime,  violence  and  abuse,  within  a  broader  sense  that 
humanity  and  human  relationships  and  actions  were  destructive  and  needed  to  be 
regulated. 
As  Fitzpatrick  observed  in  relation  to  the  AIDS  panic,  the  anxiety  and  fear  about 
AIDS  did  not  erupt  through  the  moral  promotion  of  the  idea  of  a  'gay  plague.  Rather, 
31 this  panic  only  captured  the  public  imagination  once  the  moral  campaign  was 
overtaken  by  the  new  'secular'  campaign  for  'safe  sex.  Fitzpatrick  accurately 
describes  how,  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  new  social  problems  related  to 
atomised  individuals,  not  through  traditional  morality  but  through  the  new  language  of 
risk  and  safety.  Moralising,  he  argued,  no  longer  needed  a  'dog  collar'  (Fitzpatrick 
2001). 
For  Furedi,  the  AIDS  panic  was  a  key  moment  in  moral  panics,  one  where  the 
traditional  moralists  merged  with  a  new  'radical'  sense  of  anxiety: 
The  high  point  of  the  unexpected  synthesis  between'conventional  moralizers 
and  proponents  of  the  new  etiquette  was  over  the  issue  of  AIDS 
... 
Initially,  it 
was  the  right-wing  moralists  who  sought  to  take  the  initiative 
...  In  the  AIDS 
literature,  this  attempt  to  create  an  anti-gay  moral  panic  is  still  presented  as  the 
dominant  theme  around  the  issue.  But  in  reality,  the  anti-gay  presentation  of 
AIDS  soon  ran  out  of  steam.  Proponents  of  the  new  etiquette  succeeded  in 
redefining  AIDS  ... 
[into  a  disease  where]  'everyone  was  at  risk"  [my  italics] 
(Furedi  1997:  166). 
A  concern  raised  by  Furedi  (1997)  is  that  whereas  radical  thinkers  continue  to 
challenge  old-fashioned  moral  panics  by  the  right,  another  panic  is  often  put  in  their 
place.  Cohen,  in  his  introduction  to  the  third  edition  of  Folk  Devils  and  Moral  Panics, 
similarly  hints  at  this  problem,  noting  with  reference  to  comments  made  by  American 
experts  challenging  the  idea  that  schools  are  dangerous  places: 
As  these  stories  unfold,  experts  such  as  sociologists,  psychologists  and 
criminologists  are  wheeled  in  to  comment,  react  and  supply  causal  narrative. 
Their  ritual  opening  move  -  'putting  things  in  perspective'  -  is  not  usually 
very  helpful:  'School  Still  Safest  Place  For  Children;  Many  More  Dead  at 
Home  Than  in  Classroom.  (Cohen  2002:  xiii) 
Here,  the  traditional  panic  about  violence  and  a  need  for  law  and  order  in  public,  or 
within  institutions  like  schools,  is  replaced  by  a  panic  about  violence  in  the  home. 
32 From  a  certain  feminist  perspective,  the  concern  about  a  'violent  society'  has  been 
turned  inwards,  into  the  home.  Viewed  through  the  prism  of  patriarchy,  as  Victor 
argues,  male  dominance  in  society  and  its  exploitation  of  women  and  children  has 
become  the  essential  underlying  threat  to  the  moral  ordq  of  society  (Victor  1998). 
Similarly,  US  sociologist  Donna  Killingbeck,  after  exposing  the  'construction  of 
school  violence  as  a  "moral  panic"',  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  problem  with  this  right- 
wing  moral  panic  is  that  it  misses  the  many  and  varied  ways  that  violence  occurs 
within  schools  that  make  it  almost  endemic.  The  elements  of  harm  in  schools  can  only 
be  understood,  she  argues,  once  the  following  have  been  recognised: 
(1)  the  emotional  and  psychological  pain  that  results  from  the  domination  of 
some  over  others,  (2)  the  focus  on  interpersonal  relationships  that  ignore  the 
violence  of  social  processes  which  produce  systematic  social  injury,  such  as 
that  perpetuated  through  institutiopalised  racism,  sexism,  and  classism,  and  (3) 
the  symbolic  violence  of  domination,  or  the  subtle  form  of  violence  that  brings 
coercion  through  power  exercised  in  hierarchical  relationships  (Killingbeck 
2001:  10). 
Unlike  past  writing  on  moral  panics  that  emphasised  the  disproportionate  concern 
about  violence  emanating  from  conservative  elites  or  interest  groups,  here  one  concern 
about  violence  is  simply  replaced  by  another,  more  radical,  Foucauldian  concern 
about  the  centrality  of  power  and  violence  to  the  experience  of  children  in  school. 
Issues  like  'racism,  sexism  and  classism'  are  here  challenged  within  the  framework  of 
a  concern  about  violence.  Violence  becomes  THE  issue,  and  alternative  approaches  to 
dealing  with  and  regulating  this  'problem'  are  constructed. 
Interestingly,  even  in  Pearson's  recent  retrospective  article  examining  his  past  work  in 
Hooligan,  he  notes  that,  while  there  are  panics  about  young  people  and  drugs  and 
drink,  'drug-taking  is  a  problem  among  young  people  today'  (Young  People  Now  21- 
27  January  2004).  This  rather  sweeping  statement  could  easily  fit  into  what  would  I 
have  been  seen  until  relatively  recently  as  a  moral  panic  itselL  Linked  to  Pearson's 
33 article,  the  same  magazine,  Young  People  Now,  had  a  retrospective  review  of 
Hooligan  by  Rob  Allen,  the  director  of  Rethinking  Crime  and  Punishment  and  a 
member  of  the  Youth  Justice  Board.  Noting  the  central  argument  in  Hooligan,  Allen 
stated  that  'the  last  10  years  have  seen  plenty  more  media  moral  panics:  about 
persistent  young  offenders,  paedophiles,  drugs  and  street  crime'.  However  he  goes  on: 
Rereading  Hooligan,  I  took  a  different  message  than  first  time  round.  It  is  the 
continuity  of  hooliganism  makes  it  more,  not  less,  of  a  social  problem.  In 
policy  terms  it  boils  down  to  whether  we  take  the  American  route  of  dealing 
with  the  poorest  through  prison,  or  a  more  European  approach  of  building  up 
economic,  social  and  educational  responses  [my  italics]  (Young  People  Now 
21-27  January  2004). 
Whereas  Allen  had  understood  Pearson's  work  in  the  early  1980s  as  a  correct 
challenge  to  the  moral  panics  surrounding  youth  crime,  by  the  beginning  of  the 
twenty-first  century  his  view  had  been  transformed  into  an  acceptance  of  the  problem 
of  hooliganism.  What  is  interesting  in  this  review  is  that  Allen  does  not  try  and  argue 
that  things  are  worse  and  society  has  changed,  but  simply  states  that  his  understanding 
of  youth  crime  has  changed.  Allen  had  previously  understood  Hooligan  as  a  book  that 
challenged  the  anxieties  of  the  elite  -  now  Allen  has  come  to  endorse  these  anxieties. 
A  similar  trend  to  interpret  social  problems  from  a  more  negative  perspective  and  to 
focus  upon  the  need  to  regulate  groups  in  society  also  developed  in  criminology  in  the 
1980s.  In  the  radical  criminologist  Jock  Young,  who  first  used  the  term  moral  panic  in 
1971,  we  see  another  example  of  a  socialist  who  shifted  his  emphasis  from  the  'social 
control  agents'  and  the  exaggerated  nature  of  crime  panics,  onto  the  criminal  -  and  in 
particular  the  working-class  criminal.  The  consequence  of  this  shift  is  that  it  moves 
from  a  critical  focus  on  the  elite,  towards  an  emphasis  on  social  control.  Arguing  for  a 
kind  of  politics  of  regulation,  Young  states  that: 
Such  politics  of  crime  control  are  part  of  the  wide  sweep  of  grass-roots 
politics:  the  control  of  pollution,  industrial  safety,  traffic  control, 
environmental  improvements  -  representing,  in  fact,  the  united  interest  of  a 
34 divided  community.  In  this  process  of  seeking  out  a  common  political  interest 
and  exerting  public  control,  we  will  recreate  a  sense  of  community  both  in 
consciousness  and  in  muscle,  rather  than  resurrect  a  mythical  entity,  which  has 
long  since  disappeared  (Lea  and  Young  1984:  272). 
Previously,  we  noted  how  Cohen  (1988)  believed  that  radicals  in  the  1980s  could  be 
seen  as  encouraging  moral  panics  over  issues  like  pollution.  In  Lea  and  Young  we  see 
regulation  and  social  control  in  many  areas  of  life  being  seen  in  terms  of  recreating 
community  and  recreating  community  without  resorting  to  past  myths. 
This  growing  move  away  from  questioning  elite  panics  and  a  similarly  growing  desire 
for  social  control  felt  by  'radical'  thinkers  is  expressed  in  one  form  or  another  in  all  of 
the  aforementioned  issues  or  panics,  from  AIDS  to  child  abuse  and  onto  youth  crime 
and  antisocial  behaviour.  This  shift  in  radical  thought  from  the  late  1980s  onwards 
competed  with  traditional  conservative  panics  about  crime  and  disorder,  and  changed 
the  political  framework  within  which  moral  or  'amoral'  panics  were  generated.  The 
question  of  who  now  encouraged  these  panics  became  more.  confused  as  various 
radicals  who  identified  the  moral  right  as  the  cause  for  panics  in  the  past  now  become 
moral  -  or  amoral  -  claimsmakers  in  their  own  right.  ý 
As  the  moral  right  stuttered  and  the  ideas  of  the  left  became  discredited,  left-wing  and 
right-wing  campaigners  converged  more  systematically  around  the  core  value  of  the 
1990s  -  safety.  Unlike  a  number  of  conservative  panics  that  tended  to  target  the 
immoral  minority,  28  the  new  safety  panics  generalised  a  number  of  problems.  Now 
everyone  could  die  of  AIDS,  while  child  abuse  was  porttayed  as  being  endemic  to 
society.  Where  the  moral  right  had  hoped  to  restore  society  to  a  golden  past,  the  new 
amoral  panics  had  no  idealised  vision  of  society:  the  aim  for  individuals  was  simply  to 
be  safe.  With  many  of  the  new  safety  campaigns  being  generated  by  radical  thinkers, 
opposition  to  these  panics  remained  limited,  and  in  the  case  of  the  AIDS  panic,  this 
new  amoral  approach  was  adopted  by  the  Conservative  government  under  the 
leadership  of  Margaret  Thatcher,  with  the  support  of  almost  all  radical  groups  and 
thinkers.  Consequently,  the  anxieties  within  society  expressed  through  this  and  many 
35 other  panics  were  increasingly  becorning  institutionalised  and  helped  to  forge  the  new 
social  and  personal  'moral'  norm  of  safety. 
The  new  'moral'  icon  -  the  victim 
Traditional  moral  panics  upheld  a  set  of  values  that  were  felt  to  be  under  threat.  As 
such,  despite  the  conservative  nature  of  themi  an  attempt  was  being  made  to  reengage 
individuals  with  society  and  with  a  wider  set  of  beliefs.  The  new  safety-based  panics, 
in  contrast,  have  no  belief  system  associated  with  them  and  relate  to  the  fragmented 
and  fearful  individual  directly.  Where  traditionalists  wanted  to  uphold  nationalistic 
and  family  values,  the  new  'safe  sex'  or  'community  safety'  campaigners  simply 
wanted  to  modify  people's  behaviour  to  keep  them  safe.  The  moral  image  promoted 
by  these  old  moralists  was  of  a  strong  family  man  who  worked  hard  and  would  fight 
for  his  country.  In  contrast  the  moral  icon  of  the  new  safety  campaigns  is  the  victim. 
In  Moral  Panic,  Jenkins  points  out  that  in  the  1980s  a  whole  new  branch  of  the  legal 
profession  developed  in  relation  to  lawsuits  undertaken  on  behalf  of  victims  (Jenkins 
1998:  219).  This,  rather  than  being  a  peculiarity  of  law,  reflected  what  Jenkins 
describes  as  the  new  child  protection  movement's  emphasis  on  the  experience  of  the 
victim: 
For  the  first  time  in  history,  perhaps  millions  of  people,  mainly  but  not 
exclusively  women  have  constructed  their  self-identity  in  terms  of  the 
experience  of  sexual  victimization.  Networks  of  survivors  became  a  powerful 
interest  group,  protesting  any  weakening  in  societies  vigilance  against  abuse 
and  launching  virulent  attacks  on  therapists  or  writers  who  dared  to  speak  of 
"false  memory"  (Jenkins  1998:  234). 
Rather  than  victimhood  being  merely  an  objective  existence  or  experience,  here  it  is 
understood  as,  in  part,  an  identity  developed  and  indeed  promoted  at  a  particular  time. 
Joel  Best  has  traced  the  historical  emergence  of  'victimhood'  within  the  USA, 
identifying  this  understanding  of  the  individual  as  a  central  tenant  of  claimsmaking  in 
36 the  modem  period.  This  is  something  that  has  similarly  developed  in  the  UK  and  more 
generally  within  Western  culture.  In  Random  Violence  Best  highlights  a  cultural  trend 
that  has  influenced  the  way  in  which  individuals  and  issues  are  understood  and  the 
subsequent  impact  that  this  has  had  on  laws  and  policy  developments. 
Tracing  the  emergence  of  'victim  rights'  advocates  in  conservative  claims  for  'victims 
of  crime'  in  the  sixties,  and  within  the  women's  movement  who  campaigned  for  laws 
against  various  forms  of  abuse  in  the  seventies,  Best  points  out  that  the  concept  of 
victims  often  accepted  uncritically  today  is  not  simply  an  objective  term  but  has 
developed  over  time  with  the  help  of  victim  centred  claimsmakers  (Best  1999:  94). 
A  significant  development  identified  by  Best  is  the  growing  use  of  and  strength  gained 
by  those  using  the  'victim'  framework  to  present  their  case.  Victims  of  crime,  for 
example,  may  be  labelled  as  victims  by  conservative  groups  campaigning  on  their 
behalf,  while  those  attempting  to  defend  the  'underclass'  that  are  blamed  for  these 
crimes  similarly  use  the  language  of  victimhood  to  develop  counter-claims.  As  Lee 
also  notes,  the  framework  within  which  the  'religious  right'  now  opposes  abortion  is 
less  in  relation  to  morality  and  religion  itself  than  with  reference  to  the  woman  as  a 
victim  of  post  abortion  syndrome  (Lee  2001). 
Discussing  the  convergence  of  left  and  right  in  their  campaigning  on  behalf  of  the 
victim,  Best  argues  that: 
Both  the  right  and  the  left  now  portrayed  the  victim  as  a  sympathetic  figure, 
using  victim  imagery  to  promote  crackdowns  on  crime  or  calls  for  social 
reform,  respectively.  Both  conservatives  and  liberals  treated  victims  as 
powerless  unfortunates,  blameless  for  their  circumstances  and  suffering  at  the 
hands  of  powerful  exploiters  (Best  1999:  100). 
Social  problems  analysed  by  various  professions  within  the  sciences  and  therapeutic 
field  expanded  at  this  time  and  overall,  'a  broad  range  of  authorities  -  including  social 
movement  activists,  political  conservatives  and  liberals,  therapists,  scientists,  and 
lawyers  -  became  more  likely  to  talk  about  victimization  in  society'  (Best  1999:  102). 
37 This  framework  of  understanding  social  problems,  the  language  and  the  rhetoric,  has, 
Best  argues,  now  become  dominant  in  the  development  of  how  new  crimes  such  as 
stalking  are  discussed  and  made  into  social  problems.  The  degree  to  which  this  has 
developed  in  the  UK  will  be  studied  later  in  relation  to  the  concern  about  antisocial 
behaviour. 
One  significant  aspect  of  these  developments  in  the  US,  with  reference  to  the 
changing  form  of  morality  and  moral  panics,  is  the  extent  to  which  a  claim  about 
victimisation.  'stakes  out  the  moral  high  ground'  (Best  1999:  109).  As  Sykes  argues, 
'the  route  to  moral  superiority  ...  can  be  gained  most  efficiently  through  being  a 
victim'  (Best  1999:  138). 
The  'ideology  of  victimization',  Best  illustrates,  has  been  taken  up  within  academia  - 
in  lectures  and  education  -  with  teachers  looking  out  for  child  victims,  the  law  - 
giving  increasing  priority  to  the  victim,  the  mass  media  -  talk  shows,  and  even  in 
religion  -  where  concern  for  victims  is  expressed  as  a  moral  good  (Best  1999:  117) 
One  consequence  of  this  focus  upon  victimisation  is  that  'new  crimes'  are  understood 
within  this  framework,  more  people  have  become  seen  as  'victims'  and  more  laws 
have  developed  to  protect  the  victimisation  of  one  individual  from  another.  Within 
this  framework  of  understanding  society  and  social  problems,  there  is,  argues  Best,  a 
more  generalised  sense  of  anxiety  that,  in  relation  to  crime,  has  helped  create  a  'sense 
that  contemporary  society  is  plagued  by  random  violence'  (Best  1999:  5). 
For  Best,  the  idea  of  random  violence  did  not  represent  the  real  world,  as  relatively 
few  people  faced  serious  crime  and  the  vast  majority  of  these  crimes  occurred  in 
particular  areas  and  were  often  done  to  particular  groups  in  society.  The  idea  of 
random  violence  has  developed  in  the  USA,  Best  believes,  as  a  wider  expression 
within  society  of  a  sense  of  risk  and  fear. 
The  fact  that  victims  have  become  so  central  to  claimsmaking  and  the  wider  culture 
suggests  that  there  is  a  greater  sense  of  powerlessness  within  certain  groups  and 
38 arguably  more  generally  across  society:  a  sense  of  powerlessness  that  encourages  a 
greater  sense  of  anxiety  and  increases  the  tendency  for  panics  to  erupt. 
Thompson  has  noted  that  the  current  period  is  often  understood  to  be  one  of  an  'age  of 
moral  panic'.  However,  this  understanding,  which  continues  to  see  panics  as  a  product 
of  neo-liberalism.  and  traditional  conservatism,  is both  one-sided  and  fails  to  recognise 
the  more  significant  development  of  amoral  panics.  We  are  indeed  living  in  an  era  of 
panics,  but  these  panics  are  being  generated  by  'left  and  right'  wing  campaigners 
around  issues  of  safety  and  often  in  the  defence  of  the  victim.  Conservatives,  may 
continue  to  campaign  on  issues  like  abortion  and  crime,  but  they  do  so  less  as  a 
promotion  of  moral  values  than  through  a  more  therapeutically  oriented  language  that 
engages  not  with  the  'moral  majority'  but  with  the  fragmented  individual. 
Elite  reactions  and  the  institutionalisation  of  amoral  anxieties 
The  current  age  of  amoral  panics  is  not  a  repeat  of  what  went  before.  Not  only  has  the 
basis  of  these  panics  changed  and  the  radical  opposition  to  them  declined,  but  through 
the  prism  of  safety  many  new  panics  are  actually  promoted  by  'radical'  claimsmakers. 
Society  has  subsequently  become  more  systematically  organised  around  panics. 
Rather  than  having  occasional  panics,  contemporary  modernity  could  more  accurately 
be  described  as  being  in  a  permanent  state  of  anxiety  -a  state  that  is  often  encouraged 
and  institutionalised  by  the  elite. 
Youth  crime  and  'antisocial  behaviour'  have,  over  the  last  decade  or  so  become,  more 
established  as  social  problems.  Having  often  been  a  site  for  occasional  panics  by  a 
minority  of  conservatives  in  the  past,  today  these  concerns  about  youth  are  more 
mainstream  and  widely  accepted  as  issues  to  address.  Panics  about  youth  and  youth 
crime  were  central  to  Cohen  and  Hall's  classic  moral  panic  studies  in  the  past. 
Likewise  Pearson's  study  of  past  'respectable  fears'  has  noted  the  significance  of 
panics  about  youth.  However,  one  key  difference  in  the  reaction  to  panics  about  youth 
crime  in  the  twentieth  and  early  twenty-first  centuries  compared  with  these  earlier 
periods  is  that  while  previously  the  political  elite  generally  did  not  'over-react'  to 
moral  panics,  today  the  elite  are  often  at  the  centre  ofpromoting  them. 
39 One  measure  of  the  importance  of  panics  in  terms  of  their  impact  is  whether  or  not 
new  laws  are  developed  on  the  back  of  them,  whether  social  movements  emerge  in 
relation,  to  them  and  whether  or  not  the  issue  is  adopted  by  official  political  parties  as 
something  to  campaign  around.  As  Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  put  it: 
Do  moral  panics  have  an  impact  on  the  society  in  which  they  take  place  by 
generating  formal  organizations  and  institutions;  do  they,  in  other  words,  leave 
an  institutional  legacy  in  the  form  of  laws,  agencies,  groups,  movements,  and 
so  on?  If  so,  what  is  the  nature  of  that  legacy?  Do  moral  panics  transform  the 
informal  normative  structure  of  society?  If  so,  what  is  the  nature  of  that 
transfonnation?  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994:  168) 
Examining  past  moral  panics,  it  is  clear  that  at  different  times  the  British  political 
elite,  rather  than  elevating  concerns  connected  to  moral  and  crime  panics,  actually 
either  challenged  them  or  dampened  them  down.  A  sense  of  purpose  within  the  elite 
appears  to  have  mitigated  against  a  panic  reaction  within  the  establishment  itself.  For 
example,  Pearson  notes  how,  in  the  1840s,  liberal  members  of  the  British  elite  saw  the 
panic  about  crime  as  a  problem  not  to  be  overly  concerned  with,  as  the  development 
of  the  rational  individual  -  especially  amongst  the  poor  -  would,  it  was  believed, 
result  in  an  end  to  crime  (Pearson  1983:  175). 
Similarly,  in  a  different  historical  and  political  period,  Pearson  notes  that  despite 
continuing  anxieties  being  expressed  about  family  values,  the  destruction  of 
community  and  lawless  youth  by  movements  like  the  'Scrutiny'  group  in  the  1920s, 
running  alongside  these  complaints  'and  often  holding  them  in  check'  was  a  counter- 
movement,  which  involved  a  'quite  different  moral  emphasis'.  Despite  there  being 
strong  evidence  for  a  sharp  rise  in  crime  and  violent  crime  -  like  a  70%  rise  in  shop 
raids  and  a  90%  rise  in  bag  snatching  between  1925  and  1929,  which  Pearson  believes 
was  almost  certainly  connected  to  the  availability  of  the  motor  car  -  there  was  no 
subsequent  'law  and  order'  campaign. 
40 Indeed,  comments  from  Robert  Baden  Powell  in  the  1920s  appear  almost  unbelievable 
in  today's  climate  of  crime  panics.  As  the  Times  reported: 
To  him  it  was  rather  a  promising  sign,  because  he  saw  in  those  banditry  cases, 
robbery  with  violence,  and  smash  and  grab,  little  'adventures'.  There  was  still 
some  spirit  of  adventure  among  those  juveniles  and  if  that  spirit  were  seized 
and  turned  in  the  right  direction  they  could  make  them  useful  men  (1983:  34). 
Similarly,  in  Parliament,  reports  about  motor  banditry  in  the  press  were  ridiculed  as 
gross  exaggerations  and  police  memoirs,  while  recounting  no  go  areas  for  the  police, 
described  much  of  the  'action'  on  the  street  as  people  having  a  'good  time'.  Other 
examples  of  magistrates  are  cited,  where  stealing  off  the  back  of  lorries  was  dismissed 
as  'perfectly  innocent  joyriding'  and  the  'line  between  mischief  and  crime'  was  said  to 
be  'not  easily  drawn'  (Pearson  1983:  42). 
Looking  at  Cohen's  Folk  Devils  and  Moral  Panics  we  see  that  a  significant  reaction  of 
the  government,  politicians,  educationalists  and  religious  leaders  in  the  1960s  was  not 
to  inflame  the  moral  panic  but  to  dampen  it  down.  As  Cohen  notes: 
At  times  of  moral  panic,  politicians  in  office,  even  though  one  might  expect 
them  on  the  basis  of  their  personal  records  to  be  full  of  moral  indignation, 
often  act  to  'calm  things  down'  and  minimize  the  problem.  Thus  it  was  with 
the  [Conservative]  Home  Secretary,  Mr  Henry  Brooke,  the  only  participant  in 
the  first  debate  who  expressed  an  awareness  of  the  exaggerations  and 
distortions  (Cohen  2002:  113). 
Also,  as  Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  note  regarding  the  institutional  legacy  left  by  the 
Mods  and  Rockers  panic: 
Some  panics  seem  to  leave  relatively  little  institutional  legacy.  The  furore 
generated  by  the  Mods  and  Rockers  in  England  in  the  late  1960s  resulted  in  no 
long-term  institutional  legacy;  no  laws  passed  (although  some  were  proposed), 
and  the  two  germinal  social  movement  organizations  that  emerged  in  its  wake 
41 quickly  evaporated  when  the  excitement  died  down  (Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda 
1994:  168). 
The  above  examples  are,  as  we  shall  see  throughout  this  thesis,  in  stark  contrast  to  the 
reaction  of  the  political  elite  in  British  society  today.  The  significance  of  this  is  that 
while  'even  seemingly  inconsequential  panics  leave  behind  some  sort  of  legacy'. 
(Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  1994:  169),  the  impact  of  panics  upon  s6ciety  is  qualitatively 
increased  when  they  are  institutionalised.  If  a  panic  is  institutionalised,  it  can  - 
especially  if  it  goes  unchallenged  -  change  the  'informal  normative  structures  of 
society'.  Over  time  the  new  understanding  of  a  problem  and  the  laws  and  institutions 
established  to  deal  with  them  simply  become  part  of  the  way  things  are.  This  'norm'  is 
then  something  that  can  be  built  upon  by  subsequent  panics,  as  Jenkins  notes: 
'Problem  construction  is  a  cumulative,  incremental  process  in  which  each  issue  is  to 
some  extent  built  upon  its  predecessors,  in  the  context  of  a  steadily  developing  fund  of 
socially  available  knowledge'  (Jenkins  1998:  220). 
The  role  of  the  elite  in  the  past  in  often  challenging  panics  about  youth  crime  is 
significant  in  terms  of  the  impact  panics  have  upon  society.  The  role  of  any  opposition 
to  panics  today,  or  the  lack  of  it,  especially  within  the  political  elite,  is  key  to  the 
extent  to  which  public  fears  and  those  of  clainismakers  can  become  institutionalised 
and  thus  impact  upon  society. 
As  will  be  explored  in  the  next  chapter,  from  the  early  1990s  the  centrality  of  crime 
and  crime  panics  to  political  life  and  institutional  frameworks  has  developed  apace. 
Centred  upon  the  safety  of  victims,  a  raft  of  legislation  has  developed  with  increasing 
rapidity,  not  simply  in  relation  to  panics,  but  also  as  part  of  government  programmes 
and  manifestos.  New  terms  like  'binge  drinking'  have  emerged  which  give  a  greater 
sense  of  young  people  being  out  of  control:  terms  that  are  used  and  promoted  by  all 
political  parties.  Issues  of  crime,  violence  and  today  even  antisocial  behaviour  are 
rarely  'put  into  perspective'  or  'dampened  down'  by  government  ministers.  Rather, 
the  extent  of  the  problem  of  crime  and  behaviour  is  often  pushed  most  vociferously  by 
the  government  itSelf.  29 
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practices  based  upon  them,  is  even  more  visible  in  relation  to  crime  against  children 
and  young  people.  Having  built  upon  the  child  abuse  panics  of  the  1980s,  the  issue  of 
child  safety  has  become  so  institutionalised  that  following  almost  any  one-off  extreme 
act  of  violence  towards  children  we  can  predict  a  political  and  institutional  response. 
From  the  killing  of  James  Bulger  and  the  Dunblane  massacre  to  the  death  of  Victoria 
Climbie,  institutionalised  panics  have  resulted  in  new  laws  and  safety  initiatives  being 
developed  by  government  that  impact  upon  the  way  all  adults  now  work  with  and 
relate  to  children  (Waiton  2001:  41-5). 
It  was  noted  above  that  in  the  1920s  the  argument  was  put  that  the  line  between 
mischief  and  crime  was  not  easy  to  draw.  Today  this  sentiment  has  been  reversed  and 
through  the  language  of  antisocial  behaviour  much  mischievous  behaviour  of  young 
people  has  been  redefined  as  a  crime.  With  the  defence  of  the  victim  increasingly 
taking  centre  stage  within  social  problem  formation  and  political  rhetoric,  rarely  do 
we  encounter  debates  whereby  the  exaggeration  of  a  problem  is  challenged. 
From  moral  panics  to  a  fear  of  risk 
Where  moral  panic  theories  analysed  what  were  occasional  outbursts  within  an 
otherwise  stable  or  calm  society,  more  recently  sociological  theories  have  emerged 
that  depict  a  more  generalised  state  of  risk  and  fear.  As  argued  above,  a  key  difference 
between  panics  past  and  present  is  that  they  have  become  an  ever-present  feature  of 
modem  society  and,  as  such,  it  is  more  accurate  to  describe  society  as  being  in  a 
permanent  state  of  anxiety.  Theories  of  'risk'  and  a  'culture  of  fear'  both  analyse 
society  from  this  point  of  view  and  are  useful  in  helping  to  frame  concerns  about 
crime  and  disorder  today.  While  appearing  to  be  similar  in  their  approach,  however, 
Beck's  theory  of  'risk'  and  Furedi's  theory  of  a  'culture  of  fear'  are  in  fact  very 
different.  Indeed,  following  Furedi's  understanding,  Beck's  approach  can  be 
understood  as  a  form  of  amoral  panicking  itself. 
Both  Beck's  theory  of  Risk  Society  (1992)  and  Furedi's  Culture  of  Fear  (1997) 
correctly  describe  how  'risk  consciousness'  has  become  widespread  across  society. 
43 Occasional  eruptions  of  fear  have  been  replaced  by  a  more  permanent  cultural  sense 
of  unease.  These  theories  both  accept  the  significance  of  the  fragmentation  of  society 
that  has  in  part  helped  encourage  this  sense  of  insecurity;  however,  their  explanations 
for  why  this  has  happened  are  polls  apart.  Where  Beck  understands  the  sense  of  risk  as 
a  correct  reaction  to  an  objectively  riskier  society;  Furedi  to  some  degree  follows  the 
approach  of  moral  panic  theories,  and  argues  that  the  culture  of  fear  is  more  to  do  with 
the  current  state  of  subjectivity.  However,  for  Furedi  the  generalisation  of  fear  is  not 
simply  a  ratcheting  up  of  what  went  before,  but  rather  is  an  expression  of  a 
fundamental  loss  of  belief  in  humanity,  progress  and  the  idea  of  active  moral  subjects, 
which  has  developed  out  of  the  collapse  of  both  left  and  right-wing  ideologies. 
Sheldon  Ungar,  examining  the  usefulness  of  the  idea  of  a  'risk  society'  compared  to 
past  moral  panic  theories,  correctly  notes  how  'new  sites  of  social  anxiety  have 
dmerged  around  environmental,  nuclear,  chemical  and  medical  threats'.  Consequently, 
'the  questions  motivating  moral  panics  research  have  lost  much  of  their  utility'  (Ungar 
2001:  271).  Whereas  moral  panic  research,  Ungar  argues,  is  concerned  with 
exaggeration  of  the  threat  and  the  use  of  panics  'to  engineer  social  consensus  and 
control',  with  risk  society,  'accidents  being  highly  unpredictable  and  uncontrollable, 
the  social  constructionist  concern  with  exaggeration  is  largely  undermined  as  an 
analytical  strategy'.  Also,  because  a  risk  society  has  a  'roulette  dynamic'  -  rather  than 
more  consciously  created  folk  devils  -  then,  for  Ungar,  the  idea  of  risk  society  being 
used  to  develop  social  controls  is  questioned.  Rather  than  moral  order  being  created 
through  'risks',  authorities  can  find  themselves  as  carriers  of  'hot  potatoes'  (Ungar 
2001:  276). 
Correctly,  Ungar  notes  how  the  moral  panic  focus  is  more  narrow  in  terms  of  looking 
at  exceptional'occasions  of  anxiety,  whereas  fearful  events  associated  with  risk  are 
more  ubiquitous  (2001:  276).  Moral  panics  are  also  often  associated  with  a  change  in 
moral  boundaries,  whereas  risks  can  emerge  more  from  scientific  findings.  Also  risks, 
for  Ungar,  are  not  developed  'top  down'  like  many  moral  panics,  but  often  emerge 
from  a  reaction  to  events  like  problems  with  nuclear  reactors  -  which  are  made  into 
issues  by  interest  groups.  Indeed  risk  society  issues  'tend  to  involve  diverse  interest 
groups  contending  over  relatively  intractable  scientific  claims'  (Ungar  2001:  277). 
44 Rather  than  'risks'  being  generated  by  an  elite  who  attempt  to  promote  an  alternative 
moral  order,  Ungar  accurately  illustrates  the  way  many  risks  emerge  out  with  the 
traditional  elite  and  can  undermine  rather  than  cohere  the  elite. 
However,  Ungar's  understanding  of  risks  being  the  product  of  'highly  unpredictable 
and  uncontrollable'  developments  is  questionable.  Like  Beck,  Ungar  accepts  the  idea 
that  these  risks  are  real.  Describing  Beck's  analysis,  Furlong  and  Cartmel  note  that: 
'Whereas  modernity  involved  rationality  and  the  belief  in  the  potential  offered  by 
harnessing  scientific  knowledge,  in  late  modernity  the  world  is  perceived.  as  a 
dangerous  place  in  which  we  are  constantly  confronted  with  risk'  (Furlong  and 
Cartmel  1997:  3). 
For  Furedi,  a  culture  of  fear  has  not  developed  because  of  any  technical  or  global 
objective  changes  in  production  or  communication.  Rather,  changes  in  society  and  the 
weakening  of  institutions  have  come  at  a  specific  time  when  there  is  a,  'conservative 
sense  of  caution'  (Furedi  1997:  9).  In  previous  historical  periods,  Furedi  argues,  there 
was  far  more  suffering,  pain  and  disease  than  today.  Despite  there  being  various  risks 
facing  society,  it  is  not  the  risks  themselves  but  the  pessimistic  outlook  within  society 
that  both  inflates  their  significance  and  generates  a  sense  of  impotence  in  relation  to 
social,  scientific  and  even  personal  problems.  This  sense  of  impotence  amongst  the 
elite  helps  to  explain  why  panics  and  anxieties  are  rarely  'dampened  down',  as  they 
were  in  the  past,  but  become  institutionalised. 
Explaining  this  cultural  sense  of  cautious  pessimism,  Durodie  argues  that  there  has 
been  an: 
[U]nprecedented  convergence  of  the  political  left's  loss  of  faith  in  science  and 
social  transformation  with  the  political  right's  traditional  misgivings  [that] 
have  lent  themselves  to  a  pessimistic  outlook  leading  to  the  rise.  of  an 
exaggerated  risk  consciousness  (Durodie  2002:  4). 
45 How  society  reacts  to  technological  changes  is  highly  influenced  by  the  cultural  and 
ideological  framework  within  which  they  emerge;  and  for  Furedi,  Beck's  starting  point 
for  analysis  upon  these  technical  changes  misses  what  is  specific  about  late  twentieth- 
century  society.  Rather  than  risks  emerging  in  relation  to  global  threats,  Furedi 
identifies  how  the  emergence  of  a  'risk  consciousness'  has  occurred  at  every  level  of 
society  and  has  impacted  upon  all  relationships  and  institutions.  That  children  are 
identified  as  being  almost  permanently  'at  risk',  for  example,  cannot  be  explained  by 
global  developments,  or  simply  in  relation  to  the  individualisation  of  everyday  life. 
Rather  it  is  the  end  of  ideologies  and  the  notion  of  human  progress,  ideologies  that 
have  held  back  the  individuation  of  society  for  a  century,  which  have  collapsed  and 
are  central  to  understanding  the  culture  of  fear. 
At  a  certain  level  of  abstraction,  what  is  being  proposed  here  is  that  the  idea  of  a  'risk 
society'  is  a  reflection  of  the  consciousness  of  the  elite,  which  is  then  reflected  back 
upon  society.  As  such,  the  'objective'  risks  identified  by  Beck,  Giddens  and  others  are 
a  sociological  expression  of  a  loss  of  will  of  this  elite  -  rather  than  an  indication  of 
any  real  increase  of  'risks'  in  society. 
Just  as  the  enlightenment  belief  in  science  'was  a  reflection  and  pronouncement  of 
faith  in  humanity  itself  rather  than  merely  in  science'  (Durodie  2002:  2),  the  loss  of 
faith  in  science  and  the  belief  that  the  source  of  danger  to  society  is  not  ignorance  but 
knowledge  (Beck  1992:  183)  is  the  reverse  -  the  loss  of  faith  in  humanity  and  of  the 
capacity  of  human  subjectivity  to  create  social  progress.  All  that  is  left  for  humanity  is 
the  question  not  of  liberation,  but  of  'self  limitation'  (Beck  1996:  29).  In  a  world  of 
unintended  consequences,  'Democracy  in  the  sense  that  Lukacs  described  it,  as 
"societal  self-determination",  is  rendered  impossible  by  "manufactured  uncertainty"' 
(Heartfield:  2002:  81).  Or  as  Furedi  puts  it,  the  picture  portrayed  by  Beck  is  of  a  senýd- 
conscious  humanity  desperately  trying  to  control  the  destructive  forces  it  has  created 
(Furedi  2004:  133). 
In  this  respect  Beck's  'risk  society'  could  be  seen  as  another  expression  of  amoral 
panicking  by  a  sociological  critic  who  sees  a  society  under  threat  from  technological 
developments  rather  than  'folk  devils'.  30 
46 For  both  Furedi  and  Durodie,  Beck's  exaggerated  sense  of  risk  (Durodie  2002)  reflects 
societies'  own  timidity  and  impotence  towards  social  change  and  experimentation.  In 
a  sense,  risks  become  the  'active  agent  and  people  -  at  risk  -  are  the  passive  agents  in 
society'  (Furedi  1997:  64).  With  the  loss  of  faith  in  human  progress,  what  has  emerged 
is  a  culture  of  self-loathing,  which  affects  how  every  relationship  or  development  in 
society  is  understood.  Rather  than  embracing  change,  the  left  are  now  as  conservative 
as  the  right  and  view  change  with  suspicion  and  distrust.  With  a  degraded  image  of 
4man',  many  thinkers  on  the  left  have  increasingly  become  preoccupied  with  images 
and  issues  associated  with  crime  and  abuse,  discovering,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the 
endemic  nature  of  violence  across  society. 
Furedi's  thesis  notes  that  while  a  more  conservative  outlook  has  developed  amongst 
more  radical  thinkers,  at  the  same  time  many  traditional  values  and  norms  of  the  right 
have  alsojost  their  consensus.  Consequently  without  a  social  sense  of  the  future  and 
with  the  increased  questioning  of  traditional  norms,  the  result  is  a  diminished  sense  of 
individual  and  social  control  (Furedi  1997:  68-9). 
The  politics  of  fear  will  be  explored  in  the  following  chapter.  Here  it  is  worth  noting 
that  the  rise  in  panics  about  youth  crime  and  the  institutional  development  of  more 
laws  and  more  prisons  to  resolve  this  perceived  problem  took  off  from  around  1993  - 
a  year  when  'old'  Labour  became  'New',  and  the  Conservative  Party  lost  its  moral 
credibility  following  the  failed  Back  to  Basics  campaign.  As  the  heroic  individual  of 
the  right  slipped  out  of  view  and  the  'social  man'  of  the  left  disappeared,  the  icon  of 
the  victim  took  centrc  stage  -a  victim  whose  fundamental  demand  was  the  right  to  be 
safe. 
This  new  'morality  of  safety'  filled  the  vacuum  of  traditional  morals  and  politics  and 
now  the  demand  was  for  'crime  to  be  taken  seriously',  for  'victims'  rights'  to  be 
recognised,  or  for  'community  safety'  to  be  prioritised.  Reflecting  broad  social  and 
political  trends,  the  emergence  of  this  new  'morality'  or  amorality  was  encouraged  by 
claimsmakers  and  campaigners  from  the  left  who  promoted  panics  around  child  abuse 
and  transformed  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  into  a  'working-class  issue'.  Having 
47 given  up  on  transforming  society,  the  claimsmaking  of  many  radical  campaigners  was 
reduced  to  demands  to  regulate,  control  and  monitor  individual  behaviour.  The  loss  of 
drive  for  social  change  within  this  process  was  replaced  by  a  move  to  enforce  social 
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control. 
Within  this  cultural  framework  of  understanding,  moral  panics,  generated  by 
conservative  concerns  about  family  and  nation,  can  still  occur,  but  are  more  likely  to 
develop  within  the  general  concern  about  risk  and  safety.  Indeed  as  noted  previously, 
the  AIDS  panic,  while  initially  taking  the  form  of  a  conservative  panic  about  gays  and 
prorniscuity,  was  soon  transformed  into  the  modem-day  form  of  panic  around  'safe 
sex'.  In  general,  it  is  the  argument  of  this  thesis  that  panics  may  still  come  and  go,  but 
more  importantly  there  is  a  general  and  heightened  sense  of  anxiety  that  affects  almost 
all  relationships,  policies  and  practices  in  society.  Rather  than  there  being  the 
occasional  disproportionate  outburst  to  social  problems,  there  is  a  trend  to  exaggerate 
almost  all  social  problems  and  a  diminished  sense  of  the  capacity  to  overcome  them. 
Grassroots  anxieties 
The  panics  and  anxieties  discussed  above  relate  largely  to  the  outlook  and  actions  of 
the  elite  and  of  claimsmaking  groups.  However,  for  a  culture  of  fear  and  indeed  for 
amoral  anxieties  to  be  a  general  societal  trend,  the  sense  of  unease  and  the  desire  for 
safety  and  a  more  regulated  society  must  also  take  an  expression  within  the  public 
itself.  The  increased  fragmentation  of  society  has  helped  to  ensure  this  development  at 
the  grassroots  level  of  society. 
Discussing  where  moral  panics  are  generated,  Goode  and  Ben-Yehuda  (1994:  143) 
have  argued  that  most  studies  of  moral  panics  incorporate  an  understanding  of  the  role 
played  by  the  elite,  interest  groups,  and  by  the  'grassroots.  Indeed  for  'moral'  or 
amoral  panics  to  exist,  there  must  at  some  level  be  an  element  of  grassroots  support 
for  them.  Whether  or  not  panics  are  generated  by  the  public,  there  does  appear  to  be  a 
high  level  of  fear  and  concern  in  society  about  a  wide  variety  of  issues.  The  fear  of 
crime  has  remained  high,  for  example,  despite  statistical  falls  in  crime,  and  indeed  this 
fear  has  become  a  significant  issue  in  its  own  right.  Child  safety  concerns  also  capture 
48 the  public  imagination  and  have  had  some  impact  on  the  emergence  of  'cotton-wool 
kids' 
'32  and  have  also  resulted  in  a  number  of  paedophile  panics  on  working-class 
estates. 
Part  of  the  explanation  for  the  rise  in  grassroots  anxieties  and  the  high  level  of  fear  is 
the  increased  level  of  individuation  within  society,  a  development  that  has  been 
widely  explored  within  sociology  (Beck  and  Beck-Gernsheim  2002,  Furedi  2001, 
Bauman  2000).  The  significance  of  this  development  is,  for  Thompson,  that  as  the  old 
structures  and  norms  of  society  fragmented,  an  increasing  amount  of  individual  choice 
and  diversity  helped  to  generate  more  of  a  sense  of  being  at  risk  (Thompson  1998: 
88). 
The  family,  Thompson  notes,  at  a  time  of  declining  communal  values,  has  become  'all 
that  is  left  of  traditional  community'  (Thompson  1998:  88).  The  result  of  this 
modernisation  process  is  that  people  have  a  sense  'that  they  are  constantly  going  into  a 
strange  country  and  being  at  risk'  (1998:  89).  At  the  same  time,  the  weakening  of 
traditional  beliefs  and  hierarchies,  including  family  hierarchies,  has  increased  the 
sense  of  risk  concerning  children  and  family  relationships. 
Furedi  following  Beck  and  Beck-Gernsheim's  (1995:  37)  point,  takes  this  idea  of  the 
family  as  the  last  remaining  'institution  of  trust'  one  step  further,  arguing  that  because 
marriage  itself  has  become  a  problernatised  area  of  life,  today  the  last  remaining 
'institution'  of  trust  is  the  bond  between  parent  and  child  (Furedi  200  1).  33  A  world  has 
emerged,  argues  Beck,  where  we  have  'individuals  within  homogenous  social  groups, 
and  communities  'dissolved  in  the  acid  bath  of  competition'  (Beck  and  Beck- 
Gernsheim  2002:  33). 
This  emergence  of  a  more  'liquid'  form  of  modernity  (Bauman  2000),  in  which 
relations  of  trust  are  reduced  to  the  family  and  even  to  the  bond  between  a  parent  and 
child,  helps  in  part  to  explain  the  heightened  levels  of  fear  in  society.  However, 
individualisation  has  a  long  history  within  modernity  and  cannot  in  itself  explain  the 
emergent  culture  of  fear.  Fragmentation  may  have  reduced  trust  at  the  level  of  the 
individual,  but  this  has  also  been  informed  by  a  more  pessimistic  understanding  of 
49 humanity  more  generally:  a  sense  of  pessimism  and  anxiety  that  has  also  been 
transmitted  through  the  activities  of  safety-based  claimsmakers,  and  by  the 
development  of  laws  and  institutional  practices  that  attempt  to  engage  with  this  more 
fragmented  individual  through  the  prism  of  fear. 
The  new  therapeutic  'morality'  of  safety 
Despite  the  declining  influence  of  traditional  morality,  the  tendency  to  moralise  has 
not  declined.  Indeed,  as  we  will  see  in  future  chapters,  the  emergence  of  the  'politics 
of  behaviour'  suggests  a  more  intensive  scrutiny  of  individual  behaviour  has 
developed.  Issues  related  to  antisocial  behaviour,  crime,  family  life  and  relationships 
are  central  to  social  problems  that  both  capture  the  public  imagination  and  excite 
political  comment  and  action.  However  the  dominant  form  that  these  problems  take 
today  relates  not  to  tradition  but  to  the  amoral  absolute  of  safety,  while  the 
justificatory  basis  (Beetharn  1991)  of  this  development  is  often  in  the  form  'of 
therapeutic  governance  (Nolan  1998). 
As  Furedi  argues, 
The  marginalisation  of  traditional  morality  does  not  mean  that  society  is 
without  any  system  of  values.  On  the  contrary,  the  space  left  by  the 
marginalisation  of  traditional  morality  has  been  filled  by  the  system  of  values 
and  notions  of  conduct  associated  with  risk  consciousness  (Furedi  2002:  150). 
That  this  new  risk  conscious  outlook  is  rarely  recognised  as  a  form  of  moralising  is 
explained  by  the  'value-free'  basis  upon  which  it  is  often  promoted.  Rather  than 
ascribing  a  particular  lifestyle  as  such,  the  new  etiquette  of  safety  is  more  self- 
consciously  non-judgmental  and  relativistic.  Almost  any  form  of  behaviour  and 
outlook  is  acceptable  within  this  etiquette  -  as  long  as  it  is  safe  and  does  not  disturb 
the  safety  of  others.  Despite  being  unconventional,  this  'morality'  is  not  purely  'new 
age'  but  also  incorporates  a  number  of  traditional  conservative  themes,  emphasising 
restraint  and  focusing  on  individual  behaviour  and  responsibility.  34  Unlike  traditional 
morality,  however,  that  prescribed  a  'single  answer'  to  moral  questions,  the  new 
50 etiquette  of  safety  is  more  individualistically  oriented  and  is  therefore  more  able  to 
relate  directly  to  the  contemporary  experience  of  individuation  (Furedi  2002:  163). 
One  key  development  within  this  more  individualistically  oriented  etiquette  is  the 
emergence  of  the  Therapeutic  State  (Nolan  1998),  or  of  a  Therapy  Culture  (Furedi 
2004). 
As  the  state  comes  to  lack  a  moral  or  political  basis  of  legitimation  and  engagement 
with  the  fragmented  public,  Nolan  argues,  a  new  set  of  'cultural  ideas  and  values  that 
undergird  the  practical  functions  of  the  state'  has  emerged  (Nolan  1998:  26). 
Reinforced  by  the  'demise  of  politics  and  social  solidarity',  social  problems  have 
subsequently  been  recast  as  emotional  ones  (Furedi  2004:  100).  Social  problems  like 
crime,  for  example,  have  increasingly  been  understood  in  relation  to  the  emotional 
sense  of  fear  ascribed  to  it,  while  even  welfare-related  issues  have  become  more 
therapeutic.  Supporting  this  therapeutic  framework,  Giddens  argues  that  economic 
benefits  of  welfare  are  virtually  never  enough  -  but  rather,  'welfare  institutions  must 
be  concerned  with  fostering  psychological  as  well  as  economic  benefits'  (Giddens 
1998:  117). 
The  state's  increasing  orientation  towards  a  therapeutic  model  of  intervention,  Nolan 
observes,  in  the  USA  has  influenced  civil  case  law,  where  emotional  damages  have 
outstripped  other  'damages'  cases  dramatically  since  the  1980s;  in  criminal  law  where 
drug  counselling  and  drug  courts  have  develop  an  Oprah-esque  relationship  with  the 
accused;  in  education  where  feelings  of  children  -  their  self-esteem  -  is  seen  as  one  of 
the  key  guiding  principles;  in  welfare  where  both  the  notion  of  emotional  abuse  and 
the  reformulation  of  support  around  notions  of  dignity  and  self-esteem  have  increased; 
and  in  politics  where  connecting  with  the  public  has  increasingly  been  established  by 
politicians  explaining  themselves  and  their  policies  in  terms  of  how  they  feel  about 
them  (Nolan  1998).  The  significance  of  this  development  that  has  been  replicated  in 
the  UK  is,  however,  not  simply  in  relation  to  the  more  emotionally-oriented  basis  of 
contemporary  culture,  but  that  within  this  therapeutic  outlook  the  individual  is 
understood  to  befundamentally  vulnerable. 
51 Actions  and  experiences  that  would  have  been  ignored  or  understood  as  insignificant 
in  the  past  are,  within  today's  framework  of  therapeutic  vulnerability,  given  a  greater 
significance.  Name-calling,  for  example,  is  now  interpreted  as  a  more  serious  form  of 
'bullying'  for  children,  while  the  'mischievous'  actions  of  children  are  increasingly 
being  redefined  as  forms  of  'antisocial  behaviour'  -  both  examples  being  understood 
as  having  potentially  long-term  and  significant  implications  for  individuals  and 
communities.  Even  crime  itself  has  become  problematised  and  given  greater 
importance.  As  Furedi  notes,  in  the  1970s  crime  surveys  tended  to  suggest  that  the 
impact  of  crime  was  relatively  short-lived  and  that  only  a  small  percentage  of  victims 
were  affected  by  their  experience  of  crime.  However,  more  recently  a  radically 
different  interpretation  has  been  given  to  this  experience,  and  through  therapeutic 
language:  'Most  studies  highlight  the  acute  stress,  trauma  and  psychological  damage 
suffered  by  victims  of  more  serious  crime'  (Furedi  2004:  112). 
The  new  etiquette  of  safety  is  able  not  only  to  relate  to  the  individualisation  within 
society,  but  through  the  therapeutic  culture  a  more  vulnerable  individual  is  both 
constructed  and  engaged  with. 
Conclusion 
Through  examining  moral  panic  studies  a  number  of  questions  have  been  raised  about 
the  issue  of  morals,  the  degree  to  which  panics  occur,  and  the  method  used  to  analyse 
this.  When  asking  what  values  are  unchallengeable  today,  this  chapter  has  attempted 
to  explore  the  changing  nature  of  values  and  concluded  that,  while  traditional 
conservative  reactions  still  occur,  the  new  and  dominant  trend  in  terms  of  'moral 
absolutes'  is  the  amoral  value  of  safety.  Here  the  term  amoral  is  used  not  only  as  a 
contrast  to  the  traditional  morals  of  conservatives,  but  also  in  that  the  amoral  anxieties 
to  do  with  safety  are  less  associated  with  any  grand  narrative  or  political/religious 
ideal.  Indeed  concerns  about  victims'  rights  and  protection  are  largely  directed 
towards  atomised  individuals,  and  the  safety  campaigns  around  children,  sex  and  even 
crime  have  a  more  limited  ideological  framework  that  has  less  social  meaning  or 
content.  Concerns  about  crime,  for  example,  within  this  framework  are  more  related  to 
the  defence  of  the  individual  victim  than  to  an  upholding  of  'British  Law  and  Order'. 
52 Amoral  panics  are  a  form  of  moralising  without  any  wider  system  of  meaning,  and 
indeed  have  emerged  largely  because  of  a  collapse  in  the  secular  :  faiths'  on  the  right 
and  left,  that  cohered  society  in  the  past. 
These  changes  can  be  surnmarised  as  follows. 
Table  1 
Moral  Panics  Amoral  Panics 
A  minority  concern  or  reaction  to  a  A  universalised  sense  of  anxiety  felt 
specific  event  or  change  in  society.  across  society  to  myTiad  issues. 
Often  dampened  down  by  key  sections  Political  elite  often  encourages  and 
of  the  elite.  institutionalise  the  panic. 
Promoted  by  conservatives  who  Often  promoted  by  'radicals'  with  neither 
defend  traditions  from  the  past.  a  belief  in  the  future  nor  past. 
An  attempt  to  defend  a  conservative  A  rejection  of  universal  values  and 
morality  associated  with  religion  and  promotion  of  the  etiquette  of  individual 
nation.  safety. 
Emerges  at  a  time  of  political  Emerges  with  the  collapse  of  both  left  and 
contestation  between  left  and  right.  right. 
Moral  claims  face  a  political  Amoral  claims  face  little  opposition. 
challenge. 
Predicated  on  a  belief  in  the  possibility  Predicated  on  a  diminished  sense  of  the 
of  a  morally  responsible  individual.  individual  and  the  emergence  of  the 
vulnerable  public. 
The  'virtue'  espoused  attempts  to  It  is  the  loss  of  meaning  that  explains 
promote  a  shared  system  of  meaning.  these  'panics'  and  no  alternative  system  of 
meaning  is  promoted  through  them. 
53 Cohen's  definition  of  a  moral  panic  still  holds  to  a  degree,  but  the  values  of  society 
have  changed,  as  have  the  'right  thinking  people'  who  man  the  'moral  barricades' 
(Cohen:  2002:  1).  Panics  today  are  less  about  the  promotion  of  universal  human  morals 
than  about  an  individuated  moralising  over  forms'  of  risky  behaviour.  The  new 
etiquette  of  safety  actively  avoids  any  attempt  to  uphold  or  promote  a  particular 
system  of  meaning  in  society  that  can  unite  people  around  a  common  goal.  Relying 
upon  their  engagement  with  fragmented  individuals,  amoral  panics  are  by  their  nature 
a  more  asocial  form  of  moralising. 
The  liberal/left  orientation  of  much  moral  panic  work,  especially  in  the  UK,  has  to  a 
degree  meant  that  signs  of  modem-day  panics  have  continued  to  be  understood  within 
a  critique  of  traditional  conservatism  and  the  New  Right.  However,  as  a  number  of 
authors  have  noted,  the  development  of  claimsmakers  on  the  left,  which  sometimes 
overlap  with  those  on  the  right,  has  meant  that  panics  today  often  take  the  form  of 
defending  'victims'  from  crime  and  abuse. 
Panics,  risk  and  fears  are  today  less  based  on  the  more  overtly  class-based  political 
contestation  identified  by  Hall  and  Pearson.  Indeed,  as  theories  of  risk  and  fear 
suggest,  anxiety  is  today  more  pervasive  than  ever  before.  In  a  sense,  one  could  argue 
that  the  decline  of  political  ideologies  and  organisations  that  were  largely  class-based 
has  left  a  moral  and  political  vacuum  that,  in  part,  helps  to  explain  a  greater  sense  of 
unease  today.  This,  in  turn,  makes  elites  and  the  public  more  prone  to  panic. 
A  number  of  writers  have  also  noted  the  significance  of  an  'opposition'  to  the 
prevention  of  moral  panics  being  accepted  in  society.  The  contestation  of  ideas,  issues 
and  policies  is  a  major  barrier  to  the  establishment  of  certain  concerns  becoming 
institutionalised  and  unquestioningly  accepted  in  society.  The  significance  of  crime  as 
a  'social  problem'  within  politics  is  today  accepted  and,  as  has  been  shown,  is 
something  that  has  been  increasingly  accepted,  indeed  promoted,  by  the  liberal  press 
and  by  radical  writers.  While  overt  'authoritarian'  policies  are  still  questioned  today, 
as  we  shall  go  on  to  show,  framed  within  a  discussion  about  victims  and  safety,  crime 
and  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives  are  more  difficult  to  challenge. 
54 Although  the  term  moral  panic  and  then  amoral  panic  have  been  used  throughout  this 
chapter,  in  a  society  where  a  sense  of  risk  and  anxiety  are  more  general,  the  term  panic 
becomes  less  useful.  Panics  may  occur,  but  these  panics,  unlike  in  the  past,  take  place 
in  an  already  nervous  climate.  Rather  than  panics  coming  and  going,  they  are  ever- 
present  -  or  at  least  are  less  of  a  divergence  from  the  norm.  Whereas  in  1960s  Britain, 
society's  level  of  anxiety  was  relatively  low  and  panics  can  be  seen  as  a  significant 
increase  in  this  level  of  anxiety,  in  the  1990s  and  still  today  the  level  of  anxiety  is high 
and  panics  appear  as  a  relatively  small.  deviation  from  this  general  state  of  affairs. 
Various  terms  will  be  used  from  here  on  in,  simply  to  avoid  repetition:  however  the 
idea  of  'amoral  anxieties'  comes  closest  to  the  themes  that  will  be  addressed. 
Moving  on  to  address  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  -  the  Hamilton  curfew  will  be 
examined  with  reference  to  the  above  theoretical  considerations.  However,  before 
examining  the  Hamilton  curfew  that  was  launched  under  the  New  Labour  government 
in  1997,  the  transformation  of  politics  and  the  emergence  of  the  'politics  of  behaviour' 
is  addressed  to  illustrate  how  antisocial  behaviour  was  made  into  a  social  problem  in 
the  1990s. 
55 Chapter  3:  Institutionalising  Vulnerability: 
The  Politics  of  Antisocial  Behaviour 
Our  country  faces  two  major  threats.  One  comes  from  international  terrorism,  the 
otherfrom  neighbourhood  terrorists  (The  Economist  22  July  2004). 
Introduction 
The  above  quote  from  the  outspoken  Labour  MP  Frank  Field  gives  a  sense  of  the 
problems  it  is  assumed  people  face  in  their  daily  lives.  The  terrorists  Field  is  talking 
about  are  not  organised  gangs  of  criminals,  but  antisocial  youth. 
The  problem  of  antisocial  behaviour  had  comparatively  little  political  significance 
until  the  1990s  yet  within  a  decade,  curfews  had  been  introduced,  Antisocial 
Behaviour  Orders  (ASBOs)  developed,  and  community  safety  was  established  as  a 
core  framework  directing  the  operation  of  local  authorities.  But  why?  Had  young 
people  suddenly  become  little  terrorists  in  the  sp  ace  of  one  generation,  or  was  there 
some  other  explanation  for  the  rise  of  this  social  problem? 
Antisocial  behaviour  has  become  a  major  national  political  issue  that  unites  all  the 
political  parties.  Often  assumed  to  be  simply  a  'real'  problem  for  local  people  -  one 
that  politicians  have  subsequently  engaged  with  -  this  chapter  argues  that  the  rise  of 
concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  must  also  be  understood  as  an  expression  of  the 
rise  of  amoral  anxieties  across  society. 
Due  to  the  vast  array  of  issues  that  are  today  labelled  as  being  antisocial,  and  also  due 
to  the  central  role  that  politics  and  politicians  have  had  in  promoting  issues  associated 
with  antisocial  behaviour,  rather  than  studying  individual  issues  of  antisocial 
behaviour  -  rowdiness,  dropping  litter,  and  so  on  -  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  general 
concern  about  antisocial  behaviour  and  the  changing  nature  of  politics  to  help  explain 
why  this  new  social  problem  emerged  at  the  time  it  did.  In  brief,  this  study  examines 
the  change  within  politics  from  a  macro  and  ideologically  based  approach  to  society, 
56 to  a  micro  form  of  'politics  of  behaviour'.  A  number  of  trends  identified  above,  the 
decline  of  ideology,  the  fragmentation  of  society  or  the  emergence  of  therapeutic 
governance,  all  have  a  long  history  and  are  not  specific  to  late  twentieth  century  life. 
However,  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  a  number  of  these  trends  were  become  more 
apparent  and  resulted  in  a  clearly  defined  transformation  not  only  of  politics  but  of  the 
relationship  between  politics,  the  state  and  the  public. 
Following  the  approach  of  moral  panic  theorists  and  social  constructionists,  the 
starting  point  for  this  chapter  is  to  look  at  what  have  become  the  unchallenged  values 
of  late  twentieth  century  life 
,  and  ask,  how  does  this  influence  the  formation  of  social 
problems,  and  therefore  what  issues  became  politicised  at  this  time?  With  the  decline 
of  both  the  moral  and  political  traditions  represented  within  the  two  major  political 
parties  of  the  UK  -  in  other  words,  with  the  deterioration  of  any  dynamic  system  of 
beliefs  -  the  question  is  raised,  what  impact  did  this  have  on  the  political  elite  and 
how  was  this  reflected  in  the  changing  relationship  between  the  public  and  the  state? 
Having  started  with  a  concern  about  the  introduction  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  in  1997, 
here  the  period  prior  to  this  is  examined  to  help  understand  how  and  why  antisocial 
behaviour  and  issues  relating  to  individual  safety  became  so  prominent  and  laid  the 
basis  for  this  initiative.  The  impact  that  the  emergence  of  an  'amoral',  and  'apolitical', 
elite  had  in  helping  both  to  form  and  engage  with  the  vulnerable  public  is  examined 
through  the  rise  of  the  politics  of  antisocial  behaviour. 
The  transformation  of  the  Labour  party,  represented  in  its  approach  to  law  and  order, 
is  often  interpreted  as  an  example  of  New  Labour's  move  to  the  right.  Below  it  is 
argued  that,  in  fact,  notions  of  left  and  right  have  little  meaning  today  and  that  the 
ideologically-based  politics  of  the  1980s  have  been  replaced  by  a  kind  of  micro 
politics,  which  emerged  under  Conservative  leader  John  Major,  but  has  been  more 
systematically  developed  by  the  Labour  governments  since  1997.  This  is  a  politics 
that  reacts  to  events  rather  than  forming  them:  a  politics  in  a  panic. 
The  emergence  of  the  politics  of  antisocial  behaviour,  and  the  political  engagement 
with  the  'vulnerable  public'  described  below,  is  understood  as  a  development 
57 stemming  from  the  loss  of  a  sense  of  social  progress  and  ideological  engagement 
within  the  political  elite,  and  between  political  parties  and  the  electorate.  35  Here  we 
explore  the  impact  that  the  intensified  loss  of  political  purpose  in  the  UK  had  upon  the 
politics  of  crime  through  the  1990s  following  the  decline  of  the  Labour  movement  and 
the  exhaustion  of  Thatcherism. 
In  tracing  the  transforming  rhetoric  and  policy  proposals  relating  to  crime  and 
antisocial  behaviour  the  emergence  of  the  centrality  of  'victims'  of  crime  and  the 
vulnerable  public  is  explored  -  with  particular  reference  to  the  example  of  the 
construction  of  the  social  problem  of  'aggressive  beggars'  and  the  increasing  centrality 
of  'conununity  safety'  as  an  organising  principle  for  local  authorities. 
Having  established  the  changing  framework  within  which  crime  and  antisocial 
behaviour  was  understood,  the  role  of  feminist  and  radical  criminology  is  explored  to 
help  explain  the  influence  of  the  'left'  in  this  process.  The  emergence  of  the  victim  in 
intellectual  and  political  thought,  it  is  argued,  represented  not  simpiy  a  change  to  the 
policy  framework  in  the  UK,  but  a  more  profound  transformation  in  the  role  of 
subjectivity  within  politics,  reflected  in  the  loss  of  a  sense  of  a  'public',  and  the 
emergence  of  a  newly  formed  relationship  between  a  hollow  political  centre  and  an 
atomised  electorate. 
Ultimately  the  emergence  of  the  'vulnerable  public'  is  understood  as  a  reflection  of  the 
loss  of  a  sense  of  subjective  or  human  possibilities  within  a  period  of  cultural 
pessimism  represented  by  thinkers  on  both  the  left  and  the  right.  The  centrality  of 
antisocial  behaviour  within  the  discourse  of  crime  is  therefore  seen  as  a  by-product  of 
this  political  mood  (Feeley  2003:  127),  a  mood  that  has  created  a  government  strategy 
within  which  people  are  no  longer  governed  as  part  of  a  social  citizenry  (Rose  1996: 
327). 
The  emergence  of  what  is  most  accurately  understood  as  an  isolated  and  anxious  anti- 
'social'  elite  helps  explain  the  political  preoccupation  with  antisocial  'terrorists'. 
58 The  emergence  of  Labour  as  the  new  party  of  law  and  order  is  mapped  out  and  the 
transformation  of  its  approach  to  crime  contrasted  with  the  more  'political'  approach 
of  the  Conservatives  -a  politics  which  ran  out  of  steam  in  the  early  1990s  and 
resulted  in  an  even  more  authoritarian  and  technical  approach  to  crime  and  policing.  36 
Ultimately,  the  argument  presented  below  suggests  that  while  the  preoccupation  with 
crime  had  a  basis  in  the  rising  crime  figures,  it  is  not  any  rise  in  crime  and  antisocial 
behaviour  that  explains  the  development  of  these  issues  as  social  problems.  Rather  it 
is  the  changing  political,  cultural  and  ideological  engagement  with  an  individuated 
public  that  is  central  to  this  development,  and  the  transformation  in  the  relationship 
between  institutions  and  an  anxious  public. 
The  political  context  -  Thatcher's  confrontation 
The  Conservative  Party  throughout  the  1970s  and  1980s  helped  to  fan  the  flames  of 
fear  with  regard  to  the  'problem'  of  crime.  Many  social  and  political  issues  were 
discussed  within  the  context  of  a  problem  of  'law  and  order';  indeed  the  1970 
Conservative  government  was  the  first  to  identify  itself  specifically  as  the  party  of  law 
and  order  (Pitts  1988).  Describing  the  Tory  approach  to  crime,  Phipps  noted: 
Firstly,  it  became  conflated  with  a  number  of  other  issues  whose  connection 
was  continually  reinforced  in  the  public  mind  -  permissiveness,  youth  cultures, 
demonstrations,  public  disorders,  black  immigration,  student  unrest,  and  trade 
union  militancy  (Hall  1978).  Secondly,  crime  -  by  now  a  metaphorical  term 
invoking  the  decline  of  social  stability  and  decent  values  -  was  presented  as 
only  one  aspect  of  a  bitter  harvest  for  which  Labour's  brand  of  social 
democracy  and  welfarism  was  responsible.  (Phipps  1988:  179) 
The  typical  criminals  in  question  were  'outsiders',  the  violent  trade  union  member  or 
the  young  black  mugger.  Traditional  British  values  and  individual  freedoms  were 
contrasted  to  the  collectivist,  promiscuous  values  of  the  'enemy  within'  (Milne  1995: 
26).  Even  burglars  were  understood  as  being  part  of  the  'something  for  nothing 
society'.  Here  the  'criminal',  either  the  trade  union  member  or  the  burglar,  was  not  a 
59 victim  but  an  immoral  actor  and  the  damage  being  done  was  not  centrally  to  the 
victim  of  crime,  but  to  the  economy  and  moral  values  of  society  as  a  whole. 
Social  control  and  public  order  were  promoted  within  both  a  political  and  moral 
framework  in  which  the  deviant  in  question  was  likewise  understood  to  have  certain 
political  or  moral  traits  that  needed  to  be  confronted.  37  The  responsibility  for  cutting 
crime  was  seen  as  not  simply  that  of  the  government  or  police,  but  also  that  of  the 
public,  who,  it  was  argued,  should  take  action  to  defend  themselves  (Conservative 
Manifesto  1987).  This,  after  all,  was  a  government  that  promoted  the  idea  of  the 
strong  individual,  telling  unemployed  people  to  get  on  their  bike  and  find  work. 
The  idea  of  'restoring  people  to  independence  and  self  reliance',  as  Thatcher  put  it, 
meant  that  despite  the  attacks  on  the  rights  of  pickets  or  demonstrators,  the  notion  of 
the  'rights'  and  'freedoms'  of  'law  abiding  citizens'  continued  to  influence  Tory 
policies  (Thatcher  1995:  7).  Demonstrators  and  militants  were  criminalised  and  their 
freedoms  curtailed  within  the  discourse  of  'Public  order',  but  wider  law  and  order 
policies  continued  to  be  influenced  and  somewhat  curtailed  by  a  certain  libertarianism 
within  the  ranks  of  the  Conservative  Party. 
The  legacy  of  'Thatcher's  decade',  the  1980s,  is  often  felt  still  to  be  with  us  today. 
Individuals  are  often  portrayed  as  being  'greedy'  (Wilkinson  and  Mulgan  1995)  and 
living  in  an  era  where  neo-liberalism  is  dominant  (Fukuyama  1992).  However,  in 
hindsight  the  strength  of  the  Thatcherite  ideology  appears  to  be  more  of  a  myth  than  a 
reality  and'was  something  the  Conservative  Party  itself  instinctively  recognised  in 
1990  when  Margaret  Thatcher  lost  the  leadership  of  the  party  and  the  country. 
As  the  Conservative  Party  continues  today  into  a  relative  state  of  disarray,  it  appears 
that  the  key  to  Thatcher's  success  was  less  in  relation  to  an  internally  coherent 
ideology  than  to  the  failings  of  the  welfare  state.  Rather  than  representing  a  dynamic 
movement,  in  this  respect,  1980s  Conservatism  should  be  understood  as  a  more 
negatively  based  political  approach  that  gained  its  strength  through  its  opposition  to 
the  Labour  movement  (Heartfield  2002:  170).  Despite  the  decline  of  Labourism  at 
home  and  of  the  Soviet  Union  abroad,  the  'victory'  of  the  right  was  consequently 
60 short-lived.  In  spite  of  the  defeat  of  the  left,  the  political  and  cultural  victory  of  the 
free  market  right  is  far  less  obvious;  and  indeed  the  idea  that  the  right  lost  the  'culture 
wars'  has  become  more  accepted  today,  especially  in  the  US  (Schneider  2003:  430).  38 
Even  the  moral  renewal  witnessed  with  the  rise  of  'Victorian  values'  in  the  1980s 
appears  to  have  little  significance.  As  explored  above,  moralising  may  have  increased, 
but  outside  of  a  traditional  moral  framework.  The  Family  has  been  replaced  by  an 
acceptance  of  families;  abortion  remains  contested  but  is  largely  accepted  as  part  of 
modem  life;  the  question  of  homosexuality,  rather  than  being  challenged  by  the  elite, 
is  more  likely  to  undermine  traditional  institutions  like  the  church;  and  the  capacity  of 
government  to  use  a  nationalistic  Talklands  factor'  to  win  an  election  is  far  more 
limited. 
Examining  Sex  and  Politics  in  the  1980s,  Martin  Durham  notes  that  despite  much 
rhetoric  and  the  publicly-vocal  moral  campaigners  of  this  decade,  the 
institutionalisation  of  measures  to  uphold  moral  family  values  remained  limited.  The 
New  Right  were  not  the  same  as  the  moralists,  Durham  argues  -  something  the 
feminist  and  Communist  Bea  Campbell  argued  at  the  time  (Durham  1991:  142).  Key 
to  the  New  Right  was  an  agreement  that  they  were  'against  socialism',  but  there  was 
'far  less  agreement  about  what  it  was  for'  (1991:  143). 
For  this  chapter,  Thatcher  is  understood  at  one  level  to  be  the  last  Politician  -  in  the 
sense  that  her  government  had  a  sense  of  purpose  and  engaged  in  a  political  battle  in 
an  attempt  to  challenge  the  beliefs  of  the  adult  population.  In  the  context  of  the  fight 
against  the  'enemy  within',  many  policies  -  espeqially  in  relation  to  crime  -  were 
carried  out  within  this  politicised  framework.  This  contrasts  to  the  growing  use  of  law 
and  order  in  the  1990s,  where  the  direct  regulation  of  'behaviour'  replaced  any  sense 
of  the  role  of  politics  in  challenging  the  consciousness  of  the  electorate. 
However,  the  negative  basis  of  'class  war'  in  the  1980s  and  the  subsequent  decline  of 
conservatism  in  Britain,  once  the  Labour  movement  had  been  defeat,  suggests  that 
Thatcherism  carried  little  internal  ideological  weight  and  lacked  the  ability  to  develop 
a  new  outlook  for  society.  As  Furedi  notes,  in  this  respect  Thatcher's  notion  of  TINA 
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alternatives  to  the  market,  but  also  as  a  loss  of  political  imagination  by  the  elite  about 
politics  itself  and  its  capacity  to  direct  social  change  (Furedi  2005:  14). 
Perhaps  Thatcher  can  therefore  better  be  represented  as  the  last  economist,  rather  than 
the  last  politician  -  in  that  the  key  to  the  Conservative  success  was  the  promotion  of 
an  economic  alternative,  rather  than  a  coherent  political  one.  Indeed  the  promotion  of 
the  robust  entrepreneurial  individual  within  the  Conservative  Party  was  something  that 
clashed  with  much  of  the  overt  moral  campaigning  of  the  time  (Durham  1991:  152). 
More  significantly,  this  belief  in  the  capacity  of  the  free  individual  both  held  back  to 
some  degree  the  rise  of  the  'victim'  within  law  and  order  policies,  and  also  limited  the 
more  paternalistic,  or  'Nanny  State',  forms  of  regulation  that  emerged  in  the  1990s. 
Despite  this,  a  more  therapeutic  approach  was  also  developing  at  this  time  -  in  part 
due  to  its  individualistic  nature.  Victim  Support  Schemes  grew  and  were  being  well 
funded  by  the  government  as  another  strand  to  the  focus  on  law  and  order  (Maquire 
and  Pointing  1988).  However,  notwithstanding  this  financial  support,  victims  of  crime 
were  often  used  politically,  'paraded'  by  Conservative  politicians  and  by  sections  of 
the  media  as  a  'symbol  of  disorder',  not  as  the  central  focus  for  law  and  order  policy 
or  rhetoric  itself  (Phipps  1988:  180). 
Under  Margaret  Thatcher,  authoritarian  measures  were  developed  to  back  up  the  battle 
against  the  'enemy  within',  but  otherwise  crime,  policing  and  the  regulation  of 
behaviour  more  generally  was  of  little  political  significance.  This  class  struggle,  of 
which  the  politicisation  of  crime  was  a  part,  appears  to  have  given  a  certain  coherence 
to  the  conservative  political  elite  and  also  a  sense  of  political  purpose  in  the  1980s.  In 
the  1990s  however,  the  loss  of  this  cohering  sense  of  purpose  resulted  in  a  loss  of 
political  will,  and  the  consequent  increase  in  law  and  forms  of  regulation  to  control 
society  more  directly. 
62 Major  regulation 
Law  and  order  in  the  1980s  arguably  helped  to  develop  what  Heartfield  describes  as  a 
spolice  state'  (2002:  165).  However,  despite  the  increased  significance  of  law  and 
order  in  politics  at  this  time,  the  drive  to  control  society  directly  and  to  regulate  the 
behaviour  of  individuals  more  systematically  did  not  develop  until  the  1990s.  John 
Major's  premiership,  from  1990  to  1997,  saw  an  acceleration  of  new  laws,  forms  of 
policing  and  a  greater  use  of  prisons  than  any  time  since  the  Second  World  War.  This 
was  not,  however,  simply  a  continuation  of  Margaret  Tbatcher's  political 
authoritarianism,  but  was  a  qualitatively  different  shift  towards  a  more  technical  and 
capolitical'  attempt  to  regulate  society. 
Margaret  Thatcher  had  politicised  crime  in  the  1980s  and  developed  a  more 
authoritarian  society.  However,  within  this  confrontational  approach  remained  a 
political  attempt  to  win  the  'hearts  and  minds'  of  the  public  and  to  forge  a  new  era  for 
capitalist  development.  New  authoritarian  laws  were  developed  against,  'illegal 
immigrants'  (British  Nationality  Act  1981);  powers  were  developed  against  enemies 
of  the  state  through  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  Acts  (1984  and  1989),  and 
demonstrators,  pickets  and  marchers  were  regulated  more  directly  via  the  Public  Order 
Act  of  1986.  However,  more  broadly  in  society,  outside  of  these  'high  risk  groups', 
crime  and  the  general  everyday  antisocial  behaviour  of  individuals  was  of  far  less 
importance  -  at  least  in  terms  of  political  rhetoric  and  legal  sanction  -  than  it  was  to 
become  in  the  1990s.  39  Under  John  Major  society  as  a  whole  became  increasingly 
organised  around  crime  and  safety,  not  as  a  means  to  a  wider  political  end,  but  as  the 
end  itsetf 
In  1993  then  Home  Secretary  Michael  Howard  'broke  the  policy  of  a  century  by 
declaring  that  "Prison  works"'  (Dunbar  -  and  Langdon  1998:  115).  Prison  numbers, 
which  had  increased  between  1951  and  1991  by  only  11,000,  began  to  increase 
significantly  and  within  a  decade  a  further  25,000  people  had  been  imprisoned 
(Guardian  14  October  2005).  Similarly,  the  number  of  children  under  the  age  of  18  in 
the  prison  system  has  more  than  doubled  since  1993  . 
40  Howard  argued  that  the 
criminal  justice  system  needed  to  be  transformed  from  a  system  concerned  with  the 
63 criminal  to  one  based  on  the  protection  of  the  public,  and,  as  Dunbar  and  Langdon 
note: 
Both  penal  policy  and  relations  between  government  and  judiciary  had  been 
changed  far  more  within  the  lifetime  of  the  Major  administration  than  had 
happened  at  any  of  the  changes  of  government  since  the  end  of  the  Second 
World  War,  at  least  (Dunbar  and  Langdon  1998:  2). 
Rather  than  using  law  and  order  to  crusade  and  battle  the  'enemy  within',  John  Major 
in  1993  simply  promoted  a  'crusade  against  crime'  (Dunbar  and  Langdon  1998:  115). 
Now  the  focus  was  placed  upon  a  different  section  of  the  working  class,  the 
'underclass'  and  teenage  criminals  -  joy  riders  and  persistent  young  offenders. 
Subsequently,  laws  were  introduced  that  created  'a  new  generation  of  child  prisoners', 
returning  the  British  Criminal  Justice  System  'not 
...  to  the  1970s  but  to  a  period 
preceding  the  Children  Act  1908'  (Goldson  1997:  30). 
Contrasting  Thatcher's  promotion  of  moral  values  with  the  approach  of  John  Major, 
Hugo  Young  observed  that  the  'Victorian  values,  to  which  she  pledged  herself,  were 
essentially  an  economic  rule-book  for  individualists,  reminding  them  that  thrift  and 
self-help  were  the  necessary  accompaniments  to  both  individual  and  national 
prosperity'.  Rarely,  Young  notes,  did  Thatcher  'posit  a  social  order  handed  down  from 
above'.  Behaviour  of  the  individual  deviant  was  often  challenged  within  a  political 
context,  but  the  direct  focus  upon  individual  behaviour  in  itself  was  less  of  an  issue  for 
Thatcher  than  it  was  to  become  under  John  Major  -  or  at  least,  it  was  not  seen  as 
something  that  could  be  enforced  by  the  state.  However,  as  Young  remarked  in 
relation  to  Major's  promotion  of  'family  values': 
It  is  a  disciplinary  slogan,  voiced  in  ministerial  rhetoric  which  excoriates 
parents  for  their  slack  attitudes,  and  single  parents  for  even  existing.  Far  from 
there  being  no  such  thing  as  society,  the  component  members  of  society  need 
to  be  told  to  brace  up  and  take  their  social  responsibilities  for  what  goes  on 
around  them,  whether  through  ill-trained  children,  negligent  pastors, 
unwatchful  neighbours  or  other  agents  of  a  failed  community.  The  manual  to 
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behaviour,  clothing  and  discipline  in  schools,  marks  another  stride  towards  a 
society  upon  which  Major's  ministers,  more  and  more  desperate  to  achieve 
social  control,  are  trying  to  impose  standards  which  they,  at  the  centre,  define 
(Guardian  4  January  1994). 
The  increasing  use  of  law  to  enforce  moral  behaviour,  and  of  prison  to  lock  more 
people  up,  indicated,  not  the  rise  of  the  moral  right,  but  rather  its  demise.  Now  more 
than  ever,  law  and  order  became  the  'only  effective  deterrent  in  a  society  that  no 
longer  [knew]  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong'  (Lasch  1977:  187). 
By  1993,  as  noted  previously,  the  capacity  of  the  conservative  elite  to  promote 
traditional  moral  values  had  become  highly  problematic,  and  despite  its  continued 
attack  on  the  'underclass'  and  on  single  parents,  the  moralising  language  of  the  Tory 
leadership  was  coming  under  attack  even  from  conservative  sympathisers.  The 
cohering  political  framework  provided  by  the  'militant  scroungers'  had  disappeared  - 
although  it  remained  a  framework  that,  to,  some  degree,  the  Conservative  Party 
continued  to  use  in  developing  its  policies  on  crime.  Even  the  economic  basis  of  the 
Tories'  success  was  in  disarray,  to  the  extent  that  the  government  was  described  as 
being  'permanently  destabilised'  following  the  country's  enforced  departure  from  the 
European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  in  1992  (Dunbar  and  Langdon  1998:  2). 
'Thatcher's  propaganda  war'  had  focused  on  issues  of  'trade  union  power,  left-wing 
extremism,  law  and  order,  British  chauvinism  and  Victorian  values'  (Richards  and 
Freeman  1988:  98).  Despite  Major's  continued  attempt  to  use  these  'zombie'  issues  in 
the  1990s,  in  reality  the  'class  war'  was  over,  while  'traditional  British  values'  were  in 
decline  -  all  that  remained  was  the  issue  of  law  and  order.  Following  Major's  failed 
attempt  to  promote  the  moralistic  'back  to  basics'  campaign  in  1993,  law  and  order 
became  increasingly  central  as  the  framework  for  political  debate  and  social  policy 
developments.  This  reflected  not  simply  the  loss  of  any  wider  political  imagination 
amongst  the  Conservatives,  but  also,  having  lost  the  economic  and  political  dynamic 
of  the  eighties,  the  political  elite  arguably  developed  an  internal  sense  of  society  being 
out  of  control.  In  this  respect  the  emerging  rhetoric  about  the  'yob  culture',  the  drive 
65 to  develop  CCTV  cameras,  and  the  increasing  prison  numbers  and  laws  to  deal  with 
crime,  was  not  simply  to  engage  the  more  individuated  fears  of  the  public,  but 
reflected  a  state  of  political  panic.  Lacking  a  solution  to  existing  social  problems, 
social  control  became  an  end  in  itself,  and  laws  and  the  police  replaced  moral  and 
political  arguments  as  resources  for  dealing  with  these  problems.  At  this  time,  the 
focus  for  attention  moved  from  the  ideas  and  beliefs  of  the  adult  population  onto  the 
'behaviour'  of  children  and  young  people. 
The  increasingly  direct  regulation  of  society  under  John  Major,  and  in  particular  the 
growing  focus  on  the  behaviour  of  children  and  young  people,  indicated  a  certain  shift 
away  from  any  attempt  to  engage  with  the  subjectivity  of  adults  and  a  loss  of  belief  in 
political  and  economic  possibilities.  As  Graef  notes,  at  this  point  in  time,  the  enemy  of 
the  'miners  of  the  mid  1980s  [was]  replaced  by  the  minors  of  the  mid  1990s'  (Graef 
1995  quoted  in  Scratton  1997:  134).  The  idea  of  sovereign  individuals  having  to  come 
into  the  moral  fold,  despite  Major's  moral  rhetoric,  was  actually  being  side-stepped  by 
the  Conservative  leadership  and  undermined  by  laws  that  attempted  to  enforce  this. 
The  increased  regulation  of  society  in  this  respect  became  the  solution  offered  to  the 
fragmented  and  insecure  public  that  emerged  out  of  the  Thatcher  years,  but  also  was 
the  solution  for  the  political  elite  who  lacked  any  wider  political  framework  for 
directing  society.  Politicians  now  engaged  with  people's  fears  not  to  promote  an 
alternative  political  solution  but  simply  to  engage  with  the  more  individuated  fear  of 
crime  and  regulate  more  directly  a  society  that  felt  out  of  their  control. 
The  'freedom  of  the  individual'  that  was,  at  least  rhetorically,  promoted  in  the  1980s 
was  becoming  less  important  for  the  Conservatives  than  the  desire  to  enforce 
responsible  behaviour  of  individuals.  With  social  control  as  a  central  aim  for  politics, 
the  personal  behaviour  of  individuals  was  increasingly  politicised  and  the  'politics  of 
behaviour'  emerged. 
From  the  1980s  on,  the  Conservative  party  had  used  moral  rhetoric  and  developed  law 
and  order  as  both  a  tool  with  which  to  beat  the  left,  but  also  as  a  way  to  promote  an 
alternative  norm,  a  new  social  vision  for  Britain.  As  argued  above,  much  of  the  moral 
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however,  traditional  institutions  like  the  family  and  the  nation  were  central  to  the 
rhetoric  of  1980s  Conservatives.  By  the  early  1990s,  however,  the  defeat  of  the  labour 
movement  had  created  a  far  more  fragmented  society,  while  the  cohering  basis  of  the 
nation  and  the  family  was  in  decline.  At  this  point  in  time,  the  law  and  order  policies 
of  the  Conservatives  changed  under  John  Major  and  a  more  systematic  and  diffuse 
form  of  regulation  emerged.  Major  continued  to  frame  much  of  his  crime  'crusade' 
within  the  political  rhetoric  of  the  past:  however,  moral  pontificating  about  single 
parents,  and  law  and  order  initiatives  targeted  at  ravers  and  the  underclass  based  on  a 
watered  down  form  of  'class  war',  could  no  longer  cohere  the  conservative  elite,  or 
engage  the  public  as  it  once  had.  It  was  New  Labour  who  were  able  to  engage  more 
systematically  with  the  fragmented  and  'vulnerable'  public  outside  of  the  old  moral 
and  political  framework  of  the  1980s,  and  were  able  to  become  the  new  party  of  law 
and  order. 
New  party  of  law  and  order 
As  with  the  emergence  of  amoral  anxieties,  the  shift  from  the  politics  of  crime  to  the 
politics  of  behaviour  was  developed  most  coherently  by  those  from  the  left  of  the 
political  spectrum.  With  the  decline  of  the  labour  movement  and  the  welfare  state  as  a 
framework  for  government  to  organise  society  and  engage  with  the  public,  a  new  basis 
for  policy  development  and  public  legitimacy  was  sought.  Having  jettisoned  its 
relationship  with  'old'  Labour  and  without  the  libertarian  outlook  of  sections  of  the 
right,  the  new  Labour  leadership  was  able  to  reengage  more  systematically  with 
individuals  via  their  sense  of  fear  and  anxiety. 
Labour's  ability  to  engage  with  the  idea  of  victimhood  -  often  framed  with  reference 
to  'vulnerable  groups'  -  was  coupled  with  their  condemnation  of  the  greedy  individual 
of  the  1980s,  and  helped  to  develop  both  a  more  authoritarian  and  more  'caring' 
therapeutic  approach  to  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour.  In  adopting  the  individually- 
focused  concerns  expressed  through  the  underclass  debate,  crime  was  accepted  by 
Labour  as  being  more  of  a  behavioural  than  a  structural  question  (Revell  and 
Heartfield  1996:  177).  However,  this  focus  on  behaviour  was  to  emerge  with  a  more 
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Charles  Murray.  Individual  rights  were  defended  -  but  these  rights  were  redefined  as 
rights  of  protection  from  others  and  from  fear.  Right-wing  authoritarianism  and 
attacks  on  the  poor  and  'vulnerable'  were  now  replaced  with  the  defence  of  the  poor 
and  vulnerable  as  victims  of  crime.  Tapping  into  the  culture  of  fear  and  promoting  the 
new  'morality'  of  safety,  Labour  were  successful  in  presenting  themselves  as  the  new 
party  of  law  and  order  who  could  tackle  the  more  widespread  'epidemic'  of  crime  and 
disorder  and  in  so  doing  protect  the  vulnerable  public. 
The  1997  General  Election  brought  the  first  Labour  government  to  power  since  1979. 
It  was  also  the  first  time  the  now  'New'  Labour  Party  made  crime  a  major  issue  within 
its  manifesto  (Downes  and  Morgan  1997).  In  the  Labour  Party  document  Tackling  the 
causes  of  crime:  Labour's  proposals  to  prevent  crime  and  criminality,  the  extent  of 
the  problem  of  crime  and  the  importance  of  overcoming  the  fear  of  it  were  explained 
thus:  'Tackling  the  epidemic  of  crime  and  disorder  will  be  a  top  priority  for  Labour  in 
government'  (Labour  1996:  4)  -  and  -  'Securing  people's  physical  security,  freeing 
them  from  the  fear  of  crime  and  disorder  is  the  greatest  liberty  government  can 
guarantee'(Labour  1996:  6  (my  italics)). 
Before  the  1997  election  -  at  least  within  Labour  Party  manifestos  -  crime  had  been 
either  ignored  or  associated  with  wider  'social'  issues.  As  the  Guardian  noted, 
comparing  former  Labour  Party  leader  Neil  Kinnock  with  Tony  Blair: 
There  are  areas  where  Neil  Kinnock's  manifesto  barely  ventured.  In  1992, 
crime,  for  instance,  rated  five  paragraphs  and  mainly  concentrated  on 
improving  street  lighting.  Now  law  and  order  rates  two  pages  with  the  now 
familiar  "zero  tolerance"  strategies  and  child  curfews  fighting  for  room  next  to 
pledges  to  early  legislation.  for  a  post-Dunblane  ban  on  all  hand  guns.  Such 
policies  seemed  unthinkable  five  years  ago.  However,  in  this  case,  Blair's 
"radicalisnf'  -  with  its  social  authoritarian  tinge  -  may  play  better  with  the 
centre  rather  than  the  Left  (The  Guardian  4  April  1997). 
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major  speech  attacking  'crime  and  the  causes  of  crime'.  Here  both  crime  and  'chronic' 
antisocial  behaviour  were  targeted  and  subsequently  a  'zero  tolerance'  approach  to 
antisocial  behaviour  was  proclaimed  and  the  Labour  leadership  moved  to  distance 
itself  from  the  notion  of  crime  and  delinquency  being  directly  associated  with 
inequality.  A  'Quiet  Life'  from  nuisance  neighbours  and  aggressive  beggars  was 
proposed,  and  the  idea  of  curfews  for  young  children  aired.  When  the  Conservative 
government  announced  a  version  of  the  US  policy  of  'three  strikes  and  you're  out', 
and  Jack  Straw,  Labour's  Shadow  Home  Secretary  accepted  this  policy,  a  clear  'break 
with  past  Labour  policy'  was  established  (Downes  and  Morgan  1997:  100-6). 
In  Labour's  Partners  against  Crime,  produced  in  1993,  the  shift  in  their  approach  to 
law  and  order  issues  was  clarified.  Serious  acts  of  violence  that  'hit  the  headlines',  as 
well  as  daily  burglaries,  car  crime,  abuse  and  petty  vandalism,  helped  to  'make  life 
hell',  it  was  argued,  especially  for  the  poor  and  the  vulnerable.  Crime  was  now 
understood  by  the  emerging  New  Labour  leadership  as  not  a  transitory  occurrence  but 
as  an  endemic  part  of  life  that  both  undermined  communities  and  individuals  sense  of 
well  being  (Labour  1993).  One  problem  identified  by  the  Partners  against  Crime 
paper  was  that  of  eroding  confidence  in  the  criminal  justice  system.  The  government, 
it  argued,  had  been  'thoughtless,  insensitive'  and  'cruel'  in  their  treatment  of  victims 
of  crime  and  the  solution  to  this  insensitivity  is  to  make  'the  whole  of  the  criminal 
justice  system  become  more  victim  focused'  (1993:  22). 
By  incorporating  the  fear  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  in  the  discussion  of  crime, 
New  Labour  understood  there  to  be  a  'chronic'  'epidemic'  of  crime  and  disorder.  The 
logic  of  this  approach  was  that  the  entire  population  became  conceptualised  as 
potential  'victims  of  crime'. 
Focused  on  the  public  as  potential  victims  of  crime,  the  concern  was  with  the 
'damage'  done  to  individuals  -  the  'fear'  and  'misery'  caused  by  a  'life  of  hell'.  Rather 
than  the  moral,  political  or  economic  concerns  about  crime,  here  a  central  focus 
-  became  the  emotional  damage  being  done  to  individuals  and  communities. 
Consequently  the  orientation  of  the  criminal  justice  system  shifted  and  a  more 
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greatest  liberty  New  Labour  could  bring  to  the  public  was  to  free  people  from  the  fear 
of  crime  and  disorder.  By  being  thoughtful,  sensitive  and  caring,  the  victims  of  crime 
would  thus  regain  a  trust  in  the  criminal  justice  system  and  indeed  in  the  Labour  Party 
itself. 
In  this  respect,  New  Labour  had  not  simply  moved  away  from  'Old'  Labour's 
understanding  of  crime,  but  had  also  moved  on  from  the  Conservative  understanding 
of  the  problem.  An  example  of  this  change  can  be  seen  within  the  debate  abouf 
aggressive  beggars. 
'Aggressive'  begging 
The  concern  about  victims  of  crime  had  developed  within  politics  from  the  1980s. 
However  the  centrality  of  the  victim  to  Labour's  campaigning  around  law  and  order 
only  emerged  in  the  mid  1990s,  and  was  expressed  explicitly  by  Shadow  Home 
Secretary  Jack  Straw  when  he  launched  an  attack  on  'aggressive  begging'  in  1995 
(Guardian  5  September  1995). 
The  question  of  street  begging  had  been  raised  a  year  earlier  by  Prime  Minister  John 
Major  during  a  European  Election.  Major,  whose  'personal  rating  [had]  plummeted  to 
record  lows  following  the  [economic]  debacle  of  Black  Wednesday',  attempted  to 
raise  his  profile  and  support  by  attacking  street  beggars  as  an  eyesore  (Times  3  June 
1994). 
It  was  not  until  May  1994  that  the  issue  of  'aggressive  begging'  became  a  national 
political  issue  and  thus  a  recognised,  if  contested,  social  problem.  Major's  attack  on 
begging  was  seen  as  a  European  election  stunt  to  gain  popular  appeal  from  the  right. 
However  a  year  later,  to  the  surprise  of  many  traditional  left  and  liberal  supporters  of 
Labour,  the  shadow  home  secretary  Jack  Straw,  using  American  labels,  attacked 
'aggressive  begging  of  winos,  addicts  and  squeegee  merchants'  (Guardian  5 
September  1995) 
. 
41  The  attack  by  the  shadow  home  secretary  was  linked  to  John 
Major's  'understand  a  little  less  -  condemn  a  little  more'  outlook,  developed  by  the 
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John  Major  and  his  Chancellor  Kenneth  Clarke  had  attacked  the  problem  of  begging 
using  the  political  rhetoric  of  the  1980s,  as  a  problem  of  'welfare  cheats',  Jack  Straw 
was  not  concerned  with  the  act  of  begging  so  much  as  the  aggressive  behaviour  that 
came  with  it. 
By  the  time  the  election  year  of  1997  came  around,  the  soon-to-be  Prime  Minister, 
Tony  Blair  had  elaborated  on  the  typical  and  problematic  beggar.  This  was  not  a  man 
quietly  scrounging  money  off  the  public,  but  the  often  drunken  'in-your-face'  lout 
who  would  'push  people  against  a  wall  and  demand  money  effectively  with  menace' 
(Guardian  II  January  1997). 
In  this  new  offensive  against  street  disorder,  New  Labour  redefined  begging:  not  as  an 
offence  against  the  laws  of  society,  or  a  political  or  social  problem  of  welfare  cheats, 
as  the  Conservative  leadership  had  done,  but  specifically  as  an  offence  against  the 
public  sense  of  'well  being'.  Rather  than  the  criminal  act  of  begging  being  defined  as 
the  scrounging  of  money  by  those  already  receiving  benefits,  the  problem  was 
relocated  onto  the  non-criminal  attitude  and  behaviour  of  the  beggars  and  the 
assumed  reaction  of  the  public. 
The  public  was  presented  as  being  victimised  by  the  aggressiveness  of  the  beggars, 
and  described  by  Jack  Straw  and  Tony  Blair  as  being  'intimidated',  'harassed'  and 
'bullied'  by  the  'incivility'  and  'loutish'  behaviour  of  -  these  beggars.  Straw, 
appropriating  a  well-worn  feminist  slogan,  demanded  that  we  'reclaim  the  streets'  - 
streets  that  had  been  'brutalised'  by  beggars  and  graffiti  vandals. 
In  this  respect,  the  shift  in  Labour  policy  was  less  of  an  authoritarian  move  towards 
'public  order'  where  a  problematic  and  unlawful  group  are  identified  and  punished. 
Rather  Straw's  concern  was  with  a  disordered  public.  It  was  the  intimidation  of  the 
public  that  was  of  concern.  It  was  not  so  much  a  move  to  defend  the  law  and  order  of 
societY  itself,  so  much  as  an  attempt  to  advocate  on  behalf  of  the  individual  victims  of 
this  form  of  harassment. 
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or  one  being  campaigned  around  by  politicians  -  indeed  the  term  itself  did  not  even 
exist  at  a  public  level.  By  the  time  of  the  election  year,  1997,  the  notion  of  aggressive 
beggars  harassing  the  public  was  established.  In  opposition  to  this  development, 
adopting  an  equally  victim-centred  defence  of  beggars,  homeless  charities  argued  that 
the  homeless  were  even  more  vulnerable  and  more  likely  to  be  victimised  than  to  be 
victimisers.  However  if  the  problem  for  homeless  people  was  also  that  of  antisocial 
behaviour,  then  the  need  to  resolve  this  problem  -  whether  of  public  or  homeless 
antisocial  behaviour  -  was  accepted.  As  Jack  Straw  pointed  out,  his  concern  was  with 
the  'liberty  of  victims'  whoever  they  may  be  (The  Guardian  9  September  1995). 
The  politicisation  and  problematisation  of  aggressive  begging  was  dependant  upon  an 
outlook  that  understood  the  problem  of  crime  as  one  of  incivility  that  undermined  the 
public's  feeling  of  security,  and  with  this  a  focus  on  the  victims  of  antisocial 
behaviour  was  central.  The  justification  for  'government  at  century's  end'  was  here 
based  not  on  a  political  battle  between  those  for  or against  welfarism,  but  on  a  more 
therapeutically-oriented  relationship  with  the  public  (Nolan  1998).  The  connection 
between  the  individual  and  the  state  was  now  more  direct  and  based  less  on  the 
collective  will  of  the  people  represented  in  the  laws  of  society  than  in  the  protection  of 
the  atomised  individual's  emotional  well-being. 
New  Labour  and  community  safety 
The  example  of  the  aggressive  beggar  is  useful  in  that  it  indicates  the  attempt  by  New 
Labour  to  change  their  relationship  with  the  public  and  develop  a  form  of  advocacy  to 
engage  the  more  fearful  individual.  The  approach  adopted  by  the  Labour  party  and  the 
justificatory  framework  that  was  being  developed  was  now  more  therapeutic  than 
political  -  safety,  and  particularly  the  feeling  of  safety,  being  the  goal. 
The  use  of  'safety'  as  a  political  goal  developed  through  the  1990s  within  both  the 
Conservative  and  Labour  Party,  and  began  to  be  a  more  significant  basis  for 
developing  a  relationship  between  the  government,  local  authorities  and  individuals. 
The  relationship  with  the  public  was  transformed  in  this  period  from  a  political  one  to 
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relationship  was  the  increasing  centrality  of  ideas  associated  with  'safety'  -  like 
Community  Safety,  a  concept  that  became  one  of  the  new  organising  principles  for 
local  authorities. 
Safety  in  respect  to  community  development  emerged  as  an  economic  issue  under 
Margaret  Thatcher's  government,  and  related  to  regeneration  initiatives  developed 
with  the  promotion  of  'Safer  Cities'  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s.  While  moving 
the  idea  of  safety  more  centrally  into  the  workings  of  local  authorities,  safer  cities 
remained,  to  a  degree,  an  attempt  to  improve  the  economic  regeneration  of  an  area 
through  safety  improvements,  and  also  an  attempt  to  involve  businesses  in  the 
development  of  crime  prevention  initiatives  (Cummings  1997).  In  a  sense  Safer  Cities 
was  more  about  an  internal  organisation  of  local  authorities  and  the  development  of 
interagency  co-operation  than  a  relationship  with  the  public.  But  from  an  initial 
attempt  in  the  late  1980s  to  use  safety  initiatives  to  improving  business  confidence  and 
increase  entrepreneurialism  (Gilling  1999),  as  the  1990s  progressed,  the  issue  of 
safety  became  a  more  central  focus  for  local  authorities  in  their  attempt  to  reengage 
with  the  public.  Here  the  re-creation  of  communities  and  the  relationship  between  the 
political  elite  and  state  institutions  developed  more  systematically  in  relation  to 
'safety'  as  an  end  in  itselL  Emerging  during  the  final  years  of  the  Conservative 
government,  the  significance  of  community  safety  initiatives  increased  significantly 
under  New  Labour  from  1997.  Where  Thatcher  had  understood  the  creation  of  'safer 
cities'  as  a  means  to  developing  the  economic  basis  of  communities,  increasingly 
'community  safety'  was  the  end  point  of  the  new  therapeutically  conceptualised 
community. 
The  development  of  policies  around  the  idea  of  'community  safety,  had  little 
existence  in  the  public  realm  until  1987,  when  it  was  radical  and  dejected  Labour 
supporters  -  criminologists  and  feminists  -  who  helped'develop  this  idea.  In  this  year 
the  term  became  more  commonly  used  in  the  press  with  reference  to  the  policing  and 
community  safety  units  set  up  in  Labour-controlled  London  boroughs.  Here,  the 
relationship  between  Labour  councils  and  the  public  was  more  explicitly  developed 
within  a  framework  of  safety,  and  helped  move  these  local  authorities  away  from  a 
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groups'.  42 
As  the  nature  of  politics  changed  and  the  public,  particularly  the  working  class, 
became  more  disaggregated,  the  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  individual 
increasingly  became  organised  around  safety  issues.  This  development  also  emerged 
within  the  workplace  at  this  time  and  helped  to  transform  the  relationship  between  the 
public  and  many  public  sector  workers.  Reflecting  the  more  insecure  and  fragmented 
climate  of  the  1990s,  this  relationship  developed  around  the  sentiment  of 
vulnerability.  Professions  that  were  renowned  for  their  'caring'  approach  to  a  public 
of  whi 
, 
ch  they  once  felt  part  were  increasingly  encouraged  to  monitor  the  behaviour  of 
their  'clients'  and  'customers',  and  to  protect  their  members  from  antisocial 
behaviour. 
Trade  unions,  for  example,  transformed  their  role  in  this  period,  from  one  of  collective 
bargaining  to  agencies  involved  in  protecting  the  security  of  their  members.  At  the 
Trades  Union  Congress  annual  meeting  in  1996,  Frank  Chapman  of  the  electronics 
union  the  AEEU  explained  that,  'Our  members  want  zero  tolerance  of  criminal, 
offensive  and  loutish  behaviour'.  43  At  the  same  conference,  Tony  Rouse  of  the  Civil 
and  Public  Services  Association  said  that  his  staff,  'go  to  work  daily  knowing  they 
may  be  seriously  assaulted',  while  Bernadette  Hillon  of  the  shop-workers'  union 
USDAW  explained  how  350,000  sales  staff  suffered  violence  at  work  in  1995  -  partly 
because  of  people  'losing  it'  when  they  bought  lottery  tickets  (Guardian  11  September 
1996). 
Despite  a  lack  of  figures  to  compare  the  level  of  victimisation  by  the  public  with  past 
experiences,  the  notion  that  antisocial  behaviour  was  on  the  rise  became  commonplace 
and  public  sector  workers  were  increasingly  encouraged  to  institutionalise  measures  to 
evaluate  the  extent  of  the  victimisation  of  their  workers  -  victimisation  and  violence 
being  redefined  as  not  only  acts  of  physical,  but  also  verbal,  'assault'  (Waiton  2001: 
40).  Local  Authorities,  and  Labour  Authorities  in  particular,  also  began  to  develop  the 
notion  of  'community  safety'  as  a  priority  category  around  which  to  develop  services, 
and  'multi-agency'  initiatives  were  recommended  by  the  Audit  Commission  in  1996 
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offending  teams  from  representatives  of  social  services,  health  and  education 
authorities  as  well  as  the  traditional  law  enforcement  agencies  (Waiton  2001:  31).  44 
By  the  1997  general  election,  the  idea  of  the  'politics  of  left  and  right'  had  little 
meaning.  Now  politics  was  increasingly  about  the  management  of  public  insecurities 
and  behaviour 
. 
45  Indeed,  with  the  end  of  welfarism  and  'Old'  Labour,  the  promotion 
of  concerns  connected  to  antisocial  behaviour  were  developed  in  the  1990s  most 
fervently  by  sections  of  the  Labour  movement. 
'Community  Safety',  a  term  and  framework  used  to  relate  to  the  public,  was  first 
developed  by  left-wing  Labour  councils  in  the  late  1980s,  and  had,  ten  years  later  been 
incorporated  into  the  vocabulary  and  operation  of  national  government.  The 
development  of  a  relationship  with  'communities'  based  on  safety  and  also  a  'feeling' 
of  being  safe  inevitably  led  to  the  activities  of  young  people  who  hung  about  the 
streets  becoming  an  increasing  focus  of  concern  in  the  press,  with  politicians,  and  for 
local  authorities. 
Prior  to  the  1990s,  the  Labour  Party,  the  labour  movement  and  Labour  local 
authorities  had  often  acted  as  a  barrier  to  the  politicisation  of  crime  as  a  social 
problem  in  and  of  itself.  With  the  transformation  of  Labour  politics,  not  only  was  this 
barrier  removed,  but  also  New  Labour  organisations  become  the  most  vociferous 
advocates  of  community  safety.  In  the  1990s,  unions  and  local  authorities,  in  unison 
with  Labour  politicians,  developed  a  relationship  with  the  public  not  based  on  a  wider 
social,  political  or  moral  framework  but  focused  upon  the  vulnerable  individual  and 
their  sense  of  security  and  well  being:  a  relationship  predicated  upon  a  wider  culture 
of  fear.  The  relationship  with  a  Ivictimised'  public  was,  however,  also  being 
developed  by  the  Conservative  government,  although  with  one  foot  still  in  the  past, 
there  remained  a  tendency  for  the  Tories  to  prioritise  the  targeting  of  deviant  'groups' 
within  a  more  class-based  political,  and  traditional  moralistic,  framework.  For 
example  with  the  Criminal  Justice  Act  of  1994,  the  Conservatives  targeted  squatters, 
new  age  travellers  and  ravers  -  an  Act  that  received  significant  opposition  from  the 
liberal  press. 
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confrontational  rhetoric  of  the  1980s  in  their  condemnation  of  yobs  and  criminals, 
New  Labour  adopted  the  more  'amoral'  form  of  moralising  that  relied  not  upon 
political  and  moral  values  but  on  an  individuated  sense  of  fear  and  insecurity.  New 
Labour's  cosmopolitan  authoritarianism  was  far  more  appropriate  for  the  more 
'liquid'  relationships  of  the  time  (Bauman  2000).  Relating  to  the  public  as  vulnerable 
individuals,  Tony  Blair  was  able  to  tap  into  the  culture  of  fear  and  use  'safety'  as  a 
modem  day  'slogan'  -a  therapeutic  promise  of  a  quiet  life  for  all. 
In  the  1990s,  'vulnerability'  became  an  increasingly  important  framework  through 
which  society  and  individuals  were  understood.  The  Conservative  Party's  association 
with  moral  and  political  pronouncements  about  'muggers",  'scroungers',  the  'gay 
plague'  and  so  on  added  to  its  hard-nosed,  'get  on  your  bike'  image,  and  meant  that  its 
capacity  to  relate  to  the  more  universalising  sense  of  victimhood  was  limited.  New 
Labour,  however,  having  unshackled  themselves  from  the  collective  subject  of  the 
working  class  and  influenced  by  radicals  who  had  helped  develop  the  idea  and  support 
for  'vulnerable  groups',  were  well  placed  to  develop  their  ideas  to  tap  into  the 
individualised  sense  of  anxiety  and  of  vulnerability. 
The  rise  of  the  victim  in  criminology  - 
The  changing  emphasis  within  the  Labour  Party  in  the  late  1980s  towards  issues  of 
crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  were  influenced  in  part  by  the  work  of  left  realist  and 
feminist  criminologists  who  had  an  active  role  within  Labour  local  authorities. 
Through  the  work  of  writers  like  Jock  Young,  crime  was  made  into  a  'working  class 
issue',  due  largely  to  the  transformation  in  how  large  sections  of  the  working  class 
were  understood:  i.  e.  as  'victims'  rather  than  active  citizens. 
Social  changes  and  political  defeats  of  the  labour  movement  had  a  profound  impact 
upon  subsequent  developments  within  local  and  national  government  alike  during  this 
period.  However,  the  role  of  clainismakers  on  the  left  is  also  significant  in 
understanding  how  crime  became  a  radical  issue  and  an  issue  more  centrality  focused 
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culture  of  fear,  as  we  have  seen,  developed  in  the  1990s,  riding  on  the  back  of  the 
growing  pessimism  about  social  change  and  also  with  the  emergence  of  a  more 
fragmented  society.  This  fear,  however,  rather  than  being  understood  with  reference  to 
wider  social  and  cultural  changes,  was  increasingly  interpreted  as  simply  a  reflection 
of  the  'real'  problem  of  crime  and  more  particularly  disorder. 
The  increasing  centrality  of  victims  to  not  only  the  criminal  justice  system  but  more 
broadly  to  political  and  social  problem  formation  has  been  noted  by  various 
sociologists  (Best  1999;  Garland  2002),  and  within  criminology  itself  the  victim  had 
become  increasingly  important  as  an  area  of  study  (Maquire  and  Pointing  1988;  Rock 
1990).  The  rise  of  victim-oriented  research  in  criminology  developed  with  the 
growing  concern  with  the  fear  of  crime  -a  fear  that  was  initially  identified  by 
conservative  thinkers  but  increasingly  became  a  social  problem  focused  upon  by 
feminists,  and  then  left  realists.  As  will  be  examined  below,  this  development  ran  in 
tandem  with  a  growing  pessimism  within  radical  circles  about  the  dynamic  potential 
of  the  working  class,  or  of  the  welfare  state  to  transform  society,  and  resulted  in  a 
radical  reorientation  around  the  problems  of  crime,  harassment  and  antisocial 
behaviour.  Whilst  being  a  product  of  a  declining  labour  movement  and  the  result  of 
the  failure  of  welfarism,  the  ideas  of  these  radicals  also  helped  to  elevate  the  concern 
about  crime  and  they  acted  as  key  claimsmakers  of  victims  of  crime. 
The  first  significant  identification  of  and  support  for  'victims'  emerged  in  the  USA  in 
the  form  of  a  conservative  reaction  in  the  1960s  to  criminal  justice  processes  that  were 
understood  to  be  more  concerned  with  the  rights  of  criminals  than  with  victims'  rights 
(Best  1999:  98).  Reflecting  a  more  distant  and  pessimistic  belief  in  the  state  policies 
of  the  time,  this  defence  of  the  victim  also  signified  a  sense  of  alienation  from  social 
institutions  and  political  processes.  By  the  1970s  this  pessimism  towards  welfarism, 
and  the  rehabilitative  approach  within  the  American  criminal  justice  system,  was 
becoming  more  pronounced  -  as  illustrated  in  the  influential  article  by  Robert 
Martinson,  where  he  argued  that  within  the  current  system,  'Nothing  Works'  (Feeley 
2003:  119).  46  This  pessimism  was  also  emerging  within  the  UK,  and  the  vision  and 
optimism  of  the  expansive  politics  of  the  welfare  state  (Garland  1985)  began  to 
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government  could  not  resolve  the  current  crisis  within  the  criminal  justice  system  - 
reflecting  the  fact  that,  as  Garland  argues,  man  was  losing  his  'strong  moral  compass' 
(Garland  1996:  45  1). 
The  claim  for  the  rights  of  victims  represented  a  certain  shift  within  social  thought 
about  the  relationship  of  the  individual  with  society.  Where  previously  the  criminal 
justice  system  was  understood  as  a  representation  of  the  laws  of  all  within  society  in 
relation  to  the  criminal,  by  focusing  upon  the  victim  of  crime,  the  priority  was  given 
to  the  individual  who  had  been  'damaged'  by  the  criminal  and  also  who  felt  estranged 
from  the  existing  criminal  justice  system.  In  the  UK,  the  prioritisation  and 
representation  of  the  victim  emerged  most  fervently  within  the  feminist  writing  of  the 
1970s  and  80s  with  the  'discovery'  of  violence  and  abuse  against  women  and  children 
(Jenkins  1992:  23  1). 
The  battle  to  centre  the  victim  within  criminal  justice  developed  in  the  1980s  but 
remained  contested;  and  Ashworth's  view  that  it  was  questionable  'whether  the 
particular  victim's  interests  should  count  for  more  than  those  of  any  other  member  of 
the  community'  remained  the  established  opinion  (Cretney  et  al  1994:  16).  However, 
as  the  former  director  of  the  Howard  League,  Martin  Wright,  noted  in  the  Guardian, 
times  were  changing,  reflected  in  the  draft  Declaration  on  the  Rights  of  Victims  being 
discussed  for  the  first  time  at  the  United  Nations  Congress  on  the  Prevention  of  Crime 
and  the  Treatment  of  Offenders  (Guardian  28  August  1985).  A  similar  trend  was  also 
becoming  apparent  within  popular  culture,  with  the  emergence  of  programmes  like 
Crimewatch  on  the  television.  Producer  Peter  Chafer  explained  why  the  programme 
was  such  a  success. 
Ten  of  fifteen  years  ago  I  don't  think  it  would  have  worked  because 
...  then  we 
were  concerned  as  a  society  about  what  it  was  we  were  doing  to  people  to 
make  them  criminal  ...  In  the  past  three  or  four  years  we've  suddenly  said  to 
ourselves,  "To  hell  with  the  criminal,  what  about  the  poor  bloody  victim?  " 
(Schlesinger  and  Tumber  1993:  22). 
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fear  of  crime  -  both  'victimhood'  and  fear  reflecting  an  increasing  sense  of  distance 
and  loss  of  connection  between  the  individual  and  social  processes.  This  fear  was 
again  first  identified  in  1960s  America. 
In  the  UK  the  idea  that  the  fear  of  crime  was  a  direct  consequence  of  crime  itself 
remained  highly  contested  in  the  seventies  and  eighties  and  both  radical  and  Home 
Office  criminologists  challenged  this  idea.  Sparks,  Glerm  and  Dodd  in  1977  argued 
that  'feelings  of  crime  or  insecurity  appear  to  have  many  sources,  and  to  be  strongly 
influenced  by  b  eliefs,  attitudes  and  experiences  which  have  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  crime',  and  that,  'we  need  to  be  very  cautious  about  interpreting  literally 
expressions  of  uneasiness  about  other  aspects  of  experience,  or  about  the  state  of  the 
world  in  general'(Jones  1987:  192-198).  Similarly  Smith  noted  in  1984:  'In  sum,  fear 
is frequently  generated  quite  independently  of  either  the  mass  media,  or  people's  direct 
experiences  of  crime'  (Smith  1984:  293).  Indeed,  as  van  Dijk  notes,  in  the  initial 
discussion  about  the  fear  of  crime  in  Britain,  fear  itself  was  seen  as  a  problem  which 
undermined  communities  -  not  in  terms  of  the  level  of  anxiety  it  created,  but  in  the 
exaggerated  response  by  those  living  in  fear,  where  'rhose  -  who  [took]  special 
measures  to  protect  their  households  against  crime  were  said  to  exhibit  a  'fortress 
mentality"  (Van  Dijk  1994:  122).  In  this  respect  it  was  those  people  who  feared  crime 
'too  much'  who  were  seen  as  being  antisocial  and  helping  to  undermine  communities, 
rather  than  criminals  or  antisocial  youth. 
The  idea  and  significance  given  to  the  fear  of  crime  remains  contested  within 
criminology  and  the  reality  of  this  specific  fear  has  been  challenged  and  arguably  been 
shown  to  be  exaggerated  (Farrall  et  al  1997;  Farrall  and  Gadd  2004).  However  the 
emergence  of  the  concern  with  the  fýar  of  crime  as  a  problem  in  its  own  right  has 
grown  within  politics  and  in  the  policies  developed  by  governments  from  the  early 
1990s.  This  development  was  assisted  most  systematically  within  criminology  by 
sections  of  the  feminist  'movement'  and  by  left  realist  thinkers,  particularly  with  the 
growth  of  'victim  surveys. 
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crime.  Often  stenuning  from  a  feminist  perspective,  this  research  attempted  to 
challenge  the  idea  that  fear  of  crime  was  to  some  extent  irrational,  47  by  illustrating  the 
extent  to  which  women  and  other  'vulnerable  groups  A  developed  a  sense  of  fear  due 
to  their  experiences  of  'minor'  everyday  harassment.  Rather  than  associating  the  fear 
of  crime  within  wider  social  and  political  developments,  this  research  largely  analysed 
the  direct  experience  of  'victims'  within  their  local  communities  and  in  so  doing 
focused  concern  upon  the  interpersonal  relationships  between  people.  Junger  for 
example  attempted  to  prove  that  the  'experiences  of  sexual  harassment,  which  usually 
-are  not  serious  but  could  occur  relatively  often,  can  lead  women  to  be  fearful  and 
restrict  themselves  to  their  homes'  (Junger  1987:  358).  Other  research  has  'discovered' 
teenagers  and  elderly  women  to  be  'victims  of  harassment',  with  the  'experience  of 
crime'  being  the  core  concern  addressed  (Hartless  et  al  1995;  Pain  1995).  Despite 
often  contradictory  evidence  of  the  significance  and  even  the  extent  of  the 
victimisation  under  study,  this  research  had  an  underlying  and  in-built  acceptance  of 
the  vulnerability  of  those  people  being  studied.  For  example  Hartless  notes  with 
'surprise'  that,  of  the  young  women  who  said  they  had  experienced  sexual  harassment 
of  some  kind,  'only  8%  ...  said  they  had  been  'very  scared"  (1995:  119).  Surprise  at  any 
level  of  robustness  and  at  the  ability  of  'vulnerable'  individuals  to  cope  with 
unpleasant  experiences  was  coupled  with  a  trend  to  interpret  any  evidence  of  fear  as  a 
product  of  harassment.  Pain,  in  her  analysis  of  fear  amongst  elderly  women,  raises  the 
question  of  why  older  men  fear  crime  more  than  young  men.  Despite  the  myriad 
possible  reasons  including  physical  frailty,  social  isolation  or  a  sense  of  powerlessness 
and  estrangement  from  society  which  could  be  the  cause,  Pain  speculates  that  perhaps 
it  is  due  to  their  vulnerability  to  harassment,  'especially  in  very  old  age,  to  abuse  from 
carers  inside  or  outside  the  immediate  family'  (Pain  1995:  595). 
Whatever  the  myth  or  reality  of  the  experience  of  harassment  by  these  'vulnerable 
groups',  there  is  an  implicit  and  sometimes  explicit  assumption  within  this  work  that 
communities  are  being  undermined  by  crime  and  more  particularly  antisocial 
behaviour,  including  harassment.  This  antisocial  behaviour,  it  is  assumed,  will  have  a 
long  term  and  cumulatively  damaging  impact  upon  the  individual  and  subsequently  on 
communities  as  a  whole.  Here  we  see  a  complete  turnaround  from  the  argument  put  in 
80 the  1970s  by  radicals  who  questioned  and  even  denounced  the  'fear  of  crime'  as  a 
reactionary  sentiment.  Rather  than  denying  or  challenging  the  notion  of  the  fear  of 
crime  and  the  centrality  of  victims  within  the  criminal  justice  system,  in  strands  of 
feminist  criminology  there  was  a  tendency  to  accept  the  problem  of  fear  and  to  then 
discover  the  cause  of  this  fear  within  the  realm  of  abusive  personal  relationships. 
Whereas  previously  radicals  had  attempted  to  challenge  the  official  statistics  on  crime 
and  deny  the  social  problem  of  crime,  increasingly  this  feminist  criminology  reversed 
this  approach  and  attempted  to  prove  that  crime,  harassment,  and  antisocial  behaviour 
was  even  more  of  a  problem  than  was  officially  accepted.  Here  not  only  was  the 
opposition  to  the  notion  of  crime  as  a  social  problem  lost,  but  feminists  became 
promoters  of  the  social  problem  of  crime  and  of  wider  forms  of  'antisocial'  behaviour. 
This  was  specifically  developed  with  particular  reference  to  less  serious  or  non- 
criminal  offences,  and  was  also  bound  up  with  the  centrality  of  the  fear  of  crime  as  a 
significant  factor  to  be  taken  into  account  within  the  criminal  justice  system. 
Regardless  of  the  intentions  of  the  researchers  themselves,  one  logical  outcome  of  this 
process  was  to  criminalise  everyday  behaviour  and  interactions,  to  help  develop  the 
'politics  of  behaviour',  and  thus  to  support  the  trend  towards  the  'policing'  of 
relationships. 
In  the  1980s  feminist  and  left  realist  concerns  about  the  impact  of  crime  on  individuals 
and  society  drew  closer  to  the  official  criminological  approach  at  the  time  -  especially 
with  the  common  use  of  victim  statistics.  'Establishment'  criminology  had  however 
undergone  its  own  transformation  during  this  period  moving  from  a  positivist  belief  in 
society's  capacity  to  overcome  the  problem  of  crime  to  an  'administrative  criminology' 
(Young  1988:  174).  This  administrative  criminology,  associated  with  Wilson's  (1975) 
approach  to  crime,  was  a  more  pragmatic  method  of  dealing  with  the  effects  of  it. 
Despite  the  political  nature  of  much  of  the  feminist  and  particularly  the  left  realists 
approach  to  crime,  the  common  bond  that  had  brought  them  and  the  official 
criminologist  closer  to  one  another  was  a  diminished  belief  in  social  possibilities  to 
resolve  the  problem  of  crime.  With  a  greater  pessimism  about  society  and  a  greater 
sense  of  distance  from  social  outcomes,  radical  and  conservative  thinkers  became 
more  preoccupied  with  the  plight  of  the  victim.  The  public,  or  at  least  substantial 
81 sections  of  it  were  now  increasingly  conceptualised  as  being  what  Stanko  described 
as,  'universally  vulnerable'  (Pain  1995:  596). 
Feminists  and  left  realists  as  claimsmakers 
The  significance  of  crime  and  behaviour  for  New  Labour  was  assisted  by  the  work  of 
feminist  and  new  realist  thinkers  of  the  left  in  the  1980s,  who  helped  to  formulate  an 
understanding  of  the  public  as  vulnerable.  This  vulnerability  was  understood  to  be  the 
product  of  antisocial  behaviour  within  the  day-to-day  relationships  of  significant 
sections  of  society.  Rather  than  a  right-wing  authoritarian  issue,  here  the  fight  against 
crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  was  reposed  as  a  means  to  recreate  community. 
In  Philip  Jenkins'  analysis  of  Moral  Panics  in  Contemporary  Great  Britain,  in  which 
he  analyses  the  emergence  of  panics  around  child  abuse  in  the  UK,  he  notes  the 
significance  of  feminist  as  claimsmakers: 
From  the  mid-1970s  on,  there  evolved  in  Britain  a  strong  feminist  movement, 
which  had  had  an  enormous  impact  on  many  aspects  of  society  and 
politics  ... 
[fleminist  ideas  soon  prevailed  in  radical  and  left-wing 
journals 
...  and  were  commonly  expressed  in  liberal  newspapers  like  the 
Guardian  ...  [and]  by  the  mid-1980s,  fifty  local  authorities  had  women's 
committees  (Jenkins  1992:  35-6). 
By  the  late  1970s,  many  of  the  feminist  activists  had  already  broken  with  the  'radical' 
outlook  within  criminology  and  were  equally  critical  of  socialist  ideas  on  the  left, 
turning  away  from  issues  of  social  equality  and  focusing  more  upon  problems  that 
emerged  in  the  relationships  between  men  and  women.  Indeed  as  one  author  noted,  by 
the  1980s  the  women's  'movement'  as  a  radical  drive  for  equality  had  all  but  died  and 
fragmented  into  individualistic  concerns  and  a  separatist  celebration  of  'womanhood'. 
Where  the  early  socialist  feminists  to  a  degree  rejected  the  idea  of  difference  between 
men  and  women,  many  feminists  in  the  1980s  appeared  to  celebrate  women  as  caring 
rather  than  violent  -  illustrated  by  the  peace  camp  at  Greenharn  Common,  which 
excluded  men  because  of  their  'violent  tendency'  (Marshall:  1982:  48).  This  more 
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upon  politics  in  the  UK  -  as  did  the  left  realists,  led  by  Jock  Young,  who,  like  these 
feminists,  had  become  disillusioned  with  the  idealist  beliefs  of  the  radical  left. 
In  the  editor's  introduction  to  Confronting  Crime,  Matthews  and  Young  pointed  out 
that'if  the  women's  movement  has  indicated  the  way  forward  in  terms  of  the  creation 
of  a  radical  victimology,  it  is  now  time  to  extend  its  theoretical  and  political  potential' 
(Matthews  and  Young  1986:  3).  Crime  for  these  left  realists  needed  to  be  taken 
seriously  and  victims  needed  to  be  placed  at  the  centre,  of  concern  for  criminologists 
and  the  state.  The  role  for  socialists  was  now  to  engage  with  'problems  as  people 
experience  them!  and  to  tackle  the  problem  of  crime  -a  problem  that  can  destroy 
communities: 
Crime  is  of  importance  because  unchecked  it  divides  the  working  class 
community  and  is  materially  and  morally  the  basis  of  disorganisation:  the  loss 
of  political  control.  It  is  also  a  potential  unifier  -a  realistic  issue,  amongst 
others,  for  recreating  community  (Matthews  and  Young  1986:  29). 
By  e-  ngaging  with  the  immediate  experiences  of  a  disaggregated  community  and 
understanding  crime  as  a  major  cause  and  solution  to  this  loss  of  community,  Young, 
along  with  other  realists  and  feminists,  attempted  to  turn  crime  reduction  into  a 
working-class  issue  and  in  the  process  became  significant  'anti-crime'  clainismakers 
on  the  left. 
In  the  1980s  both  feminist  and  left  realist  thinkers  had  a  significant  influence  in  the 
left-wing  Labour-run  inner-city  councils  -  carrying  out  victim  surveys,  and  sitting  on  a 
number  of  council  boards  particularly  within  the  Greater  London  Council.  Developing 
out  of  the  radical  framework  of  the  early  1970s,  a  number  of  feminist  and  realist 
criminologists  became  disillusioned  with  the  fight  for  political  and  social  change  and, 
rather  than  challenging  the  issue  of  crime  as  a  form  of  bourgeois  amplification,  for 
example,  increasingly  identified  crime  as  a  major  issue,  particularly  for  the  poor, 
women  and  blacks  who  were  now  understood  as  being  'victims  of  crime'. 
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police',  these  radicals  focused  their  concerns  on  the  most  deprived  and  fragmented 
communities,  discovering  that  crime  was  not  a  myth,  as  past  radicals  had  argued,  but  a 
reality.  Indeed  crime  was  seen  as  a  'working  class  problem'  and  issue  to  be  addressed 
(Jones  et  al  1986). 
The  identification  of  harassed  victims  of  antisocial  behaviour  rose  proportionately 
with  the  declining  belief  -  particularly  of  the  left  realists  -  in  the  possibility  of  radical 
social  change.  As  the  active  potential  of  the  working  class  to  'do'  something  about 
Conservative  attacks  on  the  welfare  state  declined,  Jock  Young  and  others  uncovered 
the  vulnerable,  'done-to',  poor. 
Discussing  the  shift  in  Labour  councils  from  radicalism  to  realism  Young  noted  that: 
Ile  recent  history  of  radical  criminology  in  Britain  has  involved  a  rising 
influence  of  feminist  and  anti-racist  ideas  and  an  encasement  of  left  wing 
Labour  administrations  in  the  majority  of  the  inner  city  Town  Halls.  An  initial 
ultra-leftism  has  been  tempered  and  often  transformed  by  a  prevalent  realism 
in  the  wake  of  the  third  consecutive  defeat  of  the  Labour  Party  on  the  national 
level  and  severe  defeats  with  regards  to  "rate  capping"  in  terms  of  local 
politics.  The  need  to  encompass  issues,  which  had  a  widespread  support 
amongst  the  electorate,  rather  than  indulge  in  marginal  or  "gesture'  politics 
included  the  attempt  to  recapture  the  issue  of  law  and  order  from  the  right 
(Young  1988:  172). 
It  was  sections  of  the  left  who,  with  the  support  of  their  victim  surveys,  both 
discovered  and  advocated  on  behalf  of  women,  blacks  and  the  poor  as  victims  of 
crime,  the  problem  of  fragmented  communities  being  located  within  the  prism  of 
crime,  antisocial  behaviour  and  the  fear  of  crime.  Indeed  crime  and  the  fear  of  it 
became  so  central  to  Young's  understanding  of  the  conditions  of  the  working  class 
that,  when  finding  that  young  men's  fear  of  crime  was  low,  despite  them  being  the 
main  victims  of  crime,  he  argued  that  in  a  sense  they  had  a  false  consciousness.  Rather 
than  trying  to  allay  women's  fears  about  the  slim  chance  of  serious  crime  happening 
84 to  them,  Young  questioned  whether  it  'would  not  be  more  advisable  to  attempt  to  raise 
the  fear  of  crime  of  young  men  rather  than  to  lower  that  of  other  parts  of  the  publicT 
(Young  1988a:  172). 
Based  upon  an  accurate  critique  of  the  romantic  notions  of  radical  criminologists,  but 
within  a  climate  of  political  defeats  and  working  class  fragmentation,  Young 
increasingly  related  to  large  sections  of  the  working  class  as  victims,  on  whose  behalf 
he  advocated.  Again,  while  often  carrying  out  more  accurate  research  of  crime,  the 
tendency  was  for  Young  and  his  co-authors  both  to  exaggerate  the  significance  of 
crime  and  to  generalise  an  understanding  of  the  public  as  fundamentally  vulnerable  - 
within  the  narrow  parameters  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour.  In  the  demoralised 
and  poverty  stricken  inner-city  areas  of  London,  like  Islington,  where  crime  rates  were 
five  times  the  national  average,  the  equally  demoralised  realists  concluded  that  it  was 
the  problem  of  crime  that  'shaped  their  lives'  (Jones  et  al  1986:  20  1).  While  correctly 
noting  that  crime  was  not  a  fantasy  for  the  people  of  Islington,  these  realists  noted  that 
a  third  of  the  women  of  the  area  avoided  going  out  after  dark,  concluding  that  this 
represented  a  'virtual  curfew  of  the  female  population'  (1986:  201).  This 
misrepresentation  of  one  third  of  women  being  transformed  into  the  entire  female 
population  reflected  not  simply  an  exaggeration,  but  a  newly  developing 
conceptualisation  of  the  public  more  generally  as  vulnerable  -  something  which  was  to 
become  more  central  to  the  Labour  Party's  understanding  of  social  problems  in  the 
1990s  and  would  help  to  transform  the  relationship  between  citizen  and  state. 
Discovering  victims  of  crime  was  by  no  means  a  uniform  development  and 
differences  of  opinion  and  prioritisation  existed  amongst  those  advocating  on  behalf 
of  differing  'vulnerable  groups'.  Indeed  identifying  victims  of  crime  was  not  a  solely 
radical  pursuit.  As  we  have  observed,  within  administrative  criminology  and  amongst 
sections  of  conservative  thinkers  the  victim  was  becoming  more  central  to  the 
approach  to  crime  and  criminal  justice.  Claims  on  behalf  of  victims  were  becoming 
more  systematic  and  politicised  by  the  late  1980s,  and  had  to  some  degree  already 
been  institutionalised  with,  for  example,  the  introduction  of  the  Victims'  Charter  by 
the  Conservative  Government  in  1990. 
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had  little  or  no  academic,  public  or  political  presence  in  British  society.  However,  by 
1990,  victims  and  the  fear  of  crime  were  becoming  increasingly  important  concepts 
informing  how  the  problem  of  crime  was  understood.  This  development  emerged  as 
belief  in  social  possibilities  under  welfarism  declined,  and  within  certain  radical 
circles  the  previously  understood  creative  capacity  of  the  working  class,  and  indeed  of 
humanity  in  general,  was  replaced  with  a  concern  with  its  destructive  potential.  Where 
some  practical  measures  to  provide  victim  support  had  become  institutionalised  in  the 
1980s  (Van  DiJk  1988:  120),  the  centrality  of  the  victim  within  politics  was  held  back 
by  the  remaining  political  contestation  between  the  Tories  and  the  'Old'  Labour 
movement.  For  the  victim  and  the  'vulnerable  public'  to  become  central  to  politics  and 
indeed  to  the  state's  relationship  with  the  people,  as  Maguire  and  Pointing  (1988) 
noted,  'fairly  major  reforms  of  the  relationships  between  State  and  citizen'  would  need 
to  occur.  As  we  have  seen  with  the  example  of  the  aggressive  beggar,  this 
transformation  did  indeed  take  place  and  was  fundamentally  dependent  upon  a  change 
in  the  nature  of  subjectivity  within  politics  and  the  consequent  transformation  in  the 
understanding  of  the  electorate  from  active  individuals  or  a  collective  agent  to  a  more 
passive  and  diminished  vulnerable  public. 
This  transformation  developed  not  simply  within  sections  of  the  left,  but  also  with  the 
relative  failure  of  the  Conservative  government  to  create  a  vibrant  economic  and 
moral  culture  founded  on  the  entrepreneurial  individual.  Margaret  Thatcher's  ideal  of 
'restoring  people  to  independence  and  self  reliance',  as  Heartfield  notes,  failed  even  in 
terms  of  'rolling  back  the  state'  (2002:  156).  State  subsidies  replaced  nationalised 
industries;  'dependency  on  the  state  increased  in  the  form  of  unemployment  benefits 
expanding  the  number  of  those  reliant  upon  the  state  more  than  any  other  post-war 
government;  regulation  of  industry  in  the  form  of  organisations  such  as  OfWat 
increased;  and  from  1985-1994  the  number  of  quangos  increased  exponentially,  rising 
to  5521  by  1994.  Rather  than  the  rise  of  the  free  market,  what  emerged  was  an 
alternatively  regulated  society,  and  despite  the  defeat  of  collective  working  class 
institutions,  'flowing  individualisrif  did  not  emerge  (Heartfield  2002:  158-160).  49 
86 As  we  have  seen  with  the  example  of  the  aggressive  beggar,  the  Conservative  party,  in 
part,  continued  to  understand  and  organise  its  policies  in  relation  to  the  imagined 
problem  of  welfare  dependency,  but  its  rhetoric  sounded  increasingly  hollow  and  its 
capacity  to  cohere  even  conservative  thinkers  was  becoming  increasingly  problematic 
(Calcutt  1996).  By  1994  Labour  were  well  ahead  in  the  opinion  polls  helped  by  their 
transformation  into  the  new  party  of  law  and  order  illustrated  in  their  support  of  the 
Conservative  government's  Criminal  Justice  and  Public  Order  Bill.  Prime  Minister 
John  Major  continually  attempted  to  paint  Labour  as  the  'villain's  friend',  but  to  no 
avail,  and  the  Conservative  Party's  disarray  continued  the  following  year,  illustrated 
by  the  leadership  challenge  to  John  Major  (Guardian  30  January  1996). 
87 Chapter  4:  Diminishing  the  Subject 
Now  for  the  first  time  -  outside  of  the  extremes  of  conservative  thinking  -a 
misanthropic  strain  emerged  that  questioned  whether  MAN  was  indeed  the  central 
figure  of  the  human  story,  and  whether  he  deserved  to  be  (Heartfield  2002:  2  1). 
Introduction 
By  the  early  years  of  the  1990s,  as  Giddens  correctly  noted,  politics  was  moving 
'beyond'  left  and  right  (Giddens  1994).  The  traditional  outlook  of  conservatives  and 
their  attempt  to  play  the  morality  card  and  get  'back  to  basics'  was  running  out  of 
steam  (Calcutt  1996).  Where  the  dernise  of  the  left  can  be  chronologically  located  in 
terrns  of  the  collapse  of  the  Berlin  Wall  in  1989,  the  incapacity  of  the  right  to  stand  up 
for  its  own  values  rather  than  rely  on  the  negative  crutch  of  denouncing  the  left  led  to 
its  own  decline  around  1993.  Collective  solutions  were  discredited  and  the 
disillusionment  with  grand  narratives  became  more  generalised  at  this  time 
(Fitzpatrick  2001:  viii).  With  a  loss  of  belief  in  social  progress  radicals  were 
increasingly  inclined  to  panic  and  develop  solutions  to  social  problems  not  in  terms  of 
their  positive  transformative  capacity  but  by  promoting  the  need  to  conserve  and  -to 
regulate  areas  of  life,  including  industry,  the  environment  and  also  communities 
(Durodie  2002;  Cohen  2002:  xxiii).  With  the  loss  of  belief  in  both  left  and  right  wing 
thought  of  the  human  potential  to  make  history,  and  with  the  parallel  loss  of  belief  in 
politics,  both  in  society  and  amongst  the  elite  itself,  risks  became  the  'active  agents 
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and  people  -  at  risk  [the]  passive  agents  in  society'  (Furedi  1997:  04). 
It  was  within  this  context  that  the  understanding  of  the  vulnerable  public  emerged  - 
an  understanding  predicated  upon  the  develcpment  of  the  diminished  subject. 
The  development  of  the  engagement  between  the  political  elite  and  the  public  in 
relation  to  their  vulnerability  is  often  portrayed  one-sidedly  as  politicians  simply 
reacting  to  public  concerns  about  issues  like  those  connected  with  antisocial 
behaviour.  However,  this  development  should  be  seen  as  a  dialectical  one  involving 
not  simply  the  public,  but  more  importantly  the  role  of  the  elite  and  the  underlying 
88 philosophy,  or  loss  of  one,  within  which  policies  associated  with  antisocial  behaviour 
have  developed.  At  the  heart  of  these  developments  is  a  loss  of  a  sense  of  both 
individual  and  collective  capacities  and  the  cultural  development  of  diminished 
subjectivity. 
In  the  1990s  concerns  about  child  safety  and  child  villainy,  which  were  to  become 
central  to  the  formation  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  developed  at  a  pace  rarely  seen 
before  in  political  life.  Indeed  compared  to  past  political  periods,  the  tendency  was  for 
the  political  elite  to  panic  and  develop  ever-more  laws  and  initiatives  to  deal  with 
these  'social  problems'.  As  traditional  morality  declined,  the  moralising  about 
behaviour  was  reconstituted  and  promoted  through  the  New  Labour  language  of 
'rights  and  responsibilities'.  However,  the  meaning  of  responsibility,  as  we  will  see  in 
the  case  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  was  actually  being  diminished,  while  the  idea  of 
rights  was  being  transformed  to  relate  not  to  people's  freedoms  but  to  a  new  form  of 
protection  of  a  'quiet  life'. 
This  downgrading  of  the  notion  of  responsibility,  the  elevation  of  the  problem  of  child 
villainy,  and  the  tendency  for  governments  to  panic,  could  all  be  seen  in  the  reaction 
to  the  James  Bulger  killing  (King  1997:  125).  Following  the  election  of  the  Labour 
government  in  1997,  the  propensity  of  Labour  to  institutionalise  new  laws  based  upon 
this  panic  was  illustrated  when  the  Bulger  case  was  used  to  justify  the  abolition  of  doli 
incapax  -a  law  dating  back  to  the  Middle  Ages  that  protected  children  from  criminal 
charges  based  on  the  assumptiýn  that  they  could  not  be  held  morally  responsible  for 
their  actions.  Here  the  question  of  'moral  responsibility'  was  revised  by  the  Labour 
government  in  the  Crime  and  Disorder  Act  (1998),  *and  minors  were  now  transformed 
into  subjects,  responsible  for  their  own  actions.  In  criminalising  children  in  this  way, 
the  image  of  dangerous  young  people  who  were  a  threat  to  society  was  projected  and 
given  political  and  legal  support  -  this  fear  itself  being  institutionalised  in  the  process. 
However,  within  this  change  of  law  ýnd  the  newly  confused  understanding  of  moral 
responsibility,  an  implicit  diminution  of  the  idea  of  adult  responsibility  was  also 
suggested:  if  ten  year  old  children  can  be  said  to  be  responsible  for  their  actions  in  the 
same  way  that  adults  are,  the  very  idea  of  responsibility  appears  to  be  diminished.  As 
89 we  will  see,  despite  the  promotion  of  rights  and  responsibilities  by  New  Labour,  what 
it  meant  to  be  responsible  becoming  infantilised. 
The  emergence  of  the  notion  of  community  safety  and  of  the  vulnerable  public  were 
predicated  upon  this  infantilisation  of  responsibility,  and  indicated  a  weakening 
understanding  of  subjectivity  and  a  lowering  of  expectations  of  the  adult  population. 
Conceptualised  as  vulnerable  and  'at  risk',  the  active  role  expected  of  the  public  was 
reduced,  and  politicians,  interest  groups,  union  representatives  and  so  on,  developed  a 
more  passive  relationship  with  anxious  individuals  across  society. 
The  failed  social,  economic  and  political  experiments  of  left  and  right  by  the  mid- 
1990s  had  led  to  what  Feeley  and  Simon  describe  as  a'decline  in  social  will'  (Feeley 
and  Simon  1992:  469)  Despite  the  triumph  of  the  market,  it  was  not  the  'market 
individual'  or  promethean  man  that  stepped  forward,  but  rather  the  victim  and  the 
vulnerable  public.  This  does  not  mean  that  this  development  marks  the  'death  of  the 
subject',  but  rather,  as  Heartfield  argues,  'the  human  subject  persists,  but  in  denial  of 
its  own  subjectivity'.  The  notion  of  diminished  subjectivity  in  this  respect  is  not  a 
description  of  individuals  as  such,  but  is  a  cultural  phenomenon  that  informs 
institutional  practices:  practices  that  have  increasingly  developed  in  relation  to  the 
regulation  of  the  public. 
The  image  of  the  individual  and  to  some  extent  the  self-image  that  individuals  take  on 
board  is  one  prone  to  a  sense  of  vulnerability,  and  is  best  expressed  in  the  concept  of 
the  victim.  The  victim,  as  Best  argues,  is  often  portrayed  as  blameless  and  powerless 
(Best  1998:  100),  and  whereas  past  moral  weight  was  given  to  saints  in  the 
Renaissance  period,  or  heroes  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the  iconic  individual  carrying 
moral  weight  in  late  twentieth  century  society  is  that  of  the  victim  (Best  1998:  138). 
This  transformation  in  the  understanding  of  humanity  reflects  both  a  more  passive 
sense  of  human  capabilities  and  also  a  more  negative  sense  of  what  humanity 
represents.  It  has  also  helped  to  form  the  framework  within  which  individuals  have 
increasingly  come  to  understand  themselves. 
90 The  trend  to  identify  and  understand  the  public  in  terms  of  its  vulnerability  was 
something  that  informed  the  turn  towards  crime  as  a  significant  social  problem  by 
radicals  in  the  1980s.  For  the  new  realists,  both  a  more  passive  and  more  negative 
understanding  of  individuals  and  in  particular  the  working  class  is  represented.  The 
issue'of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  was  not  a  major  focus  of  concern  for  these 
criminologists  until  their  own  subjective  understanding  of  social  and  political 
possibilities  had  been  diminished. 
Part  of  the  reason  for  the  left  realists'  orientation  towards  an  understanding  of  the 
working  class  as  victims  was  that  the  more  active  and  dynamic  sections  of  the 
working  class  were  understood  to  be  part  of  the  problem.  In  a  sense  what  developed 
was  the  problematisation  of  subjectivity  itself  -  in  the  form  of  the  problematisation  of 
the  aspirations  of  the  active  man.  One  caricature  of  this  man  was  the  'Essex  Min'  -  the 
upwardly  mobile,  greedy,  selfish  Thatcherite,  who  was  blamed  for  the  consecutive 
Tory  election  victories  by  many  of  those  on  the  left,  a  caricature  that  was  explained  in 
theory  within  the  notion  of  Thatcherism  and  hegemony.  51  The  greed  and  selfishness  of 
the  Essex  man  was  for  left  realist  Jock  Young  the  same  greed  and  selfishness  that 
resulted  in  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  on  estates.  For  Young,  crime  was  a  product 
of  capitalist  values  played  out  on  the  streets,  of  'individualism,  competition,  a  desire 
for  material  goods  and  often  machismo'.  Values  that  in  more  optimistic  times  would 
have  been  understood  as  largely  aspirant  -  something  socialists  could  tap  into  when 
the  market  failed  to  deliver  -  were  now  reconceptualised  as  criminal  and  anti- 
communal  (Lea  and  Young  1984). 
The  understanding  of  the  greedy  working  class  Tory  voter  was  developed  most 
systematically  by  Stuart  Hall,  within  his  analysis  of  Thatcherism.  The  use  of 
Gramsci's  theory  of  hegemony  'offered  a  way  of  theorising  the  political  crisis  of  the 
Left  and  understanding  how  the  Right  had  come  to  dominate'(Findlayson  2003:  117). 
Fundamentally,  Hall  did  this  by  undermining  the  idea  of  political  consciousness  and 
of  the  fluidity  of  subjectivity  by  identifying  an  ideology  -  'ThatcherisnY  52 
-  which 
developed  not  simply  as  an  idea  that  people  agreed  with  but  rather  as  something  that 
got  under  their  skin  and  'inserted  itself  into  people's  experience  and  common  sense, 
redefining  their  identity  and  sense  of  interests'  (Findlayson  2003:  117).  While  correctly 
91 criticising  economic  determinism  in  traditional  Marxism,  this  approach  did  not  simply 
elevate  the  significance  of  ideology  so  much  as  to  transform  ideology  and  subjectivity 
into  a  thing.  Now  the  ideas  of  the  working  class  were  understood  to  develop  in 
relation  to  a  more  statically  conceptualised  culture.  As  Malik  notes  in  relation  to  the 
concept  of  culture  in  race,  culture  had  increasingly  become  understood  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  twentieth  century,  as  a  more  static  conceptualisation  of  what  we  are,  as 
'static  and  immutable',  culture  being  related  to  unconscious  tradition  rather  than  with 
Oconscious  activity',  not  the  'conscious  creation  of  humanity  but  the  unconscious 
product  of  human  activity  which  [stands]  above  and  beyond  society'  (Malik  1996: 
154-162). 
Ironically,  within  criminology,  the  'static'  cultures  of  deviants  was  something  that  was 
first  theorised  by  radical  rather  than  conservative  thinkers,  as  Calcutt  has  observed 
with  reference  to  British  criminologists  in  the  late  1960s  (Calcutt  1996).  Originally 
positing  these  cultural  differences  with  a  positive  gloss,  by  the  1990s  the  conservative 
notion  of  cultures  of  crime,  or  what  today  has  become  a  concern  with  'gun  culture'  or  a 
'knife  culture,  took  on  a  more  overtly  negative  and  authoritarian  dynamic. 
In  the  1980s  realists  like  Lea  and  Young  coupled  their  pessimism  about  social  change 
with  a  discovery  of  a  'culture'  of  selfishness  and  greed  amongst  the  working  class. 
Describing  the  problem  as  they  saw  it  in  1984,  Lea  and  Young  argued  that  crime, 
rather  than  being  in  opposition  to  capitalist  values,  was  an  expression  of  them.  By  this 
the  left  -  realists  were  not  referring  ýo  Marx's  understanding  of  alienation  and  the 
inequalities  produced  under  capitalism,  but  rather  to  the  values  of  the  working  class 
themselves  and  in  particular  to  the  'antisocial  egoism  which  permeates  the  totality  of 
behaviour  and  values  within  capitalism!  (Lea  and  Young  1984:  55).  In  a  sense 
subjectivity  was  one-sidedly  understood  to  have  been  objectified  by  the  market,  and 
through  the  ideology  of  Thatcherism. 
Past  theories  connecting  capitalist  values  to  criminal  activity  often  took  on  a  more 
optimistic  note.  American  author  Daniel  Bell,  discussing  how  gangsters  were 
understood  in  the  USA,  noted  that,  'He  was  a  man  with  a  gun,  acquiring  by  personal 
merit  what  was  denied  him  by  complex  ordering  of  stratified  society',  a  man  who  was 
92 taking  a  'queer  ladder  of  social  mobility'  (Bell  1962:  129).  Similarly  on  the  left, 
deviant  behaviour  was  often  seen  as  understandable  given  the  limitations  of  capitalist 
society.  Here  subjective  action,  even  if  deviant,  was  to  a  certain  degree  seen  as 
acceptable  and  even  positive.  However  by  the  early  eighties,  the  realist  criminologists 
had  already  begun  to  see  subjective  intent  as  something  implanted  by  the  capitalist 
system  that  was  a  problem  (of  greed  and  selfishness)  rather  than  a  potential  solution  to 
social  problems.  Meritocracy  and  aspirations  of  individuals,  without  a  belief  in  social 
progress,  became  problematised  and  understood  more  negatively  to  represent  a  'dog 
eat  dog'  mentality.  Young  men  who  felt  able  to  'take  care  of  themselves'  in  public,  for 
example,  were  regarded  as  being  macho  and  violent,  and  in  denial  of  a  more  real 
understanding  of  themselves  as  victims  of  crime  (Young  1998a).  Subjective  activity 
was  problematised  and  seen  as  a  semi-conscious  product  of  capitalism  under  Margaret 
Thatcher:  as  such  the  active  ihtent  of  even  the  criminal  was  to  some  extent  denied,  and 
the  engagement  with  the  'done  to'  working  class  increasingly  related  to  their  passivity 
and  victimhood. 
Within  the  identification  with  victimhood  a  more  diminished  subject  is  related  to,  and 
engagement  with  and  this  representation  of  individuals  was  increasingly  universalised 
through  the  1990s.  At  the  same  time,  the  idea  of  the  greedy  Thatcherite  individual  was 
also  predicated  upon  a  more  static  and  immutable  sense  of  subjectivity.  Rather  than 
being  able  to  challenge  the  outlook  of  this  'selfish  man,  the  call  was  to  police  him,  and 
to  regulate  his  excesses.  The  democratisation  of  the  police  force  -  and  the 
involvement  of  the  working  class  in  the  policing  of  the  selfish  Thatcherite  members  of 
the  community  -  was  one  way  the  left  realists  felt  the  fear  of  crime  could  be  overcome 
and  the  greedy  criminal  dealt  with  (Jones  et  al  1986). 
Interestingly,  the  notion  that  key  sections  of  the  working  class  were  becoming  more 
greedy  and  selfish  has  been  questioned  in  research  looking  at  the  rise  and  fall  of  Essex 
Man.  Questioning  the  structural  explanations  for  the  Tory  voting  worker,  including 
the  collapse  of  manufacturing  jobs,  the  growth  in  home  ownership  and  the  shiftfrom  a 
collectivist  to  individualist  perspective,  Hayes  and  Hudson  noted  that, 
93 We  were  sceptical  of  the  idea  of  an  autonomous  correlation  between  changes 
in  working  class  social  structure  and  changes  in  working  class  political 
behaviour.  We  chose  to  look  at  the  social  and  political  attitudes  of  the  skilled 
working  class  to  see  if  in  fact  these  changes  had  eroded  a  sense  of  working 
class  identity  in  the  light  of  a  clear  falling  off  in  the  vote  for  Labour.  We  found 
that  Basildon's  C2's  did  not  conform  in  any  way  to  the  academic  stereotype  of 
what  they  were  supposed  to  be.  The  key  point  to  highlight  here  is  the  neglect 
of  the  essentially  aspirant  nature  of  the  skilled  working  class.  (Hayes  and 
Hudson  2001:  14  (my  emphasis)) 
The  support  for  the  Conservatives  was  here  found  to  be  less  connected  to  structural 
changes  or  to  an  acceptance  of  Thatcherite  'ideological  convictions'  than  to  a  negative 
experience  of  Labour's  welfarism,  connected  with  poverty  and  an  individual, 
pragmatic  aspiration  for  self  improvement.  Rather  than  the  working  class  having  being 
transformed  by  a  hegemonic  Thatcherism,  the  authors  stated  that  'the  results  of  the 
Basildon  survey  reveal  that  conservative  policies  are  not  capable  of  enthusing 
anybody.  If  anything,  it  is  the  lack  of  popular  attachment  to  the  Conservative 
programme  that  needs  to  be  explained'  (2001:  65). 
Ideas  of  the  free  individual  subject  were  associated  with  free  market  theorists  in  the 
1980s.  However,  as  Heartfield  argues,  the  problems  of  the  eighties,  at  a  time  of 
TINA,  53  became  associated  not  with  the  failures  of  the  market,  but  as  a  problem  of 
freedom  itself. 
The  communitarians  criticised  subjective  freedom  because  they  took  on  face 
value  the  claims  of  the  Thatcher  and  Reagan  governments  to  represent 
individual  freedom.  Their  response  was  ultimately  a  conservative  response  to 
the  socially  corrosive  effects  of  market  policies.  But  because  the  argument  that 
there  was  no  alternative  to  the  market  had  been  won,  the  culprit  identified  for 
the  problems  of  the  eighties  was  the  selfish  individual  (Heartfield  2002:  154). 
Within  realist  and  feminist  criminology  the  problematisation  was  often  of  the  active 
subject  itself.  Freedom,  without  a  positive  belief  in  social  change,  was  increasingly 
94 seen  as  being  problematic  and  indeed  dangerous.  Aspiration  became  greed,  self 
reliance  became  machismo,  and  active  subjective  engagement  with  others  increasingly 
became  understood  within  the  Foucauldian  framework  of.  power  and  its  abuse.  54  The 
Foucauldian  understanding  of  society,  with  its  problematisation  of  subjectivity 
(Heartfield  2002:  20)  and  its  pessimism  about  human  action,  also  became  more 
influential  at  this  time;  an  understanding,  as  Stone  explained,  within  which  we  find  'a 
denial  of  the  Enlightenment  as  an  advance  in  human  understanding  and  sensibility', 
with  a  'recurrent  emphasis  on  control,  domination,  and  punishment  as  the  only 
mediating  qualities  possible  in  personal  relations'  (Harpham  1999:  68). 
Like  the  risk  theorists'  understanding  of  human  knowledge  as  destructive,  here  too  the 
free  action  of  individuals  was  increasingly  understood  to  be  damaging  rather  than 
creative.  Instead  of  being  subjective  actors,  through  the  prism  of  the  victim  and 
notions  of  vulnerability,  the  public  increasingly  became  understood  as  being 
'subjected  to'  by  selfish,  abusive  villains.  Replicating  their  own  disengagement  with 
positive  subjective  (or  political)  action  this  trend  to  conceptualise  subjective  activity 
in  a  negative  or  diminished  light  became  a  foundation  stone  upon  which  the  politics  of 
New  Labour  was  established:  a  politics,  or  more  accurately  a  'process',  without  a 
subject  (Heartfield  2002:  174). 
Regulating  the  culture  of  greed 
The  outlook  of  members  of  the  Labour  PartY  towards  crime  was  transformed  in  the 
time  span  between  the  early  1980s  and  the  rnid  1990s.  A  few  examples  of  this  change, 
appeared  in  the  Guardian  newspaper  on  30  January  1996  and  are  given  below. 
1982:  'Five  years  of  Sir  Kenneth  Newman  as  Metropolitan  Police  Commissioner  could 
leave  the  working  class  areas  of  (London)  in  as  much  the  same  state  as  the  Catholic 
areas  ofNorthern  Ireland.  '  (Ken  Livingston,  GLC  Chairman,  later  MP  for  Brent). 
1985:  After  the  death  of  PC  Keith  Blakelock  at  the  Broadwater  Farm  riots,  Bemie 
Grant,  who  became  Labour  MP  for  Tottenham  two  years  later,  said  the  police  got  a 
"bloody  good  hiding.  "' 
95 1993:  'We  should  be  tough  on  crime  and  tough  on  the  causes  of  crime.  '  (Tony  Blair). 
1995:  'Law  and  order  is  a  Labour  issue.  We  all  suffer  crime,  the  poorest  and 
vulnerable  most  of  all.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  government  to  protect  them.  '  (Tony  Blair). 
These  quotes  give  not  only  a  taste  of  the  change  in  the  approach  to  crime  within  the 
Labour  Party,  but  equally  a  sense  of  the  transformation  of  what  was  a  more 
confrontational  and  radical  opposition  to  policing  by  left-wing  Labour  members  in  the 
1980s.  By  the  early  1990s  a  number  of  key  trends  had  emerged  that  helped  this 
transformation:  the  collapse  of  the  left  and  the  labour  movement,  the  acceptance  of  the 
market  as  the  only  way  of  running  society,  and  the  increasing  centrality  of  the  victim 
in  criminal  discourse.  The  victim  and  the  vulnerable  public,  discussed  above,  could 
not  become  the  core  of  the  approach  to  crime  while  the  political  contestation  between 
left  and  right  continued.  The  conservative  promotion  of  the  active  individual55  and  the 
socialist  engagement  with  the  'collective  subject'  of  the  working  class  declined  in  the 
1990s,  and  the  more  subjectless  image  of  the  victim  became  increasingly  central  to  a 
diminished  political  elite. 
Fitzpatrick  argues  that  whereas  the  working  class  for  much  of  the  twentieth  century 
had  been  understood  by  conservatives  'as  the  source  of  instability  in  society',  with  its 
retreat  from  the  political  stage,  'perceptions  of  a  more  diffuse  threat  [arose]  from 
trends  towards  social  disintegration'  (Fitzpatrick  2001:  91).  This  new,  more 
amorphous  sense  of  anxiety,  as  discussed  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  thesis,  came  about 
in  part  because  of  a  sense  of  loss  by  the  political  elite,  both  left  and  right,  of  a  social 
and  political  purpose  that  resulted  in  a  generalised  tendency  to  panic  and  to 
institutionalise  anxiety.  Increasingly  the  n-jicro-politics  that  developed  focused  less  on 
attempting  to  change  society,  or  challenging  the  morals  of  the  public,  and  moved  to 
the  management  of  the  more  psychologically  posed  'behaviour'  of  individuals 
(Finlayson  2003;  Muncie  1999:  285). 
Despite  left  realisms  increasing  focus  upon  crime  as  a  social  problem,  its 
understanding  of  this  problem  remained,  in  part,  associated  with  deprivation.  This 
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acceptance  of  the  market,  the  question  of  deprivation  was  transformed  into  a  more 
psychologically  founded  idea  of  social  inclusion,  and  the  problem  of  crime  again  was 
connected  more  to  the  attitudes  and  values  of  the  public  than  to  issues  of  social 
inequality. 
Despite  New  Labour's  endorsement  of  the  market,  crime  was  seen  as  a  problem 
generated  within  the  entire  culture  of  a  selfish  society.  However  because  of  this 
endorsement,  it  was  not  the  market  that  was  understood  as  the  problem  so  much  as  the 
Thatcherite  'values'  embodied  within  the  prevailing  culture. 
Somewhat  ironically,  following  Tony  Blair's  denouncement  of  the  'self-interested' 
culture  that  was  'tearing  apart  the  social  fabric  of  society',  in  1996  Margaret  Thatcher 
felt  the  need  to  dampen  down  the  concern  about  this  endemic  nature  of  crime  and 
greed,  arguing  that  'Crime  and  violence  are  not  the  result  of  the  great  majority  of 
people  being  free  -  they  are  the  result  of  a  small  minority  of  wicked  men  and  women 
abusing  their  freedom'  (Heartfield  2002:  198).  For  Thatcher  freedom  was  a  positive 
thing  abused  by  the  few;  for  Blair,  this  freedom  was  understood  more  problematically 
within  the  perceived  culture  of  greed.  While  problematising  this  culture  of  greed  and 
viewing  crime  as  endemic,  particular  attention  was  given  to  those  who  were 
understood  to  embody  these  selfish  antisocial  'values'  -  the  disconnected 
'underwolveS'56  who  had  the  capacity  to  'ruin  pretty  much  everyone's  quality  of  life' 
(Wilkinson  and  Mulgan  1995:  108). 
Disconnected  therapy 
The  coupling  of  political  disorientation  with  an  understanding  of  the  public  as  being 
victimised  by  antisocial  behaviour  led  to  an  increasing  attempt  in  the  1990s  by  the 
political  elite,  and  particularly  New  Labour,  to  re-engage  the  disconnected  public 
through  its  fear  of  crime.  The  rights  campaigned  for  by  the  Labour  leadership  were 
not  classical  rights  and  freedoms  of  the  individual,  but  the  right  to  be  protected  -  the 
right  to  a  'quiet  life'.  Community  Safety  emerged,  particularly  after  Labour's  election 
in  1997,  as  a  key  organising  principle  for  local  authorities,  and  community 
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a  more  passive  and  fearful  public. 
Within  the  framework  of  TINA,  the  economic  and  political  contestation  of  left  and 
right  was  lost  and  social  policy  developments  increasingly  took  on  an  individual  and 
managerial  orientation.  Social  problems  were  now  largely  understood  with  reference 
to  the  minutiae  of  everyday  life,  rather  than  to  grand  social  visions  based  on  political 
or  moral  principles  and  beliefs.  Without  the  economic  and  political  framework  of  the 
past,  the  fragmented  public  was  engaged  with  as  individuals  -  but  more  particularly  as 
emotionally  constituted  individuals.  Expressing  how  you  felt  and  engaging  with  the 
feelings  of  the  public  increasingly  became  the  basis  of  political  rhetoric  and  the 
justification  for  social  policy  interventions.  However,  within  the  framework  of 
diminished  subjectivity,  'therapeutic  man'  was  understood  not  as  a  vibrant  and  strong 
character,  but  as  more  fragile  individual  who  needed  emotional  protection  and 
support. 
A  more  therapeutic  relationship  with  the  public  was  developed  by  New  Labour  with 
their  concern  for  the  victims  of  crime,  the  fear  of  crime,  and  with  their  challenge  to  the 
'thoughtless,  insensitive'  and  'cruel'  treatment  of  these  victims  by  the  criminal  justice 
system  (Labour  1993:  22).  'Freeing  people  from  the  fear  of  crime',  was  now  the 
'greatest  liberty  government  [could]  guarantee'  (Labour  1996:  6).  Subsequently,  the 
management  of  the  emotions  -  the  anxieties  and  fears  -  of  individuals  was  now  more 
central  to  the  concerns  about  crime  and  disorder  in  society. 
Within  this  cultural  and  political  framework,  a  trend  has  developed  for  'victim'  groups 
to  emerge,  where  individuals  find  meaning  through  their  experience  of  crime. 
Mothers'  campaigns,  for  example,  have  developed  in  the  last  decade,  supported  by  the 
unquestioned  moral  weight  that  victimhood  provides.  Following  the  model  of  the 
Mothers  Against  Drunk  Driving  campaign,  that  was  launched  in  America  in  1980,  a 
variety  of  'Mothers  Against'  groups  have  been  formed  in  Britain.  Beginning  with 
Mothers  Against  Murder  and  Aggression  in  1993  there  are  now  mothers'  campaigns 
against  drugs,  violence,  guns,  knives,  crime  and  telecommunication  masts.  These 
4victim'  groups  have  almost  all  been  generated  by  the  personal  loss  of  a  child  or  loved 
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prevent  the  same  thing  happening  to  others.  Promoting  the  awareness  of  problems  of 
crimes,  Ms  Shakespeare  of  Mothers  Against  Crime  explained  in  2004  that  'Nobody  is 
safe'  (Birmingharn  Evening  Mail  11  March  2004). 
'Awareness'  campaigns  give  out  the  message  that  you  need  to  be  more  fearful  than 
you  are,  and  attract  significant  media  interest  and  political  support.  The  cultural 
validation  given  to  campaigns  of  this  sort  acts  as  a  further  spur  to  the  spiral  of  crime 
panics,  and  is  predicated  upon  the  incontestable  amoral  absolute  of  the  victim. 
Speaking  'from  the  heart',  the  emotions  of  a  mother  who  has  lost  a  child,  within  a 
therapeutic  culture,  are  not  only  very  difficult  to  challenge,  but  are  often  actively 
courted  by  the  political  elite,  who  attempt  to  regain  legitimacy  by  displaying  their 
emotional  awareness. 
As  James  Nolan  has  noted  with  reference  to  state  legitimation,  the  therapeutic  ethos 
has  become  central  to  the  justification  of  the  state.  In  the  UK,  like  the  USA,  a 
therapeutic  relationship  with  the  public  has  developed  at  the  same  time  as  a  more 
punitive  approach  to  criminal  justice  emerged.  Both  of  these  developments  can  be 
understood  as  a  more  alienated  engagement  between  the  individual  and  the  state  -  an 
engagement  without  a  social  or  moral  basis  for  individual  or  collective  action. 
Describing  this  therapeutic  development  within  the  criminal  justice  system  and  the 
changing  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  criminal,  Nolan  notes: 
Where  once  the  self  was  to  be  brought  into  conformity  with  the  standards  of 
externally  derived  authorities  and  social  institutions,  it  now  is  compelled  to 
look  within  ... 
In  other  words,  the  contemporary  cultural  condition  is  such  that 
externally  derived  points  of  moral  reference  are  not  available  to  individuals  as 
they  once  were.  Instead,  cultural  standards  for  judgement,  guideposts  for 
actions,  understandings  of  oneself,  and  the  tools  for  navigating  through  social 
life  are  likely  to  be  rooted  in  the  self.  (Nolan  1998:  3) 
99 The  problem  of  crime  and  disorder  in  this  respect  relates,  less  to  the  laws  of  society 
and  the  upholding  of  these  laws  by  the  state  as  an  expression  of  the  'general  will'  than 
to  the  protection  of  the  emotional  well-being  of  the  individual.  Policing  has  therefore 
become  founded  more  on  the  fears  of  individuals  than  in  carrying  out  the  will  of  the 
public,  and  a  more  directly  therapeutic  relationship  has  developed  between  the 
'authorities  and  the  individual. 
Furedi  also  notes  that  adults  and  children  are  today  'continually  invited  to  make  sense 
of  their  troubles  through  the  medium  of  therapeutics. 
Take  the  example  of  crime.  The  belief  that  the  impact  of  crime  has  a  major 
influence  on  people's  emotional  life  is  a  relatively  recent  one.  Back  in  the 
1970s,  crime  surveys  tended  to  suggest  that  the  impact  of  most  crime  on  the 
victim  was  superficial  and  of  relatively  short  duration 
...  But  during  the  past  25 
years,  criminologists  have  adopted  a  radically  different  interpretation  of  the 
effects  of  victimisation  (Furedi  2004:  112). 
For  Furedi,  a  dialectical  relationship  has  been  established  where  cultural  and 
institutional  practices  help  orient  the  public  towards  a  therapeutic  understanding  of 
themselves  and  their  troubles. 
Coupled  with  this  therapeutic  turn,  the  punitive  response  to  crime  that  developed  most 
fervently  in  the  UK  in  the  early  1990s  can  be  understood  as  part  of  a  single  process  in 
respect  to  the  move  away  from  the  'social'  (Rose  1996).  Within  criminal  justice  this 
can  be  seen  in  the  move  from  practices  of  traditional  rehabilitation  to  increasingly 
locking  people  up  or  developing  more  self-referential  therapeutic  practices, 
exemplified  most  clearly  in  the  drugs  courts  in  the  USA  that  are  being  developed  in 
the  UK. 
Nolan,  examining  the  'emergence  of  a  therapeutic  culture  with  the  universal 
discrediting  of  rehabilitative  practices',  notes  that  the  rehabilitative  ideal  is  'dedicated 
to  the  achievement  of  social  purposes'  in  that  it  intends  to  'bring  the  offenders' 
behaviour  and  attitudes  into  harmony  with  certain  values  socially  defined.  and, 
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not  individual  judgements.  In  contrast,  the  therapeutic  ethos  is  more  centrally  disposed 
to  'assign  ultimate  moral  priority  to  the  self,  over  and  against  society'  (Nolan  2001: 
179). 
Whereas  the  emphasis  of  rehabilitative  or  adaptational  therapy  was  to  bring  the 
individual  into  harmony  with  society,  [today's]  therapies  of  liberation  see 
society  as  oppressive  and  as  contributing  to  a  person's  illness.  Society,  as  it 
were.  is  the  cause  of  a  person's  sickness  (Nolan  2001:  180). 
This  estrangement  from  social  nomLs  and  outcomes  is  also  reflected  in  the  punitive 
approach  to  crime  developed  in  the  1990s,  in  that  it  is  similarly  distanced  from  the 
traditional  idea  of  rehabilitation  and  reforming  the  criminal  into  an  upstanding  citizen, 
and  it  more  negatively  attempts  simply  to  keep  criminals  off  the  streets.  The 
pessimism  about  social  change  that  developed  out  of  the  1970s'  rejection  of  welfarism 
here  takes  on  a  more  detached  view  of  the  criminal.  Where  the  tabloids  shout  for  more 
prisons,  the  more  liberal  therapeutic  approach  attempts  to  heal  the  criminal  by  relating 
them  to  their  inner  selves  and  by  raising  their  self-esteem,  or  by  giving  emotional 
support  to  victims.  In  neither  approach  does  the  'social'  world  of  politics,  society  or 
momlity  enter. 
The  therapeutic  concern  with  the  victim  of  crime  has  also  run  in  paraflcl  to  the 
conservative  promotion  of  this  victim  -  both  reflecting  a  move  away  from  a  social 
engagement  with  law  and  order  and  towards  a  more  individually  oriented  concern  for 
the  victim.  But  as  Nolan  has  pointed  out,  Ile  therapeutic  emphasis  on  the  victimised 
and  emotive  concerns  of  the  self  are  tendentiously  anticommunal',  and  at  a  time  of  a 
growing  concern  with  the  need  to  rebuild  communities,  he  asks,  'How...  can  such  an 
orientation  effectively  provide  the  basis  for  a  new  form  of  civil  solidarityT  (Nolan 
1998:  301). 
71e  increasing  centrality  of  the  victim  within  the  politics  of  crime  and  the  engagement 
with  the  public  based  upon  its  vulnerability  and  personalfears  all  imply  a  connection 
with  the  individual  based  less  upon  his  or  her  active  subjective  engagement  with  the 
101 'social'than  a  relationship  ofprotection  from  it.  Rather  than  people  being  understood 
and  engaged  with  as  producers  of  their  environment,  individuals  are  conceptualised 
and  engaged  with  as  products  of  it.  A  more  managerial  rather  than  transformative 
sense  of  society  and  the  'public'  has  similarly  emerged  and  is  seen  most  clearly  in  the 
71ird  Way  projeCL 
The  veneer  of  politics 
Examining  C.  Wright  Mills'  conception  of  the  public  as  opposed  to  a  mass,  we  are 
able  to  identify  a  distinction  between  an  autonomous  public  that  has  a  separate  life 
from  social  institutions,  where  'virtually  as  many  people  express  opinions  as  receive 
them',  and  perhaps  most  importantly  can  'find  an  outlet  in  effective  action  against,  if 
necessary.  prevailing  systems  and  agents  of  authority.  This  contrasts  with  a  mass, 
where  'far  fewer  people  express  opinions  than  receive  them',  and  where  'the 
community  of  publics  becomes  an  abstracted  collectivity  of  individuals  who  receive 
impressions  from  the  mass  media!  (Mills  1968:  355).  Public  opinion  for  Mills  is 
therefore  predicated  upon  an  active  ebb  and  now  of  opinion  where  anyone  can  speak 
and,  most  significantly,  does.  Action  by  democratic  institutions  thus  emerges  from  this 
'general  will'  of  the  people.  Rather  than  the  public  and  the  democratic  institutions 
reacting  to  society  they  collectively  create  it. 
Today.  it  appears  that  Mills'  notion  of  a  mass  society  is  more  prevalent.  57  However. 
this  development  has  a  dialectical  component  and  can  be  seen  in  relation  to  politics 
and  democratic  institutions  themselves.  Logically,  the  transformation  of  a  public  into 
a  mass,  with  the  implied  interconnection  between  the  public  and  society's  institutions, 
necessarily  means  that  this  transformation  could  not  occur  unless  there  was  an  equally 
profound  transformation  in  politics  itself.  If  in  the  late  twentieth  century  icon  of  the 
victim  we  see  a  more  powerless,  socially  alienated  individual  -  within  the  political 
elite,  a  similar  development  must  have  occurred. 
In  Alan  Finlayson's  Making  Sense  of  New  Labour,  the  emergence  of  New  Labour  is 
understood  to  represent  a  move  away  from  Politics  and  towards  a  form  of  social 
engagement  based  more  on  sociology.  What  Finlayson  means  by  this  is  that  the 
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become  more  of  a  technocratic  manager  of  a  process  that  it  believes  to  be  beyond  its 
control.  Whereas  political  developments  are  predicated  upon  an  ideology  or 
philosophy  and  a  movement  from  the  present  to  the  future,  politics  under  new  Labour 
is  more  about  a  sociological  examination  of  the  facts  of  society  and  a  subsequent 
develop  of  policies  according  to  these  facts.  Having  lost  an  engagement  with  the  idea 
of  political  agency,  New  Labour  increasingly  responds  to  social  facts,  which  they 
believe  create  certain  types  of  behaviours  (Finlayson  2003). 
For  Heartfield,  the  Wrd  Way  represents  a  'process  without  a  subject'  (Heartfield: 
2002:  174).  Blustrated  in  Fairclough's  examination  of  the  language  of  New  Labour, 
we  find  government  documents  arc  increasingly  expressed  with  'passive  sentences 
without  agents'  (Fairclough  2000:  24).  Similarly  Fairclough  notes  how  change  is 
discussed  by  Labour  n-dnisters  as  a  noun  rather  than  a  verb,  and  the  absence  of, 
'responsible  agents  further  contributes  to  constructing  change  as  inevitable' 
(Fairclough  2000:  26). 
Citing  the  examples  of  'globalisation'  and  'modernisation',  both  Finlayson  (2003)  and 
Heartfield  (2002)  suggest  that  these  concepts,  rather  than  reflecting  profound 
economic  and  social  changes,  are  rather  expressions  of  the  political  elites'  sense  of  the 
rudderless  nature  of  society:  a  sense  expressed  by  New  Labour  in  that  they  are  'not  the 
authors  of  their  own  destiny'  (Heartfield  2002:  180). 
The  search  for  a  big  idea,  which  has  troubled  political  leaders  in  the  West  for  the  last 
decade.  gives  an  indication  of  the  dislocation  of  the  political  elite  from  social 
processes.  Where  ideas  previously  emerged  from  society  and  the  conflicting  tensions 
and  movements  within  it,  today  the  new  political  elite  believes  think-tanks  and  policy 
officers  can  invent  thern.  Dislocated  from  a  public,  acting  more  as  sociologists  than  as 
Political  parties,  and  attempting  to  engage  with  a  society  that  feels  beyond  their 
control,  the  political  elites'  own  sense  of  anxiety  and  alienation  has  developed  into  a 
propensity  to  engage  individuals  through  their  personal  insecurities.  71ie  elites'  own 
sense  of  diminished  subjectivity  helps  them  to  both  understand  themselves  and  the 
public  through  the  prism  of  the  victinL 
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being  dislocated  from  the  public  and  from  a  social  will,  they  are  inclined  to  search  for 
points  of  contacted  with  the  electorate.  Participation  subsequently  becomes  an  aim  in 
itself  and  has,  through  the  1990s  and  into  the  twcnty-first  century,  become 
increasingly  developed  at  a  micro,  or  local  level  -  the  community  (Gilling  1999,  Rose 
1996  and  Flint  2002).  As  Alice  Miles  has  pointed  out,  with  reference  to  the  move  to 
regional  governments  and  the  rise  of  Antisocial  Behaviour  Orders  (ASBOs),  'Our 
rulers  are  in  denial  about  the  big  issues  and  are  seeking  refuge  in  little  things'(Times  3 
November  2004). 
While  politicising  little  things'.  the  role  of  govemance  has  also  developed, 
increasingly  incorporating  institutions,  both  voluntary  and  state-run,  in  the 
management  of  initiatives  that  attempt  to  regulate  society  more  systematically  and 
often  engage  with  the  public  through  issues  of  community  safety  (Rose  1996).  Many 
of  these  institutions,  for  example  trade  unions,  as  discussed  above,  or  housing 
associations  and  departments  (Cummings  1997;  Flint  2002,  )  have  also  been 
transformed  and  subsequently  developed  a  relationship  with  their  consumers  or  clients 
based  on  the  protection  and  regulation  of  their  behaviour  and  that  of  their  neighbours. 
Finally,  and  in  reMon  to  the  changed  operation  of  politics,  organisations  like  the 
police  have  become  more  directly  involved  in  the  participatory  concerns  of  the  state. 
With  antisocial  behaviour  -  noise,  graffiti,  vandalism  and  so  on  -  being  understood  to 
'undermine  community  spirit'  (Waiton  2001:  17),  the  police  themselves  have, 
according  to  one  Chief  Constable,  become  'formidable  agents  of  change'  (Dennis 
1997:  116).  As  'agents  of  change'  within  a  therapeutic  culture,  the  primary  objective 
of  the  police  in  late  twentieth  century  life  has  increasingly  been  transformed  from 
enforcing  law  and  order.  into  an  objective  where  the  'feel  safe  factor  is  the  primary 
measure'.  against  which  they  believe  they  should  be  judged  (Dennis  1997:  12  1). 
That  the  police  in  Britain  can  today  understand  themselves  as  having  a  role  in 
rebuilding  communities  by  their  own  actions,  rather  than  in  their  relationship  with  the 
state  and  as  an  extension  of  the  social  will,  gives  a  sense  of  the  loss  of  this  will,  the 
104 increasingly  technical  approach  to  community  building,  and  the  growing  centrality  of 
safety  to  individual,  public  and  political  life. 
The  politics  of  fear 
'Safety'  as  an  amoral  absolute  under  New  Labour  has  developed  apace,  and  the 
attempt  to  regulate  social  processes  that  appear  to  be  beyond  their  control  has  led  to 
more  laws  and  more  new  crimes  being  created  than  by  any  other  administration.  " 
Relating  to  a  more  fragmented  public  there  is  simultaneously  an  attempt  to  reconnect 
with  people  through  their  fears.  Safety  has  consequently  become  the  organising 
principle  of  the  politics  of  fear.  As  HearTield  notes,  whereas  the  Tliird  Way  in  the  UK 
and  USA  has  failed  to  connect  people  to  a  social  vision,  this  does  not  mean  that  they 
have  made  no  connection:  'If  they  have  failed  to  appeal  to  a  collective  vision  of  the 
future,  both  the  Democrats  and  New  Labour  have  managed  to  relate  to  a  more 
atomised  electorate.  by  playing  upon  its  fears'  (Heartf  ield  2002:  195). 
New  Laboues  campaign  advisor  Philip  Gould,  in  his  1994  document  'Fighting  the 
Fear  Factoe,  argues  that  the  public  are  insecure  and  anxious  and  are  more  inclined  to 
fear  that  things  may  get  worse  rather  than  better.  Given  these  circumstances  Gould 
believed  that  the  right  had  used  fear  as  a  way  of  gaining  support.  Despite  Gould  noting 
that  much  of  this  anxiety  had  developed  because  of  social  changes,  and  despite  his 
concern  with  the  reactionary  use  of  fear,  his  proposals  were  for  Labour  to  connect 
'With  the  populist  instincts  of  voters  through  policies  that  are  tough  on  crime'.  In 
Gould's  book  7he  Unfinished  Revolution  he  expWns:  'Progressive  parties  have  learned 
to  ...  connect  directly  with  the  insecurities  of  working  families'.  and  that  this  is 
necessary  because  'in  an  increasingly  fast-changing  world,  insecurity  is  likely  to  grow, 
and  with  it  the  basis  for  fear  campaigning'  (Heartf  ield  2002:  195). 
New  Labour  developed  their  own  form  of  fear  campaigning,  and  did  so  more 
systernatically  than  the  Conservatives  by  relating  not  to  the  public  with  politics,  but  to 
the  mass  of  individuals  through  their  fears  and  anxieties. 
105 Ile  killing  of  James  Bulger  in  1993,  a  year  when,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Conservative 
Party's  moral  and  political  coherence  was  on  the  wane,  provided  an  ideal  platform 
from  which  Tony  Blair  could  launch  Labour's  alternative  fear  factor.  Rather  than 
being  seen  as  a  one-off  occurrence  perpetrated  by  children  who  lacked  the  inoral 
responsibility  to  be  fully  aware  of  their  actions,  Blair  used  Bulgcr's  death  to  promote  a 
new  morality  that  emphasised  responsibility  over  selfish  individualisn-L  Discussing 
Blair's  reaction  to  this  event  and  also  denouncing  sociologists  who  had  previously 
talked  about  'moral  panics.  the  editor  of  the  Independent  newspaper  wrote, 
Tony  Blair,  the  shadow  Home  Secretary,  did  not  exaggerate  on  Friday  when  he 
likened  the  news  bulletins  of  the  last  week  to  "hammer  blows  struck  against 
the  sleeping  conscience  of  the  country,  urging  us  to  wake  up  and  look 
unflinchingly  at  what  we  see".  This  was  not  -  as  it  once  might  have  been  -a 
party  political  argument  which  sought  directly  to  connect  the  murder  in  Bootle 
of  two-year-old  James  Bulger  with  unemployment  and  deprivation:  the  failures 
of  capitalism  equal  crime,  the  economic  system  is  to  blame.  As  Blair  went  on: 
"We  cannot  live  in  a  moral  vacuum.  If  we  do  not  learn  and  then  teach  the  value 
of  what  is  right  and  wrong,  then  the  result  is  simply  moral  chaos  which  engulfs 
us  all.  "  (Independent,  21  February  1993) 
7le  fear  factor  was  here  turned  against  the  Conservative  government  and  the  previous 
understanding  of  responsibility  -  related  to  adult  subjects  -  was  replaced  by  the 
responsibilisation  of  those  who  were  previously  understood  to  be  unable  to  be  morally 
responsible  -  the  two  children  who  killed  James  Bulger  -  and  by  a  notion  of 
responsibility  that  actually  targeted  the  idea  of  rights-bearing  responsible  individuals, 
replacing  it  with  a  more  communitarian  understanding  of  rights  and  responsibilities. 
Below  the  same  Independent  editorial  is  quoted  at  length,  with  reference  to  Blair's 
concern  with  moral  chaos.  It  sums  up  much  of  what  had  changed  in  political  life  by 
1993.  and  also  what  was  to  come. 
A  Tory  theologian  -  John  Patten,  say  -  could  have  said  [what  Blair  had  said] 
and  few  would  have  noticed.  But  we  are  all  becoming  moralists  now  -  even 
106 Ken  Livingstone  has  come  out  of  the  closet  -  and  rightly  so.  We  have  lost  all 
sense  of  direction;  we  mostly  despise  our  political  leadership;  ancient 
institutions  combine  humour  and  pathos;  the  economy  crumbles.  President  Bill 
Clinton  across  the  Atlantic  may  not  be  totally  sincere  -  in  terms  of  global 
resources  his  is  the  most  seUtsh  society  -  and  he  may  fail.  But  there  is  at  least 
in  his  rhetoric  an  appeal  to  sacrifice  for  the  common  good,  and  to  a  sharing  of 
values  and  beliefs,  that  no  government  minister  could  hope  to  match  here, 
because  Conservatism  since  Tbatcher  simply  does  not  allow  it.  Our  men  at  the 
top  cling  stubbornly  to  what  one  Japanese  commentator  described  recently  as 
"a  kind  of  inverted  Marxism".  Ibcir  dogma  is  purely  economic  individualism, 
with  occasional  forays  into  Old  Testament  certainties  (John  Patten)  and  the 
criminal-spawning  tendencies  of  socialist  local  authorities  (John  Major,  at  his 
silliest)  to  explain  away  the  glaring  failures  of  British  society.  (Independent, 
21  February  1993  (my  italics)). 
Conclusion 
Crime  panics  developed  apace  in  the  1990s  under  John  Major,  while  New  Labour 
promoted  the  message  of  personal  and  moral  responsibility.  Cook,  looking  at  the 
question  of  crime  and  moral  panics  argues,  that  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  one  could 
make  the  case  that  little  had  changed  in  British  political  life  (Cook  2000:  207). 
However,  in  reality,  this  thesis  has  attempted  to  show  that  in  fact,  like  the  shift  in 
panics  from  their  moral  to  an  amoral  form,  the  politics  of  crime  and  antisocial 
behaviour  in  Britain  reflected  a  profound  change  within  politics.  As  Cook  herself 
notes,  a  key  change  was  in  the  collapse  of  the  Labour  movement.  But  this  was  no  side 
issue  -  it  was  a  change  that  transformed  the  nature  of  crime  policies  in  the  1990s.  No 
longer  was  the  politics  of  crime  pail  of  a  wider  political  struggle  between  the  left  and 
right.  but  rather  the  increasing  focus  on  the  regulation  of  behaviour  and  the  more 
direct  attempt  to  regulate  society  was  a  rcflection  of  the  collapse  of  politics  itself.  The 
regulation  and  control  of  society  was  no  longer  a  means  to  an  end  but  the  end  in  itself. 
Political  goals  associated  with  individual  cntrcprcneurialism  or  with  socialism  were 
now  replaced  by  a  more  ubiquitous  drive  to  create  a  safe  society.  Rather  than 
engaging  active  subjects  within  these  political  campaigns,  the  more  fragmented  public 
107 became  vulnerable  clients  on  whose  behalf  the  new  political  elite  advocated.  This  new 
politics  of  behaviour,  like  the  amoral  panics  that  accompanied  it,  engaged  neither  with 
individual  subjects  nor  with  a  social  or  collective  vision,  but  rather  developed  a  more 
limited  and  therapeutic  form  of  protection  of  individuals  through  the  management  of 
behaviour. 
By  the  time  of  the  1997  general  election,  as  the  Guardian  law  correspondent  noted,  all 
parties'  proposals  on  law  and  order  were  about  'public  reassurance  rather  than  crime- 
fighting'  (Guardian  16  April  1997).  Within  six  months  the  Hamilton  curfew  had  been 
implemented. 
Before  this  election  the  ailing  Conservative  Party  had  continued  in  vain  to  use  the 
crime  card  as  its  own  and  attempt  to  label  Labour  as  soft  on  crime.  Where  the 
previous  Labour  shadow  home  secretary  Roy  Hattersley,  in  the  late  1980s,  had  made 
civil  liberties  the  key  test  of  the  government's  criminal  justice  legislation,  Tony  Blair 
argued  that  'reducing  crime  had  to  be  the  first  test  and  civil  liberties  the  second' 
(Guardian  30  January  1996).  Labour  had  been  transformed  as  a  political  party  that 
was  now  even  more  able  than  the  Conservatives  to  play  the  crime  card  and  in  effect 
transform  what  liberty  meant,  from  freedom  of  action  to  freedom  from  the  action  of 
others. 
With  an  anxious  and  fragmented  electorate  supporting  a  more  regulated  environment, 
New  Labour  followed  on  from  John  Major  in  developing  a  new  authoritarianism 
based  on  the  protection  of  a  vulnerable  public.  This  new  authoritarianism,  through  the 
prism  of  diminished  subjectivity,  was  largely  welcomed  within  society  -  if  without 
any  great  passion.  As  such,  authoritarianism  became  understood  to  a  degree  as  a  more 
enlightened  engagement  with  the  real  world  and  with  the  fears  of  real  people,  than  as  a 
form  of  social  control  by  a  diminished  political  elite  over  a  diminished  public. 
The  transformation  of  the  image  of  the  public,  59  from  political  subjects  to  pitied 
victims,  had  emerged  with  the  suspension  of  politics,  the  change  in  left-wing  thought 
from  radical  to  real,  and  the  increasingly  fragmented  nature  of  the  public  itself.  While 
the  trend  towards  a  more  individuated  society,  the  greater  disengagement  from 
108 politics,  and  the  loss  of  belief  by  sections  of  the  elite  can  be  identified  many  decades 
earlier,  in  the  1980s  and  peaking  in  the  early  1990s  we  can  see  a  qualitative  change  in 
the  politics  of  crime  and  the  relationship  between  the  public  and  the  political  elite. 
The  rise  of  a  more  technically  authoritarian  politics  was  predicated  upon  the  collapse 
of  political  contestation  between  left  and  right:  a  collapse  that  left  the  Conservative 
Party  without  a  coherent  'enemy  within'  to  organise  itself  against,  and  one  which 
helped  to  disengage  the  Labour  Party  from  the  'old'  labour  movement.  Both  parties 
increasingly  isolated  from  public  life,  reacted  to  events  by  attempting  to  control  a 
society  that  they  felt  was  beyond  their  control. 
Despite  the  desire  for  'community',  60  the  sentiment  of  'to  hell  with  the  criminal'  in  the 
1990s  increasingly  represented  the  d6-moralised  elites'  underlying  approach  to 
humanity  that  implied  'to  hell  with  society'  and  the  social,  and  indeed,  'to  hell  with 
politics'.  The  role  of  micro  politics  was  now  increasingly  reduced  to  the  management 
of  and  engagement  with  the  fragmented  and  anxious  individual  at  the  'local  level'. 
Laws,  legislation  and  an  anxious  form  of  authoritarianism  developed  under  John 
Major  and  erupted  under  New  Labour.  As  Garside  observed:  'Since  1997  more  than 
20  crime-related  Bills  have  been  debated  by  parliament.  More  than  270  new  offences 
and  at  least  350  regulations  have  been  created  since  2000'  (Garside  2004:  7).  Here,  as 
Heartfield  notes,  Labour  pursued  through  legislative  activity  what  it  lacked  in  broader 
purpose  (Heartfield  2002:  1904) 
Vulnerability,  a  category  given  to  specific  'groups'  that  classified  them  as  in  need  of 
protection  by  their  very  nature  of  being  black,  women,  or  poor,  increasingly  became  a 
term  used  for  ever  more  groups  in  society  and  ultimately  to  the  population  as  a  whole. 
Clainismaking  on  behalf  of  'victims'  similarly  developed  in  this  period  and  carried 
with  it  moral  weight  that  united  radicals  and  conservatives  and  became  a  framework 
of  relating  to  society  that  was  difficult  to  challenge.  Soon  almost  all  claims  for  groups 
in  society  began  to  take  this  form  of  protecting  victims  and  the  vulnerable:  the 
aggressive  beggar  preyed  upon  the  vulnerable  public,  while  the  vulnerable  beggar  was 
a  victim  of  aggressive  members  of  the  public;  and  the  antisocial  youth  made  life  hell 
109 for  vulnerable  communities,  while  alternatively  aggressive  policing  victimised  these 
young  people. 
As  the  editor  of  the  Independent  argued  in  1993,  'we  have  lost  all  sense  of  direction'  - 
but  on  a  positive  note  he  recognised  that  'we  are  all  becoming  moralists  now  -  even 
Ken  Livingstone'  (Independent,  21  February  1993).  The  lost  sense  of  direction 
reflected  the  loss  of  political  and  moral  belief  amongst  those  in  authority,  but  the 
problem  was  understood  as  one  of  disorder  not  within  the  elite  itself  but  within  the 
public  and  in  particular  with  the  selfish  individualism  that  was  believed  to  have 
infested  the  culture  of  British  life. 
The  crisis  of  belief  and  the  loss  of  political  direction  and  a  social  will  encouraged  both 
a  tendency  to  regulate  society  more  directly  and  lock  more  people  up,  but  also  to 
moralise  about  'little  things.  The  minutiae  of  everyday  life,  the  focus  on  community, 
and  the  engagement  with  the  'troubles'  of  the  public,  became  the  basis  of  political 
action  and  explains  the  rise  of  not  only  the  politics  of  crime  but  more  specifically  the 
politics  of  antisocial  behaviour.  61  Lacking  a  'vision  thing',  the  demand  that  the  public 
learn  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  was  no  longer  founded  upon  a  moral  or 
political  basis,  but  on  the  more  vacuous  amoral  absolute  of  safety.  The  beliefs  and 
behaviour  of  people  was  to  become  judged  not  in  terms  of  their  relationship  with 
society  and  their  public  actions,  but  on  the  personal  interactions  that  was 
problematised  through  the  radical  language  of  harassment  and  abuse  -  the  ultimate  act 
of  responsibility  being  a  'zero  tolerance'  approach  to  personal  and  public  life. 
C  Wright  Mills,  discussing  the  need  to  help  constitute  an  active  public,  believed  that 
for  this  to  occur  the  'troubles'  of  everyday  life  needed  to  be  made  into  'issues'  (Mills 
1968).  These  troubles,  Mills  felt,  could  only  be  fully  understood  by  being  situated 
within  society  as  a  whole  and  transformed  into  'issues'  that  could  then  be  addressed 
by  the  public.  Rather  than  troubles,  it  was  'issues'  that  would  then  become  understood 
as  the  social  problems  to  address.  The  'troubles'  of  local  communities  before  the 
1990s  were  generally  not  made  into  social  problems.  However,  with  the  loss  of  a 
political  and  social  will,  these  troubles  have  been  engaged  with  more  directly  and  in  a 
110 sense  the  political  elite,  backed  up  by  key  institutions  including  the  trade  unions,  have, 
rather  than  making  'issues'  out  of  troubles,  made  troubles  the  issue. 
The  problems  of  everyday  life,  in  the  form  of  antisocial  behaviour,  rather  than  crime 
itself,  have  under  the  New  Labour  governments  become  the  basis  of  politics  and  the 
newly  institutionalised  framework  within  which  to  reengage  the  atomised  individual. 
Having  lost  a  social  will  (Feeley  and  Simon  1992)  and  the  energy  of  society 
(Findlayson  2003)  to  redirect  social  process  and  structures,  a  therapeutic  culture 
(Furedi  2004)  has  developed  within  which  state  institutions  relate  not  only  to 
individuals  and  'little  things',  but  to  the  emotions  associated  with  thern.  62  Initially 
developed  within  the  welfare  state  in  the  form  of  Victim  Support  Schemes,  with  the 
collapse  of  the  welfare  state,  the  emotionally  constituted  (and  damaged)  victim  has 
become  universalised,  and  state  legitimation  has  been  reconstituted  in  relationship  to 
the  emotionally  vulnerable  public. 
Finally,  whatever  the  problem  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour,  it  is  not  the  nature  of 
these  problems  themselves  that  have  led  to  them  becoming  social  problems  in  the 
form  they  now  take.  Despite  the  insecurities  felt  by  the  more  fragmented  public  and 
the  relatively  high  statistical  crime  rate,  there  remains  a  tendency  for  politicians  to 
exaggerate  still  further  the  problem  of  antisocial  behaviour  and  fear  within 
neighbourhoods  that  are  understood  to  be  'tefforised'  by  antisocial  youth. 
As  Cummings  argues  with  the  respect  to  former  Labour  home  secretary  David 
Blunkett's  belief  that  reducing  antisocial  behaviour  will  create  a  rise  in  civil 
republicanism: 
A  crucial  point  missed  by  most  commentators  is  that  the  fear  of  crime  is  an 
expression  of  atornisation  rather  than  a  cause  of  it.  And  except  in  a  few 
extreme  cases,  it  is  a  nagging  sense  of  unease  rather  than  crippling  fear  that 
people  feel,  even  in  rough  areas.  People  generally  get  on  with  their  lives,  while 
worrying  that  they  are  vulnerable  to  unspecified  threats.  The  politics  of 
antisocial  behaviour  gives  shape  to  these  threats  by  focusing  people's  unease 
on  clear  targets,  typically  young  loiterers.  This  institutionalises  atomisation 
III rather  than  overcoming  it  by  officially  endorsing  a  fearful  attitude  and 
undermining  people's  confidence  in  their  ability  to  negotiate  problems  without 
official  support  (O'Malley  and  Waiton  2005:  7). 
112 Chapter  5:  Methodology 
Introduction 
The  motivation  for  studying  the  Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative  (CSI)  came  from  my 
existing  concern  and  research  into  the  developing  'Zero  Tolerance'  police  initiatives 
being  introduced  by  Strathclyde  Police  in  the  mid-  I  990s  (Waiton  2001:  5).  'Operation 
Spotlight',  a  stop  and  search  initiative,  had  been  of  particular  concern  to  me,  as  I  was, 
at  the  time,  running  a  youth  drop-in  centre  in  Coatbridge  and  had  noted  the  level  of 
searches  of  young  people  taking  place  by  the  local  police  force,  and  the  level  of 
intervention  into  their  activities.  63 
One  of  the  key  arguments  made  about  why  the  CSI  would  be  beneficial  to  the  targeted 
areas  was  that  it  would  help  to  recreate  a  sense  of  community  by  reducing  the  number 
of  children  and  young  people  who  were  'wandering  the  streets  at  night'  -  young  people 
who  to  some  extent  were  believed  to  be  helping  to  create  a  sense  of  fear  in  these  areas. 
However,  and  somewhat  paradoxically,  research  was  also  being  developed  at  this  time 
about  the  broader  trend  within  society  of  the  emergence  of  'cotton-wool  kids'.  Rather 
than  young  people  and  children  wandering  the  streets,  this  research  suggested  that  the 
opposite  development  was  more  generally  true  -  that  children  were  having  an 
increasingly  regulated  existence,  playing  out  less  frequently,  travelling  less,  and 
having  their  free  time  ever  more  supervised.  64 
Similarly  research  examining  the  relationships  between  children,  young  people  and 
adults  had  also  suggested  that  the  amount  and  quality  of  contact  between  generations 
was  in  decline,  in  part  because  of  a  loss  of  surety  and  confidence  amongst  adults  as  to 
what  these  relationships  should  be  predicated  upon  (Furedi  and  Brown  1997).  Situated 
within  a  knowledge  of  moral  panics  research  and  the  more  recent  theoretical 
developments  of  a  culture  of  fear  (Furedi  1997),  risk  (Beck  1992)  and  individuation  in 
society,  a  research  project  was  developed  to  analyse  the  development  of  the  CSI. 
- 
113 As  well  as  analYsing  the  projected  social  problems  in  the  areas  of  crime,  youth 
disorder  and  children  being  'at  risk',  this  research  project  also  aimed  to  assess  wider 
trends  within  the  targeted  communities.  Rather  than  analyse  to  what  degree  fear  was 
being  created  by  young  people,  the  project  aimed  to  ascertain  to  what  extent  a  culture 
of  fear  was  undermining  relationships  between  all  sections  of  the  community,  and 
limiting  the  contact  between  them.  Within  this  framework,  the  question  being  posed 
was:  to  what  degree  is  the  curfew  actually  reinforcing  the  culture  of  fear,  reducing 
contact  between  people  and  ultimately  undermining,  rather  than  re-forming, 
communities?  The  purpose  of  the  research  was  therefore  to  understand  the  operation 
of  a  particular  social  policy  and  its  development  within,  and  impact  upon,  the  culture 
of  fear. 
The  research  took  a  variety  of  forms,  but  at  its  heart  were  interviews  with  childrenand 
young  people  in  the  areas  of  Hamilton  whose  lives  had  been  impacted  upon  by  the 
introduction  of  the  curfew.  Added  to  this  are  more  informal  interviews  -  or 
discussions  -  with  local  adults,  and  observational  fieldwork  of  the  area.  This  work  is 
supplemented  by  a  contextual  social  constructionist  analysis  of  the  presentation  and 
understanding  of  the  curfew,  particularly  in  the  press.  Within  the  Idtter  research,  the 
process  of  typification  65  is  identified  as  is  the  justificatory  framework  and  therefore 
the  underlying  values  that  informed  the  introduction  and  defence,  and  indeed  the 
opposition,  to  the  CSI.  Through  this  work  the  very  meaning  of  a  'good'  community  is 
analysed  and  re-connected  to  the.  concepts  developed  in  the  previous  chapter  of  the 
moral,  or  more  accurately  amoral,  absolute  of  safety  and  the  idea  of  diminished 
subjectivity.  The  ontological  framework  of  this  research  is  therefore  largely  focused 
upon  individual  interpretations  and  cultural  frameworks,  and  attempts  to  understand 
lived  experiences  and  cultural  trends  that  inform  these  experiences  and  interpretations 
(Mason  1996:  11). 
114 Numbers  interviewed 
A  table  of  the  number  of  children  and  young  people  interviewed,  and  the  number  of 
discussions  held  with  adults  living  in  and  around  Hillhouse,  is  provided  below  in 
Table  1.  In  Table  2  some  more  details  are  given  about  the  ages  of  the  children  and 
young  people  interviewed.  Furtlýer  information  about  these  statistics  is  provided  later. 
Table  2:  Number  of  interviews  and  discussions  in  Hamilton 
Number  of  children  aged  9-11  years  old  interviewed  32 
Sex  of  children  17  female 
15  male 
Number  of  young  people  12-15  years  old  interviewed  26 
Sex  of  young  people  13  female 
13  male 
Number  of  adults  involved  in  discussions  20 
Sex  of  adults  7  female 
13  male 
Total  number  of  interviews  and  discussions  in  Hillhouse  78 
Total  number  of  children  and  young  people  interviewed  58 
Table  3:  Ages  of  children  and  young  people  interviewed 
Primary  Schools  Secondary  Schools  Total 
Children 
Age  9  yrs  10yrs  II  yrs  12  yrs  13  yrs  14  yrs  15  yrs 
_  Number  3  25  4  3  7  7  1  9  58 
Interviewed  1  1  1 
Research  methods 
As  well  as  the  semi-structured  interview  and  the  contextual  constructionist  work, 
which  will  be  explored  in  some  detail  below,  other  research  methods  were  used  to 
develop  a  broad  understanding  of  the  Hamilton  curfew. 
Observation  of  one  key  targeted  area  helped  form  a  picture  of  the  estate  in  ques,  "lion 
and  give  a  sense  of  its  nature  and  the  activities  of  young  people  at  night.  66  This 
115 fieldwork  also  included  informal  discussions  with  adults  in  and  around  this  estate, 
which  helped  the  understanding  of  some  adult  interpretations  of  events,  and  in 
particular  gave  a  more  detailed  background  to  developments.  Finally,  telephone 
conversations  and  written  statements  were  gained  from  various  children's  charities, 
which  helped  to  supplement  the  construction  of  the  social  problems  reflected  in  the 
press  and  in  speeches  of  key  claimsmakers. 
Observations 
When  news  of  the  forthcoming  Child  Safety  Initiative  broke  I  visited  the  largest  of  the 
three  targeted  areas  to  get  an  idea  of  the  'ghetto'  which  Hillhouse  was,  to  some  extent, 
being  portrayed  as.  There  were  12  visits  to  the  area  in  total,  two  at  the  weekend  during 
the  day,  10  during  the  week  -5  of  these  at  night.  These  visits  consisted  largely  of 
'drive  throughs'  where  the  whole  estate  was  driven  around  a  number  of  times. 
Although  this  could  only  provide  a  snapshot  of  the  estate,  it  brought  the  area  'to  life' 
and  gave  a  picture  of  the  number  of  privately  owned  houses,  the  state  of  the  gardens, 
and  the  amount  of  graffiti  and  boarded  up  housing.  This  fieldwork  also  allowed  a 
more  detailed  understanding  of  the  'rough  streets'  that  were  mentioned  by  the  adults 
and  children  who  were  met  in  Hillhouse.  67 
As  well  as  allowing  a  familiarity  with  the  area,  this  observational  work  also  gave  an 
idea  of  where  children  and  young  people  went  at  night,  where  they  played  and  where 
they  hung  around.  It  also  gave  a  limited  opportunity  to  see  to  what  degree  young 
children  were  'roaming  the  streets'  late  at  night,  as  was  argued  by  the  authorities. 
The  area  was  visited  in  this  way  four  times  before  the  curfew  was  implemented  and 
eight  times  during  the  initial  month  of  its  inception  -  including  the  launch  day,  when 
the  streets  were  'invaded'  by  the  press  and  camera  crews.  Conscious  of  the  potentially 
suspicious  nature  of  driving  around  the  estate  at  night  observing  children  -  especially 
at  a  time  when  child  safety  and  the  threat  of  paedophiles  were  being  raised  as  a 
possible  problem  for  parents  -  this  work  was  carried  out  with  a  female  colleague  and 
the  'drive  throughs'  were  carried  out,  in  the  main,  without  stopping  and  drawing 
attention  to  ourselveS.  68  71be  estate  was  also  walked  through  a  number  of  times,  again 
116 with  a  female  colleague,  both  before  and  after  the  curfew's  introduction.  This  allowed 
more  time  to  observe  the  estate  and  the  young  people  who  were  out  at  night. 
In  and  of  itself,  this  work  could  only  provide  a  partial  glimpse  of  the  estate  and  the 
activities  of  young  people,  and  was  largely  used  to  gain  a  'feeling'  of  the  area  and 
acquire  a  certain  amount  of  local  knowledge  and  detail  about  the  Hillhouse  estate. 
This  estate  was  chosen  simply  because  it  was  the  largest  of  the  three  curfew-targeted 
areas  and,  as  it  turned  out,  was  also  the  area  that  was  chosen  by  the  police  and  the 
Scottish  Human  Rights  Centre,  for  much  of  their  research.  At  the  time  I  was  unaware 
of  any  other  research  taking  place  in  Hillhouse. 
Local  adults 
The  key  focus  of  the  research  in  Hillhouse  was  always  intended  to  be  with  children 
and  young  people  in  the  area.  However,  discussions  with  20  adults  also  helped  to  give 
another  perspective  on  the  curfew  and  the  issues  of  concern  to  older  generations  in 
Hillhouse  and  in  Hamilton  more  generally. 
The  development  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  as  it  was  labelled  in  the  local  newspaper, 
was  a  significant  talking-point  amongst  local  people  and  offered  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  the  pros  and  cons  of  this  initiative.  Initially  I  began  talking  to  adults  at  bus 
stops  simply  out  of  interest  in  their  understanding  of  the  curfew.  After  the  first  of 
these  discussions,  it  became  clear  that  this  informal  and  moderately  nondirective  form 
of  conversation  could  offer  valuable  qualitative  information  and  subsequently  notes 
were  taken  after  each  of  these  discussions.  This  form  of  note-taking  had  its 
drawbacks,  in  terms  of  recollection  and  the  accurate  recording  of  what  was  said,  and 
there  was  a  danger  that  'sound  bites'  rather  than  detailed  narratives  were  recorded.  In 
general,  key  points  and  specific  quotes  were  gained  from  this  work,  and  again  helped 
to  build  up  a  picture  of  the  local  understanding  of  social  problems  and  of  the  curfew 
itself.  Part  of  these  conversations,  sometimes  spontaneously,  sometimes  through 
questioning,  would  discuss  young  people  today  compared  with  these  adults,  own 
youth,  in  the  process  off6ring  life  histories  and  a  sense  of  how  people  felt  'times  had 
changed'.  69  Seven  adults  from  Hamilton  were  'interviewed'in  this  way  and  a  further 
117 seven  from  Hillhouse  itselL  These  latter  discussions  took  place  on  the  street  during  the 
day  outside  a  newsagent's.  Some  insight  was  therefore  gained  about  the  curfew  from 
those  on  the  'outside'  and  those  within  the  targeted  area. 
With  all  of  these  discussions,  the  adults  were  informed  at  some  stage  that  I  was 
carrying  out  research  into  the  curfew,  and,  largely  due  to  the  newsworthy  nature  of  the 
issue,  people  were,  generally  keen  to  give  their  view  of  it.  None  of  these  informal 
discussions  led  to  gaining  personal  details  of  these  adults  which,  in  hindsight,  could 
have  been  useful  for  follow-up  interviews. 
There  was  also  a  separate  'cascading'  process  of  interviews  that  developed  with  adults 
in  Hillhouse.  This  was  generated  after  contacting  a  local  councillor  who  gave  me  the 
name  of  a  local  activist,  who  then  gave  me  another  named  individual  to  talk  to  about 
the  curfew.  This  process  led  to  6  more  interviews  with  adults  in  Hillhouse  and  was 
occasionally  connected  to  specifically-named  individuals  being  suggested  to  me  by 
other  interviewees  because  they  had  a  'story  to  tell'.  These  stories  were  often 
connected  to  issues  and  incidents  in  the  local  press  that  these  named  individuals  had 
some  direct  experience  of.  This  process  was  in  part  a  form  of  investigation  into  events 
and  claims  made  about  the  curfew  as  they  unravelled. 
These  interviews  were  often  with  key  adults  within  the  area,  often  with  more  active 
older  men  who  were  involved  in  the  local  politics  and  community  groups  in  their  area 
and  were  therefore  not  representative.  However,  their  more  active  involvement  in  the 
locality  was  of  interest  in  and  of  itself,  in  terms  of  the  outlook  that  these  adults  had 
about  young  people  compared  with  some  of  the  other  adults  in  the  area. 
Initially  interviewing  the  local  Labour  councillor,  this  led  to  a  meeting  with  the  chair 
of  the  community  council  who  helped  run  a  youth  club,  who  then  gave  me  telephone 
numbers  for  other  local  adults  who  had  an  opinion  about  the  curfew  -  some  in  favour, 
and  some  who  opposed  it.  Eventually,  through  this  process,  I  interviewed  a  member  of 
the  Hillhouse  Citizen's  Jury,  which  was  of  importance  at  the  time  as  it  was  this  Jury 
that  the  local  MP  had  stated  had  come  up  with  the  idea  of  the  curfew  in  the  first  place. 
118 All  of  these  interviews  were  carried  out  informally  and  with  the  exception  of  the 
councillor  and  community  council  chair  they  Were  all  carried  out  by  telephone.  All  of 
these  adults  were  made  aware  of  the  purpose  of  the  discussion  and  were  specifically 
asked  about  being  quoted  in  this  work. 
With  all  of  the  above  work  with  adults,  the  aim  was  to  gain  a  general  understanding  of 
problems,  issues,  and  the  outlooks  of  local  adults.  As  such  the  recording  of  these 
conversations  was  less  detailed  than  the  interviews  with  the  children,  as  was  the 
framework  for  questioning  these  adults.  More  detailed  thoughts  could  have  been 
systematised  with  a  formal  questionnaire-framed  interview,  although  this  would  have 
limited  some  of  the  'stories'  being  told  by  these  adults,  which  were  of  particular 
importance  at  the  time. 
In  the  process  of  discussing  the  curfew  with  all  of  the  above  adults,  the  primary 
concern  they  expressed,  in  terms  of  my  impact  upon  their  responses,  was  a  concern 
about  whether  or  not  I  was  'with  the  papers'  -  in  other  words,  whether  I  was  a 
journalist.  There  was  a  level  of  suspicion  about  the  press  by  a  number  of  adults  - 
especially  those  people  living  in  Hillhouse  itself  and  more  particularly  from  those  who 
were  upset  at  the  image  being  portrayed  of  Hillhouse.  Once  it  was  explained  that  my 
work  was  a  piece  of  research  and  that  their  comments  would  be  anonymously 
recorded,  there  was  little  resistance  to  the  questions  I  raised.  In  the  'cascading' 
interviews  the  fact  that  'their  names'  had  been  given  to  me  by  somebody  known  to  the 
individuals  also  helped  to  gain  a  level  of  confidence  that  may  have  otherwise  been  less 
forthcoming  -  especially  when  the  interviews  were  carried  out  over  the  telephone. 
Interviews  in  schools 
From  the  standpoint  of  an  existing  concern  with  the  'regulation  of  youth'  with  respect 
to  'Zero  Tolerance'  policing  in  Strathclyde,  the  key  focus  for  this  research  was  on  the 
impact  of  the  curfew  on  children  and  young  people  in  Hillhouse.  The  Child  Safety 
Initiative,  by  its  very  name,  was  clearly  focused  upon  the  life  and  activities  of  young 
people,  and  in  its  actualisation  was  clearly  targeted  at  transforming  these  activities  in 
some  way.  It  therefore  appeared  to  be  most  important  to  ascertain  the  actual  impact 
119 this  initiative  had  both  upon  the  activities  themselves  and  the  perceptions  of  children 
and  young  people  in  the  curfewed  area  of  Hillhouse.  This  was  seen  as  doubly 
important  given  the  limited  extent  to  which  the  'child's  voice'  is  aired  in  public 
discourse  and  media  representations  generally,  and  specifically  in  relation  to  the  CSI. 
These  interviews  were  therefore  essential  for  'generating  data'  that  would  otherwise 
have  been  unobtainable  (Mason  1996:  39) 
Due  to  the  detailed  nature  of  the  information  that  was  required  to  analyse  the  impact 
of  the  curfew,  the  length  of  the  interview  (around  20  minutes),  and  also  the  nature  of 
relationships  between  young  and  old,  an  interview  process  with  individuals  within  a 
school  setting  was  established.  This  work  was  carried  out  through  one-to-one 
interviews  in  three  local  primary  and  two  local  secondary  schools.  In  so  doing  I  was 
conscious  that  this  aspect  of  the  research  was  taking  young  people  away  from  the 
I natural'  setting  within  which  the  curfew  would  be  operating,  and  could  be  problematic 
in  terms  of  the  formal  setting  of  the  school. 
Schools  were  chosen  as  the  venue  for  these  interviews,  rather  than  homes,  partly 
because  of  the  ease  of  access  to  the  young  people,  and  the  speed  with  which  these 
interviews  could  take  place.  At  the  time,  the  speed  of  accessing  the  young  people  was 
felt  to  be  important,  so  that  the  initial  response  to  the  implementation  of  the  curfew 
could  be  established.  It  was  also  felt  that  interviews  in  these  young  people's  homes 
might  be  more  restrictive  in  terms  of  the  capacity  to  have  privacy  for  these  young 
people  to  'speak  their  minds'. 
Street  interviews  would  have  been  more  difficult,  in  terms  of  the  detailed  nature  of  the 
questionnaire  and  could  also  have  led  to  peer  influences  on  the  interviewee.  This 
could  have  limited  the  interview,  but  it  may  also  have  produced  more  relevant  results  - 
in  that  in  a  group  some  of  these  young  people  may  have  been  more  'up  front'  and 
assertive  in  their  opinions  about  the  curfew  (Christensen  and  James  2000:  103).  70 
Despite  this  drawback,  the  benefits  of  interviewing  children  and  young  people  in 
schools  were  felt  to  outweigh  the  problems  and  therefore  this  approach  was  adopted. 
Both  children  (which  for  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  relates  to  anyone  in  primary  school 
120 under  the  age  of  12  years),  and  young  people  (high  school  pupils  aged  12-15  years), 
were  interviewed.  71  These  groups  of  children  and  young  people  were  targeted  for 
interview  due  to  the  fact  that  I  assumed  that  it  would  be  the  older  young  people  who 
would  be  largely  affected  by  the  curfew,  but  at  the  same  time,  it  was  the  'safety  of 
young  children  wandering  the  streets  at  night'  that  had  been  promoted  by  the  police  as 
the  main  justification  for  introducing  the  CSI. 
As  an  aside,  it  was  due  to  the  speed  of  contacting  the  schools  that  I  was  able  to  carry 
out  this  research.  Others  researchers,  unbeknown  to  me  at  the  time,  were  trying  to 
access  the  schools  to  carry  out  interviews,  were  subsequently  refused  because  I  'got 
there  first'.  There  was,  in  this  respect,  a  'competition'  between  different  individuals  to 
get  access  to  these  young  people  -  something  that  could  have  limited  the  research  for 
this  thesis  if  more  time  had  been  taken  to  set  up  the  interviews. 
The  schools  were  initially  contacted  by  telephone  and  following  these  conversations  a 
letter  of  request  was  sent  to  South  Lanarkshire  Council's  Education  Department. 
Subsequently  the  schools  were  re-contacted  after  permission  to  interview  the  children 
had  been  ganted. 
Ethics 
During  this  interview  process  ethical  practice  was  adhered  to  throughout.  72  The 
schools  were  informed  that  the  names  of  the  schools  would  not  be  used  in  relation  to 
any  particular  interview;  parents  were  sent  consent  forms  to  allow  the  interviews  to 
take  place;  and  the  children  and  young  people  were  informed  that  the  interviews  were 
confidential  while  also  being  given  the  option  of  refusing  consent  to  the  interview.  73 
The  capacity  for  the  young  people  to  opt  out'  may  have  been  difficult  given  the 
pressure  they  could  have  felt  from  adults  in  a  school  asking  them  for  their  help.  The 
purpose  of  the  interview  was  explained  to  them  and  the  general  themes  that  were 
about  to  be  discussed  were  described  in  brief.  It  was  also  made  clear  to  the  children 
and  young  people  that  if,  at  any  stage  during  the  interview,  they  felt  like  withdrawing 
their  consent,  this  was  not  a  problem.  None  did  so.  The  young  people  appeared  to  be 
121 more  than  happy  to  be  interviewed  and,  in  most  instances,  appeared  to  enjoy  the 
process.  74 
The  importance  of  talking  to  the  children,  as  explained  above,  and  the  newness  of  the 
curfew  initiative,  meant  that  the  material  being  collected  could  not  have  been  accessed 
from  another  source  and  therefore  justified  the  interviewing  of  these  children.  75 
The  interview  process 
The  fieldwork  mentioned  above  developed  into  useful  qualitative  research  in  itself, 
but  was  also  useful  as  preparatory  work  for  constructing  the  questionnaire  around 
which  the  interviews  were  based.  The  local  knowledge  gained  from  this  process,  for 
example,  while  rarely  forming  the  questions  themselves,  did  create  a  greater 
understanding  of  the  answers  given  by  young  people  about  certain  events  and  places 
mentioned.  A  trial  process  was  undertaken  with  this  questionnaire  with  five  pupils 
from  a  primary  school  and  five  pupils  from  a  high  school,  to  assess  the  relevance  of 
the  questions,  the  language  used  to  allow  comprehension  of  these  questions  by  the 
young  people,  and  the  'gaps'  within  the  questionnaire.  76  The  final  questionnaire  was 
updated  following  this  trial  and  was  used  for  the  main  interview  process. 
These  qualitative  interviews  were  in-depth  and  semi-structured  (Mason  1996:  38),  and 
attempted  to  find  out  'facts'  about  the  young  people's  lives,  actions  and  interactions, 
and  to  also  gain  a  'narrative  account'  and  perceptions  of  life  in  Hillhouse  experienced 
by  these  young  people  (Silverman  2000:  823).  The  style  of  the  interview  was 
informal,  verbal  and  face-to-face:  however,  the  questionnaire  itself  was  relatively 
structured,  but  flexible  enough  to  allow  for  themes  to  be  discussed  and  opinions 
expressed  throughout.  The  framework  of  the  interview  allowed  information  about 
what  the  children  and  young  people  did,  and  also  what  they  thought.  'What'  and  'Why' 
questions,  for  example,  allowing  set  facts  and  wider  perceptions  to  be  expressed,  were 
asked.  This  helped  provide  a  picture  of  the  activities  of  young  people  in  the  area  and 
of  their  perceptions  of  life,  their  relationships  and  their  understanding  of  issues  of 
safety  and  freedom. 
122 The  relative  length  of  the  interview  was  in  part  due  to  a  'build  up'  of  questions,  where 
specific  acts  and  experiences  were  ascertained  and  followed  up  with  broader  questions 
about  issues  and  relationships.  For  example,  the  children  and  young  people  were 
asked  if  they  would  ask  an  adult  on  their  estate  for  the  time,  and  if  not  why  not.  This 
was  later  followed  up  with  a  question  of  how  much  these  young  people  felt  they  could 
trust  adults.  A  number  of  these  types  of  questions  were  used  to  assess  what  young 
people  felt,  for  example,  about  adults  in  the  abstract,  and  also  to  what  degree  this  was 
replicated  in  their  actions  towards  them. 
To  a  degree,  this  type  of  overlapping  questioning  also  helped  to  ensure  that  questions 
were  understood  by  the  children  and  young  people,  as  contradictory  information  could 
be  observed  and  questions  re-asked  if  it  was  felt  that  they  had  been  misunderstood.  To 
a  degree  this  overcame  the  potential  problem  about  'ambiguity'  and  ensured  the  young 
people  were  answering  the  questions  they  were  being  asked  (Mason  1996:  107).  The 
relatively  simple  language,  and  the  use  of  known  terms  and  phrases  that  were  used  by 
the  young  people  themselves,  also  helped  to  minimise  confusion  throughout  the 
interview  process  (Mason  1996:  107). 
Questions  about  how  young  people  felt  about  the  curfew  were  extended  to  look  at 
views  about  wider  support  of,  or  opposition  to,  policing  and  regulation  of  young 
people  in  general.  This  line  of  questioning  was  particularly  fruitful,  as  the  assumption 
about  young  people  was  that  they  would  oppose  further  police  regulation  of  their  area, 
and  overcame  the  overly  simplistic  way  this  was  being  understood  through  simply 
asking  about  whether  young  people  supported  the  curfew  or  not. 
The  questionnaires  themselves  were  different  for  the  different  age  groups,  with  the 
secondary  school  pupils  having  a  longer  and  more  complex  set  of  questions.  This  was 
done  based  on  an  assumption  that  older  young  people  would  be  generally  'out'  later, 
have  a  wider  number  of  experiences,  and  be  able  to  give  more  detailed  answers  - 
especially  to  questions  of  opinion  and  'feeling'.  The  primary  school  pupils'  questions 
were  more  fact  based,  with  more  emphasis  on  what  they  did  rather  than  what  they 
thought.  After  the  initial  trial  interview,  it  was  also  decided  to  carry  out  a  timetable 
exercise  with  the  primary  aged  children  at  the  start  of  the  interview,  where  they  gave 
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greater  level  of  detail  about  activities  and  to  help  the  children  recollect  what  they 
actually  did  at  night.  The  timetable  also  allowed  retrospective  cross-checking  of 
information  to  ascertain  the  accuracy  of  other  questions  answers. 
Despite  the  differences  in  these  questionnaires,  the  core  set  of  questions  were  asked  to 
both  the  children  and  young  people,  thus  allowing  a  comparative  study  of  the  answers 
given  by  the  different  age  groups. 
Information  of  the  age,  sex,  race,  and  the  area,  the  children  and  young  people  lived  in, 
was  gained  to  allow  an  analysis  of  these  factors  and  their  influence  upon  activities  and 
outlooks.  The  class  of  the  person  was  not  ascertained,  largely  due  to  the  difficulty  of 
accurately  getting  this  information  from  the  young  people,  and  therefore  reduced  the 
ability  of  the  interviews  to  allow  a  comparative  class  analysis  of  the  information 
gained. 
The  ages  of  the  32  primary  school  children  interviewed  ranged  from  9-11  years  old: 
this  older  group  of  primary  school  children  being  chosen  on  the  assumption  that  they 
would  have  a  greater  amount  of  experience  of  playing  'out',  and  would  also  be  most 
able  to  answer  the  questionnaire.  The  26  young  people  interviewed  were  aged  12-15 
years  old  -  different  ages  within  this  range  being  interviewed  to  give  a  relatively 
balanced  cross-section  of  this  group  of  young  people.  The  children  and  young  people 
were  randomly  chosen  for  interview  simply  by  interviewing  the  first  names  on  any 
particular  register  at  school.  This  process  meant  that  children  and  young  people  from 
both  Hillhouse  and  other  areas  were  interviewed.  Of  those  children  interviewed,  21 
came  from  Hillhouse  and  II  from  other  areas.  There  were  13  young  people  from 
Hillhouse  interviewed  and  13  young  people  from  outside  this  area.  Interviewing  those 
both  living  in  and  outside  Hillhouse  was  thought  to  be  a  useful  exercise  so  that 
opinions  about  the  curfew  and  about  the  area  of  Hillhouse  could  be  expressed  by  those 
directly  affected  and  'outsiders'  whose  area  was  not  targeted.  This  reduced  the 
number  of  Hillhouse  interviews,  but  the  benefit  of  having  different  areas  represented, 
on  balance,  was  felt  to  be  of  more  use.  The  'other'  areas  were  generally  in  close 
proximity  to  Hillhouse  and  largely  similar  in  nature  to  it.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity, 
124 and  because  there  did  not  appear  to  be  any  great  difference  in  the  outlook  of  these 
'outside'  young  people,  when  assessing  the  opinions  of  the  curfew  they  were  labelled 
as  'others'  or  those  'outside'  of  the  curfewed  area  of  Hillhouse. 
The  questionnaires  for  these  interviews  were  filled  out  and  notes  were  taken  when  the 
children  and  young  people  elaborated  upon  their  answers.  While  being  an  efficient 
form  of  recording,  in  hindsight  tape  recordings  of  these  interviews  would  have  been 
more  detailed  and  would  be  recommended  for  further  research  of  this  nature. 
The  issue  of  bias  was  of  concern  in  carrying  out  these  interviews  -  in  particular,  the 
concern  that  children  being  interviewed  by  an  adult  in  a  school  may  encourage 
conservative  or  the  'right  answer'  to  be  given  by  these  children.  To  overcome  this 
problem  I  dressed  informally,  and  explained  clearly  that  the  interview  was 
confidential  and  that  all  names  would  be  changed  on  any  written  work.  To  support 
this,  when  asking  the  names  of  the  children  they  were  informed  that  only  the  first 
name  was  required  as  this  was  'confidential'  and  'anonymous'.  It  was  also  explained 
that  the  research  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  school,  the  council  or  the  police.  Where 
possible  the  interviews  were  carried  out  without  a  teacher  present,  although  on  one 
occasion  this  was  not  possible.  In  this  case  the  need  to  ask  the  questions  more  quietly 
ironically  gave  the  interview  a  greater  sense  of  confidentiality,  as  the  young  people 
involved  were  conscious  that  the  information  was  only  for  my  use  and  not  for  the 
teacher  present.  The  danger  with  this  general  approach  is  that  by  attempting  to 
overcome  one  bias,  another  one  is  created.  It  is  possible  that  the  young  people  felt  that 
I  was  'on  their  side'  and  therefore  encouraged  more  oppositional  or  anti-authoritarian 
answers.  This  was  not  felt  to  be  the  case  but  may  have  been  an  influence.  To  avoid 
this  aspect  of  a  possible  bias,  questions  about  the  curfew  were  always  asked  in  a 
neutral  tone  and  indeed,  before  questions  about  the  'curfew'  were  asked,  the  children 
and  young  people  were  asked  if  they  had  heard  of  the  'Child  Safety  Initiative'  and  if 
they  had  heard  of  the  'curfew'.  They  were  then  asked  which  term  they  used,  and  this 
was  the  term  that  was  used  throughout  the  interview. 
Once  completed,  the  interviews  were  analysed  and  the  answers  both  coded  in  table 
form  and  assessed  in  terms  of  the  more  detailed  and  less  factual  opinions  expressed. 
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to  factual  questions  -  for  example,  the  number  of  young  people  who  opposed  the 
curfew.  It  also  allowed  cross-referencing'of  answers  to  allow  a  study  of  'types'  of 
young  people  linking  the  amount  of  freedom  they  had,  their  relationships  with  others, 
and  their  perception  of  themselves  and  others  -  for  example  in  relation  to  the  issue  of 
safety  and  risk.  These  percentages  were  not  used  'statistically',  in  terms  of  their 
applicability  to  the  population  in  general,  but  were  useful  to  'suggest'  possible  trends 
and  outlooks,  and  were  also  useful  to  use  with  reference  to  other  research  in  the  area 
and  wider  research  about  young  people  and  their  use  of  public  space.  Opinions  and 
elaborations  by  the  young  people  were  analysed,  in  part,  to  assess  common 
perceptions,  and  also  to  allow  clear  expressions  of  particular  thoughts  and  outlooks 
that  were  understood  by  myself  to  be  particularly  telling  in  relation  to  the  cultural 
trends  being  explored. 
There  were  a  number  of  shortcomings  with  this  research,  of  which  some  have  been 
mentioned  already.  The  representative  nature  of  the  groups,  for  example,  is 
questionable,  especially  in  relation  to  class;  and  bias  due  to  the  process  of  the 
interviews  themselves  may  have  had  some  impact  on  results  gained.  Although 
superficially  the  openness  of  the  children  and  young  people  to  speaking  their  minds 
when  interviewed  suggested  that  the  concern  about  giving  the  'right  answer'  may  not 
have  been  significant. 
Other  potential  issues  include  the  in-built  epistemological  shortcoming  of  interviews  - 
that  experiences  are  being  recounted  rather  than,  for  example,  being  directly  observed 
(Mason  1996:  40).  Ibis  was  felt  to  be  a  particular  problem  when  discussing  events 
with  younger  children  -  especially  events  that  had  happened  in  the  more  distant  past. 
This  difficulty  with  recollection  meant  that  where  possible  questions  were  asked  about 
more  immediate  experiences  (Mason  1996:  108). 
There  was  also  the  potential  problem,  due  to  the  newsworthy  nature  of  the  CSI,  that  as 
the  interviews  were  not  all  carried  out  at  the  same  time  unfolding  events  may  have 
influenced  the  young  people  over  time.  To  avoid  this  being  too  much  of  an  issue,  the 
126 interviews  were  carried  out  within  two  weeks  of  each  other,  which  hopefully 
minimised  differences. 
Finally,  it  has  been  noted  that  when  asking  children  multi-choice  questions,  there  is  a 
tendency  for  them  to  choose  the  first  answer  most  often  (Mason  1996:  108).  To  avoid 
this,  the  children  and  young  people  were  asked  these  questions  without  being  offered 
alternative  answers.  Only  after  an  answer  was  given  was  clarification  asked  about 
which  'tick  box'  this  would  most  accurately  represent. 
Overall,  the  interview  process  was  relatively  unproblematic  once  arrangements  with 
the  schools  had  been  made,  and  despite  the  drawbacks  with  this  approach,  the  results 
and  information  gained  were  felt  to  be  very  useful.  The  balance  of  'factual' 
information  and  opinion  also  allowed  a  wide  variety  of  data  to  be  analysed  and  to  give 
the  research  more  than  sufficient  qualitative  data  to  bring  the  experiences  of  young 
people  'to  life' 
Social  construction 
Within  the  context  of  moral  panic  research,  the  approach  adopted  for  studying  the 
introduction  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  that  of  contextual  social  contructionism:  an 
approach  that  Stanley  Cohen  has  argued  is  most  appropriate  for  analysing  the 
construction  of  social  problems  (Cohen  2002:  xxii). 
The  work  of  Joel  Best  (1993;  1999)  and  Philip  Jenkins  (1992;  1998),  two  American 
contextual  social  constructionists,  has  been  of  particular  significance  in  the  attempt  to 
analyse  the  construction  of  the  curfew.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  these 
authors  were  especially  useful  for  this  research  in  that  their  approach  allows  both  an 
ability  to  analyse  'moral  panics',  and  a  critical  approach  to  understanding  the 
influence  and  the  integration  of  conservative  and  'liberal'  opinion  in  the  development 
of  these  panics  in  more  recent  times.  Best's  method  provided  a  useful  starting  point 
for  examining  the  clainismakers,  and  the  typification  made,  before  and  during  the  life 
of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  (Best  1993:  10).  While  lacking  a  more  structural  or 
materialist  analysis  of  'social  problems',  and  therefore  necessarily  being  somewhat 
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trends  that  influence  the  formation  and  institutionalisation  of  's6cial  problems'.  Due  to 
the  particular  interest  in  the  development  of  a  culture  of  fear  (Furedi  1997),  this 
approach  was  adopted  to  understand  the  core  justificatory  basis  (Nolan  1998:  22)  upon 
which  the  curfew  was  implemented,  and  indeed,  to  uncover  the  unquestioned  norms 
and  values  that  informed  the  discussion  about  the  CSI,  both  from  those  who  supported 
its  introduction  and  those  who  opposed  it. 
At  this  point  it  is  worth  noting  that,  while  much  social  problem  construction  research 
attempts  to  analyse  a  'new'  social  problem  and  identify  its  origins  and  the  typification 
process  that  have  led  to  the  institutionalisation  of  measures  to  resolve  this  problem,  in 
studying  the  Hamilton  curfew  two  processes  were  taking  place  simultaneously.  In 
defending  the  introduction  of  the  curfew,  key  clainismakers  were  helping  to  typify  the 
social  problems  highlighted,  but  this  was  taking  place  with  the  institutionalisation  of 
the  curfew.  In  other  words,  it  is  logical  to  assume  that  much  of  the  debate  and  process 
of  constructing  the  problems  that  the  curfew  was  intended  to  counter  had  already 
taken  place,  shown  by  the  very  fact  that  the  curfew  was  being  introduced.  In  this  sense 
what  we  are  exploring  here  is  this  institutionalising  process  and  its  impact  on  a 
community.  However,  at  the  same  time,  due  to  the  controversial  and  new  nature  of  the 
initiative,  a  significant  claimsmaking  contest  took  place  within  the  press  to  justify  this 
initiative.  As  such  we  can  also  explore  the  clainismaking  process  not  simply  to 
understand  the  construction  of  the  curfew,  but  also  to  examine  a  key  example  of  the 
values  that  already  underpinned  the  understanding  of  social  problems  associated  with 
the  antisocial  behaviour  of  young  people.  in  a  sense,  the  claimsmaking  process  had 
already  occurred  and  what  we  were  witnessing  was  the  justificatory  process  of 
legitimising  the  curfew.  At  the  same  time,  because  the  curfew  was  a  'trial'  initiative, 
there  was  also  a  constant  clainismaking  process  that  accompanied  its  implementation, 
which  could  be  examined. 
Finally,  it  should  be  recognised  that  the  aims  of  the  curfew  and  the  social  problems 
being  addressed  were  extremely  broad  and  included  substantial  thematic 
considerations,  including  child  safety,  youth  antisocial  behaviour,  parenting, 
community  cohesion  and  adult  fears.  Within  the  youth  crime  framework  alone,  there 
128 are  myriad  aspects  of  the  problematisation  of  behaviour,  like  'binge  drinking',  'youth 
violence',  'yob  culture'  and  so  on,  that  could  be  studied  individually  to  understand  the 
process  of  constructing  these  'social  problems'.  Here,  it,  is  not  the  focus  upon 
individual  social  problem  constructions  that  are  analysed,  but  rather  the  broad  themes 
of  safety,  antisocial  behaviour  and  fear.  77 
A  major  source  of  data  for  this  process  was  national  and  local  newspapers  that 
contained  articles  about  the  curfew.  National  newspaper  articles  were  analysed  using 
online  searches,  and  the  local  Hamilton  newspaper  was  examined  in  print  over  a  two 
year  period  starting  just  before  the  introduction  of  the  CSI  in  October  1997. 
Supplementing  this  research,  speeches  by  key  claimsmakers,  television  interviews, 
and  debates  with  these  claimsmakers,  were  used  to  access  further  claimsmaking  by,  in 
particular,  the  police,  the  local  council  and  politicians,  in  their  promotion  of  the 
curfew.  78  A  press  conference,  six  months  after  the  introduction  of  the  curfew,  was  also 
attended  and  notes  taken  of  the  speeches  by  those  defending  its  introduction. 
Additionally,  telephone  discussions  were  carried  out  with  a  number  of  children's 
charities  and  organisations  that  opposed  the  curfew.  This  was  carried  out  in  particular 
to  understand  the  differences,  and  more  importantly  the  similarities,  that  existed 
between  these  groups  and  those  defending  and  promoting  the  curfew. 
The  process  of  analysing  the  'news'  was  done  so  less  as  an  analysis  of  the  way  the 
media  'shapes'  this  news  (Cohen  1972;  Hall  1978;  Best  1993:  88;  McRobbie  1995: 
565),  although  this  was  part  of  the  analysis  -  but  more  so  as  a  source  of  access  to  elite 
claimsmaking  and  alternative  counter  claims.  79  The  telephone  discussions  and 
statements  made  by  groups  opposing  the  curfew  were  similarly  used  for  this  purpose. 
This  research  attempted  to  understand  how  the  curfew  was  defined,  how  it  was 
typified,  and  how  it  was  validated.  In  other  words,  what  were  the  core  examples  and 
issues  raised  that  were  representative  of  the  nature  of  the  social  problems  being 
addressed?  What  were  the  core  'values'  embodied  within  these  examples?  What 
'image'  of  children,  young  people  and  adults  was  used  to  back  up  these  values?  What 
were  the  counter-claims  to  this  typification  process,  if  any,  and  what  were  their 
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groups? 
Opposition  statements 
In  the  examination  of  the  newspaper  stories,  press  releases  and  speeches  about  the 
curfew,  there  was  a  significant  imbalance  in  terms  of  the  'voices'  being  aired. 
Especially  in  the  local  newspaper,  the  majority  of  the  news  coverage  was  framed 
around  the  claims  being  made  by  those  'elite'  individuals  and  groups  promoting  the 
curfew.  The  'oppositional'  voice  was  heard  relatively  infrequently,  and  in  little  detail. 
While  this  allowed  for  some  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  counter-claims  being  made 
about  the  curfew,  it  was  felt  that  through  telephone  interviews  with  key  individuals 
from  groups  who  opposed  the  curfew,  more  in-depth  and  detailed  material  would  be 
forthcoming.  80 
The  groups  that  were  targeted  were  done  so  in  relation  to  named  individuals  who  had 
expressed  an  opinion  in  the  press;  through  knowledge  of  other  research  that  was  being 
carried  out  that  raising  a  critical  voice  about  the  curfew;  and  finally  major  children's 
charities  and  organisations  were  contacted.  These  organisations  were  understood  to 
represent  a  significant  'voice'  in  relation  to  children  and  youth-related  issues,  policies 
and  practices,  and  as  such  were  felt  to  have  an  influential  and  potentially  alternative 
understanding  of  the  issues  and  values  associated  with  the  idea  of  curfews.  81 
The  individuals  were  contacted  and  asked  if  they  would  like  to  make  a  statement 
about  the  curfew.  These  'statements'  were  made  initially  through  telephone 
conversations  and  subsequently  a  written  statement  was  made  by  each  of  the 
individuals  and  organisations  contacted,  both  about  the  Hamilton  curfew,  and  about 
t1fe  use  of  curfews  in  general.  These  statements  were  then  analysed  in  the  same  way  as 
those  made  by  the  'elite'  voices  supporting  the  curfew,  to  assess  similarly  what  the 
core  examples  and  issues  were  that  were  representative  of  the  critique  of  the  curfew; 
what  social  problems  were  understood  to  be  made  worse  by  its  introduction;  what 
were  the  core  values  embodied  within  these  critiques,  and  what  'image'  of  children, 
young  people  and  adults  was  used  to  back  up  these  critiques. 
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Thus  far,  it  has  been  noted  that  there  are  potential  problems  with  the  type  of  research 
carried  out  -  the  potential  difficulty  of  the  environment  in  which  the  interviews  took 
place,  for  example.  In  general  it  should  be  recognised  that  interviews,  while  presented 
as  representing  the  'truth,  are  necessarily  partial  snapshots  of  events  and 
understandings  carried  out  at  a  particular  moment  in  time.  However,  the  nature  of  the 
research  and  the  detail  in  the  questioning  means  that  a  similar  approach  could  be 
adopted  in  the  future  to  assess  changes  to  the  information  and  outlook  gained  from 
young  people.  A  significant  problem  in  this  respect  with  this  research  is  that  there  are 
a  limited  number  of  historically  comparable  pieces  of  research  that  would  allow 
comparative  work  to  be  carried  out  with  regard  to  children  and  young  people's  outlook 
in  the  past. 
Perhaps  the  greatest  weakness  with  the  research  carried  out  was  not  due  to  the  specific 
issues  in  relation  to  the  methods  adopted,  but  in  the  target  audience  it  was  focused 
upon.  With  most  research,  to  some  degree,  there  will  be  a  sense  that  not  enough  data 
has  been  gathered  or  that  not  enough  various  groups  have  been  represented.  In  the 
case  of  the  research  into  the  Hamilton  curfew,  a  major  gap  in  the  interviews  carried 
out  and  the  information  obtained  is  that  parents  were  not  interviewed. 
Following  the  analysis  of  the  data  and  the  issues  being  addressed,  it  became 
increasingly  clear  that  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  not  simply  about  young  people,  but 
was  just  as  much  about  their  parents.  Questions  about  irresponsible  parenting,  the  way 
parents  understood  the  curfew,  how  they  interpreted  the  'risks'  in  their  area,  and  the 
relationship  they  had  with  other  parents  and  children,  could  all  have  been  obtained 
more  accurately  through  interviews  with  parents.  Some  of  this  information  was  gained 
through  the  interviews  with  the  young  people,  but  not  to  the  level  of  detail  that,  in 
hindsight,  could  have  substantially  added  to  the  analysis  of  the  CSI. 
As  will  be  discussed  in  forthcoming  chapters,  whereas  the  curfew  appeared,  and  to 
some  degree  was,  an  issue  about  the  management  of  public  space,  it  was  also,  and 
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parents  and  their  approach  to  keeping  their  children  safe. 
Conclusion 
The  methods  adopted  within  this  research,  both  the  contextual  constructionist 
approach  and  the  interviews  and  fieldwork,  allowed  a  specific  and  relatively  small 
local  initiative  to  be  examined  in  its  own  terms.  However,  this  was  never  the  main 
purpose  of  the  research,  which  was  more  generally  concemed  to  relocate  these  'local' 
developments  within  a  broader  analysis  of  contemporary  modemity. 
While  recognising  the  specific  nature  of  the  estate  in  question  and  gaining  an  actual 
insight  into  the  often  contradictory  and  conflictual  nature  of  the  CSI,  themes  related  to 
fear,  safety,  vulnerability  and  the  nature  of  responsibility  could  all  be  related  both  to 
the  particular  situation  in  Hamilton  and  within  a  developing  'cultural'  context.  In  this 
way  different  'puzzles'  (Mason  1996:  79)  were  uncovered  by  the  various  forms  of 
research  that  could  be  integrated  and  reconnected  within  the  theoretical  framework 
outlined  in  the  previous  chapter. 
In  particular,  the  research  helped  to  focus  attention  less  upon  the  'social  problems' 
being  promoted  than  upon  the  norms  that  underpinned  the  approach  to  these  social 
problems.  At  the  same  time,  by  examining  the  'facts'  and  'reality'  of  the  Hillhouse 
estate,  questions  could  be  raised  about  the  acceptance  of,  and  differences  to,  these 
norms,  within  a  specific  location. 
From  the  'direct'  research  into  the  curfew  and  the  attempt  to  locate  this  within  a 
particular  cultural  and  political  setting,  the  curfew  work  provided  a  basis  upon  which 
an  analysis  of  both  the  historical  development  of  the  trends  identified  could  be  further 
explored,  while  also  providing  a  starting  point  to  analyse  subsequent  developments  in 
society  -  most  particularly  around  the  'social  problem'  of  antisocial  behaviour. 
Ile  focus  of  this  research  is  therefore  sometimes  extremely  'small'  and  at  other  times 
abstract  and  general.  It  attempts,  for  example,  to  study  how  a  particular  child  gets  to  a 
132  - friend's  house  at  night,  and  then  asks,  what  is  the  significance  of  the  'culture  of  fear'  to 
this  child's  biography?  Indeed,  what  is  the  significance  of  themes  like  safety  and 
vulnerability  to  communities  in  general?  The  study  is  both  limited  in  the  extent  of  its 
analysis  particularly  of  the  'structures'  of  society.  However,  as  best  as  it  can  within  the 
limitations  of  its  approach,  it  attempts  to  find  out  what  C.  Wright  Mills  described  as 
being  one  of  the  core  components  of  the  sociological  imagination  -  to  discover: 
What  varieties  of  men  and  women  [and  young  people]  now  prevail  in  this 
society  and  in  this  period?  And  what  varieties  are  coming  to  prevail?  In  what 
ways  are  they  selected  and  formed,  liberated  and  repressed,  made  sensitive  and 
blunted?  What  kinds  of  'human  nature'  are  revealed  in  the  conduct  and 
character  we  observe  in  this  society  in  this  period?  And  what  is  the  meaning  of 
'human  nature'  of  each  and  every  feature  of  the  society  we  are  examining? 
(Mills  1967:  7) 
133 Chapter  6:  The  Hamilton  Curfew 
Hamilton's  pioneering  crackdown  on  street  kids  is  set  to  provide  the  blueprintfor 
similar  schemes  across  Britain.  The  Government's  Crime  and  Disorder  Bill,  which 
came  intojorce  yesterday,  allows  local  authorities  to  introduce  curfews  on  under  10s 
in  their  area  ...  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  backed  schemes  similar  to  the  one  pioneered 
in  Hamilton  during  his  keynote  address  to  the  Labour  Party  conference  on  Tuesday 
(Hamilton  Advertiser  I  October  1998). 
Introduction 
Following  the  political  developments  in  the  UK  through  the  1990s  and  the 
transformation  of  the  Labour  Party  in  relation  to  crime  and  safety,  the  first  Labour 
government  for  19  years  was  elected,  and  in  October  1997  the  Hamilton  Child  Safety 
Initiative  (CSI)  was  set  up  by  North  Lanarkshire  Council.  Immediately  labelled  a 
curfew  by  the  press,  this  crime  and  safety  initiative  gained  both  national  and 
international  notoriety,  and  was  understood  to  be  a  significant  reflection  of  the  New 
Labour  Government's  approach  to  law  and  order. 
Seen  within  the  context  of  'moral  panics'  surrounding  young  people,  this  research  was 
carried  out  to  analyse  the  basis  of  the  CSI,  the  arguments  used  to  justify  it,  and  the 
impact  it  had  upon  local  people.  In  this  chapter  the  findings  of  the  research  attempt  to 
locate  the  development  of  this  initiative  within  a  culture  of  fear,  and  to  a  degree  within 
the  development  of  a  therapeutic  culture. 
Rather  than  studying  the  curfew  82  simply  in  terms  of  its  impact  upon  crime  and  safety 
in  the  community,  this  chapter  also  attempts  to  uncover  the  justificatory  process 
underlying  it  and  the  broader  concerns  and  interests  of  the  key  clainismakers  who 
were  both  for  and  against  the  initiative.  S.  afety,  vulnerability,  and  a  sense  of  being  at 
risk  it  is  argued,  were  at  the  heart  of  the  initiative  and  were  central  to  the  justificatory 
process,  the  values  underpinning  it,  the  relationship  between  the  public  and  the 
authorities,  and  also  formed  the  basis  of  how  local  people  were  understood  and 
represented. 
134 Situating  the  curfew 
For  social  policies  to  develop,  certain  clainismaking  processes  generally  occur  prior  to 
them,  and  the  framework  around  which  these  policies  are  formed  are  informed  by  the 
nature  of  these  claims.  Public  attention  is  drawn  to  particular  social  problems,  but 
more  specifically,  certain  aspects  of  these  problems  become  dominant  and  help  form 
the  understanding  of  them.  Even  the  'naming'  of  the  social  problem  at  hand  plays  a 
role  in  the  way  an  issue  is  identified  and  how  the  cause  is  identified  and  solution 
sought  (Best  1995:  8).  7ypical'  examples  are  often  the  way  that  the  particular 
understanding  of  a  problem  is highlighted  and  then  acted  upon  (Best  1995:  9). 
Social  problems  thus  formed  provide  the  basis  for  social  policy  developments  -  the 
'socially  constructed  images  of  conditions  (such  as  "homelessness")  ...  serv[ing]  as 
justifications  for  public  policies'  (Loseke  1995:  261).  The  Hamilton  Child  Safety 
Initiative,  as  a  specific  form  of  intervention  by  the  police,  was  therefore  pre-dated  by  a 
number  of  prior  social  problems  that  had  been  constructed  in  society.  As  the  name 
'Child  Safety  Initiative'  itself  suggests,  'child  safety'  was  a  core  social  problem  being 
addressed  by  this  initiative  -  something  that  had  been  systematically  problematised, 
particularly  in  the  1980s  around  the  issue  of  child  abuse  (Jenkins  1992).  Youth  crime 
and  antisocial  behaviour,  another  key  area  of  concern  addressed  by  the  curfew,  had 
also  become  a  significant  social  problem,  especially  since  1993  (Scratton  1997). 
Likewise  the  'fear  of  crime'  (Van  Dijk  1994),  83  the  significance  of  the  'community' 
(Rose  1996),  and  the  notion  of  sections  of  the  public  being  'at  risle  (Furedi  2004:  127), 
had  all  developed  as  frameworks  for  understanding  social  problems  -  particularly 
social  problems  associated  with  children  and  young  people.  Finally,  by  the  time  the 
Hamilton  curfew  84  was  introduced,  the  idea  of  the  'irresponsible  parent'  (Furedi  2001) 
had  also  been  firmly  established  as  a  framework  for  understanding  a  number  of 
problems  associated  with  young  people,  crime,  and  fear  within  communities. 
The  Child  Safety  Initiative,  while  being  a  'new'  initiative,  was  therefore  not  developed 
upon  the  basis  of  'new'  crimes  or  social  problems  (Best  1999),  but  rather  was 
established  in  relation  to  existing  social  concerns.  These  concerns  existed  within 
135 politics,  professional  practice  and  areas  of  academic  research,  but  were  also  reflected 
in  'grassroots'  demands  for  more  policing  of  the  streets.  As  Professor  of  Criminal 
Justice  Rod  Morgan  noted  at  the  time,  there  was  an  'insatiable'  public  demand  'for  a 
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visible,  uniformed  presence  on  the  streets'  (Guardian  22  January  1997). 
Similarly,  this  initiative,  in  terms  of  policy  developments,  was  not  a  'bolt  from  the 
blue',  but  rather  a  continuation  of  a  number  of  initiatives,  policies  and  laws  developed 
under  the  Conservative  governments  of  the  1980s  and  especially  the  1990s  (Goldson 
1997).  It  was  closely  related  to  the  development  of  inter-agency  forms  of  crime 
prevention,  linked  to  the  notion  of  'community  safety'  (Gilling  1999;  Jacobs  et  al. 
2003),  and  was  also  related  to  the  development  of  'Zero  Tolerance'  forms  of  policing, 
at  this  time  (Dennis  1997).  86 
The  curfew  was,  however,  a  major  new  initiative  introduced  not  by  the  Conservative 
government,  but  by  the  newly  elected  New  Labour  government,  and  can  be  as  seen  as 
part  of  the  crossover  of  concern  from  right  and  'left'  about  the  issue  of  crime  and 
especially  disorder. 
Just  as  it  had  been  the  Democratic  President  Bill  Clinton  who  gave  his  support  to  the 
introduction  of  many  of  the  curfew  initiatives  in  the  United  States,  in  Britain  it  was  the 
Labour  Party  that,  when  in  opposition,  had  first  promoted  the  idea  of  youth  curfews. 
In  the  US,  Jeffs  and  Smith  (1996)  note  that  from  the  predictably  alarmist  underclass 
theorists  like  Murray  and  Wilson,  through  to  Galbraith  and  Jenks  on  the  liberal  left  as 
well  as  New  Communitarians  like  Etzioni,  the  concern  about  the  threat  posed  to  social 
stability  from  an  'underclass'  youth  was  intense.  Similarly,  within  the  UK,  the 
development  of  a  political  consensus  around  the  significance  of  crime,  discussed 
previously,  also  coincided  with  an  increasing  concern  with  violence,  abuse  and 
general  antisocial  behaviour  by  more  radical  academics  (Young  1984,  Campbell 
1993).  Within  psychology,  authors  like  Rutter  and  Smith  were  also  developing  their 
influence  within  the  discussion  about  Psychosocial  Disorders  in  Young  People  (1995) 
and  left-leaning  think  tanks  like  Demos  were  publishing  papers  describing  young 
people  as  'underwolves'  who  were  Vi5connected  from  society'  (Wilkinson  and  Mulgan 
1995). 
136 Theoretical  and  methodological  considerations 
The  CSI  was  a  local  initiative  addressed  at  problems  identified  in  three  relatively 
small  housing  estates  in  Hamilton.  It  was  however,  clearly  developed  in  relation  to  the 
'national'  social  problems  and  issues  identified  above,  and  had  also  developed  as  part 
of  a  series  of  initiatives  and  developments  within  the  Strathclyde  Police  area  itself 
. 
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While  being  local,  the  Hamilton  curfew  became  significant  -  in  its  own  terms,  winning 
a  number  of  national  and  international  community  safety  awards  (Hamilton  Advertiser 
15  October  1998),  and  also  in  terms  of  its  'success'  being  used  as  a  justification  by  the 
Labour  government's  subsequent  implementation  of  curfew  initiatives  across  the  UK. 
For  example,  following  the  Queen's  Speech  in  2000,  Jack  Straw  defended  the 
extension  of  curfew  legislation  to  include  under-  I  6-year-olds  with  reference  to  the 
success  of  the  Hamilton  initiative  (Guardian  7  December  2000).  It  was  therefore  an 
initiative  of  some  significance,  both  at  the  time  and  in  terms  of  its  consequential 
impact  on  future  discussions  about  curfews  in  Britain. 
In  studying  this  initiative,  however,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  much  of  the 
'groundwork'  and  'claimsmaking'  for  the  basis  of  this  development  had  already  taken 
place,  and  therefore  the  focus  of  the  research  was  somewhat  different  to  much  social 
problem  studies.  Whereas  most  social  problem  research  identifies  a  'new'  social 
problem  and  traces  its  genealogy  and  specific  clainismaking  process,  what  is  under 
study  within  this  chapter  is  the  institutionalisation  process  of  a  number  of  already 
established  social  problems,  in  the  particular  form  of  the  Hamilton  Child  Safety 
Initiative.  Consequently,  the  subsequent  examination  of  this  initiative  focuses  on  the 
justificatory  basis  upon  which  the  curfew  was  established.  As  a  policy  development  - 
or  more  precisely  an  'initiative'  -  introduced  by  the  local  authority  and  police,  the 
primary  focus  of  this  analysis  is  therefore  upon  the  elite  voices  that  justified  the 
actions  of  the  police  and  council.  Within  this  justificatory  process,  it  is  still  possible  to 
identify  the  form  that  the  'claims'  took,  which  establish  the  framework  for  how  the 
social  problems  being  addressed  were  understood  and  represented,  and  equally  what 
the  causes  and  solutions  to  these  problems  were  understood  to  be. 
137 A  large  number  of  social  problems  were  being  tackled  by  the  curfew,  from  child 
safety  to  youth  crime,  and  there  was  a  wide  array  of  relationships  between  people 
being  addressed,  from  parent  and  child  relations  to  peer  relations  and  adult-youth 
relations.  Consequently,  in  studying  the  justifications  used  to  introduce  the  curfew,  the 
general  ontological  understanding  of  the  people  in  Hamilton  held  by  the  authorities, 
which  laid  the  basis  for  the  initiative,  could  also  be  explored.  By  examining  how 
people  and  their  relationships  were  understood,  it  was  therefore  also  possible  to 
analYse  the  type  of  'citizen'  being  promoted  and  also  the  basis  of  the  relationship 
being  developed  between  the  state  and  the  individual. 
With  the  apparent  'death  of  the  social'  and  the  rise  of  'community'  as  a  framework  for 
governance  (Rose  1996),  the  idea  of  the  'responsibilisation'  of  individuals  has 
emerged  and  is  examined  below  (Garland  2002:  124-7;  Flint  2002).  The  idea  that  local 
people  in  Hamilton  should  take  more  responsibility  for  their  actions  was  indeed 
promoted  during  the  CSI.  However,  despite  this,  a  contradictory  and  to  some  extent 
unintended  consequence  of  this  process  was  that  the  idea  of  individual  responsibility 
was  actually  undermined  and  diminished.  Governance  based  on  an  engagement  with 
the  vulnerable  individual,  within  the  rubric  of  the  amoral  absolute  of  safety,  can  be 
seen  through  the  example  of  the  curfew  to  weaken  rather  than  encourage  a  notion  of 
the  'responsible  individual'. 
Despite  the  predominance  of  a  'market  society'  (Feeley  2003  :  117)  and  more 
individually-based  relationships  in  society  (Beck  and  Beck-Gernsheirn  2002),  the 
curf6w  illustrates  the  centrality  of  the  activities  of  a  therapeutic  state  rather  than  a 
market-led  form  of  governance,  in  reformulating  the  nature  of  relationships  in  society. 
The  therapeutic  basis  of  this  intervention,  whereby  the  role  of  the  state  becomes  to 
manage  the  anxieties  of  the  population,  is  here  illustrative  of  the  developing  state  form 
of  'governing  the  soul'  (Rose  1999).  However,  again  this  development  and 
understanding  of  the  therapeutic  nature  of  relationships,  which  is  understood  in  part  to 
be  simply  a  reflection  of  a  form  of  neo-liberal  self-actualisation,  is  questioned 
(Gordon  1991:  42).  Rather  this  therapeutic  engagement  is  predicated  on  a  diminished 
sense  of  the  self  (Furedi  2004:  195)  and  it  is  this  weakened  understanding  of  the 
subject  that  was  both  engaged  with  and  promoted  through  the  Hamilton  curfew. 
138 It  is  worth  noting  that,  despite  the  limited  nature  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  what  is 
being  examined  within  this  initiative  is  an  approach  to  a  population  by  sections  of 
' 
the 
state  that,  it  is  believed,  can  be  generalised  and  seen  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  and 
new  form  of  political  engagement  and  management  of  people  and  places  within 
contemporary  modernity. 
The  curfew  at  one  level  can'be  seen  as  a  continuation  of  police  and  social  work 
activities  within  an  area  that  are  not  new  -  moving  young  people  on  and  engaging 
with  the  maltreatment  of  children.  However,  the  basis  of  this  intervention  was  to  some 
degree  specific,  and  it  is  the  elements  of  change  from  past  practices  and  outlooks  - 
rather  than  their  continuity  -  that  are  focused  upon.  At  the  risk  of  being  somewhat 
one-sided,  this  approach  is  adopted  to  emphasise  what  are  felt  to  be  the  new  and 
significant  trends  in  culture  and  social  policy  that  have  gone  on  to  influence 
approaches  and  attitudes  to  initiatives  related  to  antisocial  behaviour. 
Finally,  there  were  a  number  of  critics  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  and  their  'voices'  will 
also  be  examined.  For  many  of  these  critics,  the  curfew  was  understood  to  be  an 
exclusionary  form  of  authoritarianism:  indeed  as  Garland  notes,  the  criminal  justice 
system  has  move  from  one  based  on  the  idea  of  solidarity  to  one  of  exclusion  and 
punishment.  88  However,  rather  than  being  simply  exclusionary,  this  initiative  can  also 
be  seen  as  an  attempt  at  re-including  the  targeted  communities  on  a  more  diminished 
basis,  in  relation  to  their  fears,  but  also  in  relation  to  their  unsafe  lifestyles.  As  such 
the  local  authority  was  attempting  to  reengage  the  more  atornised  public  through  their 
sense  of  being  at  risk,  within  a  more  therapeutically-oriented  framework. 
Background  to  the  curfew 
Visiting  Hillhouse,  the  largest  of  the  curfew-targeted  areas,  for  the  first  time,  I  was 
struck  by  the  unexceptional  appearance  of  the  estate.  In  conversation  with  local  adults 
and  the  primary  school  teachers  working  in  the  area,  they  too  appeared  somewhat 
bemused  by  the  initiative  and  the  international  media  aitention  it  had  received.  in  an 
article  examining  the  curfew,  the  music  magazine  The  Face  gave  an  apt,  if  somewhat 
139 dramatised,  picture  of  Hamilton  -a  picture  that  was  equally  applicable,  if  without  the 
9  guns',  'hatchets'  and  'heroin',  to  the  Hillhouse  estate. 
There  are  knives,  guns,  hatchets,  heroin,  booze  and  unemployment  problems 
throughout  the  vale  of  Hamilton,  but  it's  nowhere  near  as  grim  as  Glasgow's 
Easterhouse  or  Castlemilk.  Or  Manchester's  Moss  Side  or  Pill  in  Newport  and 
a  thousand  other  places  in  Britain  and  beyond.  Places  you  can  probably  see 
from  your  own  bedroom  window.  (The  Face  June  1998) 
Hillhouse  was  an  area  of  relative  poverty,  with  a  couple  of  small  streets  with  largely 
boarded-up  windows  and  a  population  of  2,400.  Public  sector  housing  made  up  80  per 
cent  of  houses  in  the  area  compared  to  44  per  cent  throughout  the  region  of  South 
Lanarkshire,  with  a  greater  percentage  of  young  people  and  single  parents  living  in 
them.  Despite  the  murder  of  a  Hillhouse  boy  two  years  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the 
curfew,  as  the  local  police  repeatedly  informed  the  press,  it  was  not  an  area  with  a 
particularly  high  crime  rate. 
Hillhouse  was  in  no  sense  a  ghetto.  89 
The  Child  Safety  Initiative  (CSI),  commonly  known  as  the  Hamilton  Curfew,  was 
launched  in  October  1997  and  was  to  run  for  a  trial  six  month  period,  ending  in  April 
1998.90  Three  working  class  areas  within  Hamilton  in  South  Lanarkshire  were  chosen 
for  this  pilot  project  -  YvUtehill,  Fairhill  and  Hillhouse.  The  aim  of  the  CSI  or  curfew 
was  to  move  any  under-  1  6-year-old  off  the  streets  if  they  were  out  'after  dark'  and 
could  not  give  'a  reasonable  excuse'  as  to  why  they  were  out.  While  not  specifying  a 
strict  curfew  time,  the  CSI  was  clearly  aimed  at  encouraging  young  people  to  stop 
hanging  around  the  streets  at  night  and  put  the  onus  on  them  to  justify  their  public 
presence.  Although  'after  dark'  was  the  time  at  which  the  police  stated  they  would 
start  to  act  in  Hillhouse,  most  of  the  young  people  spoken  to  in  the  area  believed  the 
police  started  picking  people  up  around  9pm. 
The  announcement  of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  on  23rd  October  came  with  speeches 
from  both  Chief  Constable  John  Orr  and  council  leader  Tom  McCabe.  From  the  outset 
140 the  CSI  was  promoted  as  a  joint  initiative,  not  simply  a  police  initiative,  involving 
South  Lanarkshire  Council  and  in  particular  the  Social  Work  Department.  On 
numerous  radio  and  television  debates  about  the  curfew,  it  was  not  the  chief  of  police 
who  explained  the  purpose  of  the  new  policing  initiative,  but  Sandy  Cameron,  director 
of  social  work.  Through  the  social  work  department,  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  was 
presented  as  a  safety  initiative,  to  prevent  young  people  becoming  criminals,  and  also 
as  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  the  safety  of  young  children  who  are  allowed  to  wander 
the  streets  late  at  night.  Sandy  Cameron  explained  that,  'This  is  not  a  curfew,  but  an 
issue  of  safety  and  in  particular  the  safety  of  young  people'.  91 
The  justification  for  this  initiative  therefore  took  on  a  distinct  form  compared  with  the 
more  narrowly-focused  zero  tolerance  police  initiatives  up  to  this  point,  which  had 
been  directed  largely  at  the  antisocial  behaviour  of  young  people  as  a  problem  for 
communities,  and  at  the  fear  of  crime.  The  apparently  contradictory  aspect  of  the  CSI, 
which  on  one  hand  was  being  tough  on  youth  and  on  the  other  was  promoted  as  being 
a  caring  initiative  concerned  largely  with  children  and  young  people's  safety,  was  seen 
by  many  as  being  untenable,  or  simply  a  public  relations  exercise  by  the  police. 
From  the  outset,  the  CSI  was  labelled  a  curfew  by  the  press,  partly  because  of  the 
nature  of  the  initiative  itself,  but  also  due  to  the  promotion  of  the  need  for  curfew 
legislation  being  promoted  at  the  time  by  the  New  Labour  government.  Especially  for 
the  tabloid  press,  this  was  simply  another  crackdown  on  'juvenile  crime',  where  kids 
would  be  'nicked'  for  being  out  at  night.  Frustrated  by  the  curfew  label  the  local  police 
chief,  Jim  Elliot,  argued  that  the  police  were  a  'caring  organisation'  not  an  'oppressive 
one'  (Daily  Record,  3  October  1997).  A  year  on  from  the  launch  of  the  initiative, 
Allison  McLaughlan,  a  freelance  journalist  for  the  Daily  Record,  summed  up  what 
many  of  her  colleagues  thought  about  the  police  safety-first  PR  campaign:  describing 
it  as  'bollocks,  it's  about  cutting  down  on  crime'  (The  Face,  June  1998). 
However  as  we  will  see,  the  focus  upon  the  CSI  as  simply  an  authoritarian  form  of 
policing  of  youth  crime  missed  a  number  of  wider  trends  that  laid  the  basis  for  the 
initiative,  and  also  exaggerated  the  apparent  contradiction  between  caring  and 
oppressive  policing. 
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The  curfew  was  promoted  by  Strathclyde  Chief  Constable  (Orr  1997a)  as  part  of  an 
'enlightened',  'child  welfare'  approach  related  to  the  children's  hearing  system  in 
Scotland  -  in  which  the  emphasis  is  on  protecting  the  welfare  of  the  child  rather  than 
punishing  his  or  her  criminality.  The  emphasis  placed  upon  safety  by  John  Orr  in  his 
launch  speech  is  presented  below  in  detail  to  give  a  flavour  of  how  the  police  were  to 
justify  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  -  where  italics  are  used  this  is  to  show  my  emphasis. 
T'he  Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative  is  a  pilot  which  aims  -  simultaneously  - 
to  protect  the  safety  of  young  people,  decrease  the  opportunities  for  them  to 
become  involved  in  juvenile  crime  and  reduce  the  fear  of  crime  among  the 
public  ... 
[it]  seeks  to  highlight  the  dangers  faced  by  youngsters  allowed  out 
after  dark  without  adult  supervision  -  risks  which  can  lead  to  children  falling 
prey  to  possible  danger,  becoming  involved  in  crime  or  creating  a  nuisance  to 
others.  [The  initiative]  was  drawn  up  in  response  to  local  householders  and 
young  people  about  vandalism  and  the  presence  of  unsupervised  or  unruly 
children  on  the  street  after  dark 
... 
[and]  the  principle  aim  of  the  patrols  is  to 
ensure  that  vulnerable  youngsters  aged  under  16  -  and  particularly  those  aged 
12  or  less  -  are  not  exposed  to  dangers  or  tempted  to  become  embroiled  in 
crimes  associated  with  being  out  alone  too  late  in  the  dark  or  with  equally 
vulnerable  company  -  crimes  such  as  vandalism,  creating  disturbances  and 
minor  violence. 
Police  officers  who  come  upon  unaccompanied  children  during  the  evening 
patrols  and  who  believe  the  children  are  at  risk  will  return  the  youngsters  to 
their  homes.  Parents  or  carers  will  be  reminded  of  the  dangers  facing  children 
out  alone  in  the  dark 
...  The  police  patrols  will  be  undertaken  by  a  pool  of 
community  police  officers  who  have  been  specially  selected  for  their 
experience,  skills  and  empathy  when  it  comes  to  dealing  with  young  people. 
Some  of  the  officers  are  parents  themselves. 
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have  concerns  about  their  wellbeing.  It  is  just  that  with  this  particular  project, 
we  areformalising  this  approach  and  giving  a  modem  slant  to  old-fashioned 
community  policing. 
We  do  not  allow  young  people  to  be  in  danger  in  the  home  so  we  shouldn't 
permit  it  in  the  street.  Our  hope  is  that  by  taking  vulnerable  and  impressionable 
youngsters  out  of  harm's  way,  there  will  be  a  double  spin-off.  They  will  be 
safer  and  they  won't  be  tempted  to  get  caught  up  in  mischief-making  or  worse. 
John  Off  went  on  to  give  examples  of  the  typical  problems  he  was  talking  about, 
which  included  a  story  about  a  nine-year-old  girl  found  in  a  close  only  in  her 
underwear  whose  mother  was  'dead  drunk'.  Another  story  was  told  of  a  nine-year-old 
boy  found  on  the  street  whose  mother  was  at  the  bingo  and  father  was  in  the  pub.  This 
example  of  unsupervised  children,  Off  stated,  'beggared  belief,  as: 
Yet  -  and  what  a  paradox  -  paedophile  court  cases  hit  the  headlines  regularly 
and  there  is  controversy  about  the  issue  of  the  rights  of  communities  to  know 
where  convicted  offenders  are  living. 
Then  in  relation  to  the  crime  situation  of  Hamilton,  John  Orr  explained  that, 
The  figures  for  crime  in  the  Hamilton  area  are  down  considerably  so  far  this 
year,  due  to  the  hard  work  of  the  local  police  ... 
But  if  people  remain  anxious 
and  concerned,  then  we  must  respond  -  decisively. 
Explaining  that  this  was  not  a  curfew  he  continued, 
Strathclyde  police  do  not  think  young  people  are  public  enemy  number  one 
and  this  force  is  not  anti  young  people.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  taking  this 
approach  because  we  really  care  that  our  young  people  live  a  safe  and  crime- 
free  life. 
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Views  on  people's  rights  are  many  and  varied  but  there  can  be  no  argument 
surely  against  the  right  of  all  people  -  including  and  perhaps  even  especially 
the  young  -  to  live  in  safety  in  the  conununity,  safe  from  crime  and  neglect  too. 
People  have  responsibilities,  as  well  as  rights.  All-in-all,  what  Strathclyde 
police  and  South  Lanarkshire  Council  want  this  initiative  to  do  is  to  remind 
everyone  of  their  responsibilities  to  others.  92 
For  John  Orr  this  was  a  caring  initiative  based  on  the  right  to  be  safe,  a  right  that,  he 
felt,  could  not  be  argued  against.  The  absolute  nature  of  the  'amoral'  principle  of  safety 
was  central.  The  Child  Safety  Initiative  was  a  form  of  responsibilisation.  The 
responsibility  that  members  of  the  public  had  was  to  ensure  the  safety  of  one  another. 
This  was  not  simply  in  relation  to  crimes  like  burglary  or  assault,  as  Orr  explained  -  as 
far  as  police  statistics  went,  crime  was  significantly  lower  in  Hamilton  than  it  had 
been.  Rather  the  main  target  of  the  initiative  was  petty  crimes  of  vandalism  and 
antisocial  behaviour  of  young  people,  with  the  key  indicator  of  this  problem  being  the 
levels  of  fear  by  local  adults  indicated  by  the  number  of  complaints  the  police 
received. 
But  safety  was  not  simply  about  adults.  It  was  equally  about  children  who  were 
unsupervised  at  night  -  especially  young  children.  These  children  not  only  risked  the 
dangers  of  paedophiles  but  they  were  also  'at  risk'  of  becoming  involved  in  antisocial 
and  criminal  activities. 
Following  John  Off's  speech,  the  South  Lanarkshire  Council  leader,  Tom  McCabe, 
spoke,  echoing  many  of  the  comments  made  by  John  Orr.  Straight  away,  McCabe 
challenged  the  idea  that  this  was  a  curfew  (McCabe  1997): 
This  is  a  nonsense  notion!  Such  a  notion  has  no  place  in  Hamilton,  no  place  in 
South  Lanarkshire.  It  has  no  place  in  a  society  heading  for  the  new 
millennium.  The  Hamilton  child  safety  initiative  is  about  improving  the  quality 
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and  the  protection  of  our  children  -  today,  now  -  and  in  the  future. 
On  the  issue  of  rights,  responsibilities  and  the  destruction  of  communities  caused  by 
fear,  he  explained  that: 
It  is  about  responsibility.  It  is  about  civil  liberties  and  freedom  -  thefreedom  of 
everyone  in  the  community  to  live  withoutfear  or  intimidation.  Each  of  us  has 
responsibilities  to  other  people  within  our  communities.  We  have  to  recognise 
that  when  some  people  chose  to  ignore  their  responsibilities  -  to  their  children, 
to  their  neighbours,  to  their  community  -  to  society  -  it  leads  to  an  erosion  of 
community.  It  leads  to  people  becoming  fearful  and  distrustful  of  each  other. 
Challenging  the  civil  liberties  arguments  that  had  been  made  in  relation  to  children's 
rights,  McCabe  argued: 
The  initiative  we  are  launching  today  is  not  about  an  increase  in  powers  at  the 
expense  of  the  freedom  of  children  and  young  people  ... 
It  is  in  fact  about 
returning  liberties  to  communities  -  about  removingfear.  The  truth  is  that  our 
children  and  young  people's  safety  initiative  has  at  its  core  the  rights  of 
children. 
However,  these  rights,  he  continued,  must  also  involve  young  people  and  'perhaps 
more  importantly'  parents  being  more  responsible,  as  it  is  in  the  home  that'we  learn 
that  we  are  part  of  the  conununity'. 
It's  about  the  responsibility  of  parents  realising  and  recognising  it  is  in  their 
interest  to  know  where  their  children  are  and  what  they  are  doing. 
The  safety  initiative,  McCabe  argued,  was  a  development  from  a  wide  process  of 
consultation  with  young  people,  adults  and  Scotland's  first  Citizens'  Jury,  which 
I showed  that  for  all  ages  the  number  one  priority  was  community  safety'.  Backing  up 
John  Orr's  early  point,  McCabe  reiterated  that  the  targeted  areas,  'have  been  chosen 
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country  -  but  because  the  community  itself  has  called  for  action. 
When  we  looked  at  the  evidence  from  the  surveys  and  from  the 
recommendations  of  the  Hillhouse  CitizensJury  -  the  message  came  over  loud 
and  clear  -  safety  issues  were  a  top  priority.  And  that  includes  safety  of  young 
people,  particularly  at  night.  93 
The  partnership  between  the  council  and  community  was  stressed  in  this  speech,  and 
particularly  with  young  people  who  were  to  have  as  part  of  the  safety  initiative  a  new 
centre  built  in  Hamilton,  which  would  be  recreational  and  social  -  with  advice  and 
information  provided  on  a  range  of  issues. 
Absolute  safety 
Safety  was  key  to  both  the  police  and  politicians'  justification  of  the  Child  Safety 
Initiative: 
The  aim  of  this  initiative  is  not  toforce  young  people  off  the  street.  rather  it  is 
to  make  sure  that  our  communities  are  saferfor  everyone.  (Leaflet:  Children 
and  Young  People's  Safety  Pilot,  Strathclyde  Police  'Q'Division  1997). 
This  initiative  fits  in  with  the  Government's  push  for  partnership  between 
families,  the  people  and  local  authorities  to  create  a  safer  society.  (TIie 
Scottish  Home  Affairs  Minister,  Henry  McLeish  in  the  Scotsman  3  October 
1997). 
At  one  level,  safety  has  always  been  an  aspect  of  policing  and  the  police  have  always 
played  a  role  in  maintaining  not  only  the  law,  but  also  order.  However,  the  theme  of 
safety  was  not  simply  a  police  matter  but  a  political  issue,  and  unlike  past  historical 
periods  was  here,  not  a  means  to  an  end  but  the  end  in  itself.  More  particularly,  it  was 
the  feeling  of  safety  that  was  being  promoted  and  engaged  with  -  the  process  of 
ensuring  this  feeling  of  safety  was  to  some  degree  more  important  than  the  actual 
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engaging  with  the  public  sense  of  unease  that  was  central  to  the  CSI,  rather  than  the 
aim  of  reducing  crime  and  unsafe  practices,  which  to  a  degree  were  almost  accidental 
outcomes  of  this  more  significant  process. 
The  Child  Safety  Initiative  was  justified  almost  exclusively  with  reference  to  the 
generic  issue  of  safety  in  and  of  itself.  Children  out  at  night  was  a  concern  because 
they  were  unsafe,  young  people  were  unsafe  as,  they  were  at  risk  of  becoming 
involved  in  illegal  activities,  and  adults  were  being  made  to  feel  unsafe  by  the 
activities  of  these  young  people. 
Looked  at  individually,  each  of  these  'safety'  issues  could  be  seen  as  something  the 
police  had  always  been  involved  in.  For  example  the  Children  and  Young  Persons 
(Scotland)  Act  1937  (s.  12),  'provides  that  it  is  an  offence  on  the  part  of  a  parent  to 
neglect  his  child',  and  part  of  the  legal  justification  for  the  curfew  had  been  with 
reference  to,  'the  general  duty  of  the  police  to  protect  life  and  property'  (Springharn 
1998).  However,  the  centrality  of  the  issue  of  safety  was  qualitatively  different. 
Safety  was  an  organising  principle  in  its  own  right  with  regard  to  the  community  as  a 
whole,  and  was  understood  to.  be  central  to  the  well  being  of  the  community.  Indeed  it 
was  the  issue  of  safety  and  fear  that  was  understood  to  be  at  the  heart  of  what  was 
undermining,  and  equally  what  could  recreate  a  sense  of  community.  All  aspects  of 
the  interactions  between  individuals  within  Hillhouse  were  therefore  interpreted 
within  the  prism  of  safety  -  with  even  the  previously  described  'delinquent'  or  'deviant' 
activities  of  young  people  being  described  as  'unsafe'. 
As  David  Garland  has  noted  with  regard  to  the  legal  system  in  the  UK  in  the  past,  'the 
British  political  establishment  pursued  an  ideal  of  solidarity'  (Garland  1996:  406).  In 
terms  of  rebuilding  a  sense  of  community  within  the  curfew-targetcd  areas,  there  was 
an  attempt  to  rebuild  this  'solidarity'  through  the  issue  of  safety.  This  was  not,  after  all, 
simply  a  police  initiative,  or  part  of  the  day-to-day  policing  of  an  area,  but  was  a 
political  initiative  involving  the  local  Labour  council  with  the  backing  of  the  New 
Labour  government.  It  was  in  essence  a  development  of  the  politics  of  fear. 
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Noticeably,  following  the  initial  national  interest  in  the  curfew,  media  attention 
declined,  but  remained  ever  present  in  the  local  newspaper.  Here  the  significance  of 
the  police  as  claimsmakers  can  be  seen,  where  almost  every  article  was  either  based 
on  police  statistics  and  stories  provided  to  the  press  or  in  the  comments  made  by  the 
local  chief  of  police.  With  no  organised  opposition  to  the  initiative,  the  police,  to  a 
large  degree,  were  able  to  'make'  the  news  with  their  weekly  press  releases  describing 
the  latest  curfew  interventions. 
The  most  typical  problem  being  addressed  by  the  police  was  the  safety  of 
'unsupervised  under  10s  who  wander  the  streets  after  dark',  a  message  constantly 
reiterated  by  the  police  to  explain  what  the  CSI  was  'really  about'  (Hamilton 
Advertiser  20  November  1997).  Young  children  who  hung  about  the  streets  were 
understood  and  represented  in  terms  of  being  'at  risk'.  Rarely  was  any  particular  risk 
clarified  -  rather  the  very  act  of  being  out  after  dark,  indeed  of  being  'unsupervised', 
was  understood  to  be  unsafe. 
The  extreme  case  of  a  four-year-old  found  on  the  streets  after  9pm  was  an  example  of 
the  typical  problem  being  addressed  by  the  CSI  and  the  resulting  target  for 
condemnation  of  the  'irresponsible  parent'  (Herald  3  November  1997).  In  this  respect, 
the  basis  of  what  was  understood  to  be  a  good  parent  was  a  safe  parent.  Indeed  being 
responsible,  as  council  leader  Tom  McCabe  argued  above,  was  about  ensuring  the 
safety  of  all  the  members  of  a  community,  something  which,  if  neglected,  'leads  to  an 
erosion  of  community.  It  leads  to  people  becoming  fearful  and  distrustful  of  each 
other'. 
Despite  the  police  and  local  politicians'  emphasis  upon  child  safety,  the  CSI  was  also 
presented  as  a  way  to  ensure  the  safety  of  adults  from  young  people  being  antisocial. 
This  was  the  core  understanding  of  the  curfew  for  the  press,  particularly  the  tabloid 
press,  who  were  more  inclined  to  typify  the  problem  in  Hillhouse  with  reference  to 
examples  of  'drunk  teenagers'  and  yobbish  behaviour.  Quotes  from  local  adults  were 
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gardens'  (Scotsman  3  October  1997).  This  emphasis  was  also  stressed  by  Labour  MPs 
and  national  politicians.  George  Robertson,  the  local  Labour  MP  and  the  then  defence 
secretary,  combined  his  concern  for,  'young  children  who  should  not  be  out  late  at 
night',  with  a  more  confrontational  need  to  'stamp  down  on  rowdiness  that  makes  life 
intolerable  for  decent  people'  (Scottish  Daily  Mail  24  October  1997). 
Safety  for  adults  was  bound  up  with  the  fear  of  crime,  an  issue  that  will  be  examined 
more  fully  below.  Here,  however,  it  is  worth  reiterating,  with  respect  to  how  children 
were  understood  to  be  at  risk,  that  adults  themselves  were  similarly  understood  to  also 
be  at  risk  -  not  from  the  criminals,  but  the  antisocial  young  people  in  their  community, 
who  made  the  streets  feel  unsafe.  The  loss  of  a  sense  of  community  was  located  more 
centrally  within  adult  insecurities. 
That  the  problem  being  addressed  was  not  simply  the  activities  of  young  people,  but 
also  the  feelings  of  adults,  was  somewhat  ironically  recognised  by  Campbell 
Thompson,  a  local  senior  police  officer  in  Hamilton.  Describing  the  insecurities  felt 
by  many  adults,  Thompson  explained  that, 
It's  modem  society.  There's  a  fear  of  crime  among  the  elderly  that's  very 
seldom  justified.  A  youngster  is  more  likely  to  be  assaulted  than  the  elderly 
folk,  but  that's  not  the  old  folks'  perception.  They're  taken  aback  by  a  bunch  of 
boisterous  youngsters  in  high  spirits  (The  Face,  June  1998). 
The  emphasis  placed  on  safety  was  most  distinctive  in  relation  to  the  discussion  about 
young  people  themselves,  particularly  the  'yobs'  who  were  seen  by  the  press  to  be  the 
main  problem  being  addressed  by  this  initiative.  For  John  Orr,  the  issue  of  crime  and 
safety  were  interconnected,  and  he  explained  that  'we  really  care  that  our  young 
people  live  a  safe  and  crime-free  life'.  Being  safe  was,  for  the  Chief  Constable,  an 
unquestionable  issue:  'there  can  be  no  argument  surely  against  the  right  of  all  people  - 
including  and  perhaps  even  especially  the  young  -  to  live  in  safety  in  the  community, 
safe  from  crime  and  neglect  too'. 
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Executive  Director  of  Social  Work,  explained  what  dangers  they  were  concerned 
about.  In  an  interview  with  Sky  Scottish,  McCabe  explained:  'We  are  trying  to  give 
people  their  liberty  back  -  especially  teenagers  who  through  peer  pressure  may  be  led 
into  acts  that  they  will  regret  for  a  long  time  afterwards'.  94  Young  people  who  commit 
criminal  offences  were  here  seen,  not  only  as  criminals,  but  also  as  victims  -  victims 
of  peer  pressure  who  need  to  be  protected  by  the  police.  Sandy  Cameron  made  a 
similar  point,  when  he  noted  that, 
It  is  important  to  take  young  people  back  home  into  dialogue  with  their 
parents  -  to  help  them  avoid  getting  into  criminal  activities,..  We  must  also 
recognise  that  the  misuse  of  alcohol  by  young  people  is  a  serious  problem  in 
our  communities,  and  is  something  that  sets  patterns  that  affect  us  all.  95 
Here,  both  McCabe  and  Cameron  portrayed  young  people,  especially  those  young 
people  committing  offences,  as  potential  victims,  victims  of  their  peers  or  victims  of 
alcohol,  and  in  need  of  protection  from  these  peers  and  even  from  themselves  and 
their  'set  patterns.  In  this  respect  it  became  the  job  of  the  police  not  only  to  control 
the  antisocial  behaviour  of  young  people  that  affected  adults  on  the  targeted  estates, 
but  also  to  monitor  the  unsafe  interactions  between  young  people  themselves.  96 
The  concern  about  safety,  at  the  time  of  the  CSI's  introduction,  was  not  simply  a 
framework  for  understanding  the  divisions  in  society  and  the  'collapse  of  community'. 
rt  was  also  a  framework  around  which  generational  divisions  could  be  overcome. 
During  the  curfew,  but  not  connected  directly  with  it,  a  conference  was  held  in 
Glasgow,  organised  by  Strathclyde  police  and  entitled  'Bridging  the  Gap  between 
Young  and  Old'.  The  conference  was  organised  on  a  Strathclyde-wide  basis  and  was 
intended  to  find  'something  in  common'  between  young  and  old.  Understood  as  a  form 
of  awareness-raising,  the  conference  focused  upon  promoting  the  'mutual 
understanding  of  each  other's  concerns  and  fears'.  The  conference  was  set  up  to 
challenged  the  idea,  which  it  was  understood  elderly  people  had,  of  young  people  as 
"'yobs"...  only  interested  in  drugs,  alcohol  and  loitering  on  street  comers'.  Similarly 
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. the  conference  wanted  to  challenge  young  people's  understanding  of  the  elderly  as 
"'killjoys"  with  nothing  worthwhile  to  contribute  to  society'.  These  caricatured  views, 
it  was  felt,  'can  lead  to  unnecessary  fear,  apprehension,  intimidation,  aggression  and 
provocation'.  As  Strathclyde  police  were  keen  to  tackle  not  only  the  issue  of  crime, 
'but  the  fear  of  crime',  finding  something  that  young  people  and  elderly  adults  have  in 
common  was  seen  as  a  way  of  over  coming  this  fear. 
The  common  ground  around  which  solidarity  could  be  built,  the  conference  believed, 
was  safety.  As  the  conference  promotion  paper  explained,  'Surely  the  seed  is  there. 
The  young  care  about  the  safety  of  their  grandparents,  and  granny  and  granddad  worry 
about  drugs,  not  for  themselves  but  for  their  grandchildren'.  97  That  young  and  old  not 
only  have  fears  of  their  own  but  also  have  fears  for  others  was  thus  understood  to  be 
the  basis  for  a  common  ground  between  the  two.  Fear  and  the  need  for  safety  was  seen 
as  the  framework  around  which  generational  divisions  and  therefore  divisions  in 
communities  could  be  overcome.  Like  the  Hamilton  curfew,  this  conference  took  the 
fear  of  crime  and  the  issue  of  safety  as  the  basis  of  connecting  with  people  and  indeed 
of  reconnecting  people  with  one  another. 
Those  opposing  the  curfew  raised  various  concerns  regarding  children's  rights. 
However,  in  terms  of  the  general  theme  of  safety  as  an  issue  of  concern,  or  a  real 
social  problem',  there  was  little  challenge  to  the  rhetoric  and  typification  process  of 
the  authorities.  The  issue  of  safety  was  also  something  that  those  opposing  the  curfew 
adopted  as  part  of  their  resistance  to  the  CSI.  Various  children's  charities,  'pro-youth' 
groups  and  the  Scottish  Human  Right's  Centre  opposed  the  curfew  by  challenging  the 
legal  basis  for  the  initiative  and  promoting  the  issue  of  children's  right  to  play  without 
harassment.  98  However,  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  safety,  there  was  little  questioning 
of  this  more  'caring'  side  of  the  CSI.  For  example,  the  typical  problem  of  young 
children  being  out  at  night  and  therefore  being  unsafe  was  not  questioned;  nor  was  the 
issue  of  young  people  being  at  risk  in  relation  to  drugs,  drink  and  'peer  pressure'. 
Indeed,  for  a  number  of  these  groups,  the  'at  risk'  framework  was  used  as  a  basis  of 
opposition  to  the  curfew  -  with  the  home  being  presented  as  a  place  where  children 
and  young  people  were  at  greater  risk  of  harni  than  when  they  were  in  public. 
151 For  the  Scottish  organiser  of  Save  the  Children,  one  of  the  dangers  of  the  police  taking 
people  home  was  that  children  may  face  'the  possibility  of  domestic  violence  or  other 
forms  of  harm.  Similarly  for  Play  Scotland,  safety  was  less  of  an  issue  in  public  in 
relation  to  'stranger  danger'  than  the  concern  that  'children  are  most  often  abused  by 
people  well  known  to  them  in  the  family  or  close  friends.  Whereas  'children  walking 
aimlessly'  was  not  a  positive  thing,  could  the  home,  with  'the  technology  of  video, 
computer  and  internet,  have  a  worse  impact  on  the  'future  of  the  human  raceT  For 
Gerison  Landsdown,  the  director  of  the  Children's  Rights  Office,  'many  children  may 
be  out  in  the  evening  in  order  to  avoid  abuse  or  violence  at  home.  The  imposition  of  a 
blanket  curfew  which  forces  them  home  would  place  them  at  a  greater  not  lesser  risk 
of  harnf.  Finally,  Roger  Smith  of  the  Children's  Society  added  his  voice  of  concern, 
asking,  'Will  children  be  forced  into  their  own  homes  to  suffer  violence  and  abuse 
silentlyT  (Waiton  2001:  170). 
The  problematisation  of  child  abuse,  developed  most  forcefully  in  the  1980s,  here 
provided  an  alternative  framework  for  concern  about  the  issue  of  child  safety.  Earlier 
it  was  noted  that  panics  or  anxieties  promoted  by  the  right  are  often  challenged  by 
more  radical  groups,  only  to  find  that  they  simply  replace  these  concerns  with 
alternative  panics  of  their  own.  For  those  both  for  and  against  the  curfew,  this  can  be 
seen  with  the  above  quotes,  where  the  fear  and  safety  of  adults  promoted  by  the  police 
and  local  authority  was  replaced  by  an  alternative  fear  for  the  safety  of  children  in 
their  own  home. 
Young  people  were  'at  risk'  for  both  the  curfew  supporters  and  many  of  the  opponents 
of  this  initiative.  The  radical  alternative  was  simply  to  locate  'risk'  within  the  private 
rather  than  public  arena  -  dangers  being  located  within  the  interpersonal  relationships 
between  family  and  friends. 
The  sense  of  children  and  young  people  being  'at  risk'  was,  like  the  issue  of  safety 
itself,  generic,  and  an  accepted  framework  for  understanding  many  of  the  relationships 
between  people  in  the  targeted  area.  The  actual  risks  that  children,  young  people  and 
adults  faced  was  not  questioned.  For  example,  how  dangerous  was  it  really  for 
children  to  be  out  at  night;  how  'at  risk'  were  young  people  of  'setting  patterns  of 
152 behaviour'  like  drinking  that  will  affect  their  future;  how  'at  risk'  were  adults  from 
young  people  who  hang  about;  and  indeed  how  'at  risk'  were  the  children  in  the 
Hillhouse  area  from  their  'abusive  parents'? 
Reconnecting  through  safety 
Before,  during  and  after  the  trial  Child  Safety  Initiative,  both  the  council  and  police 
were  at  pains  to  prove  that  their  activities  were  not  self-interested  or  being  externally 
enforced  on  the  public,  but  rather,  that  this  was  an  initiative  developed  by  and  for  the 
public.  99  Safety  and  the  desire  to  feel  safe  was  therefore  represented  as  a  community 
issue,  rather  than  one  being  adopted  and  promoted  by  the  authorities  themselves. 
Surveys,  consultation  documents  and  focus  groups,  as  well  as  opinion  polls,  were  set 
up  and  systematically  referred  to  in  an  effort  to  show  that  the  curfew  was  not  only 
supported  by  the  public,  but  that  the  idea  of  a  curfew  had  itself  come  from  the 
public.  100  Both  the  adult  opinion  of  the  curfew,  101  and  more  particularly  the  'youth 
voice',  102  were  constantly  referred  to  as  evidence  of  the  support  for  the  curfew. 
The  local  MP  George  Robertson,  relating  to  the  'miserý(  of  those  not  able  to  'live  in 
peace  and  quiet',  was  the  first  person  to  claim  that  the  idea  for  the  curfew  had  come 
from  the  Citizens'  Jury  set  up  in  Hillhouse.  This  was  not  the  case  -  but  the  claim  was 
repeated  many  times  throughout  the  initiative  to  indicate  that  this  was  a  community 
initiative,  a  'partnership'  based  on  'community  participation'  (Scotsman  3  October 
1997).  103 
Rejecting  the  critical  attack  on  the  council  and  the  police  for  being  heavy-handed  or 
for  taking  away  young  people's  rights,  the  authorities  kept  relating  their  initiative  to 
the  support  from  the  public,  its  desire  for  a  safe  society,  and  its  support  for  increased 
police  action  in  the  areas  targeted.  The  curfew  itself  was  clearly  justified  in  relation  to 
the  issue  of  safety  -  with  all  groups  in  the  targeted  area  being  represented  as  in  need  of 
support,  in  terms  of  the  improved  safety  the  CSI  would  bring  to  them. 
At  one  level,  the  targeting  of  young  people  who,  it  was  felt,  were  responsible  for  the 
fear  within  the  communities,  could  be  understood  as  a  form  of  'authoritarian 
153 exclusion'.  However,  more  generally,  this  initiative  should  also  be  seen  as  an'attempt 
by  the  authorities  to  reengage  and  include  the  public  in  relation  to  its  sense  of  fear  and 
vulnerability.  Even  the  once-labelled  delinquents  were  seen  not  so  much  as  groups 
needing  to  be  excluded,  but  rather  as  vulnerable  potential  victims  of  external  pressures 
who  needed  support.  Indeed  the  attempt  to  engage  young  people's  support  for  the  CSI 
was  often  in  relation  to  their  own  anxieties  and  fears  about  other  young  people,  and 
their  general  sense  of  safety  at  night. 
In  this  respect  the  authority  of  the  curfew  came  notfrom  the  authorities  themselves  but 
from  the  vulnerable  public,  and  the  role  adopted  by  the  local  authority  was  of  an 
advocatefor  the  victimised  individual.  The  basis  for  the  justification  of  the  curfew  was 
in  relation  to  the  'at  risk  child',  the  'fearful  adult',  and  the  'pressurised  youth'  -  each 
individual  within  these  groups  being  understood  as  somewhat  isolated  and  in  need  of 
protection.  The  participation,  partnership  and  community  involvement  was  therefore 
not  an  engagement  with  a  collective  public,  but  rather  with  atomised  insecure 
individuals.  104 
The  importance  given  to  the  community  participation  aspect  of  the  curfew  reflected 
the  need  of  the  political  authorities  to  reengage  with  an  atomised  public  with  whom 
there  was  no  ideological  or  organisational  connection.  Through  the  Child  Safety 
Initiative  and  the  issue  of  community  safety,  the  local  council  and  politicians 
attempted  to  engage  with  the  public  through  its  fears.  The  amoral  absolute  of  child 
safety  was  the  most  powerful  cultural  value  at  the  time,  and  was  the  dominant 
justificatory  basis  for  the  curfew.  Equally,  however,  the  emotional  insecurities  of 
adults  were  related  to  as  the  basis  for  community  solidarity,  and  the  more 
therapeutically-oriented  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  individual  was 
promoted. 
In  terms  of  the  local  authority  acting  as  advocates  for  the  vulnerable  on  the  Hillhouse 
estate,  the  issue  of  adult  fears  appeared,  and  to  a  degree  was,  contradictory  to  the  idea 
of  a  child-friendly  initiative,  as  young  people  were,  in  part,  recast  as  dangerous  and 
threatening  to  these  adults. 
154 Standing  as  advocates  of  the  vulnerable  community  rather  than  as  political 
representatives,  the  local  politicians  and  the  police  were  prone  to  feeling  pressurised 
by  alternative  victim  voices.  The  youth  voice  in  particular,  which  was  mobilised  by 
the  children's  charities  opposing  the  curfew,  carried  with  it  much  weight  as  young 
people,  by  their  very  nature  of  being  'children'  with  'rights',  could  be  represented  as 
powerless  potential  victims.  Like  the  council's  attempt  to  advocate  on  behalf  of  the 
public  with  reference  to  their  vulnerability,  the  children's  charities  opposing  the 
curfew  did  likewise.  To  counter  these  claims,  the  local  authority  attempted  to  prove 
that  young  people  were  on  their  side  and  that  the  curfew  was  in  fact  defending  their 
right  to  be  safe  from  harm. 
Through  the  prism  of  safety  and  vulnerability  a  diminished  public  was  engaged  with 
by  a  diminished  political  authority  -  an  'authority'  which  relied  on  the  'moral'  weight 
of  the  victimfor  its  legitimation. 
Rights 
The  well-worn  term  promoted  by  New  Labour  of  rights  and  responsibilities  was  a 
central  basis  for  promoting  the  values  of  safety  throughout  the  life  of  the  Hamilton 
curfew.  The  discourse  of  'rights'  was  also  engaged  with  by  those  opposing  the  curfew 
and  promoting  children's  rights.  Within  social  theory,  there  is  also  an  understanding  of 
recent  social  policy  developments  as  a  form  of  responsibilisation,  whereby  issues  of 
crime  and  safety  are  understood  to  have  filtered  down  to  the  community  and 
individual  level.  However,  the  idea  of  what  a  right  and  indeed  what  responsibility 
meant  in  the  context  of  the  CSI  was  very  different  to  the  liberal  notion  of  the  past,  and 
was  in  particular  contradictory  to  what  would  be  understood  as  a  neo-liberal  robust 
sense  of  individuality.  With  the  centrality  of  safety  over-hanging  every  relationship 
and  experience  of  the  adults  and  yo  ung  people  in  Hamilton,  the  understanding  of 
rights  as  freedoms  was  replaced  by  one  of  rights  as  protection.  Freedom  itself  was 
understood  to  be  the  freedom  from  fear,  and  from  putting  yourself  and  others  'at  risk'. 
In  the  summer  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  curfew,  Chief  Constable  John  Orr  had 
explained  that  his  approach  to  policing  was  based  on  the  'highest  possible'  level  of 
155 protection,  especially  of  children.  'Every  single  member  of  the  public',  he  argued,  'has 
the  right  to  be  safe  ...  and  feel  safe'  (Scottish  Sunday  Mail  15  June  1997).  A  month, 
before  the  CSI  was  introduced,  Scottish  Home  Affairs  Minister  Henry  McCleish 
likewise  argued  that,  'People  have  the  right  to  be  safe  and  at  peace  in  their  homes.  This 
'is  at  the  cornerstone  of  our  vision  for  a  better,  safe  and  more  prosperous  Scotland' 
(Herald  13  September  1997).  As  noted  previously,  John  Off  felt  that  the  right  to  be 
safe  was  something  that  surely  'there  can  be  no  argument  against'.  Tom  McCabe,  like 
Henry  McCleish,  had  also  spelt  out  the  significance  of  this  right  -a  right  that  if 
neglected  led  to  an  increase  in  fear  and  the  'destruction  of  communities'. 
Freedom  was  therefore  recast  as  the  freedom  to  live  without  fear  -  something  that 
local  people  needed  to  take  more  responsibility  for,  but  equally  something  that  could 
be  institutionalised  through  police  initiatives  like  the  Hamilton  curfew.  Indeed, 
through  the  prism  of  safety,  'liberty'  was  described  by  McCabe  as  something  that 
could  be  given  back  to  young  people  by  the  actions  of  the  police,  while  the  most 
positive  thing  that  politicians  could  give  to  communities  in  Hamilton  and  indeed 
across  Scotland  was  the  right  to  be  safe  and  the  freedom  from  fear.  The  principle  of 
the  right  to  be  safe  and  to  'peace  and  quiet'  was,  for  local  MP  and  Defence  Secretary 
George  Robertson,  fundamental  to  a  'democracy'  (Herald,  3  October  1997). 
The  rights  being  promoted  through  the  CSI  were  rights  to  protection  from  others  or 
from  yourself.  While  adults  were  given  the  right  to  a  quiet  life,  young  people  were, 
given  their  liberty  back  by  regulating  the  peer  pressure  they  faced  that  could  lead  them 
into  acts  that  they  would  regret  for  a  long  time  afterwards. 
The  various  children's  charities  mentioned  above,  that  opposed  the  curfew,  appealed 
to  a  number  of  clauses  within  the  UN  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  which  protected 
children's  right  to  freedom  of  association,  to  leisure,  and  to  families  to  be  treated  with 
respect.  However,  given  these  groups'  acceptance  of  the  problem  of  young  people 
being  at  risk and  of  the  abusive  nature  of  the  family,  these  arguments  were  somewhat 
contradictory  with  the  idea  of  individual  and  family  freedoms.  For  both  those  for  and 
against  the  curfew,  within  the  objectified  'at  risk'  framework  the  freedom  of  families 
to  make  their  own  decisions,  and  of  young  people  to  associate  freely,  was  to  a  degree 
156 seen  as  a  problem  in  and  of  itself.  Unregulated  activities,  after  all,  carry  within  them 
unpredictable  outcomes  and  risks  that  make  them,  within  a  precautionary  framework, 
intrinsically  unsafe. 
With  newspaper  polls  suggesting  that  the  people  of  Hamilton  were  heavily  supporting 
this  initiative,  and  with  the  understanding  of  communities  being  undermined  by  fear 
connected  to  antisocial  young  people,  those  arguing  for  these  youth  rights  were 
depicted  as  being  out  of  touch.  105  Rights  as  protection  appeared,  in  this  example,  to 
have  largely  replaced  the  understanding  and  desire  for  rights  as  freedoms.  Rather  than 
the  curfew  being  understood  as  an  extreme  measure,  it  was  those  who  argued  for  civil 
liberties  who  were  seen  as  extremists.  106 
As  Dolan  Cummings  has  argued,  in  terms  of  the  battle  for  rights  as  freedoms  against 
the  growing  use  of  surveillance  and  regulation  of  public  space  in  the  name  of  rights, 
Concerns  about  civil  liberties,  in  as  much  as  they  represent  opposition  to 
surveillance,  are  now  considered  anachronistic  and  even  damaging,  the 
preserve  of  'apologists  for  the  criminal  element'.  Instead  the  important  thing  is 
that  people  are  safe  and  that  they  feel  safe  (Cummings  1997:  4).  107 
Indeed,  whereas  the  rights  of  children  were  understood  to  be'in  conflict  with  adults' 
sense  of  safety,  the  right  to  be  safe  itself  was  presented  as  a  universal  human  right  that 
was  fundamental  to  all  the  different  groups  of  people  within  the  curfew  areas:  equality 
being  the  equal  right  to  be  and  feel  safe. 
Responsibility 
The  process  of  responsibilisation,  or  what  Garland  calls  a  responsibilisation  strategy, 
describes  a  process  whereby  techniques  and  methods  are  used  in  society  that 
incorporates  an  ever  increasing  number  of  organisations  in  crime  control  practices, 
while  transforming  the  behaviour  of  the  public  accordingly:  for  example,  publicity 
campaigns  that  target  the  public  as  a  whole  -  rather  than  engaging  simply  with 
deviants  -  to  raise  the  consciousness  of  everyone  in  relation  to  issues  of  crime  and 
157 safety  (Garland  1996:  452).  Fundamentally  having  been  developed  as  an  adaptation  to 
the  failure  of  the  welfare  state,  108  this  process,  Garland  believes,  aims  to  create  a 
I sense  of  duty'  and  to  develop  'active  citizens'  who  become  involved  in  their  own 
crime  prevention  strategy  as  individuals  and  through  partnership  work,  a  process  that 
results  in  the  'reordering  of  the  conduct  of  everyday  life'  (Garland  1996:  453-4).  Part 
of  this  process,  Flint  notes,  has  come  with  the  communitarian  attempt  by  governments 
to  'attribute  responsibility  for  community  problems  back  onto  individuals':  this  has 
developed,  Gilling  believes,  within  a  New  Labourite  version  of  Margaret  Thatcher's 
'authoritarian  populism'  (Gilling  1999:  11).  109  Governing  would  now  occur  through 
'regulated  choices  made  by  discrete  and  autonomous  actors',  human  beings  governed 
as  'individuals  -  who  are  to  be  active  in  their  own  government'  (Rose  1996:  328- 
330).  110 
The  idea  of  rights  and  especially  responsibility,  leading  up  to  the  1997  election,  was 
being  forcefully  presented  by  New  Labour  as  a  way  to,  as  Labour  leader  Tony  Blair 
put  it,  'reinvent  community  for  a  modem  age,  true  to  core  values  of  fairness,  co- 
operation  and  responsibility'  (Guardian  29  January  1996).  Both  the  neo-liberal 
emphasis  on  'choice,  personal  responsibility  [and]  control  over  one's  fate'  matched  a 
similar  focus  by  communitarians  upon  'self-responsibility  and  self  reliance  in  the  form 
of  active  citizenship  within  a  self  governing  community'  at  this  time.  As  Rose 
observed,  despite  the  ideological  differences  of  these  outlooks,  both  'utilize  similar 
images  of  the  subject  as  an  active  and  responsible  agent  in  the  securing  of  security  for 
themselves  and  those  to  whom  they  are  or  should  be  affiliated'  (Rose  1996:  335;  Flint 
2002:  624). 
The  idea  of  responsibilisation  and  responsibility  are  not  identical.  "'  However,  both 
stress,  to  some  degree,  the  role  of  the  individual  within  this  process,  often  with 
reference  to  neo-liberal  and  'market'  phraseology.  However,  as  will  be  explored 
through  the  example  of  the  curfew,  despite  the  rhetoric  of  community  and  individual 
responsibility  the  meaning  of  responsibility  had  changed.  Rather  than  individuals 
being  encouraged  to  be  'autonomous'  actors,  they  were  responsibilised  through  a 
mediating  'third  party'.  Responsibility  was  subsequently  widened  and  weakened  at  the 
same  time.  112 
158 Examining  the  'responsibilisation'  process  in  housing  management  strategies  in 
Edinburgh  and  Glasgow,  Flint  identifies  a  contradictory  development  with  this 
process  -  and  one  which  is  similarly  noted  in  respect  to  the  curfew.  Despite  housing 
association  attempts  to  make  tenants  more.  responsible  for  the  behaviour  of  themselves 
and  other  tenants,  by  involving  them  in  vetting  potential  tenants  and  organising 
meetings  to  help  parents  develop  strategies  for  regulating  the  behaviour  of  their 
children,  rather  than  'individual  responsibility'  developing,  tenants  appeared  to  become 
increasingly  reliant  on  the  housing  professionals.  In  this  way,  more  trivial  incidents 
were  reported  and  issues  that  were  seen  as  best  resolved  between  tenants  themselves 
were  handed  over  to  housing  officers  and  the  police  to  resolve.  As  Flint  notes,  one 
housing  officer  said  that,  'In  certain  areas  the  first  point  of  contact  is  often  the  police 
or  housing  association,  even  for  trivial  issues.  These  disputes  should  be  easily 
resolved  [between  neighbours]  but  aren't'  (Flint  2002:  632). 
The  curfew,  like  a  number  of  subsequent  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives  developed 
under  New  Labour,  was  largely  understood  and  indeed  presented  as  a  form  of 
responsibilisation  -  where  individuals  were  held  to  account  for  their  actions  with 
regard  to  others.  However,  while  on  the  one  hand  there  was  an  expansion  of  what 
being  responsible  meant,  what  was  meant  by  responsibility  was  diminished  at  the 
same  time.  Here  we  explore  the  claims  made  by  those  promoting  the  curfew  in 
relation  to  the  idea  of  responsibility  and  responsibilisation  to  give  an  indication  of  the 
more  fragile  and  risk  averse  ontological  understanding  of  and  relationship  being 
developed  by  the  local  authority  and  police  to  the  targeted  population  in  Hamilton. 
Responsibility  was  widened  in  relation  to  young  people,  who  were  now  expected  not 
only  to  refrain  from  criminal  acts,  but  from  behaviour  that  was  understood  to  be 
creating  fear  amongst  adults  on  the  estate.  Young  people  needed  to  be  made  aware  of 
their  responsibility  for  the  anxieties  of  elderly  adults,  and  become  seýr  aware  of  the 
risks  they  and  their  peers  faced  from  their  own  and  one  another's  actions.  At  the  same 
time  parents  were  now  expected  to  internalise  a  greater  awareness  of  risks  posed  to 
their  children  at  night,  and  to  likewise  be  aware  of  the  fear  their  teenage  sons  and 
daughters  could  instil  in  others.  In  this  respect,  both  young  people  and  parents  were 
159 'responsibilised'  based  on  an  understanding  of  themselves  and  those  around  them  as 
being  fundamentally  vulnerable. 
Within  the  'at  risk'  framework  rhetorically  promoted  by  the  police  and  local  authority, 
individual  autonomous  action  was  presented  as  being  somewhat  problematic,  as  the 
activities  of  especially  young  people  were  understood  to  involve  what  Beck  would 
describe  as  'unforeseen  circumstances'.  In  essence  a  kind  of  precautionary  principle 
regarding  actions  between  people  was  adopted  and  promoted  through  the  CSI,  a 
principle  that  placed  limited  expectations  upon  the  actions  and  responsibility  that 
individuals  were  expected  to  take  for  themselves  and  others. 
The  representation  of  adults  on  the  estates  under  curfew  was  of  potential  victims 
whose  right  to  a  quiet  life  was  being  undermined  by  rowdy  youngsters.  Understood  as 
being  both  fearful  and  vulnerable,  the  expectation  of  autonomous  action  by  these 
adults  to  resolve  the  disputes  they  had  with  these  young  people  was  noticeably 
missing  from  any  statement  by  the  police  and  the  local  authority.  In  this  respect,  rather 
than  examining  the  claims  made  by  those  promoting  or  even  opposing  the  curfew,  in  a 
sense  what  is  being  examined  here  is  what  claims,  or  more  accurately,  demands,  were 
not  made  of  the  people  in  Hillhouse. 
Within  the  prism  of  vulnerability,  risks  were  understood  to  be  best  avoided  rather  than 
confronted,  and  the  responsibility  of  adults  to  play  a  wider  role  in  their  community, 
indeed  of  taking  individual  autonomous  action  to  resolve  any  problems  they  had  - 
outside  of  locking  themselves  in  their  home  and  phoning  the  police  -  was  actively 
demoted  by  those  supporting  the  CSI.  Rather  a  relationship  of  reliance  was  developed, 
where  a  more  regular  police  presence  replaced  the  possible  activities  of  local  people  to 
deal  with  the  largely  non-criminal  nuisance  behaviour  of  young  people.  113  This 
process  encouraged  a  transformation  of  the  nature  of  relationships  between  people  on 
the  targeted  estate  and  to  help  further  formalise  previously  informal  relationships.  114 
Rather  than  a  'neo-liberal'  sense  of  individuality  being  promoted  through  the  CSI,  it 
was  a  more  universal  sense  of  the  passive,  risk-averse  individual  that  was  engaged 
with  and  encouraged.  This  can  be  seen  most  clearly  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  child 
safety. 
160 Examining  the  claims  made  about  the  CSI,  based  as  it  was  upon  the  importance  of 
child  safety,  typified  with  examples  of  young  children  'wandering  the  streets  at  night', 
it  is  significant  to  note  that  in  no  speech  or  press  release,  nor  in  any  newspaper  article, 
did  any  of  the  individuals  or  groups  promoting  the  curfew  suggest  that  the  adults 
within  the  community  itself  could  or  should  play  a,  more  active  role  in  ensuring  the 
safety  of.  children  who  were  on  the  street  at  night.  Within  a  more  fragmented  and 
individuated  climate,  the  responsibility  demanded  of  adults  was  to  themselves  and 
their  own  security  and  sense  anxiety.  The  safety  of  children  was  both  generalised  as  a 
concern  for  the  whole  community,  and  at  the  same  time  fragmented  -  with  only  the 
individual  parents  of  children  being  encouraged  to  take  an  'active'  role  and  being  held 
'responsible'  for  the  safety  of  their  own  child. 
In  respect  of  the  concerns  about  young  people  being  disorderly,  a  similarly  passive 
role  for  adults  was  promoted.  The  image  of  the  adults  on  the  curfewed  estates 
presented  by  the  council,  police,  politicians  and  the  media,  was  that  of  not  only  being 
under  siege,  but  also  being  unable  to  deal  with  the  antisocial  behaviour  of  children. 
Despite  a  recognition  by  the  police  that  elderly  adults'  fear  of  crime  and  young  people 
was  exaggerated,  this  was  not  challenged  within  the  campaign.  Rather,  this  initiative, 
like  many  others,  encouraged  local  adults  not  to  deal  with  young  people  but  instead  to 
phone  the  police.  Fear  in  this  sense  was  treated  as  an  objective  condition  that  was  not 
contestable.  Fear  was  understood  to  be  a  risk  in  and  of  itself,  responsibility  for  adults 
being  in  relation  to  their  own  physical  and  emotional  well  being  -  something  that  was 
best  protected  through  risk  avoidance  and  the  limiting  of  contact  with  young  people  at 
night.  '  15 
It  is  worth  reiterating  that  the  social  problems  being  addressed  here  were  not  related  to 
serious  violent  criminal  incidents  but  to  antisocial  young  people  and  their  nuisance 
activities.  Phoning  the  police  was  encouraged  based  on  the  fear  that  something  'may' 
happen,  and  as  such  the  police  were  being  called  into  action  not  in  relation  to  criminal 
acts  themselves,  but  based  on  the  fear  that  individuals  felt  about  a  given  situation. 
Rather  than  having  any  active  engagement  with  the  nuisance  behaviour  of  young 
161 people,  people  were  encouraged  to  hand  responsibility  to  the  police,  who  would 
intervene  on  behalf  of  the  conceptualised  'vulnerable'  individual. 
The  image  of  adults  as  being  fundamentally  vulnerable  and  in  need  of  support  was 
equally  applicable  to  the  representation  of  young  people  in  the  Hillhouse  estate,  and 
helped  to  transform  the  nature  of  'responsibility'.  Through  the  prism  of  risk  and  safety, 
young  people  were  simultaneously  held  responsible  for  the  fears  of  adults,  while  being 
represented  as  ultimately  incapable  of  being  responsible  for  themselves.  Within  this 
framework,  a  diminished  sense  of  expectations  similar  to  that  which  was  noted  above 
in  relation  to  adult  responsibility  was  promoted  in  relation  to  young  people  as  well. 
Young  people  were  represented,  especially  by  the  tabloid  press,  as  'trouble-makers'. 
However,  through  the  language  of  risk,  young  people  were  also  portrayed  by  those 
both  promoting  and  opposing  the  curfew  as  'troubled'  -  and  in  need  of  regulation  in  the 
form  of  support  and  protection  rather  than  punishment. 
Of  all  the  groups  in  Hillhouse,  the  main  one  targeted  in  terms  of  the  need  for  greater 
responsibility  was  parents.  However,  while  a  responsibilisation  process  did  occur,  in 
terms  of  encouraging  an  individual  awareness  of  risks  and  dangers  for  children  on  the 
streets  and  from  young  people  misbehaving  on  the  street,  again  the  more  informal  idea 
of  individual  responsibility  was  transformed.  In  its  place  a  more  contractual  and 
enforced  notion  of  responsibility  was  promoted,  while  at  the  same  time  the  idea  that 
parents  should  have  personal  responsibility  for  decisions  regarding  their  children  was 
diminished.  While  denouncing  irresponsible  parents,  there  was  also  a  sentiment 
expressed  by  those  promoting  the  curfew  that  parents  were  not  capable  of  controlling 
their  children  and  that  the  police,  in  this  respect,  could  act  as  a  parent  support  agency. 
Parents  were  therefore  responsibilised  in  terms  of  their  awareness  and  need  to  restrict 
the  independent  activities  of  their  children,  while  being  encouraged  to  understand  this 
form  of  responsibility  with  reference  to  the  police,  whose  advice  and  action  was  as  a 
form  of  surrogate  parent.  116 
In  Hamilton,  responsibility  was  more  of  a  pressure  put  on  parents  than  something  that 
they  were  expected  to  take  and  develop  for  themselves.  This  more  communitarian 
sense  of  responsibility  ý  or  more  accurately  this  post-liberal  understanding  of  it  (Reece 
162 2003)  -  to  some  degree  actively  undermined  the  more  classically  liberal,  and  neo- 
liberal,  idea  of  individual  responsibility.  One  commentator  noted  that,  'Another 
objective  [of  the  curfew]  is  increasing  awareness  of  parental  responsibility.  Yet 
paradoxically,  they  seem  to  be  taking  decisions,  and  the  authority  to  enforce  these 
decisions,  out  of  the  hands  of  parents'.  117 
While  promoting  the  idea  of  good  responsible  parenting  in  Hillhouse,  parents  were 
seen  as  being  responsible  for  their  children's  behaviour  in  a  way  that  broadened  the 
meaning  of  responsibility  within  the  framework  of  risk  and  safety,  while  also 
diminishing  what  responsibility  meant.  Children  and  young  people  who  were 
unsupervised'  and  potentially  at  risk,  and  adults  who  were  made  to  feel  at  risk  from 
the  presence  of  teenagers  were  all,  to  some  extent,  part  of  the  problem  of  'irresponsible 
parents'.  A  responsible  parent  was  a  risk-averse  parent,  who  was  made  aware  by  the 
local  authority  and  police. 
Part  of  the  reason  given  by  the  council  and  Strathclyde  police,  for  the  implementation 
of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  was  a  need  to  make  parents  more  responsible.  However, 
one  of  the  basic  responsibilities  of  parents  -  the  decision  about  when  and  where  to 
allow  their  children  to  go  at  night  -  was  in  part  taken  from  parents  by  the  activities  and 
promotion  campaigns  of  the  police  during  the  CSI.  An  example  of  how  this 
responsibility  became  something  decided  by  the  police  rather  than  parents  was 
demonstrated  on  Halloween  night.  For  this  night  parents  and  children  were  informed 
by  officers  going  to  all  the  schools  in  the  area  that  it  was  OK  for  children  and  young 
people  to  go  out  for  Halloween.  But  this  relaxation  of  the  curfew  came  with  a  warning 
from  a  Strathclyde  police  spokesman:  'We  would  like  all  parents  to  make  sure  that 
their  kids  are  supervised  and  go  out  that  bit  earlier  in  the  evening'  (Scotland  on 
Sunday  31  October  1997).  The  reason  for  this  'advice'from  the  police  was  that'parents 
should  be  aware,  whether  it's  Halloween  or  not,  of  the  dangers  of  allowing  their 
children  out  after  dark  without  proper  supervision'  (Hamilton  Advertiser  30  October 
1997). 
Discussing  the  use  of  curfews  in  the  UK  and  USA,  a  Sunday  Mail  reporter  noted  that 
the  use  of  curfews  was  a  useful  tool  not  only  for  the  police  but  also  for  parents,  as  'It 
163 allows  them  to  tell  children  what  they  should  do  -  not  because  they  want  to  lay  down 
the  law  but  because  it  IS  the  law'  (Sunday  Mail  15  August  1999).  Rather  than  parents 
using  their  own  authority  to  take  responsibility  for  their  children,  here  the  authority  of 
the  law  was  borrowed  by  parents  -  the  enforcement  and  ultimate  responsibility  for  the 
'in-time'of  children  becoming  that  of  the  police. 
The  population  of  Hillhouse  as  a  whole  was  encouraged  through  the  promotion  of  the 
CSI  to  change  its  behaviour,  become  more  aware  of  the  dangers  and  anxieties  that 
existed  in  its  community,  and  to  understand  itself  and  its  children  in  relation  to  the 
risks  it  faced.  Responsibility  for  the  social  problems  addressed  by  the  authorities  was 
understood  in  relation  to  parents  and  young  people,  whose  'risky'  lifestyles  and 
activities  undermined  the  security  of  the  entire  community.  This  process  of 
responsibilisation  both  widened  and  weakened  the  meaning  of  responsibility.  Through 
the  precautionary  framework  promoted,  responsibility  was  to  the  generalised  risks 
portrayed  by  the  authorities;  awareness  of  this  responsibility  to  others  meant  adopting 
a  risk-averse  approach  to  situations  and  experiences;  with  a  greater  understanding  of 
the  insecurities  of  others  and  the  self  leading  to  an  expectation  of  caution  and 
precaution.  Within  the  rhetoric  surrounding  the  curfew,  therefore,  the  notion  of  being 
1streetwise'  was  problematised  -  both  in  relation  to  children  and  young  people  -  but 
equally  in  relation  to  adults  themselves.  '  18  Being  aware  meant  being  more  fearful  and 
replaced  an  expectation  of  individual  initiative.  Understanding  of  'risk'  replaced 
action,  contact  and  confrontation  between  people.  In  essence,  the  promotion  of  the 
CSI  sponsored  a  form  of  responsibilisation  that  would  fonnalise  infonnal 
relationships,  by  developing  an  internalised  form  of  responsibility  based  on  the 
doctrine  of  safety  and  caution,  and  by  encouraging  individuals  permanently  to  mediate 
their  relationships  with  others  through  the  activities  of  the  authorities. 
Therapeutic  legitimation 
The  existence  of  fear  and  a  sense  of  vulnerability  across  the  UK  is  often  interpreted  as 
evidence  of  growing  social  problems  facing  the  public.  However,  as  Furedi  notes: 
164 Fears,  which  are  an  expression  ofpsychic  vulnerability,  are  often  misleadingly 
seen  as  the  product  of  a  world  that  faces  unprecedented  dangers 
...  Public 
perceptions  of  new  risks  and  dangers  are  rooted  in  the  sense  ofpowerlessness 
circulated  through  therapeutic  culture.  This  emotional  script  helps  frame 
perceptions  independent  of  any  risk  -  invariably  they  tend  to  overwhelm  any 
objective  calculation  of  risk  (Furedi  2004:  134). 
This  sense  of  vulnerability  had  increasingly  become  a  basis  for  police  action  in  late 
twentieth  century  life.  As  Garland  argued,  'The  police  now  hold  themselves  out  less 
as  a  crime-fighting  force  than  as  a  responsive  public  service,  aiming  to  reduce  fear, 
disorder  and  incivility  and  to  take  account  of  community  feelings  in  setting 
enforcement  priorities'  (Garland  2001). 
The  emphasis  so  far  within  this  chapter  has  been  upon  the  issue  of  safety  and  the 
contradictory  process  of  responsibilisation  promoted  through  the  CSI.  Within  this 
engagement  with  the  vulnerable  public  a  key  justificatory  framework  took  on  a 
therapeutic  form.  The  emotion  of  fear  was  understood  to  be  central  to  the  problems  of 
individuals  and  to  the  community  as  a  whole,  and  the  attempt  to  relate  to  and  manage 
these  fears  was  engaged  with.  Ultimately,  the  success  of  the  initiative  itself  was 
understood  by  the  police  and  politicians  in  relation  not  to  the  reduction  of  antisocial 
behaviour  itself,  but  more  directly  in  relation  to  the  fear  of  the  public.  Fear  in  this 
respect  was  understood  as  a  universal  emotion  felt  by  the  people  of  Hillhouse  - 
something  that  had  a  sense  of  permanence  and  that  formed  the  basis  of  the 
relationships  between  people  on  the  estate  and  consequently  provided  the  foundation 
upon  which  a  connection  could  be  made  between  the  authorities  and  the  public.  Fears 
for  and  of  children  and  young  people  were  both  related  to  and  validated  in  the 
development  of  the  curfew,  and  it  was  this  generalised  sentiment  of  fear  -  rather  than 
the  specific  anxieties  regarding  particular  activities  of  young  people  and  children  -  that 
was  being  engaged  with. 
The  notion  of  a  therapy  culture  relates  not  to  the  specific  activities  of  therapists,  but  to 
a  cultural  elevation  of  the  significance  of  the  emotional  aspect  of  individuals  -  and  in 
particular  to  an  acute  orientation  to  the  public  as  being  vulnerable  to  emotional 
165 damage.  Through  this  therapeutic  framework,  an  orientation  towards  the  people  of 
Hillhouse  was  established,  within  which  previously  understood  social  problems  were 
reinterpreted  as  emotional  ones  and  new  social  problems  -  like  antisocial  behaviour  - 
were  understood  to  be  problematic  with  reference  to  the  emotional  reaction  of  others. 
Through  the  therapeutic  gaze  of  the  authorities,  social  problems  were  reformulated 
and  the  meaning  offreedom  was  redefined  to  mean  the  freedom  from  feeling  fearful. 
'Removing  fear'  was  the  way  to  'return  liberties',  and  the  'number  one  priority'  of  the 
curfew  was  to  ensure  the  entire  community  felt  safe.  At  the  same  time,  the 
responsibilisation  process  attempted  to  engage  with  the  fear  that  parents  had  for  their 
children  -  and  specific  threats,  like  that  of  paedophiles,  were  promoted  as  an  issue  that 
should  be  of  concern  for  those  parents  who  allowed  their  children  out  at  night. 
Similarly  young  people  themselves  were  engaged  with  and  encouraged  to  support  the 
curfew,  based  on  their  own  potential  insecurities  regarding  other  young  people. 
Crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  were  understood  to  be,  and  projected  as,  social 
problems  with  reference  to  the  individual's  sense  of  'well  being'  and  the  community 
sense  of  confidence  established  through  a  generalised  mood  of  safety.  '  19  The  basis  and 
reconstitution  of  the  community  in  this  respect  related  to  the  emotional  self  - 
something  to  be  engaged  with  and  reformed  by  the  authorities.  The  common  'value' 
engaged  with  through  the  CSI  was  the  fragmented  individual's  feeling  of  anxiety. 
Moving  young  people  away  from  areas  where  adults  are  concerned  about  their 
behaviour  may  not  be  a  new  development.  However,  the  heightened  significance 
given  to  the  insecurities  of  adults  -  and  indeed  to  the  community  as  a  whole  -  reflected 
a  qualitative  elevation  adopted  by  both  politicians  and  the  police  to  the  concern  with 
the  emotional  reactions  and  fears  of  adults.  120 
Transformed  from  individual  cases  of  criminal  or  antisocial  behaviour  into  a  concern 
with  a  general  sense  of  anxiety  on  these  estates  the  'social  problem'  of,  as  one 
newspaper  labelled  it,  'streets  of  fear',  was  engaged  with  (Herald  21  October  1997). 
This  existing  understanding  of  communities,  indeed  of  society  more  broadly,  meant 
that  any  example  of  nuisance  behaviour  of  young  people  was  interpreted  as  the  basis 
for  this  universalised  sense  of  fear. 
166 The  fear  of  crime  has  been  an  issue  in  criminology  and  politics  in  the  UK  from  the 
1980s.  However,  this  fear  was  both  contested  and  less  central  to  the  concern  about 
crime  and  social  problems  affecting  communities.  As  the  following  chapter  will  show, 
there  were  unquestionably  issues  regarding  youth  drinking  and  vandalism  in  the  area, 
and  as  the  police  explained  the  curfew  had  been  introduced  in  part  because  of 
complaints  by  adults.  The  question  addressed  here,  however,  is  not  the  myth  or  reality 
of  the  antisocial  activities  of  young  people  in  the  targeted  areas  -  although  as  the 
police  admitted,  Hillhouse  was  not  an  area  of  particularly  high  crime  rates  -  but  rather 
the  justificatory  basis  of  the  initiative,  which  was  almost  exclusively  focused  upon  the 
sense  of  anxiety  felt  by  the  public. 
Within  the  framework  of  being  'at  risk',  fear  was  itself  constituted  as  a  risk  . 
121  Fear 
became  an  essential  way  of  understanding  the  targeted  communities  and  the 
individuals  within  them,  and  regardless  of  the  objective  basis  of  this  fear,  its  very 
existence  was  the  social  problem  that  was  seen  as  needing  to  be  addressed. 
In  Hillhouse  this  fear  was  understood  to  be  a  problem  for  the  whole  community,  each 
member  of  it  subsequently  being  seen  as  a  potential  victim  of  crime  but  also  an 
existing  'victim'  of  behaviour  that  created  a  dark  cloud  of  fear.  122  With  this  almost 
mystical  sense  of  fear,  which  was  understood  to  be  hovering  above  communities,  the 
basis  for  police  intervention  related  to  criminal  acts  was  transformed  into  a  more 
subjectively  constituted  defence  of  the  public's  emotional  well  being.  This 
engagement  with  the  sense  of  vulnerability  of  the  public  thus  provided  the 
justificatory  basis  for  the  curfew.  123 
In  a  sense  the  community  being  engaged  with  was  a  community  of  vulnerable 
individuals,  a  community  victimised  by  fear.  This  sense  of  victimhood  was 
understood  to  be  the  common  bond  between  individuals  -  and  the  basis  of  state 
engagement  and  legitimation.  As  Garland  explains: 
The  symbolic  figure  of  the  victim  has  taken  on  a  life  of  its  own  [and  has 
become] 
...  a  new  social  fact.  The  victim  is  no  longer  an  unfortunate  citizen 
167 who  has  been  on  the  receiving  end  of  a  criminal  harm,  and  whose  concerns  are 
subsumed  within  the  'public  interest'...  The  victim  is  now,  in  a  certain  sense,  a 
much  more  representative  character,  whose  experience  is  taken  to  be  common 
and  collective,  rather  than  individual  and  atypical  (Garland  2002:  11). 
Conclusion 
The  aim  of  this  chapter  has  not  been  to  show  what  actually  happened  with  the 
introduction  of  the  CSI  in  areas  of  Hamilton.  Rather  it  has  most  centrally  been  an 
examination  of  the  claims  made  and  the  justificatory  basis  upon  which  the  initiative 
was  promoted. 
As  noted  in  the  first  chapter;  the  cultural  context  within  which  the  curfew  developed 
was  one  in  which  fear  had  become  a  more  ever-present  framework  of  influence,  one 
that  impacted  on  not  only  a  sense  of  global  threats,  but  equally  in  relation  to  personal 
interactions  between  people.  'Moral'  panics  continue 
,d 
to  have  some  influence  at  this 
time;  but  more  generally  'anxieties'  about  social  problems  were  understood  and 
discussed  within  the  'amoral'  discourse  of  safety.  Within  this  climate,  the  tendency 
was  for  previously  discussed  issues  of  deviance  and  disorder  to  be  understood  not 
within  the  'dog  collar'  traditional  moral  framework,  but  within  a  newly  formed 
morality  -  or  amorality  -  of  safety. 
The  'social  problems'  related  to  by  the  curfew  were  predicated  on  the  previously 
problematised  issues  of  child  safety,  the  'panic'  about  a  'yob  culture,  and  the 
problematisation  of  relations  between  young  people,  which  had  resulted  in  the 
emergence,  for  example,  of  the  social  problem  of  'bullying'  and  the  developing  issue 
of  'peer  pressure'.  Community  safety  was  becoming  an  organising  framework  for 
local  authority  intervention  into  communities  at  this  time,  and  the  development  of 
initiatives  and  practices  like  the  vetting  of  youth  workers  and  the  emergence  of  CCTV 
and  security  around  schools  was  emerging  at  this  time  and  normalising  the  basis  of 
safety  as  a  framework  for  organising  everyday  life. 
168 Structural  changes  at  the  time  had  also  helped  to  develop  a  more  fragmented  society, 
with  the  decline  of  solidarity  and  collective  organisations  accompanying  changes  in 
the  family.  This  process  of  individuation  helped  to  strengthen  the  sense  of 
vulnerability  across  society  -  something  that  Furedi  argues  was  reinforced  by  a  lack  of 
clarity  about  what  society's  values  should  be  (Furedi  2002:  68). 
The  justificatory  framework  for  the  CSI  was  consequently  based  around  safety  -  with 
rights,  responsibilities,  freedom,  liberty  and  what  it  meant  to  be  a  good  citizen  or 
parent  all  relating  to  this  issue.  As  Furedi  noted  at  the  time  in  hisý  opening  line  to 
Culture  of  Fear,  'Safety  has  become  the  fundamental  value  of  our  time'  (Furedi  2002: 
1). 
The  novelty  of  the  CSI,  compared  with  previous  Strathclyde  Police  Zero  Tolerance 
type  initiatives  that  more  overtly  targeted  'spitting  yobs'  (Orr  1997:  110),  was  the 
incorporation  of  the  issue  of  child  safety  as  the  dominant  rhetorical  theme  -  at  least  at 
a  local  level.  This  double-edged  focus  on  antisocial  behaviour  and  child  safety  can  be 
seen  as  a  synthesis  of  'traditional  conservative  authoritarianism  with  leftist  intrusion 
into  the  affairs  of  the  individual'  (Furedi  2002:  103).  124  Whereas  politicians  engaged 
more  with  the  fear  of  adults  and  the  issue  of  crime  itself,  the  local  police  to  some 
extent  avoided  the  more  exclusionary  and  confrontational  language  of  'yobs'  by 
discussing  the  young  people  in  Hillhouse  as  victims  who  were  vulnerable.  In  this 
respect,  the  rhetoric  of  the  local  police  who  emphasised  the  issue  of  child  safety  was 
more  'inclusive',  and  a  certain  unity  of  purpose  with  the  community  could  be 
established  through  a  more  victim-centred  approach  to  the  problems  in  Hillhouse.  As 
Best  notes,  'As  long  as  we  remain  focused  on  victims,  disagreement  vanishes  ...  [which 
helps]  explain  why  the  new-victim  movements  tend  to  gloss  over  the  victimizers'.  The 
problem  being  that,  'Once  we  start  identifying  victimizers,  we  are  back  in  the  messy, 
divisive  business  of  trying  to  both  understand  and  blame  deviants.  As  long  as  we  stay 
focused  on  the  victims,  we  can  hope  to  mobilize  consensus'(Best  1999:  140-1).  The 
basis  of  consensus  was  therefore  achievable  only  through  the  rhetorical  association 
with  victims  on  the  estate  -  but  the  role  of  the  police  could  never  be  just  to  empathise 
with  these  victims,  they  were  expected  to  act. 
169 Despite  the  child  safety  rhetoric,  as  we  will  see  in  the  next  chapter,  the  real  concerns 
of  local  people  that  had  helped  form  the  curfew,  and  the  reality  of  the  action  of  the 
police  in  practice,  were  largely  related  to  the  issue  of  'youth'  and  their  antisocial 
behaviour.  Young  people  still  needed  to  be  moved  off  the  street. 
Whereas  the  Labour  leadership  was  more  engaged  by  the  fear  of  crime  as  the  issue  of 
concern,  the  local  council  and  especially  the  local  police  appeared  to  be  more 
apprehensive  about  the  negative  connotations  of  a  curfew  in  their  area.  However, 
despite  these  differences,  the  framework  of  vulnerability  and  the  centrality  of  the  issue 
of  safety  underlay  both  approaches. 
Initially  examined  in  terms  of  a  moral  panic,  with  reference  to  the  first  chapter  of  this 
thesis,  the  curfew  should,  in  retrospect,  more  accurately  be  understood  as  a 
development  based  upon  the  emergence  of  a  state  of  amoral  anxieties.  Safety  rather 
than  an  alternative  moral  outlook  or  values  underpinned  the  initiative,  even  in  relation 
to  the  family.  The  only  'value'  adhered  to  was  that  of  safety,  a  safe  parent  being  a  good 
parent.  The  engagement  with  the  community  thus  related  to  its  general  sense  of 
anxiety,  with  the  role  of  the  local  authority  being  to  help  the  public  become  aware  of 
and  change  its  behaviour  in  relation  to  risk  and  fear.  Discussing  the  psychotherapeutic 
emphasis  on  individuals'  feelings  and  emotions  in  the  formation  of  communities, 
communitarian  Amatal  Etzioni  notes  that,  'Expressive  individualism  assumes  that  the 
proper  focus  is  on  personal  psychological  well-being  rather  than  social  responsibility, 
not  to  mention  comniitment  to  values  or  raising  a  moral  voice'  (Etzioni  1997:  135).  In 
this  respect,  the  focus  upon  the  emotional  aspect  of  the  fear  of  crime  and  the 
therapeutic  engagement  with  the  public's  feelings  of  anxiety,  despite  the  promotion  of 
'community',  can  be  seen  as  something  that  was  neither  morally  (or  politically)  based, 
or  connected  to  a  wider  sense  of  social  responsibility. 
Similarly,  with  reference  to  the  emphasis  placed  upon  the  victimised  nature  of  the 
community,  EtziOni  also  believes  that  the  systematic  understanding  of  victimology 
means  that,  'While  social  systems  factors  are  always  important,  and  sometimes 
dominate  the  situation,  when  they  are  used  to  imply  that  the  victims  have  no  choice  in 
the  matter,  which  exempts  the  actors  from  moral  responsibility  for  their  acts,  the 
170 notion  becomes  highly  damaging  to  the  moral  voice'  (Etzioni  1997:  137).  In  the 
discussion  about  young  people  facing  'peer  pressure',  emphasis  was  placed  upon  the 
victim-based  conception  of  these  young  people  -  something  that,  by  implying  a  lack  of 
choice,  potentially  undermined  the  notion  of  responsibility  that  the  council 
simultaneously  promoted. 
Without  the  'vulnerable'  label  being  attached  to  parents,  there  was  a  level  of 
responsibility  expected  of  them  in  Hillhouse.  However,  even  here,  to  a  degree,  the 
expectation  of  their  autonomous  accountability  was  limited  by  an  initiative  that 
presumed  a  certain  degree  of  support  was  needed  from  the  police  for  parents  to  control 
and  care  for  their  children.  125 
A  key  element  in  the  defining  of  moral  panics  has  been  the  argument  that  the  reaction 
to  a  social  problem  is  disproportionate.  As  will  be  argued  in  the  following  chapter, 
especially  in  terms  of  the  issue  of  child  safety,  this  was  clearly  the  case  in  Hillhouse  - 
and  even  at  the  level  of  the  problems  related  to  young  people,  these  were  generally  of 
a  nature  more  accurately  described  as  nuisance  behaviour.  However,  at  the  more 
abstract  and  general  level  of  engaging  with  fear  within  the  community,  and  relating  to 
a  more  universalised  sense  of  vulnerability,  the  curfew  was  connecting  to  a  real  state 
of  mind.  126 
Despite  police  statements  explaining  that  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  was  not 
especially  high  within-the  targeted  areas,  by  relating  to  the  broader  sense  of  fear  in 
these  areas  through  the  discourse  of  risk  and  safety  there  appeared  at  the  same  time  to 
be  a  necessary  exaggeration  of  the  social  problems  being  addressed.  Instances  of 
nuisance  behaviour,  helped  in  part  by  the  language  of  'antisocial  behaviour',  gave  a 
more  problematic  and  ever-present  significance  to  occasional  events. 
Despite  the  aim  of  the  CSI  being  in  part  to  develop  a  sense  of  community,  the 
justificatory  rhetoric  of  the  authorities  related  more  directly  to  the  fragmented  and 
vulnerable  individual,  than  to  any  sense  of  commonality  -  except,  that  is,  with  the 
'common'  issue  of  individual  safety  and  the  desire  to  feel  safe.  In  the  process  of 
engaging  with  people  in  this  way,  rather  than  individuals  reengaging  with  one  another, 
171 the  connecting  framework  implicitly  being  established  was  between  the  political 
authorities  and  the  individuated  public. 
It  is  at  this  level  that  the  meaning  of  responsibilisation  should  be  understood  -  less  as  a 
promoti6n  of  individual  autonomous  action,  than  as  an  encouragement  of  caution  and 
an  expectation  of  reliance  upon  third  party  intervention  to  help  manage  all  the 
relationships  between  the  people  in  11illhouse.  127 
Despite  the  promotion  of  the  CSI  as  a  community-led  initiative  with  community 
participation,  as  discussed  above,  community  action  was  at  no  stage  promoted  in 
terms  of  individual  activity  to  resolve  issues  of  antisocial  behaviour  or  even  child 
safety.  In  essence,  the  initiative  in  this  respect  not  only  engaged  with  a  general  sense 
of  fear  and  desire  for  safety,  but  encouraged  all  on  the  estate  to  stop  acting  themselves 
to  help  ensure  safety  was  maintained.  Within  an  'at  risk'  framework,  where  all 
independent  interactions  where  understood  to  be  potentially  dangerous,  rather  than 
encouraging  self-activity  in  the  construction  of  the  community,  the  aim  of  the  CSI  was 
to  encourage  'self  limitation'  (Beck  1996:  29).  The  extent  to  which  this  developed  in 
practice  will  be  explored  in  the  next  chapter. 
172 Chapter  7:  Curfew  Interviews: 
Analysing  the  Culture  of  Fear 
Hamilton's  pioneering  child  safety  initiative  has  won  a  major  community  award.  The 
project,  which  has  attracted  attention  from  asJar  afield  as  Japan  and  Australia,  won  a 
top  prize  in  the  1998  Crime  Prevention  and  Community  Safety  Awards,  sponsored  by 
insurance  giants  CGU.  The  awards  were  presented  last  Thursday  by  Home  Secretary 
Jack  Straw  and  Martyn  Lewis,  presenter  of  the  BBC  television  programme 
"Crimebeat"  (Hamilton  Advertiser  15  October  1998). 
Introduction 
In  the  previous  chapter,  the  claims  made  about  the  CSI  and  the  legitimation  process, 
were  explored.  Here,  the  actual  impact  of  the  curfew  on  the  targeted  estate  of 
Hillhouse  is  examined  in  detail,  and  the  extent  to  which  this  initiative  could  be  said  to 
be  simply  attempting  to  resolve  'real'  social  problems  that  the  public  were  concerned 
about  is  explored.  Through  the  interviews  with  young  people  and  adults  in  Hillhouse, 
the  'real'  concerns  as  opposed  to  those  promoted  by  the  authorities  are  contrasted, 
while  the  more  pervasive  culture  of  fear  is  studied  and  related  to  the  point  of 
connection  being  made  between  the  local  authority  and  individuals  on  the  estate.  In 
essence  the  'real'  or  objective  risks  that  faced  people  in  Hillhouse  are  here  contrasted 
to  the  subjective  sense  of  anxiety  that  impinged  upon  not  only  how  individuals 
understood  others,  but  also  how  they  understood  themselves.  It  was  this  cultural  sense 
of  insecurity,  rather  than  any  specific  'social  problem'  in  the  area,  that,  it  is  argued,  can 
be  understood  as  the  basis  of  the  initiative  itself  and  the  framework  around  which  the 
authorities  attempted  to  reengage  the  more  risk-averse  public. 
What  social  problems? 
From  police  reports,  media  coverage,  and  interviews  with  adults  and  young  people  in 
the  areas  of  Hamilton  targeted  for  the  curfew,  there  were  clearly  some  probl5ms  of 
crime  and  disorder.  There  was  in  Hillhouse,  like  many  areas,  a  certain  problem  of 
173 crime,  drunken  behaviour,  graffiti  and  vandalism,  while  some  children  and  young 
people  were  out  on  the  streets  at  night  'after  dark'.  In  this  respect  there  were  some  'real' 
problems  that  were  being  related  to  by  the  police  and  local  authority  that  led  to  the 
introduction  of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative. 
However  to  understand  the  introduction  of  the  curfew  in  this  area,  we  must  recall  that 
for  'problems'  to  become  'social  problems',  at  a  particular  time  and  with  reference  to 
wider  social,  cultural  and  political  issues,  requires  the  existence  of  claimsmakers  who 
draw  attention  to  these  issues.  As  well as  the  reported  complaints  by  local  adults  about 
the  antisocial  behaviour  in  their  area,  which  suggests  an  element  of  grassroots  support 
for  the  initiative,  we  must  also  situate  the  CSI  within  the  context  of  zero  tolerance 
policing,  the  politicisation  of  antisocial  behaviour,  and  the  fear  of  crime. 
Unlike  past  panics  about  youth  crime  that  were  promoted  by  conservative  groups  and 
often  dampened  down  by  key  politicians,  the  concerns  about  'unsafe'  young  people  in 
Hamilton  can  be  seen  as  something  that  was  promoted  by  the  local  authority  and 
supported  by  the  government.  Zero  tolerance  policing,  as  formerly  discussed,  did  not 
only  focus  police  attention upon  minor  crimes,  but  also  directly  related  petty  criminal 
acts,  and  even  non-criminal  acts,  to  serious  criminality  and  disorder  (Off  1997). 
Likewise,  by  1997,  the  'fear  of  crime'had  become  a  widely  recognised  social  problem, 
a  problem  that  New  Labour  had  helped  to  promote.  The  fear  of  crime  had  also  been 
connected  not  only  with  crime  but  also  antisocial  behaviour,  with  the  fear  of  crime 
across  society  being  understood  to  be  undermi 
I ning  communities.  128  In  this  respect  the 
development  of  the  curfew  in  Hamilton  should  be  understood  as  relating  to  'real' 
problems  of  the  behaviour  of  young  people,  but  also,  and  most  importantly,  to'a 
broader  political  and  policing  agenda  that  elevated  the  nuisance  behaviour  of  young 
people  into  a  significant  social  problem  for  society  as  a  whole. 
With  this  in  mind  the  actual  impact  of  the  curfew  is  explored  below  to  assess  the 
similarities,  but  also  the  differences,  in  the  outlook  and  understanding  of  local  people 
in  the  area  of  Hillhouse  towards  the  problems  being  promoted  and  addressed  by  the 
CSI.  For  example,  were  the  adults  in  Hillhouse  living  in  'streets  of  fear'  and  was  this 
related  to  the  behaviour  of  young  people?  Were  children  unsafe  and  parents 
174 irresponsible  in  their  dealings  with  these  children?  Were  young  people  'at  risle  from 
their  peers?  Were  they  also  living  in  fear  and  did  they  therefore  support  the  curfew,  as 
the  police  suggested?  Or,  as  the  children's  rights  groups  maintained,  were  the  police 
harassing  these  young  people  and  creating  divisions  between  teenagers  and  the  police? 
As  will  be  explored,  the  issue  of  fear  and  concerns  about  safety  were  'real'  in  terms  of 
the  existence  of  concerns  by  local  people  -  although  these  concerns  did  not  always 
match  those  of  the  authorities.  The  basis  of  these  concerns,  while  relating  in  part  to  the 
local  issues  of  young  people's  behaviour,  also  appeared  to  be  linked  to  far  broader 
social  issues  than  the  initiative  suggested.  Finally,  with  reference  to  the  Hamilton 
Advertiser  story  above,  the  reasons  why  the  CSI  was  understood  to  be  such  a  great 
success  will  bre  addressed  with  particular  reference  to  the  political  concern  with  the 
'loss  of  a  sense  of  community'  and  the  need  for  public  participation  in  government 
initiatives. 
The  lone  voice  of  opposition 
The  typical  example  used  in  justifying  the  curfew,  before,  during  and  after  the  initial 
trial  curfew  period,  was  that  of  young  children  wandering  the  streets  late  at  night. 
Being  'at  risk',  these  children  were  apparently  both  unsafe  and  helping  to  make  the 
community  feel  unsafe  because  of  their  antisocial  activities.  This  group  was  important 
for  the  police  in  their  attempt  to  depict  the  initiative  as  being  both  caring  in  relation  to 
children  and  also  connected  to  the  issue  of  irresponsible  parenting.  This  age  group 
also  took  on  a  greater  significance  in  relation  to  legislation  dealing  with  antisocial 
behaviour  in  1998,  with  the  introduction  of  the  Crime  and  Disorder  Act.  This  Act,  one 
of  the  new  Labour  government's  first  major  pieces  of  law  and  order  legislation 
included  a  provision  for  local  authorities  across  England  and  Wales  to  introduce  a 
curfew  for  under-  I  0-year-olds  between  the  hours  of  9pm  and  6am.  The  Hamilton 
experience  was  directly  connected  to  the  development  of  this  legislation,  and  used  as 
an  example  of  how  curfews  can  have  a  positive  impact  upon  areas  (Independent,  28 
September  1998).  The  justification  for  the  Labour  government's  curfew  legislation 
targeted  at  areas  and  individuals  was  more  overtly  geared  towards  the  problem  of 
175 antisocial  children,  rather  than  child  safety,  as  the  Sunday  Times  explained  with 
reference  to  'a  seven  year  old  thief,  who  had  been  arrested  more  than  ten  times': 
The  seven  year  old  is  just  one  of  hundreds  of  problem  under-  I  Os  across  Britain 
who  police  and  local  authorities  are  considering  placing  under  curfew  using 
the  new  law.  Such  children  -cannot  currently  be  prosecuted  for  their  crimes  as 
they  are  below  the  age  of  criminal  responsibility  (Sunday  Times  6  September 
1998). 
In  Hamilton,  typical  examples  of  the  'social  problems'  the  police  were  addressing  were 
given  to  the  press  a  year  after  the  curfew  was  launched.  These  included  'a  four  year 
old  boy  found  cycling  on  waste  ground  some  distance  from  his  home.  His 
grandmother  who  had  been  baby-sitting  had  not  known  where  he  was'.  Another 
example  was  given  of  two  young  girls,  'one  of  them  inadequately  clothed',  selling 
papers  outside  a  bingo  hall  (Hamilton  Advertiser  22  October  1998).  These  'extreme' 
examples  were  relatively  rare,  but  helped  the  typification  process,  presenting  the 
curfew  as  something  that  was  needed  to  keep  young  children  safe. 
These  examples  occasionally  appeared  in  the  Scottish  national  press.  129  However,  in 
the  local  newspaper  there  was  one  occasion  when  a  police  story  about  a  four-year-old 
found  on  the  streets  after  9prn  was  challenged  by  a  parent.  The  Hamilton  Advertiser 
headline,  'Angry  Mum  Slams  Curfew  Claims',  gave  one  of  the  few  media  stories 
coming  from  someone  who  had  experienced  the  police  action  and  opposed  it.  In  so 
doing,  the  somewhat  faceless  and  one-sided  image  of  'at  risle  children  and 
'irresponsible  parents'  was  undermined,  and  in  its  place  a  story  of  everyday  life 
emerged.  June  Golder,  the  mother  of  the  four-year-old  Jamie  explained  that: 
This  gives  the  impression  that  I'm  a  mother  who  doesn't  care  about  my  weans 
but  that  couldn't  be  further  from  the  truth.  We  had  been  out  all  day  and  we 
arrived  home  at  the  back  of  eight,  Jamie  said  he  wanted  to  play  out  with  his 
friends.  I  told  him  he  could  play  out  for  10  minutes  then  come  in.  I  was  in  my 
front  room  and  I  could  see  him  from  the  window  (Hamilton  Advertiser,  6 
November  1997). 
176 This  example  is  noteworthy,  not  simply  because  it  was  unusual,  but  because  the 
potential  issue  130  of  parents'  rights  reflected  in  this  case  had  no  wider  public 
expression  or  representation  in  any  organised  opposition  to  the  curfew.  This  is  not  to 
argue  that  there  was  a  coherent  desire  or  widespread  opposition  to  this  initiative  -  but 
the  lack  of  an  existing  framework  for  questioning  its  introduction,  or  for  allowing 
expressions  of  dissent  cohered  around  issues,  meant  that  where  concerns  did  exist  they 
could  take  no  public  form  except  as  a  lone  voice  within  the  local  press.  131 
Social  problems:  myth  or  reality? 
The  curfew  was  presented  as  something  that  the  community  wanted,  not  only  because 
of  concerns  about  antisocial  youth,  but  also,  as  council  leader  Tom  McCabe  had 
argued,  because  local  people  were  also  concerned  about  the  safety  of  young  people. 
The  couplet  of  safety  for  children  and  safety  of  adults  from  children  was  central  to  this 
initiative.  The  police  had  similarly  presented  the  CS1  as  an  initiative  that  was  largely 
introduced  because  of  concerns  about  young  children  'wandering  the  streets  late  at 
night',  putting  themselves  at  risk  and  potentially  getting  up  to  'no  good'.  However,  in 
the  Scottish  Office  research  Evaluation  of  the  Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative,  a 
research  document  based  on  an  examination  of  the  impact  of  the  curfew  in  its  first  six 
month  trial  period,  it  was  noted  following  three  group  discussions  with  adults  and 
young  people  that: 
All  three  groups  questioned  the  justification  for  deploying  resources  into  the 
HCSI  [Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative]  when  they  felt  there  was  no  real 
evidence  that  under  10s  were  causing  crime  or  disorder  problems  on  the 
streets,  especially  not  in  Hillhouse  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  60). 
One  of  the  groups  also  questioned  whether  the  CSI  could  be  expected  to  tackle 
problems  such  as  'bad  parenting'  and  change  the  attitudes  of  'one  or  two  irresponsible 
parents  who  let  their  children  out  on  the  streets  late  at  night'  (McGallagly  et  a11998: 
60). 
177 MY  research  with  children  and  adults  on  the  estate  also  raises  questions  about  the 
necessity  of  a  curfew  based  upon  the  'social  problem'  of  young  children  'wandering  the 
streets  at  night'.  Hillhouse  Community  Council  chair  Joe  Parfery,  for  example,  was 
unaware  of  any  great  safety  problem,  especially  from  strangers  and  paedophiles.  132  He 
was  equally  unaware  of  any  great  number  of  young  children  wandering  the  streets  at 
night.  He  explained:  'There  are  a  few  children  who  stay  out,  especially  during  the 
summer,  till  about  10.30pm  but  not  many.  But  what's  wrong  with  that  anyway?  I  used 
to  play  out  all  the  time  when  I  was  a  kid'. 
As  well  as  the  Scottish  Office  research  finding  that  local  people  felt  that  the  issue  of 
antisocial  under-  10-year-olds  was  not  an  issue,  and  that  the  question  of  irresponsible 
parents  letting  their  young  children  stay  out  late  only  applied  to  'one  or  two'  people,  it 
also  found  that  there  was  no  evidence  of  wider  dangers  to  children  in  the  Hillhouse 
area.  The  sununary  of  the  research  findings  noted  that: 
Due  to  the  small  number  of  children  who  were  the  victims  of  crime  or  road 
traffic  accidents  in  the  6  month  period  prior  to  and  during  the  period  covered 
by  the  CSI,  it  was  not  possible  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  initiative  on  such 
incidents  (McGallagly  et  al  1998a:  3). 
In  other  words,  the  statistical  impact  of  the  curfew  on  the  safety  of  children  was  found 
to  be  impossible  to  assess  due  to  the  limited  safety  issues  that  existed.  Where 
comparisons  were  made  with  Hillhouse  and  a  control  area  by  the  Scottish  Office 
research,  with  reference  to  crime  victimisation  rates  it  was  found  that  the  CSI  'had 
little  impact  in  terms  of  reducing  child  victimisation'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  26). 
Finally,  with  reference  to  the  229  curfew  interventions  made  by  the  police  between 
October  1997  and  April  1998,  this  research  found  that  '20  [or  9%]  were  directly 
related  to  child  safety  issues'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  17).  Here  again  the  'ten  year  old 
child  ...  selling  newspapers',  who  was  'inappropriately  dressed',  was  used  as  an 
example  of  the  child  safety  approach  of  the  police. 
Despite  the  claims  made  by  the  local  authority  and,  especially,  by  the  police,  that  the 
CSI  was  being  introduced  to  protect  under-10-year-olds  from  the  irresponsible  parents 
178 who  allowed  their  children  to  wander  the  streets  at  night,  the  extent  of  this  problem, 
the  level  of  dangers  present,  and  the  impact  the  curfew  had  on  the  safety  of  children, 
are  all  questioned  by  the  above  findings. 
Cotton  wool  kids? 
Although  within  the  promotion  of  the  CSI  the  police  and  local  authority  were  careful 
not  to  argue  that  the  targeted  curfew  estates  were  'problem  areas'  that  were  'getting 
worse',  the  political  climate,  with  its  increasing  focus  on  antisocial  behaviour,  the 
development  of  zero  tolerance  policing,  and  the  understanding  of  the  growing  fear  of 
crime,  all  meant  that  the  curfew  was  interpreted  as  an  initiative  set  up  to  deal  with 
growing  social  problems  associated  with  young  people  out  on  the  streets  at  night. 
Indeed  one  could  argue  that  the  very  introduction  of  a  curfew  in  Hamilton,  which  was 
complemented  with  UK-wide  curfew  legislation,  was  based  on  an  understanding  of 
communities  riddled  with  problems  of  crime  and  disorder  -  problems  that  were  getting 
worse. 
However,  whatever  the  myth  and  reality  of  these  perceived  social  problems,  there  was 
also  a  growing  body  of  research  suggesting  that  children,  rather  than  wandering  the 
streets  at  night,  were  in  fact  having  their  free  time  increasingly  regulated  by  parents.  133 
This  research  found  that:  the  time  children  were  allowed  out  was  decreasing,  as  was 
the  distance  they  were  allowed  to  travel;  children  could  play  in  fewer  places  and  could 
travel  less  far  from  home  than  previous  generations;  there  was  a  growth  of  children 
whose  parents  would  define  them  as  'indoor  kids'  as  opposed  to  'outdoor  kids';  and  that 
children  were  engaged  in  more  supervised  as  opposed  to  unsupervised  activities. 
Research  by  Gill  Valentine  and  John  McKendrick  sums  up  the  trends  being  identified 
by  this  research.  With  reference  to  the  growing  regulatiod  of  children's  free  time,  they 
noted  that: 
In  other  words,  a  significant  amount  of  children's  outdoor  play  is  taking  place 
in  'private'  space  [or  regulated  space],  rather  than  'public'  space,  so  that 
although children  are  spending  a  considerable  proportion  of  their  leisure  time 
179 'out-doors'  most  have  very  limited  opportunities  to  play  in  or  explore  the 
public  environment  independently  of  adult  supervision  (Valentine  and 
McKendrick  1997:  227). 
This  general  trend  of  an  increase  in  the  regulation  of  children's  lives,  rather  than  a 
growth  in  'street  kids  out  at  all  hours',  was  replicated  by  my  research  with  the  32 
children  living  in  and  around  Hillhouse.  The  latest  any  of  the  children  said  they  were 
allowed  to  play  out  at  night  was  9pm,  but  this  only  applied  to  two  2  children  -  and  the 
average  'in-time'was  7.30pm.  A  majority  of  the  children  interviewed  were  allowed  to 
walk  to  school  by  themselves  and  could  walk  to  friends'  houses  alone.  However, 
further  questioning  of  the  children  who  went  out  alone  at  night  -  about  where  they 
went  and  where  their  friends  lived  -  found  that  many  of  those  who  did  travel  to  their 
friends'  houses  at  night  were  allowed  to  do  so  only  because  they  lived  very  close  by  or 
because  their  parents  were  able  to  watch  them  on  their  travels. 
For  example,  10-year-old  Jane  from  Hillhouse  explained  that  she  was  allowed  to  walk 
to  her  friend's  house  alone,  but  only  because  'I'm  not  even  a  minute  away,  and  my 
friend's  parents  watch  out  for  me'.  Similarly,  Mark,  who  was  9  years  old,  was  allowed 
to  walked  to  his  friend's  house  but  only  because  'he  only  lives  next  door'.  Joanne 
from  Hillhouse  also  explained  that  she  was  allowed  out,  but  that  'Mum  watches  me 
go.  My  friend's  mum  watches  me  come,  and  mum  phones  her  to  let  her  know  I'm  on 
my  way.  But  I've  never  had  any  bother'. 
From  these  interviews  and  the  research  carried  out  by  the  Scottish  Office,  there  was 
little  evidence  of  children  'running  wild'  around  Hillhouse.  Indeed,  around  a  third  of 
children  -  similar  numbers  to  those  in  the  Wheway  (1997)  and  Livingstone  and  Bovill 
(1999)  research  -  said  they  were  not  allowed  out  of  the  sight  of  their  parents.  A  quarter 
of  the  children  said  they  were  not  allowed  to  play  out  after  school  hours  and  a  third 
explained  that  they  were  not  allowed  to  go  to  the  shops  alone.  The  majority  of  the 
children  could  play  out  for  a  time  at  night,  but  most  of  these  children  had  significant 
limits  imposed  on  where  they  could  go  and  only  two  children  said  they  could  walk  or 
cycle  around  the  entire  estate. 
180  - Rather  than  an  overall  'social  problem'  of  an  increasing  numbers  of  children  being  out 
late  at  night,  the  general  trend  towards  the  increasing  regulation  of  children's  'free 
time',  highlighted  by  various  research  projects  in  the  1990s,  was  suggested  by  the 
interviews  with  the  children  in  and  around  Hillhouse.  Indeed  at  a  national  level  the 
concern  about  'wandering  children'  has  been  raised  by  Fran  Russell  from  the  legal 
reform  group,  the  Howard  League.  In  conversation  about  this  issue,  she  stated  that  'no 
evidence  has  been  produced  to  suggest  young  children  wandering  the  streets  at  night 
is  a  serious  or  growing  problem'  (Waiton  2004:  65).  Even  within  the  police  reports  of 
the  'extreme'  cases  of  young  children  being  out  late  at  night,  these  were  few  and  far 
between.  In  this  respect,  the  curfew  could  be  seen  less  as  an  artificial  imposition  of 
new  rules  placed  upon  parents,  so  much  as  a  replication  of  existing  parental  practices 
based  on  a  more  pronounced  precautionary  approach  to  children  who  were 
understood  to  be  'at  risk. 
In  terms  of  the  irresponsibility  of  parents,  with  respect  to  the  active  involvement  of 
parents  in  their  children's  'free  time',  not  only  were  many  parents  heavily  involved  in 
the  regulation  of  children's  'street-life',  but  a  third  of  parents  also  regularly  took  their 
children  to  and  from  school  and  to  and  from  friends'houses  at  night.  Three  quarters  of 
the  children  interviewed  were  also  involved  in  organised  activities  after  school  and  a 
ma  ority  of  these  children  were  taken  to  and  from  these  activities  by  parents  or  older 
siblings.  In  other  words,  the  idea  that  there  was  a  serious  problem  of  irresponsible 
parents  who  allowed  their  children  to  go  out  unsupervised  'at  all  hours'  was  extremely 
rare  -  with  little  or  no  evidence  being  uncovered  by  this  or  the  Scottish  Office 
research.  Indeed  the  'extreme'  examples  given  by  the  police  of  children  'inadequately 
dressed'  selling  newspapers,  or  of  a  four-year-old  on  his  bike  on  waste  ground,  would 
perhaps  in  previous  generations,  when  children  were  more  likely  to  be  out  at  night,  not 
have  been  understood  as  a  'social  problem'.  However,  within  a  'safety  first'  or  an  'at 
risk'  framework,  these  activities  were  reinterpreted  as  examples  of  wider  social 
problems  associated  with  irresponsible  parenting. 
The  relatively  high  level  of  parental  supervision  of  the  children  in  Hillhouse,  the 
somewhat  limited  time  and  space  allowed  to  them,  and  the  lack  of  statistical  evidence 
181 uncovered  by  the  Scottish  Office  in  respect  to  dangers  facing  children  in  this  area, 
suggest  that  the  notion  that  these  children  were  'at  risk'  was  questionable. 
Following  the  interviews  with  the  children  in  and  around  Hillhouse,  the  lack  of  any 
significant  dangers  faced  by  these  children  was  again  shown.  Almost  two  thirds  of  the 
children  interviewed  from  Hillhouse  said  they  had  'no  bother'  in  their  area;  this  was 
fewer  than  for  the  children  living  outside  of  the  area.  No  child  had  been  put  'at  risk'  by 
an  adult  and  the  home  was  seen  as  a  safe  place  by  all  of  these  children.  The  main 
'bother'  mentioned  by  these  children  was  from  other  children,  and  especially  the 
general  activities  of  some  teenagers  in  the  area.  Three  children  mentioned  windows 
being  broken,  two  mentioned  fights,  and  two  others  described  a  fire  being  started  by 
young  people.  Those  who  mentioned  having  had  some  'bother'  themselves  explained 
that  they  had  either  been  chased  or  called  names.  Ten-year-old  Steven  told  me: 
'Teeýagers  drink  sometimes  and  shout  at  me,  I've  been  chased  as  well,  but  only  once', 
while  Tim  said:  'Jamie  hit  me  with  his  stookie  [plaster  cast],  he's  always  picking  on 
smaller  children. 
There  appears  to  be  a  situation  where  some  older  teenagers  drink  and  are  sometimes 
'antisocial'  at  night  in  and  around  Hillhouse.  However,  the  extent  to  which  this  could 
be  understood  as  children  being  put  'at  risk'  is  questionable.  No  paedophile  or  abusive 
adult  was  mentioned;  teenagers  sometimes  chased  or  called  the  smaller  children 
names,  but  overall  there  was  no  evidence  that  these  children  were  facing  more 
difficulties  in  their  area  than  their  parents  may  have  faced  when  they  were  children. 
Interestingly,  while  alcohol  was  frequently  raised  as  an  issue  throughout  this  survey, 
these  children  did  not  mention  drugs. 
A  concoction  of  fear 
As  has  been  shown  above,  in  any  real  sense  the  idea  that  children  in  Hillhouse  were 
running  around  wild,  or  that  they  were  being  put  at  risk  by  irresponsible  parents,  was 
far  from  the  truth  -  and  yet  this  was  the  key  justificatory  basis  for  the  curfew.  Even  in 
the  Scottish  Office  research  it  was  noted  that  of  the  229  police  interventions,  only 
three  'special  circumstances'  were  highlighted  relating  to  poor  parental  supervision 
182 (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  18).  In  this  respect,  the  basis  for  the  curfew  can  be  seen  in 
part  as  a  concoction  by  the  authorities  based  on  a  culturally-accepted  set  of  anxieties 
and  fears  they  already  had  about  these  issues,  rather  than  a  development  based  on  real 
problems  and  speciflc  local  concerns.  134 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  in  general  terms  concerns  about  child  safety  were  shared 
by  parents  in  Hillhouse,  and  the  promotion  of  child  safety  was  supported.  In  the 
Scottish  Office  research  it  was  found  that  'despite  reservations'  about  the  focus  on 
under-  I  0-year-olds,  'there  was  a  general  consensus  that  the  police  were  right  to 
address  the  safety  of  young  children'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  60).  In  discussion  with 
three  focus  groups,  it  was  also  noted  that,  'All  three  groups  commended  the  HCSI  for 
its  concern  with  the  safety  of  young  children  and  showed  considerable  interest  in  this 
aspect  of  the  Initiative'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  63).  In  other  words,  despite  there 
being  little  concern  by  adults  about  the  reality  of  the  problem  of  young  children 
wandering  the  streets  late  at  night,  and  also  despite  their  being  little  evidence  within 
the  Scottish  Office  research  or  in  the  research  of  this  thesis  that  young  children  were 
practically  'at  risk',  there  was  a  more  generalised  acceptance  that  safety  was  an 
important  issue  for  children,  that  children  were  indeed  more  generally  'at  risk',  and 
that  action  taken  to  promote  this  could  only  be  a  good  thing. 
Put  more  starkly,  the  reality  of  young  children  out  late  on  the  streets  being  'at  risk'  was 
largely  a  myth  and  something  that  local  people  felt  was  not  a  serious  problem, 
whereas  the  generalisedJear  for  children's  safety  was  real.  As  a  generic  sentiment,  the 
issue  of  child  safety  was  one  that  was  accepted  and  lent  support  to  the  introduction  of 
the  curfew.  However,  rather  than  there  being  agreement  between  the  authorities  and 
the  public  about  the  practical  dangers  children  faced,  the  agreement  was  about  thefear 
felt  for  children.  In  this  respect  the  CSI  was  an  engagement  with,  and  promotion  of, 
the  culture  offear,  rather  than  a  practical  initiative  to  resolve  an  objective  problem. 
As  discussed  previously,  child  safety  was  here  not  only  an  unquestioned  issue  but  was 
also  understood  as  an  unquestionably  good  thing.  But  rather  than  engage  with  fears 
related  to  specific  issues,  the  engagement  between  the  authorities  and  the  targeted 
areas  was  an  engagement  with  a  more  generalised  sense  of  fear. 
183 Discussing  the  successes  of  the  initiative  with  a  group  of  parents,  the  Scottish  Office 
research  noted  that  one  of  the  positive  factors  had  been  that  'this  parents'  focus  group 
considered  that  the  HCSI  had  been  effective  in  making  parents  more  aware  of  the 
dangers  for  children  out  late  at  night'.  Here  the  success  of  the  cur  ew  was  not  only  in 
its  ability  to  relate  to  people's  fears,  but  to  enhance  them.  Parents  were  now  also 
believed  to  regulating  their  children  more  strictly  because  of  these  fears  (McGallagly 
et  al  1998:  78).  For  the  local  authority  and  police,  the  greater  regulation  of  these 
children's  time  was  seen  as  a  positive  move  to  make  them  safer  -  despite  the  reality  of 
limited  evidence  of  any  dangers  faced  by  the  children.  Child  safety  is  here  more  of  an 
absolutist  'moral'  or  amoral  position  than  a  reflection  of,  or  attempt  to  resolve,  'real' 
social  problems. 
The  success  of  the  authorities  was  in  engaging  with  and  encouraging  a  culture  of  fear 
amongst  parents.  To  be  a  fearful  parent  in  this  respect  was  a  good  thing  and  reflected  a 
responsible  attitude,  regardless  of  the  risks  that  existed.  - 
Ironically,  in  the  research  carried  out  for  this  thesis,  the  main  reason  children  gave  for 
having  to  be  home  earlier  since  the  curfew  was  introduced  was  that  their  parents  were 
worried  about  them  coming  into  contact  with  the  police.  This  does  not  necessarily 
contradict  the  idea  that  most  parents  supported  the  initiative,  but  rather  suggests  that 
as  well  as  raising  awareness  about  'child  safety'  issues  in  general,  the  practicalities  of 
the  curfew  also  led  to  an  unintended  fear  about  police  involvement  in  their  child's  life. 
The  elevation  of  fear  regarding  the  police  was  not  something  explored  by  the  Scottish 
Office  research. 
Having  found  little  evidence  of  harm  towards  the  children  of  Hillhouse,  the  Scottish 
Office  research  noted  that  'over  a  third  of  those  children  asked  felt  unsafe  when 
walking  alone  in  their  local  area  after  darle.  This  'provides  some  justification  for  the 
present  Initiative'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  49).  Here  again  the  basis  for  the  initiative 
was  established  not  through  real  problems  faced  by  these  children,  but  in  the  fears 
they  had  about  going  out  in  the  dark. 
184 Most  parents,  as  we  have  discussed,  were  'highly  responsible'  in  terms  of  the  extent  to 
which  they  regulated  their  children's  free  time.  In  this  respect,  the  curfew  was  simply 
reinforcing  an  existing  high  level  of  parental  supervision.  Much  research  suggests  that 
a  major  reason  nationally  for  this  high  level  of  parental  supervision  is.  fear  for  their 
children's  safety.  135  The  curfew  was  reinforcing  the  idea  that  a  fearful  parent  was  a 
good  parent,  while  targeting  those  parents  who  did  not  share  these  fears  as 
problematic  and  a  danger  to  their  children  and  the  community.  A  culture  of  fear  was 
therefore  not  only  expressed  within  this  study,  but  reinforced  by  those  promoting  the 
curfew.  There  may  be,  in  part,  structural  reasons  for  the  development  of  this  culture, 
but  here  we  see  a  practical  example  of  how  a  sense  of  anxiety  was  institutionalised, 
generalised  still  further,  and  promoted  by  the  local  authority  -  and  subsequently,  how 
this  reinforces  a  local  culture  based  more  directly  on  an  exaggerated  sense  of  fear. 
Taking  this  argument  to  its  logical  conclusion  it  could  be  argued  that  the  problem  the 
authorities  had  with  the  so-called  irresponsible  parents  was  not  that  they  were  making 
their  children  unsafe,  but  that  they  were  refusing  to  join  the  community  offear  -  the 
new  imagined  basis  for  community  and  the  framework  around  which  the  authorities 
were  attempting  to  reengage  the  public. 
Engaging  fear  through  safety 
As  well  as  the  CSI  being  introduced  to  make  children  safe,  it  was  also  an  initiative 
that  aimed  to  make  adults  feel  safe,  by  stopping  the  antisocial  and  criminal  activities 
of  young  people  who  were  under  16  years  of  age  and  hung  about  the  streets. 
During  the  initiative,  the  notion  that  local  people  were  living  in  fear  was  promoted  by 
the  police,  local  councillors,  national  politicians  and  the  press.  Community  safety.  it 
was  argued  by  council  leader  Tom  McCabe,  was  the  community's  number  one 
priority  and  helped  explain  why  they  had  called  for  a  curfew. 
As  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  curfew  idea  had  not  come  from  the  local 
Citizens'  Jury,  as  had  been  suggested  by  local  MP  George  Robertson.  Community 
safety  was  a  significant  issue  for  the  people  of  Hamilton  -  as  was  discovered  by  the 
185 System  3  (1996)  survey  carried  out  by  the  council.  However,  although  there  was  a 
general  concern  about  community  safety,  this  survey  notes  that  when  the  public  were 
asked  about  'specific  problems  in  their  local  area'  rather  than  'general  problems',  the 
issue  of  unemployment  came  out  as  the  highest  concern.  Despite  this,  when 
establishing  the  Citizens'  Jury,  it  was  the  issue  of  community  safety  that  was  put  on 
the  agenda  first  by  the  local  authority,  rather  than  the  issue  of  unemployment. 
Community  safety  was  an  issue  for  adults  and  also  young  people  in  the  area. 
However,  there  appeared  to  be  a  tendency  by  the  council  to  elevate  this  issue,  even 
when  it  was  not  of  great  concern.  For  example,  in  a  young  people's  Citizens'  Jury  set 
up  by  the  council  to  look  at  the  issue  of  leisure  and  entertainment,  of  the  eight 
proposals  made,  community  safety  was  fourth  on  the  list  of  the  report  published.  Yet 
this  report  notes  that:  'The  issues  with  regard  to  safety  and  security  are  varied.  In 
general,  the  Jury  did  not  view  them  as  being  overly  important'  (South  Lanarkshire 
Council  1998).  That  an  issue  that  was  of  little  importance  to  the  young  people  on  this 
Citizens'  Jury  ends  up  as  a  top-listed  priority  suggests  that  the  issue  of  community 
safety  had  become  an  established  framework  around  which  the  council  was  organising 
its  policies,  rather  than  simply  a  reflection  of  public  concerns. 
A  key  reason  for  the  curfew  being  introduced  in  Hillhouse  had  been  the  perceived 
problem  of  the  fear  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour.  This  concern  about  the  'fear  of 
crime'  was  politically  significant  at  the  time  and  was  an  issue  New  Labour  had 
promoted  as  being  important  since  1993. 
In  Hillhouse  there  was  evidence  of  a  level  of  fear  of  crime.  However,  the  notion  that 
this  community  was  being  undermined  by  fear  due  to  young  people's  criminal 
behaviour  is  questionable.  The  Citizens'  Jury,  for  example,  when  asked  to  isolate  what 
it  saw  as  the  main  problem  to  solve  in  the  area,  named  graffiti  as  the  key  problem. 
Graffiti  can  have  a  negative  physical  and  psychological  impact  on  communities  - 
however,  compared  with  the  idea  of  children  running  wild  and  young  people  making 
people's  lives  hell,  the  issue  of  graffiti  appears  to  be  somewhat  less  serious  than  the 
image  of  the  area  portrayed  by  the  politicians  and  the  media.  If  fear  was  being  caused 
largely  because  of  graffiti,  it  could  be  argued  that  this  sense  of  fear  was  connected  to 
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loss  of  community.  In  this  respect  the  concern  about  graffiti,  while  being  a  concern  in 
and  of  itself,  may  also  have  had  a  metaphorical  component  (South  Lanarkshire 
Council  1997a). 
The  Scottish  Office  research  found,  when  interviewing  adults  from  Hillhouse,  that  the 
main  perceived  problem  of  crime  and  disorder  for  the  area  was  caused  not  by  young 
people  under  the  age  of  16,  but  rather:  'It  was  generally  believed  that  crime  in 
Hillhouse  was  caused  by  a  small  number  of  'older'  Young  people  who  tended  to  be 
heavy  drinkers  or  drug  users  and  who  were,  for  the  most  part,  unemployed' 
(McGallagly  et  al  1998).  If  this  Was  indeed  the  main  age  group  committing  crimes  and 
being  antisocial  in  the  area,  then  clearly  the  basis  of  the  curfew  must  again  be 
questioned,  as  its  target  audience  was  all  young  people  under  the  age  of  16. 
There  were  specific  issues  of  concern  in  Hillhouse,  regarding  crime,  the  antisocial 
behaviour  of  young  people,  and  young  men  who  hung  about  drinking.  However,  these 
problems  did  not  simply  become  'social  problems'  because  of  the  increased  severity  of 
them,  but  emerged  within  a  political  climate  within  which  crime  and  the  fear  of  crime 
had  become  general  public  concerns,  assisted  by  the  problematisation  of  youth  crime 
by  the  Conservative  government  and  by  the  transformation  of  Labour  into  New 
Labour  in  the  early  1990s.  The  'practical'  concerns  in  Hillhouse,  about  a  small  number 
of  young  people  whose  behaviour  was  disorderly,  was  therefore  supplemented  by  a 
broader  climate  of  insecurity  that  gave  meaning  to  the  political  promotion  of  a  more 
general  problem  of  a  'yob  culture'  and  of  'streets  of  fear'. 
Measuring  the  fear  of  crime  in  the  area  of  Hillhouse,  the  Scottish  Office  research 
concluded  that  fear  was  an  issue  in  Hillhouse,  but  that  in  certain  cases  the  curfew  had 
done  little  to  resolve  this  problem.  For  example,  while  discovering  that  65%  of  those 
surveyed  had  often  or  sometimes  felt  unsafe  either  in  their  homes  or  on  the  street,  after 
six  months  of  the  curfew,  'this  proportion  had  only  reduced  slightly  to  60%1 
(McGallagly  et  al  1998:  xi).  Also: 
187 Anxiety  about  groups  or  gangs  of  youths  or  young  people  remained  strong, 
with  three  quarters  of  respondents  saying  that  they  found  the  presence  of 
groups  of  young  people  on  the  streets  frightening,  both  before  the  initiative 
began  and  after  the  first  six  months  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  xi). 
This  research  also  found  that'more  people  were  likely  to  avoid  an  area  after  the  HCSI 
began  (86%)  than  before  (77%)'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  xi).  But  despite  this,  it  was 
also  found  that  44%  of  those  surveyed  said  they  felt  safer  on  the  streets  since  the 
initiative  was  introduced  -  partly  because  of  the  lower  number  of  young  people  on  the 
streets. 
One  question  that  is  not  covered  by  this  Scottish  Office  research  is:  What  is  it  that  the 
adults  are  afraid  of?  They  are  concerned  about  'gangs  of  young  people',  but  is  this 
because  these  young  people  attack  them,  attack  their  house,  or  simply  that  they  make 
them  feel  nervous?  Also,  if  the  fear  expressed  by  this  research  related  to  a  serious 
problem  with  young  people,  why  were  these  problems  not  mentioned  by  the  Citizens' 
Jury  or  identified  as  a  problem  of  crime  in  the  Scottish  Office  research? 
From  the  discussions  with  adults  in  Hamilton  and  within  the  targeted  area  carried  out 
for  this  thesis,  it  is  difficult  to  assess  statistically  the  various  reasons  for  the  fear  of 
crime.  However,  from  these  discussions  and  with  reference  to  wider  research,  the 
question  of  adults'  sense  of  distance  from  young  people  is  suggested  as  one  possible 
explanation  for  this  sense  of  fear.  It  is  also  possible  that  the  issue  of  safety  that  had 
become  all-encompassing  in  relation  to  children  had  actually  impacted  on  adults  in 
terms  of  how  they  understood  children  and  their  relationships  with  them,  and 
increased  their  sense  of  anxiety  in  relation  to  young  people  and  public  space. 
Alienating  strangers 
From  the  previous  chapter,  we  can  note  that  the  police  themselves  were  conscious  of 
the  exaggerated  concern  that  many  elderly  adults  have  about  young  people.  It  was  also 
noted  that  a  number  of  conferences  have  over  recent  years  addressed  a  perceived 
problem  of  the  distance  between  generations.  Following  this  issue,  the  amount  of 
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of  young  people  related  to  a  change  in  the  relationships  between  young  and  old. 
Fear  of  crime,  as  Furedi  (1997)  has  argued,  is  not  simply  related  to  the  objective 
behaviour  of  people,  but  rather,  like  the  broader  culture  of  fear,  is  related  to  far  wider 
social  changes.  In  Strathclyde  itself,  despite  falling  crime  figures  at  the  time  of  the 
curfew,  the  police  discovered  that  the  public's  fear  of  crime  was  continuing  to  rise. 
Frustrated  by  this,  at  the  end  of  1997  Strathclyde  police  launched  a  E150,000 
advertising  campaign  to  inform  people  that  crime  was  in  fact  falling  (Scotsman,  11 
November  1997). 
Fear  of  crime  was  understood  by  the  authorities  to  be  directly  related  to  the  behaviour 
of  young  people  at  night  -  something  that  made  adults  fear  for  their  own  safety. 
However,  research  suggests  that  not  only  do  older  adults  fear  for  themselves  -  they  are 
also  concerned  for  the  safety  of  young  people.  Bamardos  research,  for  example,  found 
that  three  in  five  adults  think  childhood  today  is  worse  than  it  was  when  they  were 
children.  The  main  reasons  given  for  this,  from  a  prompted  list,  are  the  'level  of 
crime'  and  'availability  of  drugs'.  More  than  nine  out  of  ten  of  these  adults  agreed  that 
the  level  of  violence  in  British  society  is  increasing,  and  a  similar  figure  felt  that 
'children  witness  more  crime  these  days'  (Bamardos  1995a).  These  concerns  may 
again  relate  to  certain  changes  in  young  people's  lives:  however,  there  is  also  a  sense 
expressed  in  this  research  that  these  adults  are  relating  not  just  to  objective  changes  in 
young  people's  lives  but  to  a  world  that  they  feel  has  changed  fundamentally. 
Previously,  it  was  noted  that  the  fear  of  crime  is  often  a  reflection  of  fear  generated  by 
wider  social  changes,  rather  than  a  reflection  of  an  increase  in  crime  itself.  In 
discussion  with  adults  in  Hamilton  town  centre,  the  issue  of  how  times  have  changed 
emerged  in  relation  to  the  sense  of  distance  many  older  people  have  in  relating  to 
other  people  within  their  community.  An  often-expressed  sentiment  within  these 
discussions  was  the  feeling  that  local  people,  and  young  people  in  particular,  could  not 
be  trusted  anymore.  Most  of  these  adults  recognise  that  'there  have  always  been  bad 
kids  from  bad  families',  but  as  a  67-year-old  grandmother  explained,  'In  the  past  you 
knew  who  the  bad  ones  were,  but  you  also  knew  that  the  rest  were  good  kids'.  This 
189 she  contrasts  to  'today',  where  'you  still  know  who  the  bad  families  are  but  I  guess  I 
just  don't  know  if  the  rest  of  them  are  OK  are  not'. 
The  Scottish  Office  research  similarly  found  that  adults'  concern  about  young  people 
related  to  broader  sentiments  about  how  'things  have  changed',  with  there  now  being  a 
'lack  of  respect'  of  adults  (McGallagly  et  al  1998:  6  1). 
To  assess  the  extent  to  which  adults  had  contact  with  young  people  in  the  Hillhouse 
area,  young  people  were  asked  about  who  talked  to  them  in  the  street.  Of  the  26  young 
people,  aged  between  12  and  15  years,  a  large  majority  said  that  they  had  been  spoken 
to  by  a  local  adult  about  their  behaviour,  while  half  of  these  young  people  said  that  it 
was  local  adults  rather  than  the  police  who  normally  spoke  to  them  at  night.  The 
'adults  who  spoke  to  these  young  people  about  their  behaviour  were  usually  adults  that 
were  known  to  the  young  people.  However,  once  these  teenagers  went  out  of  their 
own  streets  into  areas  where  they  knew  fewer  adults,  the  likelihood  of  coming  into 
contact  with  adults  decreased  and  the  level  of  contact  with  the  police  rose.  While  half 
of  the  young  people  explained  that  adults  they  didn't  know  had  at  some  time  in  the 
last  six  months  spoken  to  them  about  their  behaviour,  over  half  said  they  had  been 
spoken  to  by  the  police  -  this  figure  increased  to  over  two  thirds  for  those  teenagers 
living  in  Hillhouse. 
The  majority  of  young  people  living  in  and  around  Hillhouse  had  more  contact  with 
adults  than  with  the  police  regarding  their  behaviour  when  out  at  night.  Much  of  this 
contact  with  adults  may  well  be  'negative'  contact,  where  groups  of  teenagers  are 
simply  being  told  to  move  on.  But  it  is  still  the  case  that,  for  a  third  of  the  young 
people  living  in  Hillhouse,  there  was  more  contact  with  the  police  than  there  was  with 
adults,  and  once  these  teenagers  moved  to  areas  they  were  less  well  known,  this  level 
of  contact  with  the  police,  compared  to  adults,  increased  dramatically. 
Direct  knowledge  of  young  people  appeared  to  mean  that  some  adults  continued  to 
relate  to  young  people  they  knew  who  hung  about  the  street-  However,  once  a  young 
person  moved  from  their  direct  neighbourhood  there  appeared  to  be  a  trend  for  adults 
to  avoid  contact  with  them.  This  may  relate  to  the  reduced  sense  of  community  that 
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framework  of  behaviour. 
The  concern  expressed  above,  about  not  knowing  who  the  'bad  families  are',  was 
telling  in  its  reflection  of  a  growing  sense  of  distance  felt  by  certain  adults  to  others  in 
their  community.  In  a  similar  vein,  a  lack  of  a  sense  of  group  norms  was  expressed  by 
a  Mrs  Boyle,  who  had  lived  in  Hamilton  since  1940  and  explained  how,  in  her  youth, 
'everybody'  went  to  the  dances  and  'you  felt  like  you  knew  everyone'.  This  compares 
with  'today',  where  it  was  felt  that  'everybody  does  their  own  thing'  and  'people  seem 
to  come  and  go',  so  that  you,  'never  know  who's  who'.  Mrs  Boyle  clearly  didn't  know 
everyone  in  Hamilton  in  the  past,  but  nevertheless  had  a  sense  of  commonality  that 
meant  that  she  felt  more  trusting  and  secure  in  her  relationships  with  people  she  met. 
A  lack  of  a  sense  of  commonality  felt  by  some  adults  in  Hillhouse  could  result  in 
suspicion  being  something  no  longer  felt  just  for  the  'bad  families'  but  more  broadly, 
in  relation  to  all  those  adults  and  young  people  with  whom,  there  was  no  longer  any 
contact  or  shared  social  or  cultural  norms. 
Research  by  Furedi  and  Brown  has  also  raised  the  significance  of  a  declining  web  of 
meaning  held  by  adults  in  their  relationships  with  young  people.  In  this  study,  not  only 
was  contact  between  generations  limited  but,  the  authors  noted,  'there  is  no  foundation 
in  existence  for  intergenerational  contact  for  those  who  do  not  have  grandchildren' 
(Furedi  and  Brown  1997).  Two  significant  relationships  between  the  experience  of 
isolation  and  the  intense  consciousness  of  vulnerability  were  identified.  Firstly,  the 
'lack  of  contact  and  familiarity  with  the  ways  of  the  young  tends  to  inflate  the  sense  of 
difference  between  the  generations'.  One  aspect  of  this  process  is  that  many  elderly 
people  feel  inadequate  about  the  task  of  rearing  or  educating  children,  and  in  some 
cases,  'a  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  ways  of  the  younger  generation  creates  a 
disposition  towards  accepting  negative  images  of  the  young'.  Secondly,  the  'feeling  of 
irrelevance  and  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  ways  of  the  young  helps  to  accelerate  the 
loss  of  confidence  that  comes  with  ageing',  which  leads  to  caution  and  distrust 
dominating  elderly  people's  perception  of  youth  (Furedi  and  Brown  1997). 
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cautious  behaviour  serves  to  isolate  the  elderly  from  new  social  networks  and  this,  in 
turn,  exacerbates  feelings  of  vulnerability. 
Despite  the  myopic  focus  upon  antisocial  behaviour  by  the  authorities  in 
understanding  adult  insecurities  in  the  area,  the  issues  that  influenced  the  adult 
feelings  of  insecurity  regarding  young  people  were  complex  and  ranged  far  beyond 
the  mere  behaviour  of  the  young  people  concerned.  Indeed  the  fear  of  antisocial  youth 
at  one  level  related  more  to  the  changing  relationship  between  adults  and  young 
people.  A  certain  distance,  literally,  culturally  and  socially,  between  young  and  old, 
and  a  change  in  the  recognised  position  of  adults  vis-A-vis  young  people,  appeared  to 
have  helped  to  undermine  adults'  surety  about  their  engagement  with  the  young 
people  in  their  area. 
Ironically,  through  the  interviews  with  children  under  the  age  of  12  it  was  found  that 
the  issue  of  safety  may  itself  be  another  barrier  between  young  and  old.  For  example, 
when  asked  'if  you  were  out  at  night  and  needed  to  know  the  time  would  you  ask  an 
adult  you  don't  know  who  was  passing  byT,  two  thirds  of  those  asked  explained  that 
they  would  not  ask  an  adult  the  time.  As  Linda  explained,  'You  don't  know  what  they 
might  do'.  This  compared  with  100  per  cent  of  children  who  said  they  would  be  happy 
to  ask  a  police  officer.  Similarly,  when  asked  whether  or  not  they  had  ever  visited  a 
house  of  someone  they  didn't  know  very  well  -  for  Halloween  or  to  raise  money,  for 
example  -  well  over  half  of  the  children  said  they  had  not  done  so.  Two  thirds  of  the 
children  felt  that  'talking  to  adults  was  a  good  thing',  but  a  third  said  it  was  not,  and  of 
those  who  felt  it  was  a  good  thing  many  explained  that  it  was  only  a  good  thing  'if  you 
knew  them'. 
The  question  of  stranger  danger,  of  adults  not  being  people  in  your  estate  you  could 
spontaneously  rely  on  and  of  children's  self-conscious  recognition  that  approaching 
adults  was  a  potentially  problematic  thing,  again  raises  questions  about  the  informal 
trusting  relationships  between  children  and  adults. 
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promoted  the  curfew  and  understood  the  conflicts  on  the  estate  through  a  narrow 
prism  of  crime  and  safety.  However,  understanding  the  various  tensions  between 
adults  and  children  must  in  part  relate  to  the  sense  of  distance  and  alienation  that  is 
felt  between  the  generations  -  not  because  of  the  behaviour  of  children  in  and  of  itself, 
but  in  context  of  a  changing  web  of  meaning  within  which  community  relations  take 
place.  Communities  are  more  fragmented  or  individualised,  as  Beck  and  Beck- 
Gernsheim  (2002)  have  described,  and  they  are  also  arguably  less  certain  about  the 
basic  informal  rules  that  govern  people's  contact  with  one  another.  In  this  sense,  the 
behaviour  of  the  young  people  in  Hillhouse  could  be  of  secondary.  importance  to  the 
changing,  more  fractured  relationships  that  have  emerged  between  generations  and 
between  the  more  individuated  people  living  on  this  estate. 
This  may  help  to  explain  why,  despite  the  relatively  high  level  of  policing  in  the  area, 
the  sense  of  security  -  or  perhaps  more  accurately  a  sense  of  surety  -  did  not  develop 
in  Hillhouse  during  the  curfew.  Discussing  the  curfew  with  George,  a  pensioner  in 
Hillhouse,  he  explained  that'he  was  pleased  that  the  young  people  had  been  moved 
away  from  his  street,  but  he  recognised  that  this  did  not  make  him  feel  any  more 
relaxed  about  approaching  young  people  himself.  Even  where  the  immediate  concern 
was  removed  from  the  streets,  the  broader  fragility  of  relations  between  people 
remained,  and  would  most  likely  continue  to  be  expressed  in  future  relations. 
In  this  sense,  the  impact  of  the  curfew  was  to  institutionalise  the  sense  of  anxiety  that 
existed  between  people. 
Freedom  versus  safety 
As  part  of  the  interview  process  with  the  young  people  aged  12-15  years  living  in  and 
around  Hillhouse,  the  actual  impact  of  the  initiative  was  analysed  to  assess  the  level  of 
contact  with  the  police  and  the  changes  the  CSI  had  upon  young  people's  night-time 
activities. 
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activities,  it  was  found  that  most  of  the  teenagers  in  and  around  Hillhouse  still  went 
gut  at  night,  but  half  of  those  living  in  Hillhouse  itself  believed  that  their  parents  were 
now  more  worried  about  them  going  out  in  case  they  came  into  contact  with  the 
police.  It  was  also  found  that  the  curfew  had  not  substantially  altered  the  amount  of 
contact  the  teenagers  in  Hillhouse  had  with  the  police  -  with  many  young  people 
having  had  more  contact  the  previous  summer,  when  they  were  out  later  and  when 
there  was  no  curfew  in  operation.  The  young  people  felt  harassed  and  confused  about 
why  they  were  being  stopped  by  the  police  -  which  occurred  largely  when  they  were 
in  groups.  They  were  equally  confused  about  why  adults  felt  the  need  to  phone  the 
police  when  they  were  out,  rather  than  talk  to  them  themselves. 
Almost  all  of  the  young  people  from  Hillhouse  hung  about  the  streets  at  some  time  in 
the  week,  with  around  two  thirds  going  out  almost  every  night.  This  had  not  changed 
with  the  introduction  of  the  CSI.  Most  of  the  12-13  year  olds  from  in  and  outside 
Hillhouse  had  to  be  home  by  9pm.  Most  of  the  14-15  year  olds  from  both  areas  had  to 
be  home  before  10.30pm  and  only  two  teenage  boys  -  both  aged  15  -  were  allowed  to 
stay  out  after  10.30pm.  In  other  words,  few  of  the  young  people  interviewed  were 
allowed  to  wander  the  streets  'at  all  hours'. 
The  number  of  police  interventions  relating  to  young  people  in  Hillhouse  during  the 
first  six  months  of  the  curfew  that  occurred  after  lOpm  equally  suggests  that  few 
young  people  were  out  very  late  at  night.  For  example,  between  8pm  and  9pm  there 
had  been  around  160  interventions;  between  9pm  and  lOpm  there  were  66 
interventions;  and  after  lOpm  there  were  fewer  than  ten  interventions  (McGallagly  et 
al  1998). 
Only  two  of  the  young  people  from  Hillhouse  had  had  their  home-time  changed  since 
the  introduction  of  the  curfew,  but  almost  half  of  these  young  people  believed  that 
their  parents  were  now  more  worried  about  them  going  out,  in  case  they  came  into 
contact  with  the  police.  As  14-year-old  Laura  from  Hillhouse  explained,  'At  weekends 
I  have  to  be  in  half  an  hour  earlier  now  in  case  I  get  picked  up  by  the  police'. 
194 The  young  people  interviewed  who  lived  in  Hillhouse  felt  harassed  and  confused 
about  why  the  police  moved  them  on  or  told  them  to  go  home  at  night.  Over  two 
thirds  of  these  young  people  had  had  contact  with  the  police  since  the  introduction  of 
the  curfew,  compared  to  less  than  half  of  those  who  lived  in  other  areas.  A  third  of  the 
Hillhouse  teenagers  had  been  told  to  go  home  by  the  police,  and  another  third  had 
been  told  to  move  on.  None  of  the  young  people  interviewed  had  been  taken  home  by 
the  police  since'the  curfew  was  launched. 
Diane,  a  13-year-oldfrom.  Hillhouse,  told  me,  'I  was  sent  home  on  the  first  day  of  the 
curfew,  but  that's  all'.  Fifteen-year-old  Richard  said,  'I've  been  moved  on,  told  to  be 
getting  in  for  the  curfew,  but  not  much'.  A  number  of  the  young  people  who  had  been 
spoken  to  by  the  police  during  the  curfew  were  concerned  that  simply  standing  around 
with  friends  often  led  either  to  complaints  from  adults  or  to  action  by  the  police  to 
move  them  or  split  up  their  group. 
However,  as  mentioned,  for  a  number  of  these  young  people  the  amount  of  contact 
with  the  police  had  been  more  in  the  previous  summer  than  during  the  curfew. 
Fourteen-year-old  Laura  explained,  'They  move  us  on  a  lot  in  the  summer.  The  police 
tell  us  there's  been  complaints,  but  no  one  complains  to  us  which  they  should  do  'cos 
we're  never  up  to  much.  I  guess  they're  scared  of  us  'cos  we're  a  big  group.  There's 
about  15  of  us.  They  think  we'll  hit  their  windows  or  something  if  they  speak  to  us  - 
but  if  they  spoke  to  me  I'd  tell  my  pals  we'd  better  move'.  Angela,  Laura's  classmate 
from  Burnbank,  said,  'The  police  have  stopped  us  a  few  times  and  said  there's  been 
complaints.  We'd  not  had  anyone  complain  to  us  -  if  they  had  we'd  be  quiet.  It 
usually  happens  when  we're  in  a  big  group',  while  15-year-old  William  felt  that  the 
police  used  the  excuse  of  adults  complaining  to  do  what  ever  they  wanted  to.  'They 
shift  us  all  the  time',  he  said.  'They  say  there's  been  complaints,  but  that's  not  true. 
The  Scottish  Office  report  evaluating  the  impact  of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  after  six 
months  found  that  all  of  the  boys  in  their  survey  had  had  contact  with  the  police 
compared  to  only  half  of  the  girls.  These  young  people  felt  that  the  level  of  policing 
was  more  than  ever  before.  One  respondent  explained:  'Before  the  "curfew"  I  had 
been  searched  once  but  now  it's  about  every  weekend'.  This  report  found  that  girls 
195 appeared  to  avoid  contact  with  the  police  -  one  girl  explaining  that,  'If  we  see  them 
coming  we  run  and  hide  up  the  closes'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998). 
None  of  the  young  people  interviewed  expressed  a  concern  about  peer  pressure.  Also 
few  described  having  had  'serious  bother'  in  their  area.  Where  issues  of  'bother'  were 
raised,  other  groups  of  teenagers  of  a  similar  age  to  themselves  were  mentioned. 
A  safe  generation 
The  expectation  of  some  of  those  groups  and  newspapers  that  questioned  the  curfew 
was  that  its  impact  on  young  people  would  create  a  greater  sense  of  'us  and  them'  - 
especially  for  young  people  who  felt  harassed  by  the  police  activities.  However,  in 
analysing  the  thoughts  of  the  young  people  in  Hillhouse,  the  extent  of  this  concern  is 
questionable.  Rather  than  the  curfew  alienating  young  people.  frorn  the  police,  the 
teenagers  in  Hillhouse  appear  to  be  part  of  an  'alien  nation'  within  which  other  people 
are  treated  with  suspicion,  and  where  there  is  a  greater  readiness  to  understand 
freedom  less  in  terms  of  individual  liberty  than  in  terms  of  the  freedom  to  be  safe. 
Following  the  interviews  with  young  people  in  and  around  Hillhouse,  it  was  clear  that, 
despite  the  resentment  at  being  targeted  by  the  police,  these  teenagers  were  generally 
more  concerned  about  the  need  to  control  other  young  people.  Subsequently,  as  the 
police  themselves  had  suggested,  most  young  people  actually  wanted  more,  not  less, 
policing. 
The  concern  felt  by  adults  about  the  nuisance  behaviour  of  young  people,  and  the  need 
to  involve  the  police  in  the  regulation  of  this  behaviour,  was  reflected  by  the  young 
people  themselves.  This  desire  for  more  regulation  of  others  meant  that  the  young 
people  had  a  contradictory  attitude  to  the  police.  Personally,  many  young  people  had 
experiences  of  being  moved  on  by  the  police  that  frustrated  them,  but  despite  this 
there  was  still  a  desire  for  more  regulation  of  other  teenagers.  Similarly,  while  there 
was  an  acceptance  or  even  support  for  more  regulation  of  young  people's  time,  there 
was  some  evidence  that  these  teenagers  were  accepting  more  limits  on  their  own 
freedom  at  night. 
196 Asked  whether  or  not  they  supported  the  curfew,  over  half  of  the  young  people 
interviewed  from  in  and  around  Hillhouse  said  they  did  support  it.  However,  when 
broken  down  into  areas,  it  was  found  that  while  over  three  quarters  of  those  living 
outside  Hillhouse  agreed  with  the  curfew,  only  a  minority,  or  38%,  of  those  in 
Hillhouse  supported  it,  with  54%  against.  Similarly,  the  Scottish  Human  Rights 
Centre's  research,  based  on  interviews  with  66  young  people  on  the  streets  of 
Hillhouse,  found  a  quarter  of  these  young  people  supported  the  initiative  and  55% 
opposed  it  (Springham  1998). 
However,  despite  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  Hillhouse  young  people  interviewed  for 
this  thesis  opposed  the  curfew,  a  third  of  these  teenagers  opposed  it  simply  because 
they  felt  that  it  was  ineffective.  For  example,  Donna  believed  that  'It  doesn't  change 
anything',  while  Christopher  said:  'No  one's  going  in  at  9pm  anyway.  It's  a  waste  of 
time'.  Likewise  Steven  felt  that  'It  makes  no  difference,  people  just  run  away  from  the 
police'. 
Before  and  indeed  during  the  curfew,  it  was  argued,  especially  by  the  children's 
charities  and  those  opposing  the  curfew,  that  young  people  were  also  opposed  to  it. 
The  implication,  which  was  also  drawn  out  by  newspapers  like  the  Scotsman,  was  that 
young  people  were  against  the  increased  policing  of  public  space  and  of  their  freedom. 
To  assess  this  in  more  detail,  the  young  people  who  opposed  the  curfew  were  also 
asked  whether  they  thought  the  police  should  be  given  some  powers  other  than  the 
curfew  to  deal  with  the  young  people  in  their  area.  Here  it  was  found  that  two  thirds 
said  they  should  be  given  alternative  powers. 
This  meant  that,  of  the  young  people  interviewed,  only  seven  percent  were  against  the 
curfew  and  against  any  other  increase  in  police  powers  to  deal  with  young  people  in 
their  area.  Those  young  people  who  were  opposed  to  any  increased  regulation  were 
also  the  only  ones  interviewed  who  mentioned  their  rights,  or  their  parents'  rights, 
being  infringed  by  the  curfew.  For  example  Ann  from  Hillhouse,  who  was  14,  thought 
that  'the  age'  the  curfew  targeted  'is  wrong',  and  that,  'It  should  be  just  for  younger 
ones  'cos  I  want  more  time.  Fifteen-year-old  Richard  from  Hillhouse  was  annoyed  by 
197 the  police  initiative  and  explained  that,  'Tbey  take  away  our  freedom  and  boss  us 
around'.  Fifteen-year-old  Leanne  explained  that,  'It  should  be  up  to  your  marn  and 
dad'. 
The  Scottish  Office  research  in  the  area  also  found  conflicting  views  regarding 
freedom,  with  one  teenage  boy  forcefully  stating  that  'William  Wallace  fought  for 
fuck  all,  we  don't  have  freedom  here'  (McGallagly  et  al  1998).  However,  this  was  the 
exception  rather  than  the  norm,  and  made  up  a  small  percentage  of  the  young  people, 
the  vast  majority  of  whom  were  in  favour  of  some  increase  in  policing  of  the  area. 
The  limited  opposition  to  the  curfew  or  alternative  forms  of  policing  may  in  part 
reflect  the  age  of  the  interviewees  and  the  tendency  for  younger  people  to  give  the 
'right  answer'  to  questions  asked  by  adults.  In  this  respect  it  would  be  expected  that  the 
older  teenagers  would  be  more  inclined  to  demand  freedom  rather  than  more  policing. 
However,  the  majority  of  the  15-year-olds  from  in  and  around  Hillhouse  were  in 
favour  of  more  policing  of  other  young  people. 
Continuing  with  this  theme,  the  young  people  were  asked  if  they  would  like  to  see 
more  policing  in  their  area.  Almost  a  third  of  the  young  people  from  Hillhouse  wanted 
fewer  police  in  their  area,  but  over  two  thirds  wanted  more  or  no  change  to  the  amount 
of  policing  that  their  area  received.  Therefore,  for  the  majority  of  the  young  people 
living  in  Hillhouse,  it  was  found  that  the  level  of  policing  undertaken  during  the 
curfew  was  either  supported,  or  thought  to  be  not  enough.  Despite  the  fact  that  many 
of  these  young  people  were  not  convinced  that  the  curfew  was  either  fair  or  effective, 
there  was  no  overall  opposition  to  more  policing  itself. 
Studying  the  gender  difference  in  the  support  for  the  curfew,  it  was  found  that  there 
was  no  gender  difference  in  the  level  of  support  for  more  police,  or  more  regulation  of 
young  people  who  were  out  at  night.  Looking  again  at  age  differences  in  general,  it 
was  also  found,  that  there  was  little  difference  in  the  attitudes  of  the  younger  and  older 
young  people  towards  the  police.  It  was  expected  that  the  younger  teenagers,  who 
were  less  independent  and  would  be  out  on  the  street  at  night  less,  would  have  a  more 
conservative,  pro-regulatory  attitude  towards  other  young  people.  However,  while 
198 there  was  some  evidence  of  this,  it  was  also  the  case  that  the  majority  of  the  older 
teenagers  had  a  very  similar  pro-regulatory  approach  to  other  young  people,  despite 
their  own  negative  experiences  of  the  police  in  their  area. 
Examining  similar  research  into  young  people's  attitudes  to  the  police,  it  was  also 
found  that  despite  bad  personal  experiences  of  policing,  young  people  still  wanted 
more  of  it.  In  a  survey  Carried  out  in  Stirling,  for  example,  of  the  16-25  year  olds 
surveyed,  only  one  percent  of  respondents  felt  they  were  treated  well  by  the  police  and 
yet  three  quarters  believed  the  police  should  make  their  area  safer  (Stirling  Council 
1997:  106). 
Research  examining  the  experiences  and  attitudes  of  12-15  year  olds  in  the  British 
Crime  Survey  found  that  'the  stereotype  of  young  people  as  anti-authority  -  and  more 
specifically  anti-police  -  does  not  hold'.  The  report  went  on  to  explain  that  'the 
overwhelming  majority  of  young  people  recognise  the  need  for  the  police,  and  many 
look  to  them  for  protection'.  In  conclusion  the  report  noted  that  young  people  -  many 
of  whom  are  stopped  by  the  police  and  sometimes  searched  -  'may  come  to  expect  a 
degree  of  monitoring  from  the  police,  and  not  always  judge  them  any  worse  for  it' 
(Maung  1995:  57). 
The  general  relationship  between  young  people  and  the  police  appears  therefore  to  be 
a  contradictory  one.  As  the  Stirling  research  concluded,  'Young  people  seem  to  have 
quite  contradictory  views  on  policing'  (Stirling  Council  1997),  or  as  the  Scottish 
Crime  Survey  found,  'young  people  [are]  unsure  about  how  they  perceived  the  police' 
(Anderson  and  Leitch  1996:  88). 
In  Hillhouse,  the  young  people  had  a  similarly  contradictory  attitude  towards  the 
police.  For  many  young  people,  their  personal  experience  of  the  police  was  generally 
negative.  Having  been  stopped  and  moved  on  by  the  police  at  night  -  often  for  simply 
hanging  around  -  these  young  people  were  frustrated  by  police  attitudes.  The  young 
people  felt  that  it  was  unfair  to  be  moved  by  the  police  for  standing  about  with  friends. 
However,  despite  these  experiences,  the  young  people  in  and  around  Hillhouse  were 
generally  in  favour  of  the  increasing  regulation  of  public  space  -  and  in  favour  of  the 
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increased  regulation  of  young  people  who  hung  about  the  streets.  As  we  have  seen, 
few  of  these  teenagers  argued  about  their  right  to  move  around  their  estate  without 
police  interference,  or  about  the  right  of  their  parents  to  decide  upon  the  time  that  they 
should  be  allowed  out  at  night.  In  terms  of  the  general  support  for  young  people's 
freedom  to  use  public  space  in  general,  fewer  still  were  concerned  about  the  rights  of 
all  the  young  people  in  the  area,  and,  like  the  adults  they  often  criticised  for  contacting 
the  police,  they  too  were  keen  to  have  the  police  deal  with  young  people.  The  police 
were  understood  by  these  young  people  not  as  a  body  that  dealt  with  crime  but  more 
particularly  as  a  body  to  deal  with  regulating  the  petty  'antisocial'  behaviour  of  young 
people  on  their  estates  and  to  ensure  their  safety. 
Regulating  others 
To  assess  the  extent  to  which  both  children  and  young  people  had  come  to  recognise 
the  police  as  the  people  to  deal  with  young  people's  nuisance  behaviour  in  public 
space,  they  were  asked  a  serious  of  questions  related  to  this. 
Given  a  variety  of  'nuisance'  activities  that  young  people  might  be  involved  in,  the 
children  and  young  people  were  asked  if  the  police  should  be  contacted  to  deal  with 
these  problems.  These  activities  were: 
Sitting  on  a  stranger's  wall? 
Running  in  a  garden? 
Knocking  on  a  door  and  running  off? 
Smashing  a  bottle  in  the  street? 
Fighting  in  the  street? 
Playing  football  in  the  street? 
Being  noisy  in  the  street? 
Drinking  in  the  street? 
Going  out  after  the  curfew  time? 
The  level  of  support  for  phoning  the  police  if  a  young  person  was  involved  in  these 
various  activities  is  shown  below. 
200 Figure  1:  Number  of  children  and  young  people  in  favour  of  phoning  the  police 
in  different  circumstances  (%) 
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The  most  significant  finding  from  this  table  is  the  large  number  of  primary  school,  but 
more  significantly  high  school,  pupils  who  were  prepared  to  phone  the  police  for 
minor  offences.  Indeed,  apart  from  the  disparities  in  the  answers  of  the  children  and 
young  people  regarding  knocking  on  someone's  door  and  being  out  after  the  curfew 
time,  the  percentage  of  children  under  12  and  the  young  teenagers  who  would  call  the 
police  is  very  similar.  There  was  no  equivocation  in  particular  about  calling  the  police 
if  a  young  person  was  seen  drinking  under  age. 
Whether  or  not  young  people  would  actually  phone  the  police  themselves  is  unclear, 
but  there  is  a  significant  minority  of  young  people  who  said  the  police  should  be 
called  for  almost  any  'offence'  and  a  large  majority  who  said  the  police  should  be 
involved  if  young  people  were  fighting  or  drinking.  This  appears  to  reflect  a  certain 
attitude  and  a  desire  to  have  other  young  people  moved  off  the  street  for  activities  that 
would  be  defined  as  nuisance  or'non-criminal'by  the  police. 
201 Despite  the  fact  that  some  of  these  young  people  admitted  drinking  themselves,  the 
assumption  regarding  'street  drinkers'  was  that  they  would  'get  into  a  fight',  'cause 
trouble',  or  'go  a  bit  nuts'  -  and  so  deserved  to  be  picked  up  or  moved  on  by  the 
police,  just  in  case. 
The  question  about  phoning  the  police  may  have  been  too  prescriptive  and  could  have 
been  improved  with  a  more  open-ended  question  about  what  should  be  done  if  a 
young  person  was  drinking.  However,  to  clarify  the  expectation  of  police  involvement 
compared  with  that  of  local  adults,  the  80  percent  of  young  people  who  said  the  police 
should  be  phoned  for  street  drinkers  were  also  asked,  'Do  you  think  it  would  be  better 
to  contact  the  young  person's  parents  rather  than  the  policeT  Of  this  80  percent, 
almost  two  thirds  of  the  young  people  answered  no  to  this  question.  Therefore  over 
half  of  the  young  people,  even  when  given  the  option  of  contacting  a  young  person's 
parents  rather  than  contacting  the  police,  still  said  the  police  should  be  contacted  first 
to  deal  with  this  'problem'. 
The  reason  for  this  attitude  towards  other  young  people  who  drink  on  the  streets  at 
night  is  varied  and  relates  in  part  to  experiences  of  'street  drinkers'  who  sometimes 
cause  trouble  and  can  be  rowdy.  It  may  also  reflect  the  simple  fact  that  drinking  is 
something  young  people  know  they  should  not  do.  It  is  likely,  however,  that  these 
young  people  had  also  been  influenced  by  the  high-profile  police  campaigns  and  new 
laws  that  banned  street  drinking  in  many  areas  of  Scotland  in  the  years  running  up  to 
the  introduction  of  the  curfew.  Generally,  it  reflected  a  view  held  by  most  of  these 
young  people  that  the  nuisance  or  antisocial  behaviour  of  other  young  people  was 
something  that  should  be  dealt  with  by  the  police.  The  chance  that  young  people 
drinking  may  result  in  rowdy  behaviour  was  seen  as  enough  justification  for  involving 
the  police  and  moving  these  young  people  off  the  streets. 
Mile  possibly  representing  a  more  intolerant  attitude  towards  other  young  people, 
the  approach  by  many  of  the  teenagers  in  Hillhouse  to  the  issue  offreedom  in  public 
space  could  be  seen  as  representing  a  more  risk-averse  attitude,  predicated  upon  a 
more  limited  expectation  of  their  engagement  with  potential  risks. 
202 Regulating  the  self 
The  extent  of  the  personal  difficulties  facing  young  people  in  Hillhouse  was  assessed 
to  ascertain  the  myth  and  reality  of  the  idea  that  they  were  'unsafe'  in  their 
neighbourhood.  While  over  half  of  the  young  people  interviewed  thought  that 
Hillhouse  was  an  area  with  'a  lot  of  bother',  only  one  in  eight  had  personally  had  any 
'bother'.  The  trouble  mentioned  consisted  of  fights  (by  three  females),  a  gang  fight, 
and  some  teenagers  being  noisy  at  night.  Fourteen-year-old  Carol  mentioned  that  there 
had  been  a  young  man  stabbed  and  killed  a  few  years  earlier  in  a  fight.  However  this 
was  clearly  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule  to  life  in  Hillhouse,  and  does  not  explain 
why  these  young  people  had  come  to  accept,  even  expect,  the  high  level  of  regulation 
of  public  space  in  their  area. 
The  intolerant  attitude  that  many  adults  have  towards  young  people  is  here  replicated 
by  many  of  the  young  people  themselves,  who  despite  their  own  personal  experience 
of  the  police  appeared  to  be  keen  to  have  any  potential  troublemakers  cleared  off  the 
streets.  This  desire  for  a  more  regulated  environment  could  reflect  a  changing 
expectation  of  freedom  within  public  space,  and  may  also  result  in  young  people 
having  a  more  limited  expectation  of  themselves,  of  what  people  they  are  prepared  to 
have  contact  with,  and  of  what  situations  they  are  prepared  to  deal  with,  without 
police  back-up.  In  this  respect,  the  desire  by  teenagers  for  greater  freedom  and 
independence  as  they  get  older  is  potentially  conflicting  with  the  desire  for  more 
safety  and  regulation  of  others,  and  ultimately  of  themselves.  In  a  survey  of  young 
people  carried  out  by  the  South  Lanarkshire  youth  council  planning  group,  for 
example,  when  given  ten  options  to  chose  from  as  a  priority  issue,  21  %  of  respondents 
chose  'crime,  violence  and  personal  safety',  compared  to  only  15%  who  chose  'Youth 
rights'.  Like  the  transformation  of  rights  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  here,  too, 
the  right  to  be  safe  was  arguably  winning  the  battle  against  the  right  to  be  free'.  As 
15-year-old  Simon  from  Earnock  explained,  'If  someone's  drinking  in  my  street,  it's 
my  right  to  phone  the  police  if  I  want  to.  ' 
This  desire  by  teenagers  for  safety  and  more  policing  of  other  young  people  was  also 
found  to  be  the  case  in  Stirling.  Here,  it  was  found  in  a  study  of  young  people  that  half 
203 of  those  surveyed  wanted  more  police  on  the  street;  a  fifth  wanted  CCTV  to  be 
introduced  on  their  estate;  and  a  quarter  said  a  good  way  of  making  the  streets  safer 
would  be  to  make  sure  young  people  stay  off  the  streets  at  night  (Stirling  Council 
1997)  Similarly,  the  attitudes  of  the  young  people  in  and  around  Hillhouse  reflect  a 
broader  move  away  from  what  could  be  described  as  libertarian  values,  and  a  move 
towards  a  more  authoritarian  or  regulated  environment. 
Looking  at  the  12th  report  of  the  British  Social  Attitudes  Survey,  a  chapter  entitled 
'Libertarianism  in  Retreat'  assesses  the  attitudes  of  the  British  public  towards 
different  forms  of  policing  and  surveillance  and  concludes  that,  'Four  years  ago,  we 
described  the  British  public  as  "fainthearted  libertarians",  and  our  latest  data  give  no 
grounds  for  questioning  this  judgement'  (Jowells  et  al  1995:  204).  The  report  also 
noted  that  the  support  for  the  use  of  video  cameras  on  housing  estates  to  detect 
vandals,  for  example,  had  significantly  increased  from  53%  in  1990  to  70%  in  1994. 
As  with  the  desire  for  more  policing  of  street  drinking  in  Hillhouse,  the  authors  of  this 
chapter  of  the  BSA  survey  believe  that  this  move  to  accepting  more  surveillance 
cameras  on  estates  is  partly  to  do  with  the  public  becoming  used  to  these  new  forms  of 
policing.  Once  established  as  the  norm,  it  is  less  likely  that  people  will  view  new 
forms  of  policing  as  problematic  and  will  therefore  potentially  come  to  expect  a  more 
regulated  environment. 
This  expectation  of  a  higher  level  of  regulation  of  public  space  reflects  not  only  the 
normalisation  of  this  process,  but  also  an  attitude  to  life  that  elevates  the  issue  of 
safety  and  therefore  protection  above  that  of  autonomy  and  individual  freedom. 
Safety  First 
What  this  research  suggests  is  not  only  that  young  people  have  a  more  pro-regulatory 
attitude  and  level  of  support  for  police  involvement  in  public  life  than  young  people 
would  perhaps  have  had  previously,  but  that  more  generally,  their  relationships  with 
and  negotiation  of  other  young  people  in  public  space  has  been  influenced  by  a  culture 
that  elevates  safety  and  frames  relationships  more  within  a  prism  of  being  'at  risk'.  As 
such  the  interactions  and  conflicts  between  young  people  which  often  occur  in  public 
204 space  were  understood  to  a  degree  within  a  more  problematic  framework  and  the  basis 
of  support  for  'antisocial  behaviour'  initiatives  appeared  to  be  already  in  existence. 
For  those  promoting  the  curfew,  the  issue  of  safety  was  one  they  felt  was  as  relevant 
for  young  people  as  it  was  for  adults  in  the  area.  Groups  opposing  the  curfew 
questioned  this  safety  promotion  as  being,  in  part,  a  PR  exercise  to  hide  the  more 
authoritarian  and  anti-young  people  aspect  of  the  initiative.  Within  this  promotion  the 
idea  of  young  people  needing  protection  from  other  young  people  and  indeed  from 
themselves  had  a  paternalistic  quality  to  it  -  one  which  would  be  unlikely  to  be 
replicated  in  how  young  people  saw  themselves.  However,  for  a  significant  minority 
of  young  people  in  and  around  Hillhouse,  safety  was  something  they  saw  as  central 
and  was  something  which  influenced  their  activities  and  relationships  with  other 
young  people.  At  the  same  time,  for  most  of  these  young  people  the  question  of  safety 
was  one  they  clearly  were  conscious  of  and,  to  some  degree,  engaged  with  in  their 
understanding  of  themselves  and  others  around  them.  In  this  respect,  the  issue  of 
safety  promoted  by  the  authorities  was  indeed  one  which  young  people  adhered  to. 
Discussing  whether  or  not  young  people  felt  safe  on  the  streets,  travelling  around 
Hamilton,  and  in  their  dealings  with  other  young  people,  what  was  most  noticeable 
was  that  every  young  person  asked  these  questions  understood  what  was  meant  by 
being  'at  risk'  and  being  'safe'.  Also,  nobody  asked,  for  example  when  discussing 
feeling  'safe'  on  their  estate,  'Safe  from  whaff  The  category  of  being  and  feeling  safe 
was  one  that  young  people  both  engaged  with  and  understood. 
Within  a  cultural  climate  which,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  understood  and 
represented  young  people  within  the  framework  of  safety,  abuse  and  vulnerability,  and 
also  living  in  an  environment  where  safety  initiatives  were  highly  visible  and 
normalised,  it  was  likely  that  this  would  impact  not  only  on  young  people's  activities 
but  also  on  the  image  that  these  young  people  had  of  themselves  and  others. 
Despite  the  differences  between  the  understanding  that  adults  in  Hillhouse  had  of  the 
risks  and  dangers  in  the  area  compared  with  those  promoted  by  the  local  authority  and 
police,  there  was  a  general  understanding  of  children,  young  people,  and  indeed  of 
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the  safety  of  their  children,  for  example,  in  this  respect  reflected  a  common  culture  of 
fear  that  was  being  engaged  with  and  supported  by  the  CSI. 
The  extent  to  which  the  young  people  in  Hillhouse  did  understand  themselves  as  being 
'vulnerable'  is  difficult  to  ascertain.  However,  there  was  evidence  that  in  terms  of 
independent  travel,  going  out  at  night,  and  travelling  to  friends'  houses,  a  substantial 
minority  of  young  people,  between  a  quarter  and  a  third,  led  highly  regulated  lives  -  in 
part  because  of  safety  concerns  that  they  or  their  parents  had.  These  concerns  were 
rarely  based  on  any  personal  experience  of  problems  in  the  area,  but  rather  represented 
a  precautionary  approach  to  dealings  with  other  young  people. 
Discussing  her  experience  of  travelling  to  a  friend's  house,  Lucy  explained  that,  'it's  a 
fifteen  minute  walk  so  mum  takes  me  for  my  safety'.  Fifteen-year-old  Lillian 
remarked  that,  'If  it's  Hillhouse  I  get  a  lift.  I'm  scared  to  walk  by  myself  -I  don't  know 
everybody  there'.  This  concern  for  safety,  which  is  arguably  not  new,  especially  for 
girls,  was  replicated  by  a  number  of  fifteen-year-old  boys  in  the  area,  who  gave  such 
explanations  as:  'I  get  a  lift  when  it's  dark,  my  parents  would  worry  if  I  didn't,  and 
'My  mother  doesn't  like  me  walking  in  the  dark'. 
The  majority  of  young  people  in  and  around  Hillhouse  did  go  out  at  night.  However, 
as  discussed,  they  also,  at  least  in  part,  understood  their  activities  more  generally  and 
perhaps  more  acutely  in  terms  of  the  safety  and  danger  posed.  More  particularly  it  also 
appears  that  these  potential  dangers  were  understood  less  as  practical  issues  to  be 
negotiated  and  overcome,  but  as  risks  that  simply  should  not  be  faced,  or  issues  to  be 
managed  by  others.  When  discussing  the  reasons  for  supporting  the  curfew,  for 
example,  a  number  of  young  people  spoke  of  their  own  safety  but  also  that  of  young 
children.  Paul  believed  that  it  would,  'Keep  younger  kids  in  when  drink's  about',  and 
Tracy  supported  the  curfew  because  it  'saves  young  ones  from  danger'.  The  CSI  in  this 
respect  could  have  elevated  the  awareness  of  safety  and  dangers  that  existed  on  the 
Hillhouse  estate  -  despite  the  limited  evidence  of  any  real  dangers,  especially  for  the 
children  in  the  area. 
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relationship  that  young  people  in  Hillhouse  and  elsewhere  appear  to  have  with  the 
police.  As  the  Stirling  research  noted: 
Many  young  people  do  not  feel  the  police  respect  young  people  and  are 
therefore  suspicious  and  distrustful  (if  not  hostile)  towards  them,  however  they 
also  argue  for  increased  policing  and  a  more  visible  police  presence  to  increase 
their  feelings  of  safety  (Stirling  Council  1997:  106). 
For  young  people,  like  the  adults  in  the  area,  a  'feeling'  of  safety  appeared  in  part  to 
relate  to  their  awareness  of  themselves  as  being  vulnerable,  an  awareness  predicated 
upon  a  precautionary  consciousness  of  safety  first. 
This  safety  first  framework  was  something  that  was  becoming  an  influential  cultural 
trend  at  the  time  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  -  reflected  for  example  in  the  'Safe  Clubbing' 
movement  which  developed  in  nightclubs  across  the  UK.  Studying  this  development 
in  young  people's  leisure  activities,  Amis  noted  that  in  the  1950s,  1960s  and  1970s  the 
main  perceived  danger  for  young  people  who  went  out  clubbing  came  from  going  to 
'dodgy'  clubs  in  'rough'  areas.  Here  young  people  would  make  a  conscious  decision 
whether  or  pot  to  go  to  these  areas,  aware  that  there  may  be  trouble.  Today,  by 
comparison,  he  explained,  clubs  that  have  'Safe  Clubbing'  campaigns  treat  all  young 
people  as  potential  victims  not  only  of  violence,  and  sexual  harassment  but,  more 
significantly,  as  being  at  risk  from  the  'harm  adolescents  might  do  to  themselves 
through  abuse  of  alcohol  and/or  drugs'  (Amis  1997:  11).  The  implicit  assumption, 
Amis  believes,  is  that  the  young  clubbers  are  not  capable  of  making  their  own 
assessment  of  what,  if  any,  risk  is  involved  in  their  activity.  'In  effect,  '  he  states, 
4  consumption  of  drugs  and/or  drunkenness  are  seen  as  manifestations  of  victimhood 
where  people  have  lost  their  self-control  and  have  succumbed  to  temptation'  (Amis 
1997:  12). 
Like  the  concern  for  young  people  within  the  CSI  promotion,  that  they  would  become 
victims  of  peer  pressure  and  criminal  influences,  here  the  activities  of  young  people 
are  similarly  seen  within  the  prism  of  the  'at  risk'  youth.  As  Arnis  argued: 
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of  ways.  People  are  seen  as  less  in  overall  control  of  their  lives  and  more  as 
victims  of  circumstance  or  chance.  It  is  in  this  context  that  adolýscents  and 
young  adults  who  go  out  clubbing  are  increasingly  seen  as  being  "at  risk"  from 
circumstances  they  are  perceived  to  be  no  longer  capable  of  controlling 
without  outside  intervention  (Amis  1997:  15). 
While  many  young  people  would  challenge  the  notion  that  they  are  passively 
accepting  a  more  regulated  environment,  Amis  notes,  they  appear  to  have  taken  on 
board  the  idea  that  they  are  'at  risk'.  In  Hillhouse,  there  was  some  evidence  of  this 
more  risk-conscious  outlook  of  young  people,  although  as  we  have  seen  the  tension 
between  being  protected  and  being  Tree'remained  an  issue  for  many  of  these  young 
people. 
Partners  in  crime 
A  year  after  its  introduction,  the  curfew  was  announced  to  have  been  a  great  success 
and  a  declaration  was  made  by  the  police  that  the  CSI  would  be  expanded  to  cover  the 
whole  of  Hamilton.  To  emphasise  the  safety  aspect  of  the  initiative,  the  curfew  was 
renamed  the  Child  and  Young  Persons  Safety  Initiative  and  the  police  were  now  - 
possibly  to  overcome  the  'curfew'  label  -  said  to  be  enforcing  this  initiative  both  in  the 
daytime  and  at  night. 
Before  the  CSI  was  launched,  Henry  McLeish,  the  Scottish  Home  Affairs  Minister, 
explained  that,  'This  initiative  fits  in  with  the  Government's  push  for  partnership 
between  families,  the  people  and  local  authorities  to  create  a  safer  society'  (Scotsman 
3  October  1997).  One  year  on,  a  key  reasons  for  the  CSI  being  seen  as  a  success  was 
the  'partnership'  with  the  police  and  local  authority,  but  most  significantly  with  the 
public  themselves. 
In  October  1998  the  curfew  received  a  'top  award'  from  the  Crime  Prevention  and 
Community  Safety  Awards  scheme,  and  Chief  Inspector  John  Orr  explained  that  the 
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Crime  Concern,  who  organised  the  awards,  similarly  said  that:  The  Hamilton 
initiative  shows  what  can  be  achieved  with  local  partners  to  tackle  crime  and 
antisocial  behaviour',  especially  when  the  solutions  were  'based  in  the  community' 
(Hamilton  Advertiser  15  October  1998). 
The  community  involvement  in  the  CSI  had  been  a  key  aspect  of  its  promotion  by 
local  politicians  before,  during  and  after  its  initial  trial  period.  As  we  have  seen, 
consultation  had  taken  place  with  people  in  Hamilton  to  assess  public  concerns  and 
subsequent  research  was  carried  out  in  schools  and  with  local  people  in  Hillhouse  to 
gauge  the  impact  of  the  CSI.  The  desire  to  show  that  the  new  initiative  was  something 
generated  by  the  public  themselves  even  led  local  MP  George  Robertson  to  claim 
incorrectly  that  the  idea  for  a  curfew  had  come  from  the  Citizens'  Jury  -  another 
consultation  group  set  up  specifically  to  look  at  the  issue  of  community  safety. 
Following  the  publication  of  the  Scottish  Office  research  into  the  CSI,  it  was  unclear 
whether  the  initiative  had  been  a  success  or  not  -  even  in  terms  of  the  categories  of 
success  stipulated  by  the  police.  As  discussed  above,  the  safety  aspect  of  the  CSI  was 
not  proven  -  this  was  something  one  of  the  researchers  noted  in  the  local  paper,  saying 
that  'It  is  difficult  to  state  categorically  at  this  stage  whether  it  has  been  a  success  or 
failure  in  relation  to  the  safety  issue.  However,  he  noted  that  'there  is  some  evidence 
to  suggest  a  reduction  in  juvenile  crime  in  the  intervention  area'  (Hamilton  Advertiser 
22  October  1998).  The  evidence  for  this  reduction  in  crime  was,  however,  also  not 
clear  and  the  research  document  examining  various  aspects  of  crime  and  disorder  had 
conflicting  findings  (McGallagly  et  al  1998).  Indeed,  despite  the  fact  that  crime  had 
fallen  in  the  targeted  areas  by  23  percent  compared  with  the  six  months  prior  to  its 
introduction,  when  comparing  the  same  time  of  year  in  the  year  before  the  CSI  was 
introduced  it  was  found  that  crimes  had  actually  increased  by  17  percent  (Hamilton 
Advertiser  22  October  1998). 
This  may,  as  John  Orr  noted,  reflect  an  increase  in  reporting  of  crime.  However  it  was 
despite  the  research  set  up  by  the  police  and  the  statistics  they  provided  that  the 
initiative  was  said  to  be  a  great  success.  Dismissing  the  significance  of  these  findings 
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(Hamilton  Advertiser  22  October  1998). 
Indeed  regardless  of  the  statistical  evidence  of  the  usefulness  of  the  CSI,  the  act  of 
engaging  with  the  public  was  clearly  seen  by  both  police  and  especially  the  local 
politicians  as  a  success  in  and  of  itself.  That  local  people  were  anxious  and  supportive 
of  increased  policing  across  the  whole  of  Hamilton  appeared  to  be  proven  by  the  local 
newspaper's  opinion  poll.  The  poll  questioned  whether  or  not  people  would  support 
the  CSI  being  extended  across  the  whole  of  Hamilton  and  resulted  in  1556  or  93  per 
cent  of  callers  saying  they  would  support  it.  In  Hillhouse  itself,  the  Scottish  Office 
research  found  that  68  per  cent  of  those  surveyed  said  they  would  support  the  curfew's 
continuation,  although  interestingly  54  per  cent  of  the  men  asked  said  they  would  not 
support  this. 
Despite  the  often  contradictory  evidence  of  even  the  Scottish  Office  research  about  the 
curfew  -  its  success,  its  impact  of  feelings  of  safe,  the  basis  of  its  introduction  in 
relation  n  to  young  children  wandering  the  streets  and  the  impact  on  crime  and  safety  - 
the  authorities  felt  that  it  had  been  a  great  success,  and  indeed  it  won  an  award  not 
only  in  the  UK  but  also  in  Europe.  As  well  as  having  some  impact  'on  the  ground'  of 
the  targeted  areas,  it  was  the  engagement  made  between  the  authorities  and  the  public 
itself  around  this  safety  initiative  which  appeared  central.  At  a  certain  level,  the  actual 
impact  of  the  curfew  was  secondary  to  this  developed  relationship  and  the  support  of 
the  public  for  the  safety  initiative. 
However,  the  nature  of  the  'partnership'  is  itself  telling  both  in  terms  of  the  fragile 
basis  of  legitimacy  it  suggests  and  also  the  more  passive  nature  of  the  'involvement,  of 
the  community.  That  consultants  were  initially  used  to  assess  the  concerns  of  the 
public  suggests  a  certain  lack  of  surety  and  direction  by  the  local  authority,  as  does  the 
constant  attempt  to  show  that  the  initiative  was  the  product  of  public  concerns  and 
demands.  It  also  reflects  a  certain  sense  of  distance  between  the  local  politicians  and 
the  public,  who  rather  than  acting  as  their  representatives  by  nature  of  the  vote,  felt  the 
need  to  survey  their  public  to  understand  their  needs  and  desires.  To  a  degree  the 
legitimacy  and  the  responsibility  of  the  CSI  was  handed  over  to  the  public  themselves 
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general  sense  of  anxiety  that  did  appear  to  exist  amongst  the  public,  the  curfew  was 
not  something  that  they  felt  actively  engaged  by  -  it  was  not  something  that  people  felt 
was  theirs.  Indeed  the  top-down  nature  of  the  initiative  was  expressed  by  the  focus 
groups  in  the  Scottish  Office  research,  where  rather  than  feeling  part  of  the  process  of 
developing  this  initiative,  they  'expressed  confusion  over  the  purpose  and  targets  of 
the  Initiative  -  which  age  groups  it  would  apply  to  and  when  it  would  operate' 
(McGallagly  et  al  1998:  xi). 
Despite  the  consultation,  local  people  in  Hillhouse  were  not  part  of  an  active 
'movement'  to  develop  this  initiative,  while  on  the  other  hand,  local  politicians  were 
attempting,  in  part,  to  distance  themselves  from  it  by  locating  its  emergence  within  the 
community.  Not  only  were  the  authorities,  to  a  degree,  attempting  to  relinquish 
responsibility  for  the  curfew's  introduction  in  this  way,  they  were  also  attempting  to 
'de-politicise'  it  by  using  surveys  to  give  a  statistical  justification  for  their  focus  upon 
community  safety.  Rather  than  situate  the  curfew  within  a,  broad  political  programme, 
legitimacy  was  gained,  as  discussed  previously,  from  the  vulnerable  public. 
As  Heartfield  notes  with  reference  to  the  form  of  engagement  developing  under  the 
'Third  Way'  project  of  New  Labour: 
The  Third  Way  connected  with  the  electorate,  not  on  the  basis  of  their 
collective  purpose,  but  instead  playing  upon  their  individuation  and  the 
anxieties  that  arose  from  it.  The  voters  were  no  longer  represented  in  the  polity 
as  the  collective  subject  of  the  democratic  process.  Instead  they  were 
recognised  by  the  state  as  the  isolated  and  persecuted  victims  of  events  beyond 
their  control  (Heartfield  2002:  199). 
Politicising  fear 
At  a  national  level,  Labour  politicians  were  less  defensive  about  the  attack  on 
antisocial  behaviour,  and  the  MP  for  Hamilton,  George  Robertson,  prioritised  the 
'right  to  a  quiet  life'  ahead  of  concerns  about  representing  the  curfew  as  a  child  safety 
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British  government  had  introduced  the  Crime  and  Disorder  Bill,  which  gave  powers  to 
local  authorities  to  introduce  'curfews'  for  under-  I  0-year-olds  across  the  country.  This 
was  not  something  that  the  government  quietly  introduced,  but  was  presented  rather  as 
a  flagship  initiative  symbolising  Labour's  tough  stance  on  disorder. 
The  legitimacy  for  this  development  may  well  have  come  from  'borrowing'  the 
authority  of  the  victim,  but  was  something  that  national  politicians,  the  home  secretary 
and  the  Prime  NEnister  felt  they  could  actively  promote  and  place  at  the  centre  of  their 
crime  policies.  Like  the  chief  inspector  of  Strathclyde  police  who  was  not  going  to  get 
'hung  up  on  figures'  that  questioned  the  curfew's  legitimacy,  national  politicians  were 
similarly  confident  in  their  understanding  of  the  public  as  being  generally  victimised 
and  in  need  of  support.  At  this  national  level,  politicians  were  more  in  tune  with  the 
general  or  abstract  sense  of  the  victimised  public  and  more  vociferous  in  their  attempt 
to  reengage  this  public  through  this  representation  of  thern. 
That  on  the  anniversary  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  the  Crime  and  Disorder  Bill  was 
passed,  allowing  local  authorities  to  introduce  curfew  for  under-  10-year-olds  across 
the  country,  indicates  that  the  developments  in  Hamilton  were  part  of  a  wider  political 
process. 
In  this  chapter  it  has  been  shown  that  there  was  often  a  different  response  by  local 
people  to  the  initiative,  to  do  with  their  understanding  of  the  problems  in  their  area 
and  to  the  measures  needed  to  overcome  them.  The  curfew,  for  example,  was  not 
supported  by  most  young  people  in  the  area  and  the  extent  that  children  were  unsafe 
was  not  agreed  upon.  However,  whatever  the  myths  and  realities  of  the  'at  risk'  nature 
of  the  Hillhouse  estate,  there  was  a  general  sense  of  insecurity  which  the  initiative 
tapped  into.  Whatever  the  safety  risks  for  adults  and  young  people  there  was  a  sense 
of  being  unsafe,  and  while  the  curfew  was  not  fully  endorsed  by  all  sections  of  the 
public  there  was  again  a  general  desire  that  safety  should  be  'provided'  by  the 
authorities  and  that  this  was  a  'right'  that  was  expected  by  much  of  the  community. 
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insecurities  but  also,  and  perhaps  most  significantly,  to  the  concerns  of  the  political 
elite.  In  this  respect  the  study  of  the  curfew  in  Hamilton  was  also  a  study  of  these 
concerns  and  of  the  newly  developing  relationship  between  the  political  authorities 
and  the  'victimised  public':  a  relationship  that  was  therapeutically  reforming  around 
the  'feelings'  of  insecurity  and  the  'community  of  fear'. 
Conclusion 
Ignoring  for  a  moment  the  intricacies  of  the  curfew  and  the  various  justifications  for 
its  introduction  and  its  actual  impact,  what  is  under  study  at  the  core  of  this  thesis  is 
the  relationship  between  the  state  and  society  -  or  perhaps  more  accurately,  between 
the  state  and  the  individual. 
In  examining  the  curfew,  we  have  been  studying  in  part  the  arguments  used  to 
legitimise  the  state  and  through  this,  attempted  to  uncover  the  nature  of  the 
contemporary  'subject'  both  within  politics  and  at  the  level  of  the  individual:  a  subject 
that  is  less  a  'reflexive'  individual  (Giddens  1991)  or  a  greedy  individual  (Lea  and 
Young  1984)  than  a  diminished  subject. 
In  this  respect,  if  at  a  more  narrowly  focused  level,  this  thesis  is  attempting  to  address 
the  problem  raised  by  C.  Wright  Mills  when  he  asked,  'What  varieties  of  men  and 
women  now  prevail  in  this  society  and  in  this  period?  And  what  varieties  are  coming 
to  prevail?  In  what  ways  are  they  selected  and  formed,  liberated  and  repressed,  made 
sensitive  and  blunted?  '(Mills  1967:  13). 
In  Hamilton,  where  'child  safety'  was  understood  to  be  a  significant  issue  by  the  local 
authority,  there  was  no  demand  or  expectation  that  the  community  should,  or  even 
could,  do  something  about  this  themselves.  This  is  perhaps  the  strongest  example  of 
the  diminished  expectations  of  local  people.  Despite  the  unquestionable  moral  or 
amoral  absolutist  position  that  child  safety  had  in  society,  no  independent  action  of  an 
individual  or  collective  nature  was  even  contemplated  by  the  local  authority.  But  then, 
the  very  process  of  engaging  with  people  as  fundamentally  vulnerable  already 
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expressed  most  acutely  in  the  promotion  of  the  problems  of  child  safety  itself  -a 
problem  that  in  objective  terms  appears  to  have  had  little  if  any  validity,  indeed  that 
was,  at  a  general  level,  a  myth. 
The  attempted  engagement,  as  discussed,  between  the  authorities  and  the  individual 
was  within  the  prism  of  safety  and  as  such  related  to  a  more  fragmented  insecure 
public  at  an  individual  level.  Community  safety  was,  however,  not  simply  a  public 
preoccupation  but  was  also  something  that  was  a  political  priority  at  the  same  time. 
At  a  local  level  the  role  of  politicians  was  important  in  helping  to  frame  the  arguments 
for  the  curfew,  and  at  a  national  level  the  significance  of  antisocial  behaviour  made 
politicians  the  dominant  clainismakers  in  relation  to  this  social  problem. 
One  reason  for  the  previous  and  subsequent  examination  of  political  processes  and 
rhetoric  within  this  thesis,  is  the  centrality  of  politics  in  the  sphere  of  subjectivity  and 
subjective  action.  While  there  are  underlying  social  and  economic  developments  that 
have  led  to  the  situation  in  Hamilton,  in  particular  with  the  fragmentation  of 
communities,  as  Heartfield  notes,  the  examination  of  politics  is  of  value  because 
I politics  is  the  realm  of  subject  formation'  (Heartfield  2002:  204).  By  this  Heartfield 
means  that,  whereas  economic  and  social  changes  provide  the  background  for  changes 
in  society,  the  'final  determination  of  events'  comes  from  the  reaction  of  significant 
groups  and  individuals  within  the  realm  of  politics. 
Despite  subjectivity  being  discussed  here  as  having  been  diminished,  this  does  not 
signify  that  the  role  of  subjectivity  is  less  important,  but  rather  that  the  exan-dnation  of 
this  diminished  subjectivity  can  help  to  unearth  and  explain  the  increasing 
significance  given  to  community  safety  and  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives  by  the 
authorities  themselves. 
In  terms  of  the  CSI  and  the  diminished  level  of  responsibility  and  action  expected  of 
the  local  people,  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  it  is  important  to  note  that  not  all 
of  the  people  in  Hillhouse  reflected  the  vulnerable  individual  that  was  represented  by 
214 the  authorities.  Some  of  the  young  people  -  if  a  minority  -  remained  more  'streetwise' 
and  dynamic  in  their  engagement  with  public  space,  and  a  number  of  adults  were  still 
involved  in  regulating  the  behaviour  of  young  people  in  their  area.  Indeed,  that  only 
just  over  half  of  the  local  men  questioned  in  the  Scottish  Office  survey  supported  an 
extension  of  this  initiative  could  suggest  that  they  felt  it  unnecessary,  possibly  because 
the  problems  being  engaged  with  were  ones  they  felt  able  to  resolve  themselves. 
Whatever  the  reasons  for  this,  it  was  clear,  in  discussions  with  the  local  community 
council  chair  and  others,  that  not  all  of  the  adults  in  the  area  were  as  engaged  by  the 
problems  of  crime,  safety  and  antisocial  young  people.  This  is  not  to  argue  that  fear 
and  a  level  of  insecurity  was  not  significant  in  the  area  -  and  certainly  in  terms  of  child 
safety  there  appeared  to  be  no  disagreement  with  its  importance  in  general.  However, 
as  Nolan  has  noted  in  relation  to  therapeutic  awareness  training  within  the  workplace 
that,  'take[s]  the  most  thin-skinned,  chronically  offended  person  in  a  group  as  the 
norm'  (Nolan  1998:  294),  in  Hamilton  the  CSI  was  similarly  based  upon  an 
understanding  of  the  local  adults  as  being  'chronically'  vulnerable,  and  terrorised  by 
the  activities  of  local  children  and  young  people.  As  Garland  has  noted,  in  terms  of 
how  the  state  relates  to  its  citizens,  The  victim  is  now,  in  a  certain  sense,  a  much  more 
representative  character,  whose  experience  is  taken  to  be  common  and  collective, 
rather  than  individual  and  atypical"  (Garland  2002:  11).  It  was  this  image  of  the 
subject  which  dominated  the  promotion  and  implementation  of  the  curfew. 
That  local  adults  were  understood  to  be  'living  in  fear'  was  not  simply  a  figment  of  the 
authority's  imagination,  indeed  a  'culture  of  fear'  did  appear  to  both  surround  adults 
lives  and  also  that  of  children.  However,  that  this  fear  was  a  direct  product  of  crime 
and  antisocial  behaviour  is  extremely  contestable.  As  we  noted  in  interviews  with  the 
children  and  young  people,  Hillhouse  was  far  from  being  a  ghetto  where  young  people 
or  adults  were  seriously  'at  risk'.  Indeed,  looking  not  only  at  broad  social  and 
economic  changes,  but  also  at  the  level  of  the  different  generations  and  their 
interactions  with  young  people,  there  appears  to  be  far  wider  reasons  for  the  level  of 
insecurity  and  lack  of  surety  felt  by  adults  in  their  relations  with  the  young.  - 
However,  despite  these  wider  considerations  it  has  been  politicians  and,  most 
noticeably  and  currently,  the  New  Labour  Party  that  has  not  only  reacted  to  public 
215 insecurities  but  helped  to  generate  them  by  engaging  with  and  promoting  the  politics 
of  fear.  In  his  book  The  Unfinished  Revolution,  Labour  Party  moderniser  Philip 
Gould,  for  example,  self-consciously  recognised  that  fear  had  emerged  due  to  broad 
social  changes,  but  nonetheless  believed  that  New  Labour  must  reconnect  with  voters 
with  policies  that  are  'tough  on  crime'  (Gould  1999). 
This  development,  rather  than  reflecting  simple  political  opportunism  or  a  conspiracy 
within  the  Labour  ranks  to  engage  with  public  fears  that  the  politicians  themselves  do 
not  hold,  expressed  an  emerging  political  elite  that,  for  different  reasons  than  the 
fragmented  public,  also  had  an  exaggerated  sense  of  social  disintegration,  in  part 
because  of  a  diminution  of  a  belief  in  its  own  capacity  to  influence  social 
developments. 
As  the  curfew  was  approaching  its  first  year  in  operation,  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair 
expressed  this  sense  of  social  instability  in  a  world  where  subjective  intervention 
appeared  not  only  as  inadequate  but  as  part  of  the  problem.  Speaking  at  the  Labour 
Party  conference  in  Blackpool,  Blair  explained  that, 
People  are  posing  questions  far  more  fundamental  than  about  what  is  in  a 
manifesto.  How  can  I  be  sure  about  my  job,  about  my  family's  safety,  about 
the  future  prosperity  of  my  country?  This  is  the  challenge:  finding  security  and 
stability  in  a  world  pushed  ever  faster  forward  by  the  irresistible  forces  of 
history  and  human  invention  (Guardian  30  September  1998  (my  italics)). 
History  and  human  intervention,  understood  as  an  'irresistible  force'  somehow  beyond 
control,  has  here  resulted  in  a  conservative  preoccupation  with  'security  and  stability' 
at  the  international  and  national  level. 
The  focus  on  community  safety  seen  in  Hamilton  was,  in  this  respect,  less  to  do  with 
local  fears  and  the  activities  of  the  local  youth  than  with  the  loss  of  a  sense  of 
subjective  political  capacities  of  the  political  elite  themselves  -  something  that  was 
reflected  at  the  local  level.  In  South  Lanarkshire  and  in  Hillhouse  itself,  the  somewhat 
myopic  and  persistent  focus  upon  community  safety  in  the  interpretation  of  surveys 
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with  and  organisation  around  safety  and  security. 
However,  while  the  'culture  of  fear'  has  broad  cultural  routes,  it  is  the  development 
not  only  of  relevant  claims  that  promote  certain  social  problems,  but  perhaps  more 
importantly  the  institutionalisation.  of  these  problems. 
The  institutionalisation  of  the  CSI,  for  example,  had  an  impact  not  only  at  a  local  level 
but  at  a  national  and  indeed  international  level,  in  promoting  the  idea  that  children 
were  'at  risk'  and  that  communities  are  being  undermined  by  the  antisocial  behaviour 
of  young  people.  In  this  respect  this  initiative  not  only  related  to  the  culture  of  fear, 
but  helped  to  reinforce  it  and  form  the  framework  of  understanding  the  problem  of 
fear  in  society. 
Ironically,  in  relation  to  how  social  problems  are  constructed  or  how  they  are  ignored, 
it  was  within  the  development  of  the  CSI  that  a  very  different  and  alternative  response 
by  local  politicians  was  illustrated  -  with  the  development  of  the  Universal 
Connexions  youth  caM. 
This  0  million  pound  development  was  part  of  the  CSI  package  -  not  only  to  remove 
young  people  off  the  streets,  but  to  give  them  something  to  do  and  somewhere  to  go. 
However,  the  subsequent  gathering  of  young  people  around  this  centre  and  the  various 
$antisocial'  activities  they  'got  up  to'  led  to  a  significant  number  of  complaints  from 
local  adults.  Rather  than  react  to  these  complaints  with  another  curfew  or  a  similar 
community  safety  initiative,  the  council  leader  Tom  McCabe  denounced  those  people 
complaining  and  rejected  their  calls  for  a  'quiet  neighbourhood'.  Frustrated  by  these 
complaints  and  the  fact  that  the  council  had  spent  so  much  money  on  a  new  youth 
resource,  McCabe  swept  aside  the  local  concerns  and  stated  that  the  area  was  'never 
that  quiet  anyway'  (Hamilton  Advertiser  24  December  1998). 
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Antisocial.,  opposed  to  the  principles  on  which  society  is  constituted  (Oxford  English 
Dictionary  in  !  L83). 
Antisocial:  Contrary  to  the  laws  and  customs  of  society;  causing  annoyance  and 
disapproval  in  others:  children's  antisocial  behaviour  (New  Oxford  English 
Dictionary  1.282).  136 
Introduction 
The  term  'antisocial  behaviour'  has  existed  for  many  years,  and  indeed  many  of  the 
issues  addressed  today  within  the  parameters  of  antisocial  behaviour  are  Often  similar 
to  those  addressed  in  the  past.  137  However,  despite  these  similarities,  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  understand  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  -  especially  in  terms  of  its 
significance  to  politics  and  society  more  generally  -  as  simply  a  continuation  of  past 
concerns.  Not  only  has  the  meaning  of  antisocial  behaviour  changed somewhat,  as 
reflected  in  the  dictionary  definitions  above,  but  the  number  and  variety  of  forms  of 
behaviour  and  actions  that  are  today  so  labelled  has  increased,  and  continues  to 
increase.  Old  social  concerns  have  been  relabelled  as  antisocial,  while  new  'crimes' 
and  forms  of  problem  behaviour  have  been  discovered  and  branded  within  the  rubric 
of  'antisocial  behaviour'. 
Having  discussed  so  far  the  rise  of  amoral  panics  and  the  development  of  the  politics 
of  antisocial  behaviour  that  led  to  the  introduction  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  here  the 
increasing  concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  since  this  initiative  was  introduced  is 
explored  more  fully. 
In  1997,  when  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  introduced,  many  issues  that  have  become 
associated  with  antisocial  behaviour  were  at  this  point  in  time  not  defined  as  being 
$antisocial'.  Subsequently,  the  rise  in  the  significance  of  'antisocial  behaviour'  to 
public  and  political  life  has  been  established  to  the  extent  that  it  has  become  one  of  the 
218 most  discussed  social  problems.  But  why  is  this,  and  why  has  the  term  'antisocial 
behaviour'  come  to  be  used  to  explain  myriad  social  problems?  How  does  this  relate 
to  the  nature  of  politics,  the  engagement  with  the  vulnerable  public,  and  what  does  it 
tell  us  about  the  individual  and  about  society? 
As  we  will  see,  the  use  of  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  has  grown  significantly  in 
recent  years,  within  the  media,  within  academic  research  and  particularly  within  the 
more  psychologically  framed  forms  of  research  and  criminology.  In  much  of  these 
discussions  about  antisocial  behaviour,  it  is  not  simply  that  old  issues  have  been  re- 
branded  as  antisocial,  but  rather  that  new  forms  of  behaviour  have  been  problematised 
and  old  issues  reinterpreted  through  a  more  therapeutic  gaze.  Why  such  issues  can  be 
understood  as  both  antisocial  and  as  a  form  of  behaviour  is  examined  to  understand 
how  the  themes  discussed  so  far  in  the  thesis  can  be  seen  within  the  very  meaning  and 
understanding  of  modem  day  antisocial  behaviour. 
The  rise  of  antisocial  behaviour 
So  prevalent  is  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  today  that  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that 
this  'social  problem'  had  little  public/political  existence  just  a  few  years  ago.  Today, 
tantisocial  behaviour'  is  a  significant  issue  in  the  media,  politics,  law  and  research.  In 
social  policy,  in  local  government,  and  within  the  activities  of  voluntary  organisations, 
antisocial  behaviour  helps  to  direct  myriad  initiatives;  while  within  the  public  domain 
and  even  in  popular  television  culture  issues  associated  with  antisocial  behaviour  have 
become  an  area  of  significant  concern  and  focus.  This  popular  and  political  concern 
with  antisocial  behaviour  is  also  reflected  to  some  degree  within  academia  - 
especially  within  the  more  psychologically-oriented  forms  of  sociology  and 
criminology. 
Examining  the  media  articles  addressing  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour,  for 
example,  we  find  that  from  the  1980s,  when  there  were  few  such  articles,  the  concern 
with  antisocial  behaviour  has  increased  significantly  through  the  1990s  and  into  the 
twenty-first  century. 
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From  a  consistent  increase  in  articles  related  to  antisocial  behaviour  up  to  2001  -  as 
shown  above  -a  further  and  more  rapid  increase  occurred.  For  example,  whereas  the 
number  of  such  articles  in  2001  in  the  Guardian  was  80,  this  increased  to  273  in  2003, 
and  then  to  574  in  2004.139  This  increase  reflected  in  part  the  institutional  isation  of 
initiatives  to  address  issues  of  antisocial  behaviour  -  like  ASBOs  (Antisocial 
Behaviour  Orders),  140  and  the  concurrent  political  focus  on  this  issue  by  the  Labour 
government.  141 
The  Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative  was  one  of  the  first  major  local  initiatives, 
following  the  election  of  New  Labour,  to  deal  with  issues  associated  with  antisocial 
behaviour,  and  this  has  been  followed  by  a  number  of  significant  pieces  of  legislation 
including  the  1998  Crime  and  Disorder  Act,  the  Antisocial  Behaviour  Act  (2003)  and 
the  Antisocial  Behaviour  Act  (Scotland)  2004.142 
Politicians  have  also  helped  to  make  antisocial  behaviour  into  a  'social  problem', 
expressed  in  their  speeches  and  laws.  This  can  be  illustrated  by  the  number  of  articles 
where  politicians  discuss  or  comment  on  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour.  In  1985,  for 
example,  there  was  only  one  such  article  in  the  Guardian,  with  9  in  1994  and  over  170 
in  2004.143 
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1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 'Antisocial  behaviour'  has  increasingly,  over  the  last  decade  (in  terms  of  newspaper 
coverage),  become  associated  with  'communities'  and  'estates'  -  and  with  working 
class  youth  in  particular.  Over  half  of  the  Guardian  articles  on  antisocial  behaviour  in 
2004,  for  example,  related  to  young  people  and  a  similar  number  related  to 
'community'  or  'estates.  144 
Judging  by  the  number  of  articles  on  antisocial  behaviour,  it  would  appear  that  the 
issue  has  grown  slowly  over  the  1990s  and  suddenly  exploded  from  2002  to  become  a 
major  issue.  However,  this  understanding  would  underestimate  the  growing  concern 
about  I)ehaviourin  general  which  took  various  forms  in  the  1990s,  and  which  by  the 
turn  of  the  century  had  become  more  directly  institutionalised  around  the  theme  of 
'antisocial  behaviour'. 
The  media  coverage  of  antisocial  behaviour  related  to  both  the  political  and 
institutional  focus  upon  this  social  problem  -  but  concern  about  this  type  of  behaviour 
is  by  no  means  simply  an  'elite'  concern.  Phone  calls  to  the  police,  for  example,  about 
'nuisance'  (i.  e.  non-criminal  behaviour)  of  young  people,  had  been  noted  to  be  a  major 
issue  for  the  police  in  1996,145  and  before  this  in  1992,  the  British  Crime  Survey  had 
also  noted  that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  rise  in  their  crime  statistics  was  due  to  the 
increased  reporting  of  'less  serious'  crimes,  due  to  the  'increasing  public  sensitivity'  to 
crime  related  issues  (Home  Office  1992).  More  recently  the  MORI  poll  What  Place 
for  ASBOs  in  an  Era  of  Respect?,  has  noted  that  'antisocial  behaviour  is  an  issue 
which  resonates  with  the  public  at  a  'local  level'.  146 
Within  the  social  sciences,  issues  associated  with  antisocial  behaviour  have  also 
become  more  significant  as  an  area  for  research.  This  has  developed  in  part  with  the 
increased  focus  within  criminology  on  victims  of  crime  and  concerns  with  harassment 
and  abuse,  147  but  perhaps  most  significantly  within  the  field  of  psychology  and 
research  focused  upon  psychosocial  risk  factors. 
Examining  research  related  to  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour,  and  in  particular  the 
increasing  use  of  this  term,  very  similar  results  were  found  to  the  newspaper  searches, 
with  a  huge  increase  in  journal  articles  in  the  International  Bibliography  of  the  Social 
221 Sciences  (BIDS)  containing  the  term'antisocial  behaviour'  or  'anti-social  behavioue  in 
the  late  1990s  and  early  years  of  the  twenty-first  century.  148 
Table  4:  BIDS  search  for  'antisocial  behaviour'  or  'anti-social  behaviour'. 
Year  Number  of  hits 
1951-55  3 
1956-60  1 
1961-65  1 
1966-70  0 
1971-75  5 
1976-80  7 
1981-85  6 
1986-90  8 
1991-95  28 
1996-2000  154 
2001-  April  2005  120 
Part  of  this  increase  reflects  the  increasing  number  of  journals  searched  within  BIDS. 
However,  it  also  reflects  the  greater  number  of  psychologically  oriented  journals, 
which,  in  part,  have  helped  focus  more  research  on  issues  associated  with  antisocial 
behaviour.  149 
In  relation  to  policy  developments  associated  with  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour,  the 
growth  of  the  psychologically-based  developmental  criminology  has  also  been 
significant  in  focusing  attention  on  issues  of  'behaviour'  within  criminology  and  also 
in  helping  to  set  the  parameters  within  which  these  problems  are  understood.  As  a 
leading  figure  within  developmental  criminology,  David  Farrington,  notes: 
'Developmental  criminology  advanced  enormously  in  the  1980s  and  1990s',  in  the 
study  of  'the  development  of  offending  and  antisocial  behaviour'  (Farrington  2002: 
658).  This  approach  to  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  has,  in  the  1990s,  encouraged 
an  'enormous  increase  in  the  influence  of  risk-focused  prevention  in  criminology,  an 
222 approach  which  was  'imported  into  criminology  from  medicine  and  public  health' 
(2002:  660),  and  that,  as  Farrington  argues,  sees  offending  as  'part  of  a  larger 
syndrome  of  antisocial  behaviour  that  arises  in  childhood  and  tends  to  persist  into 
adulthood'  (2002:  658  my  italics). 
Through  the  1980s  and  1990s,  as  Hollin  states,  'criminological  psychologists  became 
sufficiently  confident  in  their  subject  to  begin  to  produce  a  string  of  textbooks  on  the 
topic  of  psychology  and  crime'(Hollin  2002:  163-5).  As  this  confidence  grew,  so  too 
did  the  'increasing  harmony  between  criminologists  and  psychologists  in  the  UK', 
assisted  in  large  part  by  the  Developmental  Criminology  of  authors  like  David 
Farrington  (2002:  166). 
Antisocial  behaviour  has  unquestionably  grown  as  a  'social  problem'  and  focus  for 
concern  within  public  life,  within  politics,  and  in  research,  while  the  media  coverage 
of  issues  labelled  as  being  antisocial  has  risen  sharply  over  the  last  few  years. 
However,  as  discussed  previously,  a  number  of  issues  had  already  arisen  and  helped 
lay  the  foundations  of  this  focus  upon  problematic  behaviour  between  people  in 
society  often  associated  with  crime  and  abuse.  Issues  of  abuse  had  emerged,  especially 
in  relation  to  children,  in  the  1980s;  youth  crime  had  emerged  as  a  political  priority 
from  1993;  the  issue  of  'irresponsible  parents'  had  developed  as  a  major  concern 
regarding  antisocial  young  people;  and  the  fear  of  crime  and  focus  on  victims  within 
crime  had  become  an  accepted  priority  by  the  mid-1990s.  Also  areas  of  concern  like 
that  of  'community'  -  as  a  place  of  focus,  and  in  terms  of  the  sense  of  'community'  - 
had  become  issues  for  governance  (Rose  1996),  while  notions  of  'risk'  and  'safety'  had 
become  more  influential  at  this  time  (Furedi  2004:  127). 
How  these  issues  inform  the  understanding  of  antisocial  behaviour,  and  more 
specifically,  what  the  conceptual  issues  are  that  link  them  together  under  the  banner  of 
antisocial  behaviour,  will  be  discussed  more  fully  below.  Before  developing  this  thesis 
on  antisocial  behaviour,  however,  it  is  worth  examining  in  more  detail  how  antisocial 
behaviour  is  related  to  the  couplet  it  is  often  paired  with  -  crime. 
223 Crime  and  antisocial  behaviour 
Antisocial  behaviour,  at  the  time  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  was  often  given  significance 
with  reference  to  more  serious  crime,  with  for  example  the  popularity  of  the  broken 
windows  theory  of  disorder  leading  to  criminality  espoused  by  Strathclyde  Chief 
Constable  John  Off.  However  as  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  has  itself  become 
more  accepted  as  a  serious  Problem  in  its  own  right,  this  association  with  crime  has 
become  less  necessary. 
Some  of  the  most  recent  crime  statistics,  and  the  reactions  to  them,  are  telling  in 
understanding  how  the  socially  constructed  nature  of  crime  is  addressed  today. 
Despite  headlines  like'Overall  crime  down  by  44%  since  1995',  the  high  levels  of  fear 
of  crime  amongst  the  public  and  the  reaction  to  this  fear  by  politicians  remains  intense 
(Guardian  I  December  2005). 
Crime  figures  that  would  in  previous  historical  periods  have  led  to  a  sense  that  society 
was  improving  and  that  crime  problems  were  falling  have  not  accompanied  this  'quite 
extraordinary  and  historically  unprecedented,  statistical  fall  in  crime.  Rather,  the  focus 
of  newspaper  articles,  television  debate  programmes  and  most  political  commentary 
on  these  figures  in  2005  was  to  focus  in  on  any  possible  negative  figure  available. 
Statistics  on  violent  crime,  for  example,  showed  an  increase  and  became  the  focus  of 
media  and  political  concern,  despite  Home  Office  experts  strenuously  denying  that 
this  increase  was  'real'  (Guardian  21  July  2005).  150 
With  crime  being  a  universally  accepted  political  priority,  and  with  all  political  parties 
attempting  to  gain  support  by  relating  to  this  'problem',  both  the  Liberal  Democrats 
and  the  Conservative  home  affairs  spokesmen  targeted  these  figures  on  violent  crime, 
relating  it  specifically  to  the  problem  of  'binge  drinking',  a  form  of  'antisocial 
behaviour'the  government  had  itself  helped  make  into  a  social  problem. 
Here,  as  in  many  discussions  about  crime  today,  the  issue  of  'violent  crime'  became  a 
discussion  of  problem  behaviour:  'binge  drinking',  something  that  is  not  itself  a  crime, 
but  has  become  directly  connected  with  it.  Regardless  of  the  reality  that  violent  crime 
224 -  if  measured  using  methods  used  in  1997  -  has  actually  fallen,  and  the  recognition 
that  the  statistical  increase  in  2005  is  due  to  changes  in  reporting  and  recording  of 
these  crimes,  objective  statistics  appear  to  be  almost  irrelevant  to  the  sense  that  crime 
is  on  the  increase  and  to  the  way  politicians  and  the  media  relate  to  issues  of  crime 
and  antisocial  behaviour.  Politicians  from  all  sides  continue  to  demand  further 
regulations  of  problem  behaviour,  while  the  government  continues  to  look  for  ever- 
more  forms  of  regulation  to  make  society  even  safer  -  like  the  proposal  to  ban  replica 
guns,  following  the  significant  fall  in  real  gun  crime. 
Within  concerns  and  discussions  about  crime  and  particularly  antisocial  behaviour, 
there  appears  to  be  a  declining  significance  in  the  'objectively'  measured  reality  of 
these  problems  for  both  politicians  and  the  public  -  helped  in  large  part  by  the  focus 
not  on  crime  and  antisocial  acts  themselves,  but  on  the  fear  and  anxiety  expressed 
within  society.  151  Rather  than  engaging  with  'real'  social  problems  and  processes,  the 
trend  within  politics  and  the  press  is  to  engage  with  this  subjective  sense  of  fear. 
Crime  policies  and  discussions  in  this  respect  become  less  about  actual  crime  than 
about  engaging  with  people's  perceptions,  anxieties,  and  'loss  of  confidence'. 
As  the  MORI  Poll  What  place  for  ASBOs  in  an  era  of  Respect?  notes  with  regard  to 
the  development  of  ASBOs,  'Antisocial  behaviour  orders  are  a  symbol  of  action  - 
thereby  helping  to  increase  public  confidence  on  an  issue  which  resonates'  (MORI 
2005). 
The  relationship  between  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  continues  today.  However, 
the  emphasis  of  concern  has  shifted  to  focus  increasingly  upon  antisocial  behaviour  as 
the  problem.  In  the  example  of  'violent  crime',  'problem  behaviour'  like  binge  drinking 
is  directly  associated  with  more  serious  crime;  however,  the  issue  of  binge  drinking  is 
also  understood  to  be  a  serious  problem  of  'antisocial  behaviour'  in  and  of  itself  -  and 
has  become  a  focus  for  political  intervention.  Whereas  antisocial  behaviour  in  the 
mid-1990s  was  often  highlighted  as  being  a  significant  problem  within,  for  example, 
'Zero  Tolerance'  police  initiatives,  by  associating  petty  crimes  with  serious  crimes, 
today,  the  issue  of  'antisocial  behaviour'  is  a  recognised  social  problem  in  its  own 
225 right.  There  is  no  longer  a  need  to  associate  antisocial  behaviour  with  'serious' 
problems  of  crime:  it  is itself  a'serious  problem'. 
Secondly,  like  the  positive  crime  figures  in  2005  that  are  generally  interpreted 
negatively  in  society,  despite  the  statistical  evidence  to  the  contrary,  antisocial 
behaviour  needs  little  or  no  objective  verification  as  a  social  problem.  Indeed,  rarely, 
if  ever,  do  speeches,  new  laws  and  initiatives  about  antisocial  behaviour  come  with  a 
statistical  justification.  Where  previously  crime  initiatives  would  often  have  been 
developed  in  relation  to  statistical  'evidence',  today  the  problem  of  antisocial 
behaviour  is  simply  accepted.  'Antisocial  behaviour'  as  a  social  problem  is  in  this 
respect  related  to  as  an  almost  entirely  subjective  problem,  and  one  that  politicians 
engage  with  at  the  level  of  fear,  anxiety  and  confidence. 
The  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  -  while  having  already  been  isolated  as  a  topic  of 
concern,  for  example  in  the  Labour  Party  document  Partners  against  crime  -  has 
increasingly  become  understood  as  the  most  significant  issue  in  relation  to  this  sense 
of  fear  and  anxiety  in  society.  152  With  falling  crime  rates  in  the  last  ten  years,  and 
particularly  since  New  Labour  came  to  power,  but  with  no  similar  fall  in  the  anxiety 
about  crime  and  disorder,  the  focus  upon  antisocial  behaviour  has  further  intensified, 
and  been  understood  as  the  key  problem  affecting  communities  and  society  more 
generally. 
Finally,  despite  the  fact  that  the  problem  of  'antisocial  behaviour'  is  often  related  to 
non-criminal  or  petty  criminal  activities,  it  is  understood  to  be  a  problem  that  is 
serious  -  indeed  to  some  extent  more  serious  than  crime  itself.  153  To  engage  with  the 
issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  is  to  relate  both  to  the  fear  in  society  and  the  broad  sense 
of  social  disorder.  In  this  respect  it  is  not  so  much  that  antisocial  behaviour  is  given 
significance  in  relation  to  crime,  but  rather  that  crime  is  seen  as  significant  as  an 
expression  of  antisocial  behaviour. 
Whereas  crimes  like  burglary,  for  example,  which  were  a  major  focus  for  analysis  in 
the  1970s,  had  a  certain  objective  (economic)  image  and  were  recognised  to  be  rare 
events  for  most  people,  antisocial  behaviour  has  a  more  generalised  air  of  permanence 
226 and  is  understood  to  be  a  more  'irrational'  or  'random'  (Best  1999)  occurrence  -a  wider 
problem  of  'behaviour'  and  one  which  is  ever-present.  Even  burglary,  in  this  respect,  is 
discussed  most  frequently  with  reference  to  drug  addicts  -  the  issue  of  concern  being 
less  on  the  crime  itself  than  on  the  problematic  lifestyle  and  behaviour  of  heroine 
users. 
'Liquid'  morality 
At  a  time  when  antisocial  behaviour  has  become  a  key  theme  in  politics  and  society, 
this  development  can  appear  to  be  a  reflection  of  a  government  deterrrýined  to  enforce 
I social'  and  'moral'  norms  within  society.  However,  in  fact  the  opposite  is  the  case.  The 
rise  and  rise  of  concerns  with  antisocial  behaviour  today  reflect  the  loss,  not  the 
enforcement,  of  moral  and  political  beliefs. 
Comparing  the  original  use  of  the  term  'antisocial'  -  opposed  to  the  principles  on 
which  society  is  constituted  -  with  the  definition  cited  at  the  start  of  this  chapter  in 
1989,  we  find  a  shift  in  emphasis  of  the  identified  antisocial  actor.  The  first  use  of  the 
term,  in  1802  and  subsequently  in  1844,  is highly  political  and  referred  to  the  moral 
and  political  standpoint  of  Republicans,  who  were  perceived  to  be  a  threat  to  society 
and  its  social  and  religious/moral  norms.  154  This  definition  of  antisocial  therefore 
privileges  the  beliefs  of  society  against  those  who  actively  oppose  them.  In  contrast, 
the  more  recent  definition  of  antisocial  has  added  to  the  idea  of  challenging  the  norms 
of  society  the  following:  causing  annoyance  and  disapproval  in  others:  children's 
antisocial  behaviour.  155  Taking  the  extremes  of  what  these  definitions  relate  to, 
whereas  the  original  use  of  the  term  antisocial  was  a  conservative  denunciation  of 
revolutionary  Republicans,  the  modem  equivalent  is  related  to  the  misbehaviour  of 
children.  Also,  where  the  first  definition  in  denouncing  Republican  activities  as 
antisocial  sets  up  an  alternative  sense  of  the  correct  moral  and  political  'social' 
outlook,  the  latter  meaning  lacks  this  wider  political  or  moral  content. 
Concern  about  antisocial  acts  both  past  and  present  evolved  within  a  political  context. 
However,  the  transformation  of  the  meaning  of  antisocial  behaviour  reflects,  in  part, 
the  shift  from  the  politics  of  the  past  to  the  micro-politics  of  today.  The  original  use 
227 of  the  term  antisocial  emerged  at  the  time  of  the  French  Revolution  -a  time  when  the 
ideas  of  'left  and  right'  developed,  pitting  ideas  of  change  and  rationality  against  the 
conservative  demand  for  tradition  and  morality.  Comparatively,  the  modem  growth  of 
the  concern  with  the  antisocial  has  come  about  precisely  when  we  have  gone  'beyond 
left  and  right'.  In  other  words,  whereas  the  original  use  and  meaning  of  the  term 
4antisocial'  reflected  a  clash  of  ideas  of  left  and  right,  and  alternative  meanings  of 
what  it  meant  to  be  'social'  as  opposed  to  'antisocial',  today  this  has  emerged  at  a  time 
when  this  clash  of  ideas  has  largely  evaporated,  and  with  it  any  systematic  defence  of 
absolute  'social'  norms.  This  would  suggest  that  the  very  meaning  of  what  it  is  to  be 
antisocial  today  has  been  transformed. 
Rather,  what  it  means  to  be  social  as  opposed  to  antisocial  today  relates  less  to 
absolute  'social'  norms  and  values  of  society,  than  to  the  offence  and  harm  that 
antisocial  individual  acts  may  have  upon  other  individuals.  The  'social'  content  of  the 
meaning  of  antisocial  has  largely  been  lost  and  been  replaced  by  a  concept  that 
privileges  and  defends  the  individual  from  others.  Rather  than  seeing  this  as  the  re- 
moralisation  or  re-politicisation  of  society,  this  change  reflects  the  politicisation  and 
moralising  of  individual  interpersonal  interactions.  The  emergence  of  the  concern 
with  being  antisocial  has  therefore  occurred  at  a  time  when  the  content  of  what  it 
means  to  be  social,  political  and  moral  has  significantly  declined. 
The  concern  with  social  order  expressed  in  today's  preoccupation  with  antisocial 
behaviour  is  not  new.  Indeed,  nor  is  the  anxiety  about  the  loss  of  values  and  beliefs  a 
late  twentieth  century  occurrence.  Emile  Durkheirn  for  example,  writing  at  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  was  largely  motivated  in  his  sociological  study  of  religion  to 
understand  the  moral  vacuum  left  with  the  decline  of  tradition  and  religion.  However, 
despite  Durkheim's  pessimism  about  the  emerging  individualism  in  society  (Morrison 
1995:  146),  he  maintained  that  'there  is  something  eternal  in  religion'.  For  Durkheim, 
this  eternal  something  related  not  to  religion  as  such,  but  to  the  centrality  of  society 
and  the  fundamental  need  for  people  to  'reaffirm  the  collective  feelings  and  ideas  that 
constitute  its  unity  and  its  personality'  (Durkheim  2001:  322).  Where  traditional  forms 
of  collectivity  were  in  decline  more  secular  forms  would  emerge.  Indeed  Durkheim, 
was  himself  a  French  patriot,  a  firm  defender  of  science,  and  is  described  as  a  socialist 
228 -  in  this  respect  he  embodied  many  of  these  secular  forms  of  'religion'  that  gave  a 
collective  coherence  to  much  of  twentieth  century  life  and  subsequently  undermined 
the  sense  of  a  loss  of  social  order  which  dogged  Durkheim  himself  156 
Today  the  sense  of  a  loss  of  social  order  in  Britain  and  the  concern  with  antisocial 
behaviour  has  re-emerged  and  become  more  universal  because  of  the  collapse  of  these 
'secular  beliefs'.  This  sense  of  disorder  amongst  the  elite  has  also  been  encouraged  by 
the  decline  of  traditional  morality  -  reflected  in  the  confusion  of  'moral  language'  and 
the  inability  of  conservatives  to  promote  a  'back  to  basics'  outlook  discussed  in 
previous  chapters.  The  concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  has  emerged  within  the  elite 
not  in  terms  of  its  acting  as  the  landlords  of  society,  but  rather,  as  Bauman  argues,  as 
the  elite  acting  as  'absentee  landlords'.  The  'new  elite'  lacks  both  traditional 
conservative  values  and  'secular  religions'  to  cohere  a  society  that  it  senses  is  out  of 
their  control  -  an  antisocial  society.  This  sense  of  society  being  out  of  control  is  a 
reflection  of  the  elite  itself,  who  have  abdicated  the  responsibility  of  being  the  'pilot' 
of  society.  This  elite,  'rule  without  burdening  itself  with  the  chores  of  administration, 
management,  welfare  concerns,  or,  for  that  matter,  with  the  mission  of  'bringing  light', 
'reforming  the  ways',  morally  uplifting,  'civilizing'  and  cultural  crusades'  (Bauman 
2000:  13).  Where  past  rules  were  set  down  by  the  'captains'  of  society  and  'displayed 
in  bold  letters  in  every  passageway'  -  rules  that  could  be  followed  or  challenged  - 
today,  in  comparison,  'the  passengers  of  the  'Light  Capitalism'  aircraft  ... 
discover  to 
their  horror  that  the  pilot's  cabin  is  empty'  (2000:  59). 
In  this  sense,  the  feeling  that  society  is  somehow  out  of  control  -  something  which  is 
increasingly  related  to  the  activities  and  'behaviour  of  children'  -  is  more  a  reflection 
of  the  'behaviour'  of  the  'global  elite'  itseýf  Unlike  the  time  when  the  term  antisocial 
was  first  used,  a  time  of  emerging  and  fundamental  political  contestation,  today  no 
such  contestation  exists.  Concurrently,  where  the  label  of  'antisocial'  was  given  to 
Republicans,  this  definition  would  have  been  contested  and  rejected  by  those  on  the 
left.  Today,  however,  there  is  no  such  challenge,  and  it  is  this  loss  of  opposition  to 
conservative  concerns  with  social  order  that  has  allowed  the  idea  of  antisocial 
behaviour  to  become  a  universally  accepted  problem.  157 
229 In  the  1980s,  when  politicians  attempted  to  label  someone  as  being  antisocial,  it  was 
done  to  reaffirm  an  alternative  moral  order  and  was,  in  many  cases,  questioned  or 
challenged  by  those  on  the  left.  Indeed  this  contestation  laid  the  basis  for  both  moral 
panics  and  the  reaction  to  them.  Where  the  right  would  denounce  the  antisocial 
activities  of  muggers  or  militants,  the  left  would  both  challenge  this  label  and  throw  it 
back  at  the  then  Conservative  government.  Even  at  the  level  of  concerns  with  the 
behaviour  of  school  children,  for  example,  which  were  aired  in  the  1970s  and  1980s 
and  often  within  a  traditionalist  demand  for  'decency',  the  question  of  school  discipline 
and  the  control  of  young  people  was  challenged  within  a  radical  political 
framework.  158 
Today,  by  comparison,  there  is  a  more  generalised  acceptance  of  the  problem  of 
I antisocial  behaviour'in  and  of  itself.  The  particular  activity  or  outlook  of  an  antisocial 
individual  is  no  longer  needed  to  elaborate  upon  this  problem:  we  are  increasingly, 
according  to  certain  polls,  aware  of  the  'problem  of  antisocial  behavioue  and  in 
general  support  government  attempts  to  deal  with  it.  "9  However,  the  emergence  of  the 
concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  and  a  concern  with  social  order  does  not  simply 
represent  a  'move  to  the  right'  in  any  traditional  sense.  As  noted  previously,  the  rise  in 
the  concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  has  occurred  at  a  time  when  traditional  moral 
authority  has  declined.  Rather  than  reflecting  a  rise  of  traditional  values  and  beliefs, 
the  concem  with  antisocial  behaviour  has  been  re-moralised  and  re-politicised  on  a 
different  basis. 
What  unites  the  approach  by  those  on  the  'left'  with  those  on  the  'right'  is  a  move  away 
from  a  social  basis  of  legitimation  (within  a  moral  or  political  framework)  and  a  shift 
towards  a  focus  upon  the  individual  in  understanding  social  problems.  Whereas 
antisocial  behaviour  in  the  past  was  understood  as  an  affront  to  the  values  and 
institutions  of  society,  today,  even  within  the  definition  of  'antisocial'  itself,  the 
concern  is  not  with  society  as  such  but  with  'behaviour'  of  individuals  and  the  harm 
done  to  individual  'victims'of  this  behaviour.  Legitimation  is  subsequently  gained  in 
attacking  antisocial  behaviour,  not  with  reference  to  a  wider  moral  or  political  point  of 
reference,  but  within  the  defence  the  victim.  The  society  or  'community'  that  is  being 
defended  is,  in  effect,  a  conglomeration  of  individuals  rather  than  a  unified  whole 
230 based  on  'social'  (whether  morally  or  politically  constituted)  values  and  norms.  (As 
Eric  Hobsbawn  notes,  the  word  'community'has  become  increasingly  used  at  a  time 
I when  communities  in  the  sociological  sense'  have  become  'hard  to  find  in  real  life' 
(Hobsbawn  1994:  428)).  Values  have  become  relativised  and  few  'absolute'  norms  are 
accepted,  except  the  'moral'  value  of  individual  safety.  160 
Concern  with  problematic  'behaviour'  emerged  most  systematically  at  the  same  time 
as  the  discussion  about  the  'underclass'  (around  the  early  1990s),  and  this 
preoccupation  with  the  values  and  attitudes  of  the  poorest  sections  of  society  has 
continued  today  and  forms  a  key  element  within  the  concern  with  antisocial 
behaviour.  However,  it  is  not  the  language  and  outlook  of  the  moral  right  that 
predominates  in  today's  discussion  about,  for  example,  the  underclass,  but  rather  the 
more  morally  neutral,  'scientific',  language  of  risk  and  safety.  Indeed  the  use  of  the 
term  underclass,  while  still  remaining,  is  more  problematic  today  and  often  used  in 
inverted  commas  or  replaced  by  the  idea  of  the  socially  excluded.  161 
More  appropriate  for  today's  discussion  and  understanding  of  antisocial  behaviour  are 
the  'risk  categories'  used  by  criminal  psychologist  David  Farrington,  who  has 
incorporated  many  of  the  underclass  'categories'  of  concern  but  added  various 
structural  risk  indicators  into  his  predictive  model  of  antisocial  and  criminal 
behaviour.  Here  individual  behaviour  and  relationships  are  problematised,  but  outside 
of  any  totalising  moral  framework.  162  As  we  will  go  on  to  explain,  the  loss  of  a  social 
sense  and  a  moral  or  political  relationship  and  engagement  with  activities  understood 
to  be  antisocial  has  seen  the  emergence  of  a  more  psychologically,  indeed 
therapeutically,  oriented  understanding  of  types  of  individual  'behaviour'. 
Today's  concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  is  predicated  upon  the  end  of  any  secular  or 
moral  'religion'.  Indeed,  the  political  focus  on  antisocial  behaviour  in  the  modem  form 
it  takes  is  helping  to  institutionalise  this  amoral  and  asocial  basis  of  engaging  with 
society. 
231 The  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  is  a  central  element  within  the  politics  of  fear  -a 
more  limited  politics  that  attempts  to  create  consensus  around  the  'morality'  of  risk  and 
risk  avoidance. 
Antisocial  behaviour  in  a  culture  of  limits 
Within  a  period  of  history  when  not  only  the  individual,  but  society  itself,  is 
understood  more  generally  to  be  'at  risle,  the  tendency  is  to  look  not  to  the  creative 
potential  within  the  individual  but  the  destructive  impact  that  individuals'  actions  and 
very  existence  embody.  The  rise  of  the  concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  clearly 
reflects  this  more  misanthropic  understanding  of  the  essence  of  human  action. 
Discussing  the  consequential  limiting  of  horizons  within  the  political  imagination  with 
the  loss  of  belief  in  alternatives  to  the  market,  Marxist  theoretician  Istvan  Meszaros 
notes  that: 
If  it  is  true,  as  they  say,  that  'there  is  no  alternative'  to  the  structural 
determinations  of  the  capitalist  system  in  the  'real  world',  in  that  case  the  very 
idea  of  causal  interventions  -  no  matter  how  little  or  large  -  must  be 
condemned  as  an  absurdity.  The  only  change  admissible  within  such  a  vision 
of  the  world  belongs  to  the  type  which  concerns  itself  with  some  strictly 
limited  negative  effects  but  leaves  their  causal  foundation  ...  completely 
unaffected  (Meszaros  1995:  xiii). 
The  limited  sense  of  social  possibilities  described  by  Meszaros  above  has  become 
I  reflected  within  social  policies  and  also  impacts  upon  how  the  individual  is 
understood.  Consequently,  issues  have  increasingly  vanished  in  a  sea  of  troubles. 
At  the  level  of  politics  and  the  'elite',  today's  culture  of  limits  not  only  results  in  the 
focus  upon  'little  things'  like  antisocial  behaviour,  but  the  purpose  of  governance  itself 
changes  from  a  transformative  process  to  one  in  which  the  prevention  of  harm 
becomes  the  aim  and  objective  of  intervention.  Within  society  the  loss  of  a  social 
imagination  results  in  a  similar  transformation  of  how  issues  of  everyday  life  are 
232 understood.  Our  concerns  not  only  become  more  'local',  but  the  solutions  to  these 
problems  lose  both  a  social  perspective  and  an  active  engagement  with  the  problems 
themselves.  As  society  is  understood  to  be  a  product  offorces  beyond  our  control,  so 
too  are  the  lives  of  individuals,  who  become  conceptualised  as  mere  ýproducts'qf  their 
environment. 
'Risk'  indicators  within  this  environment  emerge  not  simply  as  a  'scientific' 
mechanism  of  predicting  'behaviour'  but  as  the  way  in  which  the  culture  of  society 
engages  with  the  individual  more  generally.  Here  tackling  'crime  and  the  causes  of 
crime'  takes  on  a  meaning  devoid  of  structural  content,  and  the  causes  of  crime 
increasingly  come  to  relate  to  individuals  and  their  behaviour.  In  a  sense  there  is  no 
cause  as  such  -  at  any  social  level  -  that  can  be  transformed,  and  the  perception  of 
overcoming  even  relatively  minor  social  problems  become  limited. 
For  example,  the  international  authoritY  on  child  development,  Sir  Michael  Rutter, 
believes  that  'major  advances  have 
...  been  made  in  prevention  and  intervention 
research,  leading  to  a  tone  of  cautious  optimism'.  Having  examined  all  of  the  potential 
mechanisms  for  identifying  the  causes  of  antisocial  behaviour,  and  studying  methods 
for  resolving  them,  Rutter,  in  Antisocial  Behaviour  hy  Young  People,  concludes  that, 
I given  the  multiplicity  of  causes  and  the  complexity  of  human  behaviour',  the  typical 
impact  of  initiatives  to  prevent  antisocial  behaviour  will  be  'in  the  order  of  a  12% 
reduction'. 
From  previously  held  beliefs  in  the  'perfectability  of  man'  or  the  positivist  potential  for 
social  change,  here  we  find  the  understanding  of  society  hidden  under  a  'multiplicity' 
of  causes.  The  discovery  by  Rutter,  in  practice,  that  just  over  one  in  ten  'at  risk' 
individuals  will  overcome  their  antisocial  behaviour  and  avoid  a  life  of  criminality, 
mirrors  the  cultural  sense  not  that  'nothing  works',  but  that  almost  nothing  works.  That 
Rutter  can  interpret  this  with  'cautious  optimism'  reflects  well  the  diminished  horizons 
embodied  in  social  policy  within  the  culture  of  limits  (Rutter  ctal  1998:  383). 
The  potential,  or  even  the  aspiration  for,  culture',  univýrsalism  or  a  sense  of 
nationhood  and  commonality,  today  is  drowned  in  an  avalanche  of  what  are 
233 understood  to  be  crime,  knife,  gun,  binge  drinking  and  yob  eultures.  Meanwhile  the 
focus  upon  'community'  as  a  resolution  to  problems  of  antisocial  behaviour  embody  a 
similar  sense  of  limited  possibilities.  As  Bauman  notes,  the'communitarian  cult'holds 
out  the  possibility  not  of  social  harmony  but  of  peace  within  the  narrow  parameters  of 
the  walls  and  gates  surrounding  their  frightened  inhabitants: 
The  vision  of  community,  let  me  repeat,  is  that  of  an  island  of  homely  and 
cosy  tranquillity  in  a  sea  of  turbulence  and  inhospitality.  It  tempts  and  seduces, 
prompting  the  admirer  to  refrain  from  looking  too.  closely,  since  the 
eventuality  of  ruling  the  waves  and  taming  the  sea  has  already  been  deleted 
from  the  agenda  as  a  proposition  both  suspect  and  real  (Bauman  2000:  182). 
Similarly,  regarding  the  elite's  loss  of  a  sense  of  purpose,  Christopher  Lasch  in  The 
Culture  of  Narcissism,  writing  in  the  late  1970s  about  'American  life  in  an  age  of  low 
expectations',  observes  that: 
Hardly  more  than  a  quarter-century  after  Henry  Luce  proclaimed  "the 
American  century,  "  American  confidence  has  fallen  to  a  low  ebb.  Those  who 
recently  dreamed  of  world  power  now  despair  of  governing  the  city  of  New 
York  (Lasch  1979). 
New  York  may  now  have  seen  the  successful  governance  of  a  'zero  tolerance' 
approach  to  'squeegee  merchants',  but  this  city,  which  once  represented  the  dynamic 
self-confidence  of  American  capitalism,  appears  to  be  more  inclined  to  promote  itself 
as  a  'safe  city'  than  as  part  of  a  nation  striving  to  'rule  the  waves  and  tame  the  sea'.  At 
the  local  level,  for  even  those  who,  by  virtue  of  wealth  (who  can  create  gated 
communities)  or  state  intervention  (can  have  noisy  neighbours  removed)  and  are  able 
to  find  their  island  of  tranquillity,  the  sense  of  isolation  and  estrangement  remains  in 
the  regulated  communities  that  have  been  developed,  communitieg  that  'feel  more  like 
orphanages,  prisons  or  mad  houses  than  sites  of  potential  liberation'  (Bauman  2000: 
182). 
234 The  problematisation  of  behaviour 
The  problematic  behaviour  of  different  groups  -  the  residuum,  criminals  or  deviants, 
for  example  -  has  been  a  concern  for  sections  of  the  elite  for  many  years.  However, 
where  previously  these  concerns  were  often  more  common  amongst  conservative 
sections  of  society,  the  anxiety  about  problematic  forms  of  behaviour  has  become 
more  all  pervasive  today.  Indeed,  whereas  previously  issues  of  problem  behaviour 
were  generally  confined  to  certain  defined  'deviant'  sections  of  society,  today  the 
'problem  of  behaviour'  now  incorporates  almost  all  aspects  of  life. 
Antisocial  behaviour  in  this  respect  is  just  one  of  the  many  issues  that  relates  to  a 
broader  concern  with  human  behaviour,  within  a  'problematised'  framework  -a 
framework  within  which  issues  of  everyday  life  are  increasingly  understood  to  be  part 
of  a  society  undermined  by  myriad  toxic  relationships  (Furedi  2W4:  77).  163 
Such  is  the  extent  of  the  problematisation  of  behaviour  that  it  is hard  to  find  an  area  of 
life  that  is  not  understood  to  be  troubled  with  'issues'  of  behaviour.  From  the  family  to 
school  life  and  work  relationships,  issues  of  bullying  and  abuse'64  have  become  a 
major  concern,  while  travelling  to  and  from  these  areas  of  life  issues  of  stalking,  road 
and  air  rage  have  come  to  light  in  the  last  decade. 
While  many  of  these  'social  problems'  relate  to  various  forms  of  'aggressive 
behaviour',  more  generally  still,  issues  of  personal  habits  and  lifestyle  have  become 
problematised  and  defined  as  'unsafe'  for  both  'other  people'  and  for  individuals 
themselves  -  with  passive  smoking,  binge  drinking,  165  unsafe  sex,  and  obesity,  for 
example,  all  being  modem  socially-constructed  problems  of  behaviour. 
The  'strictly  limited  negative'  aspects  of  society  have,  at  a  time  of  TINA,  increasingly 
been  understood  within  the  realm  'of  individual  'behaviour',  with  the  'causal 
interventions'  (Meszaros  1995:  xiii)  similarly  being  engaged  with  through  the  Politics 
of  Behaviour  (Field  2003). 
235 With  this  growing  focus  and  problematisation  of  individual  behaviour, 
psychologically-oriepted  explanations  of  social  problems  have  become  more 
prevalent,  as  has  social  policy  concerns  related  to  'psychosocial'  risk  factors  (Asquith 
1998).  166  As  significant,  therefore,  as  the  term  'antisocial',  in  relation  to  the  growing 
prevalence  with  the  concern  with  'antisocial  behaviour',  is  the  politicisation  and 
problematisation  of  behaviour  itself.  167 
This  concern  with  the  'problem  of  behaviour'  comes  with  a  growing  focus  upon 
relationships,  and  can  be  seen  within  the  social  sciences  itself.  There  has  been  a 
certain  orientation  within  some  sociological  journals  towards  a  more  psychological 
approach  -  as,  for  example,  with  the  emergence  of  the  journal  Addiction.  Within  a 
number  of  psychological  journals  the  reverse  is  the  case,  and  they  have  become  more 
oriented  to  examining  'social'  problems.  Within  both,  more  areas  of  life  and 
interpersonal  relationships  have  been  problematised  and  studied  as  part  of  the  social 
Problem  of  antisocial  behaviour.  168, 
Contrasting  articles  in  the  influential  Child  Development  journal  over  time,  for 
example,  it  is  noticeable  that  unlike  papers  in  the  1960s  that  were  more  concerned 
with  examining  cognitive  developmental  processes  of  young  children,  papers  in  the 
mid-1990s  had  a  more  'psychosocial'  focus:  problem  relationships  between 
adolescence,  and  between  parents  and  children,  being  far  more  prevalent  for  example. 
From  a  less  problematised  psychological  examination  of  child  development,  the  focus 
has  become  more  on  the  psycho  'social  problems'  like  the  various  'addictions' 
discovered  amongst  young  people. 
The  problematisation  of  behaviour  has  taken  many  forms  over  recent  years,  but 
perhaps  the  most  prevalent  has  been  with  the  pathologisation  of  emotions. 
Examining  the  propensity  in  America  for  discovering  therapeutic  problems  with 
'behaviour',  Christina  Hoff  Sommers  and  Sally  Satel  note  that: 
The  propensity  of  experts  to  pathologize  and  medicalise  healthy  children  en 
masse  has  gotten  way  out  of  hand.  The  past  decade  has  seen  a  cascade  of 
236 books  and  articles  promoting  the  idea  that  seemingly  content  and  well-adjusted 
Americans  -  adults  as  well  as  children  -  are  emotionally  damaged  (Sommers 
and  Satel  2005:  1). 
For  Sommers  and  Satel,  the  significant  growth  and  influence  of  therapeutic 
professionals  over  the  last  decade  or  so  has  helped  to  transform  the  way  behaviour  - 
especially  the  behaviour  of  children  -  has  become  reinterpreted  as  a  social  (or  more 
accurately  a  psychosocial)  problem.  Part  of  this  development  has  helped  to  focus 
attention  further  onto  the  perceived  problem  relationships  between  people. 
Within  the  media  and  in  popular  culture,  problems  of  behaviour  have  become  a 
growth  industry  -  most  clearly  expressed  in  the  various  Oprahesque  chat  shows  and 
reality  television  programmes  that  invariably  come  with  the  resident  expert 
psychologist.  Even  within  education,  issues  of  behavioural  management  associated 
with  bullying,  but  also  with  relationship  education  and  emotional  awareness  training, 
there  is  a  certain  psychologisation  and  pathologisation  of  'problems'  that  until  recently 
were  not  understood  as  needing  professional  guidance. 
The  issue  of  'behaviour'  has  been  of  concern  in  relation  to  children  for  centuries. 
However,  whereas  previously  there  was  an  expectation  that  through  a  process  of 
socialisation  young  people  would  'grow  up',  in  today's  more  pessimistic  climate,  the 
process  of  socialisation  is  itself  more  readily  understood  to  be  the  problem.  As  Furedi 
notes,  in  terms  of  the  growth  of  the  perceived  'addicted  society',  addiction  that  was 
once  seen  to  be  the  exception  is  increasingly  depicted  as  the  norm.  When  'society 
itself  is  understood  to  be  'inherently  addictive,  the  problem  of  behaviour  -  not  only 
within  children  but  adults  as  well  -  can  be  seen  to  have  become  highly  problematic 
(Furedi  2004:  124).  That  this  outlook  has  emerged  in  some  quarters  today  is 
predicated  upon  a  more  fatalistic  interpretation  of  human  behaviour. 
The  passive  subject  of  antisocial  behaviour 
Within  the  definition  of  antisocial  behaviour  discussed  above,  it  is  noticeable  that  the 
modem  emphasis  is  upon  the  behaviour  of  children,  rather  than  the  actions  of  adults. 
237 This  new  definition  diminishes  the  conscious  element  within  this  form  of  behaviour. 
Where  previously  antisocial  behaviour  was  understood  to  be  acted  out  by  conscious 
political  adult  subjects,  today  it  has  also  come  to  relate  to  the  relatively  unconscious 
misbehaviour  of  children.  This  more  subject-less  understanding  of  antisocial 
behaviour  makes  sense  at  a  time  when  social  processes  and  human  action  more 
generally  is  understood  to  be  beyond  our  control. 
The  definition  of  behaviour  within  the  Penguin  Dictionary  of  Psychology  is:  a  generic 
term  covering  acts,  activities,  responses,  reactions,  movements,  processes,  operations 
etc.,  in  short,  any  measurable  response  of  an  organism.  (Reber  1995:  '86).  Like  this 
definition,  which  in  part  reduces  behaviour  to  the  reactions  of  an  organism,  the 
subjective  human  element  within  the  understanding  of  behaviour  is  today  largely 
missing  within  the  understanding  of  antisocial  behaviour.  We  consequently  no  longer 
act,  we  react;  we  no  longer  produce  our  environment,  we  are  products  of  it;  we  no 
longer  determine  our  own  fate,  we  are  determined  beings.  And  in  this  respect  it  is  less 
the  thoughts  and  beliefs  that  we  challenge  in  labelling  someone  as  'behaving'  in  an 
antisocial  manner,  but  rather  their  'thoughtlessness'  -  or  their  diminished  capacity  to 
think  before  they  act.  I 
Children,  in  everyday  language,  have  often  been  described  as  'behaving  badly',  but 
bad  behaviour  was  generally  a  term  not  used  in  relation  to  adults,  who  were 
understood  to  be  responsible  for  their  actions  rather  than  their  behaviour.  Today  this  is 
less  the  case.  Indeed,  unlike  terms  that  differentiated  adult  criminal  actions  from 
young  people  -  who  were  labelled  juvenile  delinquents  -  today  we  have  no  equivalent 
term  in  common  usage  that  differentiates  the  actions  of  adults  from  children's  deviant 
activities.  Rather,  it  is  more  the  case  that  adults,  like  children,  can  be  defined  with  the 
catch-all  term  'antisocial  behaviour'.  Where  the  term  juvenile  delinquent  separated 
adults  from  the  world  of  children,  privileging  the  idea  of  the  adult  subject  and 
subsequently  allowing  a  certain  space  for  young  people  to  be  seen  as  'behaving'  in  a 
manner  related  to  their  age  and  immaturity,  today,  through  the  categorisation  of 
I antisocial  behaviour',  we  have  an  infantilisation  of  adult  'behaviour'  and  at  the  same 
time  a  more  serious  criminalisation  of  children.  169 
238 Within  the  previously  defined  juvenile  delinquent',  we  had  both  labelling  of  a  type  of 
person,  but  also  a  sense  of  the  capacity,  with  age  and  maturity,  for  a  progression  from 
'abnormal'  to  'normal'  behaviour:  a  sense  of  progress  embodied  both  within  society 
and  its  capacity  to  socialise  the  young,  and  within  the  individual  itself.  This  sense  of 
social  progress  reflected  in  the  individual  is  today  more  limited,  at  a  time  when  'causal 
interventions'  must  be  'condemned  as  an  absurdity'  (Meszaros  1995:  xiii). 
The  distinction  between  subjective  intentions  and  behaviour  has  been  muddied  and  a 
more  deterministic  understanding  of  humanity  has  emerged,  giving  both  a  more 
limited  sense  of  the  individual's  capacity  to  act  consciously,  while  at  the  same  time 
giving  a  more  static  sense  of  people  and  their  capacity  to  change  themselves  or  to  be 
transformed  by  and  transform  society  itself. 
The  underlying  message  within  the  discourse  of  antisocial  behaviour  is,  despite  the 
I cautious  optimism',  that  of  'find  me  the  antisocial  child  and  I  will  show  you  the 
antisocial  adult  of  the  future'.  170  Rather  than  deviant  actions  being  understood  in  part 
to  be  discrete  immoral  acts  by  individuals,  today  we  are  increasingly  discovering 
'types'  of  people  whose  behaviour  is  understood  to  be  a  permanent  aspect  of  what  they 
are.  171 
As  Findlayson  has  noted  in  relation  to  the  politics  of  today,  the  political  elites  simply 
react  to  social  facts.  Likewise,  individuals  themselves  are  equally  understood  to 
behave  rather  than  to  act  in  relation  to  their  environment. 
Within  Rutter  and  Farrington's  risk  model  of  behaviour,  people  no  longer  make 
considered  decisions  before  they  act,  but  rather  arc  simple  products  of  their 
environment  -  responding  as  organisms  within  a  scientifically  defined  risk  model  of 
behaviour.  As  such,  it  is  less  the  conscious  individual  who  is  engaged  with  in  relation 
to  his  or  her  moral  outlook,  than  various  stimuli  or  'risks'  that  need  to  be  managed. 
This  approach  to  the  behaviour  of  both  adults  and  children  helps  to  explain  the 
significant  focus  on  the  lives  of  young  people,  who  are  deterministically  understood  to 
be  the  product  of  their  environment  and  relationships.  'Peer  pressure',  for  example,  as 
discussed  in  relation  to  the  Hamilton  curfew,  is  understood  to  be  a  one-sided  force  that 
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becomes  more  about  reacting  to  understood  risk  factors  in  childhood  than  a  battle  of 
ideas  and  morals  within  the  adult  population.  Rather  than  challenging  the  destructive 
will  of  Republicans,  for  example,  today's  conservative  political  elite  attempt  to 
manage  and  modify  the  problem  behaviour  of  children. 
This  deterministic  understanding  of  individuals,  as  Furedi  notes,  goes  way  beyond  that 
of  classical  social  theorists  like  Marx  and  Weber,  or  thinkers  like  Freud,  Mead  and 
Dewey,  all  of  whom  recognised  the  constraints  of  society  and  culture  in  forging  an 
individuals  identity,  but  equally  emphasised  the  'element  of  interaction  where 
individuals  could  exercise  a  degree  of  individual  choice,  though  often  in 
circumstances  not  of  their  own  making'.  In  comparison,  today's  model  of  interaction 
lias  given  way  to  an  outlook  where  the  individual  is  one-sidedly  presented  as  a  mere 
social  product,  whose  action  is  almost  never  the  outcome  of  choice,  but  of 
compulsion'  (Furedi  2004:  124). 
Like  the  behaviour  of  the  antisocial  individual,  the  victim  of  antisocial  behaviour  is 
also  understood  within  a  more  diminished  framework.  As  discussed  previously,  the 
idea  that  people  are  fundamentally  vulnerable  has  helped  to  inform  the  issue  of 
antisocial  behaviour.  Within  the  definition  itself,  the  sense  of  human  frailty  is 
introduced  in  the  modem  meaning.  The  original  meaning  of  'antisocial'  made  no 
reference  to  damage  being  done  to  the  individual:  indeed  as  noted  previously,  there 
was  no  reference  to  the  individual  within  this  meaning,  but  rather  to  society  and  the 
beliefs  and  morals  being  challenged  by  antisocial  Republicans.  Within  the  modem 
definition  of  'antisocial',  however,  the  victim  of  this  behaviour  is  privileged  -  in  fact, 
what  it  is  to  be  antisocial  is  directly  related  to  the  'annoyance  and  disapproval  in 
others'.  Antisocial  behaviour,  in  this  respect,  relates  less  to  the  actions  of  the 
perpetrator  than  to  the  subjective  experience  of  those  on  the  receiving  end  of  it.  To  a 
degree,  even  the  definition  that  was  introduced  into  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  in 
1989  could  be  said  to  be  somewhat  out  of  date  in  relation  to  the  significance  given  to 
antisocial  behaviour,  which  is  today  seen  as  being  far  more  damaging  and  'tefforising' 
to  the  individuals  who  live  amongst  'neighbours  from  hell'  in  our  imagined  'yob 
culture'.  172  Taken  to  its  extreme  -  an  extreme  which  often  informs  political 
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would  relate  not  to  the  'annoyance'  but  to  the  'terror'  caused  by  this  behaviour. 
With  the  decline  in  the  'social'  and  any  positive  sense  of  social  change,  the 
understanding  of  the  individual  has  also  been  diminished  and  the  understanding  of 
their  capacity  and  resilience  to  deal  with  conflict  within  everyday  life  has  been 
weakened.  This  sense  of  individual  and  indeed  public  vulnerability  is  at  the  heart  of 
the  growing  concern  with  the  more  petty  aspects  of  behaviour  within  society.  Seen 
less  as  actors  in  society  than  as  being  acted  upon,  today's  understanding  of  antisocial 
behaviour  relates  to  the  object  of  this  behaviour,  rather  than  the  subject  who  is  acting 
in  an  antisocial  manner. 
The  understood  fragility  of  the  individual  within  society  has  helped  to  make  'antisocial 
behaviour'  into  the  key  political  and  public  issue  that  it  is  today,  and  it  has  come  to 
replace  the  more  robust  understanding  associated  within  the  definition  of  nuisance 
behaviour  that  preceded  it.  As  Scott  and  Parker  note: 
Common  law  nuisance  is  any  conduct  which  causes  "serious  disturbance  or 
substantial  inconvenience  to  a  ncighbour".  it  must  be  "more  than  "sentimental, 
speculative  trivial  discomfort  or  personal  annoYance"  and  it  should  be  looked 
at  in  the  light  of  general  social  conditions  in  the  neighbourhood  (Scott  and 
Parkey  1998:  328). 
However,  this  definition  is  much  too  robust  for  today's  world,  in  which  'sentimental, 
speculative  trivial  discomfort  or  personal  annoyance'  are  understood  to  be  far  more 
significant  and  damaging  to  individuals  and  to  society  than  was  previously  believed. 
Nuisance  behaviour  in  the  above  definition  also  gave  some  significance  to  the  'general 
social  conditions  in  the  neighbourhood'.  More  deprived  neighbourhoods,  for  example, 
where  a  greater  level  of  noise  and  rowdiness  was  more  the  norm,  may  not  have  had 
the  same  definition  of  'nuisance'used  within  it  as  quieter  areas.  Today,  however,  when 
victimhood  is  a  more  generalised  indeed  universal  framework  for  understanding  all 
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becomes  the  bench  mark  for  all  in  relation  to  'antisocial  behaviour'. 
This  socially-constructed  understanding  of  the  'vulnerable'  is,  however,  not  simply 
foisted  upon  the  gullible  public,  but  engages  with  a  more  isolated  individual.  The 
individual  today,  Bauman  notes,  lacks  the  'solid  modernity'  of  old  and  experiences  'the 
body'  (or  the  emotional  self,  as  will  be  discussed  below),  as  'becoming  safety's  last 
line  of  trenches,  trenches  which  are  exposed  to  constant  enemy  bombardment,  or, 
which  is  felt  to  be,  'the  last  oasis  among  wind-swept  moving  sands'  (Bauman  2000: 
183-4). 
The  meaning  and  understanding  of  antisocial  behaviour  discussed  above,  despite  the 
limited  relation  that  it  has  with  a  wider  moral  or  political  understanding  of  social 
problems,  is  not  valuefree.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  the  term  antisocial  emerged  as  a 
condemnation  of  radical  political  beliefs  and  actions  and  a  defence  of  opposing  ideals. 
Today,  the  focus  of  concern  within  the  new  definition  is  with  behaviour  seen  to  be  a 
problem  to  the  individual.  The  modem  meaning  of  antisocial  bchaviour-privilcges  the 
passive  recipient  of  the  behaviour.  The  'moral'weight  of  the  term,  and  the  legitimacy 
gained  by  those  opposing  it,  comes  with  reference  to  the  protection  of  the  individual 
who  is  suffering  at  the  hands  of  antisocial  behaviour.  In  this  respect  the  term  antisocial 
behaviour  today  privileges  not  just  the  individual,  but  what  has  come  to  be  understood 
as  the  individual  victim  The  wider  meaning  carried  by  the  term  antisocial  behaviour 
relates  less  to  the  actions  of  the  antisocial  themselves  than  to  the  reactions  of  the 
vulnerable  individual.  However,  at  the  same  time,  in  addressing  the  antisocial  actor, 
he  himself  is  understood  less  as  a  conscious  active  agent  than  as  a  mere  product  of  his 
environment  and  the  'behaviour'  of  those  around  him. 
Within  a  society  where  a  more  diminished  or  passive  subject  is  the  expected  norm, 
responsibility  for  antisocial  actions,  despite  the  political  vilification  that  accompanies 
this  issue,  is  difficult  to  pin  upon  the  individual  who  is  understood  to  be  more  an 
organism  that  behaves  than  a  conscious  moral  subject.  Likewise,  where  previously 
'trivial  discomfort  or  personal  annoyance'  would  have  been  understood  as  something 
that  members  of  the  public  would  be  expected  to  resolve  themselves,  today  it  is  seen 
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society  can  expect  the  vulnerable  public  to  suffer,  let  alone  resolve. 
Therapy  culture  and  antisocial  behaviour 
Above,  we  have  seen  how  the  understanding  of  antisocial  behaviour  as  a  social 
problem  has  developed  most  significantly  with  the  emerging  understanding  of  the 
vulnerability  of  the  individual  in  society.  Psychological  explanations  of  'behaviour' 
have  also  become  more  influential  in  describing  the  somewhat  deterministic  actions  of 
individuals  deemed  to  be  antisocial.  Within  this  deterministic  framework  there  is  also 
a  cyclical  interpretation  of  this  behaviour,  with,  for  example,  Farrington's  research, 
which  suggests  that  the  antisocial  behaviour  of  mothers  who  drink  and  smoke  while 
pregnant  will  result  in  the  creation  of  antisocial  children  (Asquith  1998:  5). 
As  well  as  the  physical  damage  done  by  antisocial  mothers,  even  more  important  in 
understanding  the  rise  in  the  concern  with  antisocial  behaviour  is  the  rise  of  a 
therapeutic  culture  that  both  privileges  the  'emotional  self  but  also  understands  the 
individual  as  being  emotionally  vulnerable  and  emotionally  damaged.  Rather  than 
biological  determinism,  the  dominant  conservative  understanding  of  humanity  is 
developing  around  a  belief  in  emotional  determinism. 
As  Lasch  argued  in  the  late  1970s: 
The  contemporary  climate  is  therapeutic,  not  religious.  People  today  hunger 
not  for  personal  salvation,  let  alone  for  the  restoration  of  an  earlier  golden  age, 
but  for  the  feeling,  the  momentary  illusion,  of  personal  well-being,  health,  and 
psychic  security  (Lasch  1979:  7). 
Lasch  believed  that,  'Having  displaced  religion  as  the  organizing  framework  of 
American  culture,  the  therapeutic  outlook  threatens  to  displace  politics  as  well,  the  last 
refuge  of  ideology'  (Lasch  1979:  13).  In  the  UK,  the  accelerated  development  of  a 
therapeutic  culture  grew  on  the  back  of  'the  thinning  out  of  community  attachments, 
the  decline  of  systems  of  moral  meaning',  and  was  'reinforced  in  the  1980s  by  the 
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problems  have  been  increasingly  recast  as  emotional  ones.  Two  decades  on,  Lasch's 
prediction  appears  apposite.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  politics  and  religion 
simply  disappear,  but  rather  that  they  have  mutated  within  a  therapeutic  sensibility, 
with  religion  (and  indeed  politics)  becoming  increasingly  'new  age'  and  focused  upon 
the  emotional  self.  173  Even  welfare,  within  this  therapeutic  climate,  becomes  about 
'fostering  psychological  as  well  as  economic  benefits'to  the  individual  (Giddens  1998: 
117). 
This  concern  with  the  emotional  well-being  of  the  individual,  however,  is  not  simply 
of  concern  to  the  'elites'  and  social  institutions,  but  equally  relates  to  the  more  fluid 
and  isolated  individual  within  society.  As  Bauman  notes,  compared  to  Durkheim's 
sense  of  individuation,  which  in  hindsight  appears  to  be  grounded  in  a  'the  land  of 
solid  modernity',  today  the  individual  and  indeed  'the  body'  appears  -  in  comparison 
with  almost  all  social  institutions  and  bonds  of  solidity  -  to  be  the  'last  shelter  and 
sanctuary  of  continuity  and  duration'  (Bauman  2000:  183).  However,  the  focus 
inwards  onto  the  emotional  self  has  not  emerged  because  of  structural  changes  in 
society,  but  has  been  encouraged  by  a  therapeutic  culture. 
This  therapeutic  turn  not  only  transforms  the  understanding  of  the  individual  and 
society,  but  the  in-built  belief  in  the  fragility  of  this  emotional  'state'  leads  to  the 
presumption  of  the  need  to  protect  people  from  an  increasing  array  of  potential  harms. 
In  fact,  through  engaging  with  the  fragile,  emotionally  constituted  individual  within  a 
culture  of  fear,  almost  all  relations,  with  parents,  peers,  neighbours,  workmates  and  so 
on  have  become  understood  as  sites  of  harassment,  harm  and  abuse.  In  this  respect, 
antisocial  behaviour  is  all  around  us.  As  insecure  individuals,  increasingly  buried 
within  our  fragile  emotional  selves,  we  increasingly  relate  to  the  world  as  a  sea  of 
turbulence  and  inhospitality  -  of  relationships  and  interactions  that  need  to  be 
mediated,  regulated  and  policed. 
For  Bauman,  having  lost  the  solidity  of  the  past,  liquid  modernity  attempts 
(unsuccessfully)  to  engage  with  and  relate  to  the  individual  as  a  'body'  within  a 
'Community',  both  being  'the  last  defensive  outposts  on  the  increasingly  deserted 
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little,  if  any  respite'  (Bauman  2000:  184). 
Through  today's  therapeutic  culture,  'well-being',  as  Hoggett  argues,  'is  defined 
essentially  in  mental-health  terms'.  This,  Furedi  argues,  results  in  the  citizen  being 
'transformed  into  a  patient',  and  the  'private  feelings  of  people  [becoming]  a  subject 
matter  for  public  policy-making  and  cultural  concern'(Furedi  2004:  197). 
The  objective  measurement  of  'breaking  the  law'  is,  to  a  degree,  by-passed  in  an 
attempt  to  engage  with  the  emotional  feelings  of  the  victim,  and  laws  develop  to 
encourage  'respect'.  Part  of  the  'respect'  offered  by  the  state  is  increasingly  to  accept 
that  if  an  individual  'feels'  that  there  is  a  problem,  then  there  is  one.  Antisocial 
behaviour  subsequently  becomes,  not  about  objective  actions  defined  as  'illegal'  by 
society,  but  more  about  the  subjective  sense  of  the  victim.  174 
Rather  than  a  rise  in  traditional  morality,  within  this  therapeutic  culture,  and  in 
relation  to  antisocial  behaviour,  we  find  a  remoralisation  of  behaviour  in  relation  to 
the  emotional  sensitivities  of  the  public.  'Antisocial  behaviour'  relates  less  to 
conventional  criminal  acts  -  to  economic  damage  or  physical  harm  -  than  to  issues 
understood  to  disrupt  the  sensibilities  of  the  individual  and  the  'community.  Graffiti, 
for  example,  may  still  be  a  problem  of  criminal  damage,  but  its  significance  for  the 
governing  of  communities  is  with  the  sense  of  disorder  -  felt  most  acutely  at  the  level 
of  the  individual  victim's  emotional  state  of  well-being.  175 
Even  the  definition  of  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  and  the  implementation  of 
initiatives  to  tackle  the  problem  recognise  that  what  is  deemed  to  be  antisocial  is  often 
dependent  upon  subjective  factors  and  interpretation.  The  Crime  and  Disorder  Act 
defines  antisocial  behaviour  as  'conduct,  including  speech,  which  has  caused,  or  is 
likelY  to  cause,  alarm  or  distress  to  one  or  more  persons'.  Being  anti  'social'  therefore, 
and  somewhat  ironically,  relates  not  to  wider  social  norms  as  such  but  more 
particularly  to  the  impact  that  this  behaviour  has  upon  the  feelings  of  vulnerable 
individuals.  The  correct  form  of  behaviour  for  individuals  is  therefore  predicated  upon 
this  concern  with  the  'well-being'  of  the  vulnerable  public.  The  wide  scope  for  the 
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vulnerability  of  individuals  -  actions,  taken  by  authorities  developing  accordingly  to 
protect  the  public  from  such  behaviour.  Antisocial  behaviour  is  therefore  often 
measured  in  relation  to  the  level  of  fear,  anxiety  or  stress  that  is  (or  is  assumed  to  have 
been)  felt  by  the  vulnerable  public.  The  subjective  component  of  the  meaning  of 
antisocial  behaviour,  coupled  with  the  centrality  of  vulnerability,  gives  it  a  high  level 
of  flexibility  and  means  that  an  ever-greater  array  of  forms  of  behaviour  can  be 
interpreted  as  being  antisocial. 
At  the  level  of  social  policy,  then,  the  aim  in  tackling  antisocial  behaviour  is  not 
connected  to  creating  a  positive  sense  of  the  'social',  but  rather  in  allowing  individuals 
to  be  'liberated  from  fear'.  The  positive  'sense  of  community'  comes  about  not  through 
political  or  moral  purpose  and  unity,  but  via  the  collection  of  individuals'  feeling  of 
safety  -  with  this  being  accomplished,  it  is  assumed,  by  the  eradication  of  antisocial 
behaviour. 
Elite  sense  of  disorder 
The  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  can  be  addressed  at  various  levels.  Generally  it  is 
understood  and  analysed  in  relation  to  issues  of  crime  and  the  collapse  of  community. 
Above  however,  it  has  been  situated  more  broadly  within  a  focus  upon  the  problem  of 
behaviour  of  people  more  widely. 
In  the  previous  chapters,  the  rise  and  rise  of  the  'social  problem'  of  antisocial 
behaviour  was  also  located  within  the  political  elite  itself.  The  Politics  of  Behaviour, 
as  the  Labour  NIP  Frank  Field  argues,  has  indeed  become  a  key  defining  aspect  of 
politics  in  the  twenty-first  century,  and  relates  not  only  to  action  that  is  specifically 
labelled  as  being  'antisocial  behaviour',  but  incorporates  myriad  other  forms  of 
problem  behaviour  like  bullying,  staWng,  binge  drinking,  drug  taking  and  even 
smoking  or  'irresponsible  parenting'  -  all  of  which  can  be  understood  to  one  degree  or 
another  as  issues  of,  or  associated,  with  antisocial  behaviour. 
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particular,  relates  most  often  to  concerns  with  'sink  estates',  'neighbours  from  hcll'  and 
'neds'  or  'chavers'.  It  also,  however,  has  a  far  broader  remit,  in  that  it  helps  frame  a 
host  of  discussions  about  the  behaviour  and  relationships  between  people  in  public 
space,  workplaces  and  private  life.  In  both  uses  it  oscillates  around  a  sense  of  a  loss  of 
social  order  that  resonates  within  today's  culture  of  fear. 
This  chapter  has  attempted  to  explain  why  'antisocial  behaviour'  has  emerged  as  a 
significant  social  problem  today  -  and  also  why  this  term  itself  is  particularly  useful 
for  defining  social  problems  as  they  are  understood.  Antisocial  behaviour  has  been  a 
term  used  for  decades;  however  its  significance,  and  indeed  its  very  meaning,  is 
historically  specific  and  relates  to  the  transformation  of  how  'society'  is  understood, 
and  equally  how  the  individual  or  subject  is  conceptualised  within  contemporary 
modernity. 
The  problem  of  the  antisocial  that  arose  in  the  1990s,  while  often  referring  to 
particular  problems  in  'sink'  estates,  also  incorporates  myriad  forms  of  behaviour 
across  society  and  in  almost  every  'area  of  life.  Its  centrality  to  politics  today  reflects  a 
sense  that  people  'out  there'  are  acting  in  a  disorderly  manner  that  is  opposed  to 
principles  upon  which  society  is  constituted.  However,  that  problems  of  litter  and  fly 
tipping,  for  example,  have  become  issues  of  central  government  concern  reflects  a 
diminution  of  what  'moral'  behaviour  has  come  to  mean,  while  equally  reflecting  a 
sense  of  fragility  of  the  social  order  and  the  ease  with  which  it  can  be  disrupted. 
The  concern  with  the  antisocial  in  this  respect  reflects  less  the  activities  in  question 
than  the  real  problem  of  a  loss  of  political  leadership  in  society,  and  also  the  problem 
of  the  loss  of  a  public  and  the  capacity  of  the  political  elite  to  engage  with  and  be  part 
of  a  wider  'social  will'.  The  disjuncture  between  politics  and  changes  in  society  leaves 
the  political  elite  prone  to  exaggerate  and  to  see  within  various  forms  of  behaviour  the 
problem  of  the  antisocial.  As  argued  previously,  in  essence  the  concern  with  social 
order  reflected  through  the  discussion  about  antisocial  behaviour  represents  the 
disengagement  of  this  elite  from  social  processes  that  are  felt  to  be  beyond  its  control. 
Beyond  its  control,  that  is,  except  within  a  more  socially  and  politically  static  form  of 
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behaviour  of  adults  and  their  children.  In  this  respect,  both  the  words  antisocial  and 
behaviour  are  particularly  useful  for  an  amoral  and  apolitical  elite  that  senses  disorder 
but  is  only  able  to  grapple  with  the  problem  at  the  level  of  the  behaviour  of 
individuals. 
The  term  'antisocial  behaviour'  today  lacks  specific  moral  or  political  depth  and  has  a 
quasi-scientific  psychosocial  meaning.  In  the  recent  past,  social  problems  of  disorder 
were  grounded  in  political  and  moral  language  often  promoting  'traditional  values'. 
The  problem  behaviour  of  the  black  'mugger'  who  wanted  'something  for  nothing',  for 
example,  was  seen  as  being  literally  alien  to  an  alternative  and  morally  upstanding, 
'British  way  of  life'.  Alternatively  when  the  term  antisocial  was  first  used  in  the  early 
nineteenth  century,  it  was  done  so  not  with  reference  to  'behaviour'  in  the  abstract,  but 
to  a  specific  political  and  moral  outlook  that  was  deemed  to  be  antisocial  in  its 
opposition  to  alternative  specific  conservative  values  and  beliefs. 
The  more  'trivial'  forms  of  antisocial  behaviour,  like  noisy  neighbours  and  young 
people  hanging  around,  were  of  little  significance  to  the  Conservative  government  in 
the  1980s  because  they  lacked  political  content:  although  as  the  collective  opposition 
to  the  government  declined,  these  more  trivial  issues  of  'behaviour'  -  like  'lager  louts', 
an  issue  of  concern  for  the  Conservative  government  in  the  late  1980s  -  began  to 
become  more  of  a  focus  for  attention. 
As  the  1990s  progressed,  so  too  did  the  politics  of  fear.  Now  insecurity  more 
generally,  outside  of  any  specific  political  contest,  helped  inform  the  nature  of  crime 
panics,  and  issues  of  antisocial  behaviour  emerged  more  systematically.  This  was 
assisted  by  the  more  'liquid'  relationships  between  people  themselves  -  the  working 
class  in  particular  -  providing  a  more  fluid  and  less  stable  basis  for  relationships  and 
personal  interaction.  More  fragmented,  and  without  a  'solid'  social  framework  for 
interacting,  relationships  between  adults  and  children,  for  example,  become  more 
confused  (Waiton  2001:  123). 
248 Today,  rather  than  using  specific  terms  like  'mugger'  that  are  'value  added',  or 
defining  the  specific  immoral  beliefs  underlying  those  being  antisocial,  we  simply  get 
'antisocial  behaviour'  as  an  ill-defined  thing  in  itselL  The  term  'antisocial  behaviour', 
which  has  grown  within  political  discourse  over  the  last  decade,  is  devoid  of  a  wider 
political,  moral  or  even  social  meaning.  No  substantial  framework  for  what  it  means 
to  be  'social'  -  or  pro-social  -  is  reflected  within  this  term:  rather,  'moral'  weight  is 
given  simply  to  the  act  of  not  being  antisocial.  In  this  respect  the  term  antisocial 
behaviour  refers  not  to  what  you  should  do,  but  rather  to  what  you  should  not  do.  To 
be  good  is  to  be  not  antisocial.  It  is  a  negative  concept  based  upon  the  need  to  prevent 
action  rather  than  to  instil  an  alternative  belieL  The  limit  of  any  positive  demand 
placed  upon  society  is  confined  to  telling  the  public  to  be  polite,  to  be  thoughtful  of 
others,  and  not  to  drop  litter  -  mantras  which  sound  more  like  what  parents  and 
teachers  say  to  small  children  than  a  set  of  values  for  society. 
At  the  heart  of  government  policy  in  the  twenty-first  century  is  not  a  projection  of  a 
moral  or  political  framework  of  operation.  Rather  the  aim  is  the  prevention  of 
incivility  and  the  maintenance  of  order.  Order,  not  disorder,  is  the  cry,  with  no  value 
added  content.  Within  the  language  of  'risk,  this  reflects,  like  Beck's  concern  with  the 
damaging  potential  of  human  action  at  a  global  level,  government  concern  at  a  local 
and  personal  level  of  the  need  to  prevent  'human  bad'  rather  than  to  create  'human 
good'.  Instead  of  engaging  the  'energy  of  society'  to  move  forward,  the  aim  is  to  stop  a 
static  society  from  moving  back.  'Stop  being  antisocial'is  a  cry  in  the  dark  by  a  hollow 
elite  that  no  longer  holds  the  rudder  of  society. 
The  problem  of  living  in  a  'moral  vacuum',  as  Tony  Blair  described  it  following  the 
James  Bulger  killing,  is  thus  overcome  not  by  filling  the  vacuum  with  an  alternative 
moral  code  or  through  social  meaning,  but  by  sidestepping  this  ideological  problem 
and  reposing  the  issue  as  one  of  individual  incivility  -  or  of  'antisocial  behaviour,. 
With  the  decline  of  the  welfare  'dream'  (Pitts  1988:  26)  -  social  policy  has  developed 
with  a  lack  of  purpose  to  directly  regulate  the  behaviour  of  the  fragmented  public.  176 
The  problem  of  'antisocial  behaviour'as  it  is  understood  today  is  a  direct  reflection  of 
the  diminution  of  the  political  will. 
249 The  rise  of  concern  within  the  political  elite  with  'antisocial  behaviour',  especially 
post-1993,  arose  not  because  of  a  rise  in  morality,  but  the  opposite  -a  decline  in  the 
sense  of  moral  or  political  purpose.  Indeed  the  strength  of  the  term  'antisocial 
behaviour'  is  not  only  in  its  flexibility  but  also  in  its  lack  of  moral  and  political 
specificity  that  could  lead  to  dissent  and  opposition.  To  say  that  someone  is  antisocial 
in  the  1980s  would  have  had  little  political  meaning,  as  the  question  would  have 
related  to  competing  views  of,  for  example,  the  militant  striker  and  the  black  mugger. 
In  effect,  to  use  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  at  this  time  would  have  required  an 
association  with  a  particular  morally  or  politically  reprehensible  actor  -  the  antisocial 
behaviour  'of  muggers'  or  'of  demonstrators'.  The  acceptance  of  what  'antisocial 
behaviour'  was,  at  this  time,  was  contested,  as  were  the  labels  associated  with  them  - 
such  as  mugger  (Hall  1978). 
The  term  'antisocial  behaviour'  could  only  become  a  generalised  term  to  describe  a 
loss  of  social  order  once  ideological  points  of  opposition  were  lost  and  when 
everybody  agreed  that  'order'  was  a  good  thing  and  that  there  was  a  problem  of 
disorder.  177 
Divorced  of  wider  meaning,  concern  about  'antisocial  behaviour'  within  a  culture  of 
fear  was  given  legitimacy  by  the  amoral  panics  and  concern  about  abusive  individuals, 
relationships  and  criminal  behaviour  that  emerged  within  sections  of  the  left  and 
feminist  thought  in  the  1980s.  Left  and  right  were  increasingly  in  agreement  that  there 
was  indeed  a  problem  of  behaviour  in  society,  with  New  Labour  most  fervently  giving 
expression  to  the  sense  that  this  problem  behaviour  was  reflected  in  the  'loss  of  a  sense 
of  community'.  Like  the  loss  of  opposition,  especially  in  political  life,  to  the  problem 
of  crime,  the  'social  problem'  of  antisocial  behaviour  has  faced  few  opponents. 
In  the  same  way  that  the  term  antisocial  has  become  more  significant,  the 
problematisation  of  and  the  use  of  the  term  behaviour  could  only  become  more  central 
to  political  discourse  once  the  purposeful  action  of  individuals  was  no  longer  linked  to 
moral  or  political  values  -  or  more  precisely  to  the  question  of  consciousness  and 
beliefs.  Rather  than  acting,  today's  diminished  subject  is  understood  to  be  reacting. 
Rather  than  acting  immorally,  people  have  syndromes,  addictions  and  rage.  In  the  past 
250 only  children  misbehaved  -  adults  acted  immorally.  Today  the  distinction  has  been 
diminished  and  individuals  of  all  ages  are  increasingly  judged  on  their  good 
behaviour.  The  understanding  of  actions  across  society,  as  forms  of  behaviour, 
represents  the  infantilisation  of  the  subject. 
With  the  increasing  focus  on  behaviour  rather  than  beliefs,  the  logical  necessity  for 
government  is  to  direct  ever  more  attention  onto  the  lives  and  relationships  of 
children:  the  paediatrician  rather  than  the  politician  becorning  the  key  player  in  the 
creation  of  a  non-antisocial  society. 
Farrington's  influential  developmental  criminology  incorporates  many  of  the  concerns 
of  underclass  theorists  while  incorporating  structural  factors  within  the  'grab-bag'  term 
of  psychosocial  risk  factors,  thus  giving  an  appropriately  neutral  and  apparently 
scientific  explanation  of  antisocial  behaviour.  178  This  approach  is  particularly 
appropriate  today,  with  its  emphasis  upon  things  done  to  you,  especially  as  a  child, 
which  are  beyond  your  control.  Whether  the  antisocial  adult's  behaviour  has  been 
genetically,  emotionally  or  structurally  determined,  this  determinism  of  humanity 
represents  the  actions  of  antisocial  adults  and  children  alike  as  being  semi-conscious 
and  set  in  stone.  Farrington's  methodology  of  examining  what  happened  to  individuals 
in  the  past  to  explain  their  actions  in  the  present  reflects  well  the  cultural  sense  of 
powerlessness  -  which  is  itself  a  reflection  of  the  political  sense  of  powerlessness  felt 
by  the  political  elite.  The  future  within  this  model  is  not  made  by  conscious  action  but 
has  already  been  made  and  ingrained  within  our  behaviour,  behaviour  that  stems  from 
our  damaged  past. 
Conclusion 
Historically,  then,  the  recent  preoccupation  with  'antisocial  behaviour'  has  come  very 
much  with  the  politicisation  of  this  term,  based  on  a  more  generalised  concern  with 
order  and  the  location  of  this  problem  at  the  level  of  individual  behaviour  that  is 
experienced  by  the  vulnerable  public. 
251 The  growth  in  the  use  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  in  recent  years  is  a  reflection  of 
the  increasing  development  of  policies  aimed  at  preventing  antisocial  behaviour  in 
society  and  especially  on  working  class  estates.  However,  lacking  a  political  or  social 
component,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  sense  of  the  problem  of  disorder  and  fear  that  grips 
the  political  elite  and  to  a  degree  the  public  themselves  will  be  dissipated.  The  attempt 
to  develop  state  legitimation  in  relation  to  antisociai  behaviour  initiatives  therefore 
appears  to  be  highly  problematic,  as  in  the  very  use  of  this  relatively  'value  free'  term 
the  problem  of  a  lack  of  social  meaning  which  underpins  the  sense  of  disorder  remains 
unresolved.  Indeed  the  focus  upon  the  problem  of  social  order  at  the  level  of 
problematic  individual  behaviour  has  helped  to  create  a  spiral  of  concern  with  ever- 
more  forms  of  antisocial  behaviour,  which  can  only  develop  further  as  the  state 
continues  to  relate  to  the  public  in  relation  to  its  sense  of  vulnerability. 
The  term  antisocial  behaviour  has  ultimately  emerged  and  grown  in  significance  in 
recent  years  with  the  increasing  sense  of  social  disorder  within  the  depoliticised 
political  elite  and  also  within  the  individuated  public.  The  rise  and  rise  of  the  social 
problem  of  antisocial  behaviour  is  a  reflection  of  this  loss  of  politics  and  the 
subsequent  exponential  increase  in  the  'politics  of  behaviour'. 
Social  problems  are  rarely  just  myths  that  have  no  basis  in  society,  and  many  of  the 
problems  related  to  via  ASBOs  and  other  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives  like  the 
Hamilton  curfew  connect  with  'real'  concerns.  However,  the  issue  of  antisocial 
behaviour  also  contains  a  metaphorical  dimension.  For  an  elite  that  lacks  even  the 
capacity  or  will  to  'dream  of  world  power,  there  remains  the  problem  of  its  inability  to 
engage  the  public  in  defining  and  enforcing  'social'  order  at  home  -a  problem  that  can 
only  remain  when  any  attempt  to  morally  uplift  or  civilise  the  public  has  been 
abandoned.  Whether  antisocial  behaviour  were  increasing  or  not,  there  would  remain, 
for  the  political  elite  and  to  a  degree  the  public,  a  sense  that  we  were  all  living  in  a, 
'sea  of  turbulence'  (Bauman  2000:  13). 
Finally,  one  of  the  ironies  with  the  growing  preoccupation  with  issues  of  antisocial 
behaviour  is  that,  despite  the  repeated  concern  with  a  loss  of  respect  and  responsibility 
in  society,  through  the  more  therapeutic  forms  of  intervention  values  related  to  the 
252 emotions  of  the  individual  themselves  further  relativise  ideas  of  moral  right,  while 
diminishing  the  idea  of  individual  personal  responsibility.  In  a  world  of  vulnerable 
individuals,  a  call  for  'respect'  amounts  to  little  more  than  a  demand  that  we  be  nice  to 
everyone,  just  in  case  we  undermine  someone's  self  esteem. 
As  Sommers  and  Satel  note: 
Therapism  tends  to  regard  people  as  essentially  weak,  dependent,  and  never 
altogether  responsible  for  what  they  do.  Alan  Wolfe,  a  Boston  College 
sociologist  and  expert  on  national  mores  and  attitudes,  reports  that  for  many 
Americans  nonjudgementalism  has  become  a  cardinal  virtue.  Concepts  of  right 
and  wrong,  good  and  evil,  are  often  regarded  as  anachronistic  and  intolerant. 
"Thou  shalt  be  nice"  is  the  new  categorical  imperative.  (Sommers  and  Satel 
2005:  6) 
253 Chapter  9:  Conclusion 
Societies  that  are  able  to  project  a  positive  vision  of  the  future  do  not  need  to 
employfear  as  a  currency  in  public  life  (Furedi  2005:  134). 
Three  key  developments  in  society  have  been  examined  in  this  thesis:  the  relationship 
between  the  individual  and  the  state,  expressed  through  the  relationship  between  the 
public  and  the  political  elite;  the  development  of  amoral  rather  than  moral  panics;  and 
the  nature  of  the  individual  being  constructed  through  the  prism  of  vulnerability  and 
diminished  subjectivity. 
The  changing  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  individual  is  one  that,  in  essence, 
has  been  depoliticised  and  demoralised.  The  political  elite's  inability  to  engage  the 
public  with  a  wider  set  of  values  has  resulted  in  a  new  form  of  'public'  engagement  at 
the  level  of  the  individual,  expressed  most  clearly  in  the  rise  of  the  therapeutic  and 
highly  regulatory  'politics  of  behaviour'. 
This  development  has  undermined  moral  panics,  as  the  capacity  to  promote  absolute 
moral  -  or  indeed  political  -  values,  has  declined.  in  the  place  of  moral  panics,  what 
has  been  described  as  a  form  of  amoral  anxiety  has  arisen  -a  more  permanent  and 
universal  form  of  anxiety  that  engages  people  as  fragmented  individuals  through 
issues  of  safety. 
Central  to  these  developments  has  been  the  changing  nature  of  the  individual  and  the 
emergence  of  a  more  diminished  form  of  subjectivity.  This  cultural  development  has 
material  roots  in  the  decline  of  ideologies,  of  collective  organisations  and  institutional 
practices,  and  has  been  reinforced  by  the  self-limiting  subjective  outlook  within 
contemporary  modernity.  With  vulnerability  and  an  'at  risk'  framework  becoming  a 
cultural  norm,  despite  calls  for  'responsibility',  the  exp&tations  society  places  on 
individuals  has  in  reality  declined. 
254 The  outcome  of  this  process  -  seen  clearly  through  the  example  of  the  Hamilton 
curfew  -  is  that  the  meaning  of  rights  has  been  transformed  from  a  promotion  of 
freedom  and  forms  of  action  by  individuals,  to  a  form  of  protection  of  individuals  by 
the  state.  Likewise  the  meaning  of  responsibility  has  been  widened  but,  more 
significantly,  weakened,  as  personal  safety  and  feelings  of  safety  come  to  represent 
the  highest  form  of  responsible  behaviour.  Ultimately,  by  organising  society  around 
the  conservative  amoral  theme  of  safety,  the  communities  in  Hamilton,  and  indeed 
more  generally  across  the  UK,  remain  fragmented  and  have  been  made  more  passive 
and  reliant  upon  third  party  intervention. 
Permanently  disconnected 
By  engaging  with  individuals'  fears,  the  modem  political  elite  has  been  able  to  tap 
into  the  broad  sense  of  insecurity  in  society,  but  this  new  'morality'  of  safety  lacks  the 
capacity  to  connect  people  with  a  wider  sense  of  meaning.  Rather  this  development 
has  helped  to  reinforce  the  disconnection  that  exists  between  people  today  and  so 
.  ntain  the  cultural  climate  that  encourages  a  sense  of  fear. 
We  live  in  a  world  of  panics,  but  not  a  world  of  moral  panics.  Attempts  to  promote 
traditional  morality  do  not  lie  at  the  heart  of  modem-day  panics  and  anxieties.  Rather 
it  is  the  collapse  of  a  coherent  web  of  meaning  once  provided  by  morals  and  by 
secular  'religions'  -  or  politics  -  that  explains  the  rise  of  amoral  panics. 
Today,  through  the  amoral  absolute  of  safety,  the  political  elite  is  bypassing  any 
attempt  to  reconstitute  a  web  of  social  meaning  that  binds  people  together.  Instead  it 
engages  with  the  more  fragmented  public  and  intervenes  on  its  behalf  to  manage  the 
behaviour  of  individuals. 
A  sense  of  social  meaning  has  historically  related  to  religion  and  later  to  secular 
'religions'  of  the  right  and  left  -  nationalism  and  socialism  in  particular  -  and  has  been 
supported  by  major  institutions  and  organisations  that  enjoyed  widespread  public 
support.  The  rise  of  democracy,  of  politics  and  of  competing  systems  of  belief  has,  for 
the  last  two  centuries,  helped  frame  the  lives  of  individuals  but  also  the  outlook  of  the 
255 political  elite.  Whether  based  on  tradition  or  a  more  radical  belief  in  the  future,  this 
sense  of  social  meaning  upheld  an  ideal  that  gave  a  certain  sense  of  purpose  to  the 
elite  and  the  public  alike.  It  is  the  loss  of  this  sense  of  purpose  on  both  the  left  and 
right  that  has  resulted  in  a  society  that  is  not  only  more  prone  to  panic,  but  which  has 
institutionalised  the  anxiety  expressed  within  these  panics. 
As  we  observed  earlier,  in  previous  times  panics  about  crime  and  youth  crime  in 
particular  were  often  counteracted  by  significant  elite  individuals  and  groups,  like 
Baden  Powell,  or  the  Conservative  Home  Secretary  Henry  Brooke,  due  in  part  to  the 
sense  of  purpose  felt  by  the  elite  itself.  So  long  as  those  running  society  felt  able  to 
engage  the  'energy  of  society'  -  or  indeed  the  energy  of  youth  -  in  a  project  to 
4  civilize',  social  problems  could  be  addressed  -within  this  positive  sense  of  social 
progress.  But  having  lost  this  sense  of  meaning  and  purpose,  the  directionless  political 
elite  has  developed  a  tendency  to  panic  and  today  aims  to  simply  conserve  things  and 
to  regulate  society  more  directly. 
Without  a  system  of  meaning  with  which  to  direct  social  processes  and  include  the 
public,  institutions  across  society  backed  up  by  myriad  social  policy  initiatives  have 
instead  attempted  to  engage  with  the  individual  through  the  micro-politics  of 
behaviour.  Rather  than  reconnecting  individuals  with  a  social  project,  the  role  of 
politics  has  become  the  management  of  everyday  life  as  an  end  in  itself. 
Fragmentation  within  society,  coupled  with  a  growing  distance  between  individuals 
and  any  system  of  social  meaning,  has  resulted  in  a  more  insecure  and  anxious 
electorate  emerging.  Consequently  individual  safety  has  become  the  more  limited  goal 
for  society  and  one  that  the  political  elite  has  both  engaged  with  and  encouraged.  With 
new  laws  and  initiatives  like  the  Hamilton  curfew,  the  fragmented  individual  is  in 
theory  made  to  feel  safe  -  while  in  practice  is  left  isolated,  and  disconnected  from 
society. 
Asocial  politics 
Significant  long-term  trends  helped  to  stimulate  the  emergence  of  recent  moral  panics 
that  grew  out  of  the  1960s  and  also  resulted  in  the  amoral  safety  panics  of  the  late 
256 1980s  and  1990s.  Discussions  of  the  End  of  Ideology  (Bell  1962)  and  the  End  of 
Utopia  (Jacoby  1999)179  give  some  insight  into  the  decline  of  the  'great'  ideologies 
associated  with  the  left  and  right  that  have  in  part  led  to  the  various  panic  reactions  in 
post-war  Western  societies.  These  broader  theoretical  considerations  have  been 
somewhat  beyond  the  remit  of  this  thesis  but  have  informed  its  development. 
However,  these  'trends'  do  not  have  a  life  of  their  own,  but  have  been  implemented 
and  given  concrete  expression  by  a  variety  of  claimsmakers  and  activists  who  have 
helped  to  create  and  recreate  new  crimes  and  new  social  problems  over  the  last  two 
decades. 
Most  significantly,  issues  labelled  as  forms  of  antisocial  behaviour  have  emerged 
within  the  major  political  parties  particularly  from  the  early  1990s,  as  politics  moved 
from  an  engagement  with  the  social  or a  belief  in  the  individual  subject.  Rather  than 
representing  opposite  ends  of  a  political  spectrum  of  left  and  right,  the  decline  of 
social  or  collective  beliefs  and  institutions  has  seen  the  simultaneous  decline  or 
diminution  of  the  active  subject  as  the  basis  for  social  life  and  government  policy 
initiatives.  Micro-politics  has  developed  with  an  increasing  rapidity  to  manage  the 
behaviour  of  individuals,  replacing  the  ideological  political  battle  for  the  conscious 
support  of  the  public.  A  fight  over  the  beliefs  of  adults  through  the  promotion  of 
morals  and  politics  has  subsequently  been  replaced  by  an  attempt  to  manage  the 
emotions  and  behaviour  of  adults  and  especially  children  and  young  people. 
'Realism'  emerged  on  the  left  and  the  right  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  giving  expression 
to  the  idea  that  'there  is  no  alternative'  to  what  already  exists  in  society.  Within 
criminology,  the  belief  in  the  capacity  of  society  to  overcome  crime  was  abandoned, 
and  through  the  left  realist  and  feminist  promotion  of  the  defence  of  'vulnerable 
groups',  crime  control  was  given  a  radical  edge  and  began  to  be  a  priority  issue  for 
Labour  councils.  More  generally,  the  'victim'  became  a  new  cultural  icon  at  this  time, 
helped  by  both  right-wing  but  especially  left-wing  thinkers,  whose  role  became  one  of 
an  advocate  for  newly  discovered  victims  in  society.  The  significance  of  the  'done-to 
victim'  could  only  fully  emerge  as  a  dominant  understanding  of  people  when  the 
active  engagement  of  political  subjects  was  no  longer  relevant  to  public  life.  From  the 
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authorities  and  unions,  with  a  newly  understood  vulnerable  public. 
Whatever  the  changes  in  the  'antisocial  behaviour'  of  the  public,  the  rise  in  the 
concern  with  individual  behaviour  was  predicated  upon  this  transformation  in  the 
public  and  within  politics  -  something  that  was  given  added  weight  by  the  radical  and 
realist  claimsmakers  of  victims  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour.  A  wider  cultural 
, 
sense  of  fear  emerged  with  the  political  and  social  changes  of  the  time,  but  was 
engaged  with  at  the  individual  level  of  problem  behaviour  -  especially  on  working 
class  estates. 
Within  this  framework,  social  problems  in  the  1990s  were  increasingly  understood 
with  reference  to  individual  'behaviour',  rather  than  to  social  or  structural  factors  or  to 
an  understanding  of  the  'conscious  action'  of  the  individual.  Predicated  on  a  more 
static  and  conservative  outlook  about  both  society  and  the  individual,  risk  factors 
discovered  by  psychological  criminologists  like  Farrington  helped  to  develop  a 
framework  for  intervention  into  community  and  family  life.  This  more  behavioural 
and  deterministic  approach  to  individual  and  community  development  was  influential 
at  the  time  of  the  election  of  the  New  Labour  government  and  the  introduction  of  the 
Hamilton  curfew.  Attempting  to  manage  risk  factors,  this  academic  and  'scicntiric' 
approach  to  antisocial  behaviour  sat  comfortably  with  the  shift  in  politics  to  manage 
the  behaviour  of  individuals  outside  of  a  moral  or  political  framework:  managing  risks 
and  providing  safety  for  the  public  being  the  'ultimate  liberty'  on  offer  from  the 
government. 
Creating  safe  communities 
The  election  of  the  Labour  Government  in  1997,  which  preceded  the  introduction  of 
the  Hamilton  Child  Safety  Initiative,  brought  a  new  Prime  Minister  to  power  who  had 
cut  his  teeth  on  the  slogan  of  fighting  crime  and  the  causes  of  crime.  Creating  safer 
communities  was  something  that  could  relate  to  a  more  fragmented  and  insecure 
public,  but  was  not  part  of  a  wider  ideology  or  social  movement  -  rather  it  was  the 
result  of  a  loss  of  one. 
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voice  made  public  through  media  campaigns,  phone-in  polls  and  council-run  surveys. 
In  the  Citizens'  Jury  set  up  with  council  support,  run  by  professional  facilitators 
around  a  pre-set  agenda  of  community  safety,  a  handful  of  local  people  were 
encouraged  to  'participate'  in  a  process  that  in  the  end  was  not  of  their  making.  The 
resulting  curfew  initiative  had  not  been  the  idea  of  this  jury,  as  was  claimed  by  the 
local  MP,  nor  did  the  people  of  Hillhouse  feel  any  great  sense  of  ownership  or  even 
understanding  of  what  was  taking  place.  Rather  than  the  demands  of  local  people 
being  reflected  as  a  public  voice  through  their  political  representatives,  consultants, 
pollsters  and  facilitators  were  employed  to  help  give  the  local  politicians  a  sense  of 
what  local  people  wanted. 
That  a  Citizens'  Jury  was  felt  to  be  needed  by  the  Labour-run  South  Lanarkshire 
Council  to  relate  to  the  public  gives  a  sense  of  the  loss  of  connection  between  politics 
and  'citizens'  at  this  time.  The  'old'  Labour  Party  was  a  mass  political  organisation 
that  grew  out  of  the  labour  movement  with  a  socialist  ideology  and  helped  create  the 
welfare  state.  New  Labour,  by  comparison,  had  neither  a  vision  thing,  nor  a 
Movement.  Contrasting  a  time  when  politicians  had  a  sense  of  future  possibilities, 
Furedi  notes  how  Roosevelt's  New  Deal  speech  came  with  the  famous  statement  that 
the  'only  thing  we  have  to  fear  is  fear  itself  (Furedi  2005:  135).  How  different  a 
world  of  politics  from  that  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  where  the  only  thing  it  appeared 
that  politicians  could  engage  with  was,  in  fact,  fear  itself. 
The  Hamilton  curfew  was  a  panic  reaction  to  what  were  unexceptional  troubles  on  a 
working  class  estate  in  Scotland  -  but  a  panic  that  was  able  to  tap  into  the  insecurities 
of  local  people.  Without  a  wider  sense  of  purpose  or  social  meaning,  New  Labour 
nationally  and  locally  engaged  with  people's  fears  through  the  value  of  safety  -  with 
rights,  responsibilities,  freedom,  liberty  and  what  it  meant  to  be  a  good  citizen  or  even 
parent  all  relating  to  this  new  amoral  absolute. 
Despite  claims  that  community  safety  initiatives  would  help  to  rebuild  communities, 
in  Hillhouse  there  was  no  sense  of  this  developing  -  indeed  with  the  emphasis  on 
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in  the  area,  it  was  perhaps  unsurprising  that  fear  within  the  community  was  not 
dissipated.  Rather  than  people  being  reconnected  with  one  another,  the  curfew  did  the 
opposite,  by  promoting  a  new  etiquette  of  safety  based  on  the  suspicion  and  fear  of 
other  people  in  the  area. 
Rights  and  Responsibilities 
The  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  has  elevated  the  significance  of  generally  non- 
criminal  offences  into  a  key  social  problem  for  communities  and  society  more 
generally.  In  part  this  represents  an  attempt  to  create  a  more  legally-based  form  of 
regulation  of  relationships  between  people,  an  enforced  code  of  conduct.  Introduced  at 
a  time  when  a  wider  system  of  meaning  in  society  that  helped  to  direct  relationships 
between  people  had  been  lost,  antisocial  behaviour  and  community  safety  initiatives 
replicated  in  public  space  the  codes  of  conduct  and  harassment  codes  that  had  been 
introduced  in  workplaces.  As  health  and  safety  at  work  and  in  union  practice,  for 
example,  moved  from  a  collective  form  of  protection  of  the  workforce  from 
employers  towards  a  protection  of  workers  from  one  another  and  from  the  public,  so 
community  safety  initiatives  developed  to  regulate  the  conflicts  between  individuals  in 
communities  (Wainwright  and  CaInan  2002:  143).  Both  developments  reflected  to 
some  extent  the.  more  distant  relationships  between  individuals  and  a  loss  of  a  sense  of 
solidarity:  however,  by  developing  practices  predicated  upon  the  assumed 
vulnerability  of  people,  third  party  intervention  increasingly  became  the  norm  and  a 
more  limited  expectation  of  individuals  was  institutionalised. 
In  Hamilton,  the  Child  Safety  initiative  was  promoted  as  a  defence  of  people's  rights, 
yet  the  meaning  of  'rights'  was  here  downgraded  and  came  to  mean  the  protection  of 
individuals  from  those  around  them.  The  'right  to  a  quiet  life'  in  practice  meant  the 
right  of  adults  to  phone  the  police  if  young  people  were  hanging  around  the  streets  and 
the  responsibility  of  young  people  and  parents  to  others  in  the  community  was  to  'be 
quiet'.  In  essence  a  code  of  conduct  was  promoted  in  Hamilton  predicated  on  the 
understanding  that  communities  were  being  undermined  by  fear  generated  by  young 
people  out  at  night  -  and  also  predicated  on  the  assumption  that  adults  could  not  and 
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child  safety  was  understood  to  be  an  issue  that  the  community  had  no  active  role  in 
resolving. 
Since  the  curfew  was  introduced,  a  raft  of  new  laws  and  initiatives  have  developed  to 
regulate  further  the  relationships  between  people  on  estates  across  the  UK,  with  the 
development  of  community  wardens,  for  example,  potentially  leading  to  a  serni- 
permanent  mediation  service  between  people.  Labour  MP  Frank  Field,  disillusioned 
with  the  state  of  parenting  in  society,  has  ultimately  proposed  that  the  police  should 
become  surrogate  parents  and  take  a  more  direct  role  in  the  regulation  of  children's 
bad  behaviour  (Field  2003).  As  the  expectation  of  adults  to  act  to  resolve  problems 
themselves  declines  -a  development  that  is  encouraged  by  these  new  safety  initiatives 
an  increasing  burden  is  placed  upon  the  police  to  become  the  creators  of 
community'  or  even  the  responsible  parents  of  the  future. 
However,  despite  the  talk  of  rights  and  responsibility  by  Labour  politicians  like  Field, 
this  development  should  be  seen  as  a  relinquishing  of  political  responsibility  by  the 
political  elite,  which  has  given  up  on  developing  a  framework  of  social  meaning  that 
can  reconnect  individuals.  As  problems  have  become  understood  to  relate  to 
individual  relationships,  so  too  have  the  solutions  to  these  problems.  However,  rarely, 
if  ever,  is  there  an  expectation  that  individuals  can  resolve  problems  themselves,  and 
consequently  a  framework  of  reliance  has  been  established  in  the  last  decade  between 
the  public  and  state  institutions  that  both  encourages  a  more  passive  engagement  with 
society  and  communities. 
The  experience  of  antisocial  behaviour 
Finally,  an  area  of  interest  that  this  thesis  has  said  little  about  directly  is  why  antisocial 
behaviour  is  such  a  major  concern  for  individuals  themselves.  Why  do  the  issues 
raised  by  the  government  -  of  graffiti,  rowdiness  and  incivility  of  youth  connect  so 
much  with  the  public?  Here,  by  incorporating  the  themes  addressed  so  far,  a  brief 
attempt  is  made  to  answer  this  question. 
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agenda',  which  elevated  the  significance,  not  simply  of  antisocial  behaviour,  but  of 
politeness,  as  a  serious  social  problem.  Within  this  thesis  the  emphasis  has  been 
placed  on  analysing  the  political  elite  and  clainismakers  who  have  helped  to  construct 
the  problem  of  antisocial  behaviour,  but  as  was  noted  in  relation  to  the  Hamflton 
curfew,  support  for  community  safety  initiatives  amongst  the  public  is  high.  Indeed  as 
Squires  notes,  by  2004  Labour  election  co-ordinators  were  of  the  opinion  that 
antisocial  behaviour  was  the  number  one  issue  on  the  doorsteps  (Squires  and  Stephen 
2005).  But  why  is  this? 
At  a  broad  cultural  level,  the  climate  of  political  cynicism,  which  has  seen  the  fall  in 
voter  turn-out,  the  huge  decline  in  party  political  activists  (Heartfield  2002:  202),  and 
the  development  of  these  parties  as  some  of  the  least  trusted  organisations  in  society 
(MORI  2001),  has  helped  to  create  a  climate  of  pessimism  about  the  future  and  a 
diminished  sense  of  collective  and  also  individual  possibilities.  As  Furedi  argues,  the 
significance  of  the  collapse  of  politics  reflects  not  simply  a  form  of  apathy  on  an 
otherwise  healthy  civil  society,  but  rather:  Cynicism  and  suspicion  towards  politics 
ultimately  represents  cynicism  and  suspicion  towards  one  another'  (Furedi  2005:  2). 
This  'cynicism  and  suspicion'  of  others  has  resulted,  for  example,  in  the  increasing 
concern  amongst  parents  and  grandparents  about  'what  the  future  will  be  for  our 
children'.  Part  of  the  more  pessimistic  view  about  life  for  the  next  generation  has 
come  from  an  increased  fear  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour  that  is  understood  to  be 
blighting  children's  future  (Barnardos  1995a).  But  this  fear  has  also  resulted  in  a  more 
negative  image  of  young  people  themselves,  an  image  that  preoccupies  the 
imagination  both  here  and  abroad.  A  recent  survey  on  public  attitudes  to  youth  and 
youth  crime  in  Scotland,  for  example,  found  that  despite  the  statistical  fall  in  youth 
crime,  of  those  interviewed  69%  believed  that  youth  crime  had  increased  and  only  2% 
believed  it  had  fallen.  180  Describing  the  misanthropic  outlook  towards  young  people  in 
the  US  and  the  fear  of  'violent  youth',  Zimring  notes  that: 
A  modest  expansion  in  the  size  of  the  youth  population  is  regarded  as 
unqualified  bad  news.  It  is  never  alleged  that  more  than  a  small  proportion  of 
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subject  to  be  considered  in  congressional  debate.  From  this  perspective,  an 
entire  generation  of  future  adolescents  is  considered  to  be  bad  news,  so  that  the 
larger  the  size  of  the  cohort,  the  bigger  the  social  and  government  problems 
will  result  (Zimring  2000:  179). 
This  more  cynical  and  pessimistic  sense  of  the  future  has  arguably  transformed  the 
way  young  people  in  particular  are  understood  -  as  without  a  positive  sense  of  social 
meaning  and  developing  possibilities,  the  lives  of  the  future  generation  comes  to  be 
seen  as  more  directionless  and  out  of  control.  In  the  past,  when  there  was  a  greater 
understanding  of  where  young  people  would  fit  into  society  and  also  what  the  role  of 
adults  was  in  this  process  (Furlong  and  Cartmel  1997:  110),  a  more  relaxed  attitude 
was  taken  to  forms  of  behaviour  that  are  today  seen  as  being  antisocial.  Without  a 
sense  of  social  progress  or  a  view  of  the  future,  the  trend  in  politics  and  society  more 
generally  has  been  to  lose  the  optimistic  belief  that  young  people  will  'grow  out  of 
crime'  (Squires  and  Stephen  2005:  21),  or  that  their  energy  will  be  harnessed  in 
socially  useful  ways  -  within  the  workplace,  by  'serving  their  country'  or  in  looking 
after  themselves  and  their  family.  Even  the  language  used  to  describe  young  boys  and 
men  in  particular  has  changed,  as  'mischievous'  and  'boisterous'  behaviour  has 
become  reclassified  as  aggressive  and  antisocial,  while  being  tough  and  assertive  has 
become  'macho'  and  'abusive'. 
In  a  society  that  lacks  a  positive  vision  of  the  future,  and  is  preoccupied  with 
preventing  harm  rather  than  creating  good,  the  'bad  behaviour'  of  young  people  has 
become  exaggerated  as  a  social  problem.  It  is  not  the  behaviour  of  young  people  itself 
that  has  necessarily  changed,  but  that  within  this  more  pessimistic  cultural  climate  the 
image  of  the  'antisocial  yob'  has  become  a  metaphorfor  a  loss  of  social  control  in  a 
society  that  lacks  direction  andpurpose. 
'Behaviour'  is  a  big  issue  today,  both  in  politics  and  on  the  street,  but  whatever  the 
problem  of  misbehaving  youth,  the  sense  that  all  young  people  are  running  wild  is 
exaggerated.  However,  the  problem  of  behaviour  is  real,  not  in  the  way  it  is  often 
understood  -  with  young  people  simply  being  seen  as  'yobs'  -  but  rather  in  terms  of  a 
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particular  between  adults  and  young  people. 
The  public  has  become  disconnected  from  society,  and  from  the  myriad  institutions 
within  it,  but  they  have  also  become  disconnected  from  one  another.  The  informal 
rules  that  help  people  to  navigate  their  day-to-day  encounters  have  broken  down, 
leaving  people  more  anxious  and  unsure  about  how  to  respond  to  one  another.  People 
may  still  have  a  sense  of  what  is  right  and  wrong,  but  the  rules  of  the  game  can  no 
longer  be  taken  for  granted.  Adults  are  no  longer  sure  if  they  should  intervene  to 
regulate  young  people's  behaviour,  nor  are  they  clear  about  whether  or  not  they 
should  help  a  distressed  child. 
Today  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong  has  become  more  fragmented.  Parents  may  each 
have  concerns  about  issues  of  antisocial  behaviour,  but  when  problems  of  their  own 
child's  behaviour  are  brought  to  their  attention  by  neighbouring  adults  they  are  more 
inclined  to  defend  the  child  than  back.  the  adult.  The  more  privatised  nature  of  the 
family  has  assisted  this  development,  but  the  awkwardness  adults  feel  in  relating  to 
young  people  today  has  also  been  reinforced  by  the  developing  'politics  of  behaviour'. 
Through  the  myriad  community  safety  initiative  over  the  last  ten  to  15  years  the 
message  has  been  sent  out  that  the  regulation  of  young  people  is  no  longer  an 
expected  role  for  adults.  The  more  distant  relationship  this  encourages  between  the 
generations  has  also  been  encouraged  by  the  concerns  over  child  safety.  The 
recognition  amongst  both  the  adults  and  children  in  Hillhouse  for  example  that 
children  should  not  talk  to  strangers,  expressed  well  the  framework  of  distrust  that  has 
developed  in  communities  -  something  that  has  been  encouraged  through  the 
promotion  of  child  safety  both  at  a  local  and  national  level.  The  result  of  this 
development  has  led  to  what  is  today  being  described  as  a  walk  on  by  society,  where 
adults  turn  away  from  children  who  need  help,  unsure  what  others  might  think  if  they 
dare  to  lend  a  hand. 
Society  may  be  more  fragmented,  but  this  fragmentation  and  disconnection  between 
people  has  been  facilitated  by  the  child  and  community  safety  industry  that  has  both 
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out  to  communities  today,  is  that  it  is  the  job  of  professionals  rather  than  local  adults 
to  engage  with,  discipline  or  even  care  for  the  children  in  your  area. 
Outside  of  children  in  your  immediate  family,  it  is  no  longer  clear  what  the  role  of 
adults  should  be  in  relation  to  young  people  and  their  rnisbehaviour.  '  Given  this 
situation,  when  young  people  are  'antisocial',  it  is  not  simply  the  behaviour  itsetr 
which  wefind  so  upsetting  but  our  own  sense  of  impotence  and  confusion  about  what 
our  role  as  adults  should  be. 
Adults,  perhaps  more  than  at  any  other  time,  are  concerned  about  young  people's 
behaviour  and  support,  even  demand,  something  be  done  about  it.  But  at  the  same 
time  -  there  is  little  expectation  within  the  adult  population  itself  that  they  should  be 
involved  in  regulating  this  behaviour.  The  result  is  that  adults  and  young  people  have 
become  disconnected  from  one  another,  while  informal  relationships  are  formalised. 
CCTV  cameras  on  estates  have  increasingly  become  the  technical  way  to  watch  over 
young  people,  replacing  the  watchful  gaze  of  even  the  old  'curtain  twitcher',  while 
troublesome  young  people  are  given  behaviour  contracts  by  the  police  rather  than 
being  socialised  through  spontaneous  encounters  with  adults.  Where  adults  do 
intervene  they  often  do  it  alone,  receiving  little  support  from  those  around  them,  and 
frequently  decide  that  next  time  they  will  leave  it  to  someone  else.  With  little  support 
from  one  another,  potential  confrontation  with  young  people's  parents,  and 
discouragement  from  the  authorities  to  get  involved,  the  active  men  and  women  of 
conununities  are  a  dying  breed. 
Given  this  situation,  this  vacuum  of  adult  authority,  it  is  likely  that  the  behaviour  of 
young  people  will  become  less  predictable  and  potentially  more  problematic.  Thus  the 
cry  that  'something  must  be  done'  by  the  authorities  gets  ever  louder,  and  the 
breakdown  of  informal  relationships  spirals  ever  downwards. 
Finally,  the  pressures  on  adults  not  to  'get  involved'  when  young  people  misbehave 
also  helps  to  raise  the  level  of  anxiety  about  antisocial  behaviour.  Because  by  not 
acting  to  resolve  these  problems,  we  undermine  our  own  sense  of  adulthood.  People 
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but  also  with  themselves  because  they  have  relinquished  responsibility  for  something 
they  sense  they  should  be  able  to  sort  out.  What  individuals  e-rperience  from  their 
inaction  in  relation  to  axiwial  behaviour  is  a  sense  of  their  own  diminished 
subjectivigy. 
Ultimately,  the  loss  of  connection  between  people  is  a  significant  problem  today  -  but 
one  that  is  rarely  addressed  politically.  Politicians  and  local  authorities  feel  more 
comfortable  tapping  into  the  public  sense  of  fear  and  insecurity  and  do  so  through 
Promoting  safety  campaigns  and  launching  cvCr-more  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives. 
However.  the  result  of  this  is  that  it  reinforces  a  sense  that  young  people  are  indeed 
Out  of  control  and  it  further  discourages  adults  from  having  anything  to  do  with  these 
Young  people.  Today's  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives  send  out  the  message  that  it  is 
the  role  of  the  police,  of  the  housing  department,  or  of  community  wardens,  to  deal 
with  Youngsters,  rather  than  local  adults.  This  both  promotes  passivity  and  literally 
helps  to  reduce  still  further  the  contact  that  different  generations  have  with  one 
another. 
Future  Research 
As  the  thesis  'goes  to  press'.  a  report  by  the  Institute  of  Public  Policy  Research  has 
been  printed  (Margo  and  Dixon  2006).  Making  the  headlines  on  a  number  of  issues, 
two  key  points  made  in  this  research  relate  to  the  findings  that  British  adults  are  both 
4  scared  of  young  people'  and  that  compared  with  their  European  counterparts,  they  are 
less  likely  to  intervene  when  they  see  teenagers  misbehaving.  The  research  in 
Hamilton  Provided  some  evidence  of  this.  The  argument  made  here  has  been  that  in 
effect  the  community  safety  initiatives  developed  from  the  mid  1990s  have  actually 
encouraged  this  'walk  on  by'  approach  by  adults.  However,  a  weaknes§  of  the 
research  in  Hillhouse  was  that  relatively  few  adults  and'especially  parents,  were 
interviewed.  What  were  their  thoughts  about  the  child  safety  message,  did  they 
intervene  in  their  community,  and  if  not  why  not?  it  appears  in  retrospect  that  despite 
the  focus  of  the  curfew  app=ring  to  be  on  young  people,  perhaps  more  significantly  it 
was  Parents  and  parenting  that  was  central  to  the  Child  Safety  Initiative.  With  the 
266 focus  on  young  people.  in  tmm  of  interviews,  the  voice  of  the  adults  in  the  area  wcre 
]relatively  underdeveloped  here. 
As  antisocial  behaviour  initiatives  and  child  safety  issues  become  further 
institutionalised,  more  researcb  is  needed  into  the  understanding  that  adults  have  of 
themselves  and  their  role  in  their  communities  and  especially  with  children  and  young 
people. 
Conclusion 
Many  of  the  trends  identified  in  the  thesis  related  to  the  Hamilton  curfew  in  1997  have 
developed  and  become  more  pronounced  today.  Antisocial  behaviour  has  become  an 
increasingly  significant  political  issue,  and  as  crime  figures  fall  and  the  fear  of  crime 
remains  high.  the  focus  on  antisocial  behaviour  has  intensified  further.  The  search  for 
the  elusive  cause  of  fear  in  society  is  drifting  ever  downwards  onto  the  minutiae  of 
everyday  life  and  relationships  between  people.  7be  promotion  of  the  'politics  of 
behaviour,  (Blears,  2004).  which  in  the  recent  past  would  have  been  more  problematic, 
is  now  becoming  an  accepted  and  indeed  promoted  role  for  government,  with  how  and 
where  People  smoke  and  drink.  or  what  they  eat,  for  example,  increasingly  understood 
to  be  a  lcgitinwe  political  issue  of  public  safety  and  individual  responsibility. 
MC-anIhile  the  police  -  an  organisation  that  today  has  far  greater  public  legitimacy 
than  Political  Parties  (MORI  2001:  12)  -  has  become  more  relied  upon  to  resolve  an 
increasing  array  of  social  issues.  As  the  Guardian  editorial  commented  in  relation  to 
the  Dimbleby  L-ecture  by  Sir  Ian  Bell,  the  Metropolitan  Police  Commissioner,  in 
November  2005,  'policing  may  once  have  been  marginal  to  much  ordinary  life,  but 
today  it  is  closer  to  the  ccntre'  (Guardian  17  November  2005).  Developments  that 
would  Previously  have  been  understood  as  a  move  towards  a  police  state  are  today 
endorsed  by  even  liberal  newspapers  and  acaden-ýics,  as  fear  becomes  an  accepted 
framework  for  political  actiotL 
In  the  case  of  the  Hamilton  curfew.  it  was  noted  that  despite  there  being  some  real 
issues  regarding  young  people's  behaviour  in  the  area.  in  general  the  fear  expressed  by 
local  People  was  less  to  do  with  any  particular  safety  issues  than  with  a  more 
267 generalised  sense  of  insecurity:  a  sentiment  that  led  to  a  high  level  of  support  for  the 
community  safety  initiatives  being  introduced.  Fear  of  young  people  and  fear  for 
children  were  both  significant  issues  promoted  and  engaged  with  at  this  time.  Since 
1997  when  Labour  came  into  power,  the  engagement  with  fear  has  become 
normalised  and  institutionalised  to  such  an  extent  that  the  culture  of  fear  is  today  even 
more  ingrained  in  everyday  life.  Antisocial  Behaviour  Orders  are  being  used  at  an 
accelerated  rate,  institutionalising  the  more  therapeutic  protection  of  the  public,  not 
from  crime,  but  from  anything  that  the  Crime  and  Disorder  Act  1998  dcrincd  as  being, 
'likely  to  cause  harassment  alarm  or  distress'.  Local  radio  stations  in  Scotland  today 
advertise  antisocial  behaviour  laws  to  encourage  people  to  use  these  new  powers,  and 
sound  no  more  out  of  place  than  an  advert  for  cereal  or washing  powder,  while  new 
rules  under  Disclosure  Scotland'81  introduce,  with  the  support  of  public  sector  unions, 
ever-more  intrusive  forms  of  vetting  of  adults  working  with  young  people. 
Safety  is  today's  amoral  absolute  and  the  modem  framework  for  the  state  to  relate  to 
individuals  and  communities.  But  rather  than  communities  being  developed,  they  arc 
being  further  undermined  by  this  process.  A  key  to  the  creation  of  communities  at  a 
local  level  is  the  development  of  relationships  between  adults  and  children,  and  the 
experience  of  bringing  up  the  next  generation  of  adults.  Unfortunately,  the  more 
society  is  organised  around  fear  and  safety,  the  more  fragmented  and  distrusting  will 
these  communities  become,  creating  A  truly  antisocial  society. 
268 Notes 
'Seethe  Guidance  on  Crime  and  DisorderAct.  local  child  curfiews(1998).  2  For  an  over-view  of  this  period  see  Joel  Best's  Deviance:  The  Career  of  a  Concept  (2004). 
3  The  trend  towards  'radicals'  accepting  the  social  problem  of  crime  developed  with  feminist  writers  in 
the  1970s  followed  by  New  Realists  in  the  1980s.  However,  it  was  not  until  the  1990s  that  the  'social 
problems'  of  both  crime  and  especially  antisocial  behaviour  became  mainstrcam.  This  topic  is 
addressed  further  in  Chapter  5. 
4  The  British  Crime  Survey  was  initially  seen  as  an  alternative  source  of  information  of  crime  and  has 
over  time  become  increasingly  used  in  tandem  with  the  official  crime  statistics  to  give  a  more  accurate 
picture  of  crime  in  the  UK.  (See  a  review  of  the  BCS  in  the  British  Journal  of  Criminology  1984.  Vol. 
24,  ppl95-205). 
5  Jenkins,  in  his  critique  of  official  crime  statistics,  argues  that  'the  first  thing  to  say  is  that  police 
statistics  are  totally  useless,  either  as  a  true  record  of  crime  or  as  a  measure  of  its  movement  over  time. 
They  are  simply  a  record  of  police  station  activity'  (Jenkins  1994:  83). 
6  See  also  Coleman  and  Moynihan  (1996). 
7  See  also  Bob  Holman's  Children  and  Crime:  How  Can  Society  Tum  Back  the  Tide  of  Delinquency 
(1995),  a  tide  of  delinquency  that  the  leftwing  Holman  finds  to  be  contradicted  by  the  same  conviction 
statistics. 
8  See  also  Cohen's  Images  of  Deviance  (1971),  Jock  Young's  The  Druglakers  (1971)  and  Ian  and 
Laurie  Taylor's  Politics  and  Deviance  (1973). 
9  Until  1997  the  Labour  Party  had  never  made  law  and  order  a  central  part  of  their  general  election 
manifestos.  See  Downes  and  Morgan  (1997). 
10  Ile  problems  of  'harassment  and  abuse,  for  example,  that  have  often  been  highlighted  within 
feminist  research,  are  central  to  the  definition  of  antisocial  behaviour. 
11  The  seriousness  with  which  'antisocial  behaviour'  of  young  people  is  taken  today  suggests  that  the 
use  of  the  term  'mischief  to  describe  these  petty  misdemcanours  will.  if  it  hasn't  already,  become 
obsolete. 
12  See  the  Antisocial  Behaviour  Acts  in  both  Scotland  (2004)  and  the  England  and  Wales  (2003). 
13  In  a  local  area  of  Airdrie,  for  example,  L6  million  was  set  aside  for  community  safety  work  by  the 
council,  targeted  at  a  population  of  fewer  than  10,000  people. 
14  Beck's  'Risk  Society'  is  different  to  O'Malley  and  Simon's,  being  more  'real'  as  opposed  to  a 
developing  'technology  of  power'.  However,  here  the  idea  of  risk  is  highlighted  more  generally  to 
illustrate  the  changing  analysis  of  society  that  situates  risk  and  risk  management  at  its  heart,  which 
elevates  concerns  about  events  that  have  often  yet  to  occ&. 
15  'Outsiders'  are  defined  by  Best  as  those  groups  of  claimsmakcrs  outside  of  the  main  political  and 
social  institutions  of  society  (Best  1993). 
16  Also  see  Rose  (1999). 
17  In  the  Guardian  19  January  2006,  for  example,  the  children's  commissioner  for  England  argued  that 
the  problem  of  disorder  was  not  about  young  people  not  showing  respect  but  was  in  fact  a  problem 
created  because  adults  do  not  show  young  people  enough  respect. 
18  Here  the  notion  of  victimisation  is  used  to  depict  the  understanding  and  representation  of  all  of  the 
affected  groups  in  the  curfew-targeted  areas  as  victims. 
19  The  idea  of  'cotton  wool  kids'  refers  to  concerns  about  the  ovcr-protected  and  limited  nature  of 
children's  lives  and  free  time,  concerns  that  have  been  explored  in  detail  through  various  publications 
and  research  projects.  See  for  examp  . le  Hillman,  Adams  and  Whitcleg  (1990). 
20  Cohen's  work  on  Mods  and  Rockers  was  developed  from  labelling  theory  that  emerged  in  the  USA  in 
the  fifties  and  sixties  (Lemert  1951;  Becker  1991(originally  printed  in  1963)).  Labelling  theory,  rather 
than  taking  the  deviant  as  a  given  by  his  actions  and  studying  this,  looked  at  how  the  very  process  of 
labelling  came  about,  and  what  impact  labelling  an  individual  or  group  had  on  the  accused. 
21  This,  he  argued,  in  the  1960s  was  something  felt  most  acutely  by  the  lower  middle  class,  as  the  'work 
ethic'  was  seen  to  be  displaced  amongst  the  young  by  a  'New  Hedonism'  (1978:  157). 
22  Many  on  the  right  attacked  extremists.  demonstrators,  squatters,  black  power  activists  and  student 
radicals.  Militant  trade  unionists  were  also  attacked  and  new  laws  like  the  Industrial  Relations  Act 
introduced.  The  demonstration  against  this  act  was  depicted  at  the  time  as  a  demonstration  of  rowdies 
and  anarchists  'promoting  the  downfall  of  law  and  order'  (1978:  284). 
269 23  Explaining  how  society  'creates'  deviance,  Becker  notes  that'social  groups  make  deviance  by  making 
the  rules  whose  infraction  constitutes  deviance,  and  by  applying  those  rules  to  particular  people  and 
labelling  them  as  outsiders.  From  this  point  of  view,  deviance  is  not  the  quality  of  the  act  the  person 
commits,  but  rather  a  consequence  of  the  application  by  others  of  rules  and  sanctions  to  an  "offender"' 
(Becker  1991:  9). 
24  This  form  of  social  constructionism,  known  as  contextual  constructionism,  will  be  used  within  this 
thesis.  For  a  discussion  about  the  conflicting  methods  of  strict  and  contextual  constructionists.  see 
ýp!  c_  tor  and  Kitsuse  (1987)  and  Best  (1990:  189) 
See  for  example  Thompson's  Moral  Panic  (1998),  where  panics  are  understood  to  be  generated  by 
traditional  conservative  moralists,  and  also  where  'safety'  based  panics  like  the  'safe  sex'  campaign  are 
understood  more  as  a  justifiable  response  to  a  real  social  problem  than  as  a  new  form  of  panic. 
26  Ile  interest  group  theory  has  been  developed  most  in  the  USA,  due.  Thompson  believes,  to  existing 
fields  of  research  in  this  country  around  social  movements  and  collective  behaviour  studies.  "csc 
social  movements  are  defined  as  those  groups  that  do  not  have  the  influence  of  established  pressure 
groups  and  therefore,  in  part,  because  they  need  to  attract  attention  to  their  issue  of  concern,  are  prone 
to  present  these  concerns  in  terms  of  outrage  and  moral  indignation  (Thompson  1998:  19). 
27  The  defence  of  tradition  -  and  particularly  the  notion  of  a  national  tradition  -  is  explicit  within  these 
statements  and  have  been  part  of  the  conservative  outlook  in  Britain  since  the  French  Revolution.  See 
for  example  Edmond  Burke's  Reflections  on  the  Revolution  in  France  (1999). 
28  Like  the  underclass,  single  parents  and  muggers. 
29  See  Knife  Culture?  Cut  the  Crap  (http:  //www.  spiked-online.  con-JArticics/OOOOOOOCA825.  htm). 
30  See  Beck  in  Lash's  Risk,  Environment  and  Modernity:  Towards  a  new  ecology  (1996). 
31  The  concern  with  social  control  as  the  aim  for  social  policy  and  political  interventions  is  expressed 
clearly  by  leading  sociologist  and  New  Labour  adviser  Anthony  Giddcns,  in  his  book  The  Third  Way. 
Giddens'  concern  for  social  order  is  reflected  in  his  proposals,  which  lose  any  principle  and  become 
simple  pragmatic  judgements  about  the  best  way  to  maintain  order  in  society.  Mcritocracy,  for  example 
is  discussed  in  wholly  negative  terms  and  is  questioned  because  of  its  potentially  dcstabilising  impact 
on  'social  cohesion'  (1998:  102). 
32  The  idea  of  cotton-wool  kids  relates  to  children  who  are  over-protectcd  by  their  parents. 
33  This  helps  in  part  to  understand  the  notion  of  'paranoid  parenting'.  and  the  strength  of  the  amoral 
absolute  of  child  safety,  discussed  in  later  chapters. 
34  Although,  as  will  be  discussed  later,  what  is  meant  by  responsibility  has  changed  and  diminished. 
35  This  sense  of  The  End  of  Ideology,  identified  by  Daniel  Bell  (1962)  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  was 
emerging  at  the  time  amongst  key  sections  of  the  American  intelligentsia.  However  this  scnfiment  was 
relatively  marginal  to  society  as  a  whole,  but  by  the  1990s  this  sense  of  loss  had  become  more  universal 
within  left-  and  right-wing  thought  (Furedi  1992). 
36  The  'political'  approach  of  the  Conservatives  in  the  1980s  is  contrasted  to  the  micro  politics  of  the 
1990s.  However,  this  is  a  somewhat  exaggerated  distinction  that  masks  many  of  the  trends  emerging  at 
this  time  (for  example,  the  centrality  of  crime  to  politics  and  a  growing  therapeutic  culture),  which 
developed  more  forcefully  in  the  1990s.  Despite  this,  politics  in  the  1980s,  compared  with  later 
developments,  maintained  an  ideological  dimension  with  competing  visions  of  the  'social'  and  the 
active  individual,  both  of  which  held  back  the  centrality  of  the  passive  victim  and  the  centrality  of  this 
victim  to  the  relationship  between  state  and  society. 
37  Where  the  petty  criminal  acts  of  children  were  mentioned,  the  target  was  not  simply  with  this 
behaviour  itself,  nor  the  impact  it  had  on  individuals,  but  rather  with  the  'soft  liberal'  moral  values  - 
held  by  teachers 
, 
and  social  workers  -  that  it  was  assumed  were  the  cause  of  undermining  British 
Victorian  values  of  discipline,  hard  work  and  a  stiff  upper  lip'  (Pearson  1982). 
38  As  one  Conservative  noted  with  frustration,  'I  believe  that  we  probably  have  lost  the  culture  war. 
That  doesn't  mean  that  war  isn't  going  to  continue,  and  that  it  isn't  going  to  be  fought  on  other  fronts. 
But  in  terms  of  society  in  general,  we  have  lost.  This  is  why,  even  when  we  win  in  politics,  our 
victories  fail  to  translate  into  the  kind  of  policies  we  believe  are  important'  (Schneider  2003:  430). 
39  Crime  was  certainly  an  issue  that  the  Conservative  government  used  in  the  1980s,  however,  as 
Dunbar  and  Langdon  note,  it  was  not  an  issue  that  was,  'very  prominent  in  either  of  the  general 
elections  of  1983  or  1987'  (Dunbar  and  Langdon  1998:  100). 
40  Reference  htti):  //www.  rethinkinR.  oriz.  uk/facts/system.  shtml  [on  29/Nov  20051 
270 41  For  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  British  politics  Labour  were  seen  and  described  as  putting  the 
Tories  on  the  defensive  over  crime.  Indeed,  now  it  was  the  turn  of  the  Conservative  government  to  call 
foul  and  demand  that  crime  -  according  to  the  official  statistics  -  was  actually  failing. 
42  Ile  articles  discussing  community  safety  at  thii  time  were  written  with  reference  to  the  victim 
research  being  carried  out  examining  the  impact  of  racial  harassment  and  also  general  crime  concerns 
of  burglary  and  robbery.  This  research  was  not  simply  academic  but  was  a  form  of  action  rcw=h 
adopted  by  the  council,  'in  the  hope  that  it  will  show  [local  people]  how  to  defeat  burglars  and  robbers' 
(Times  24  November  1987).  Left  realist,  feminist  criminologists  and  activists  including  Jock  Young 
carried  out  this  research.  Still  focused  on  specific  areas  and  particular  groups,  this  approach  grew  in  the 
late  1990s  to  incorporate  the  entire  population. 
43  The  extreme  examples  of  the  shooting  of  school  children  in  Dunblane  and  the  killing  of  the  head 
teacher  Philip  Lawrence  were  sited  as  evidence,  which  typified  the  problem  of  'an  explosion  of  crime 
and  disorder'. 
44  'Community  safety'  as  a  term  used  in  the  press  with  reference  to  crime  noticeably  increase  in  its 
significance  in  the  mid  1990s,  and  a  more  pronounced  increase  followed  the  election  of  New  Labour  in 
1997.  From  zero  articles  in  1986  and  four  in  1987  this  increased  to  61  in  1995  and  by  1998  there  were 
over  900  articles  related  to  community  safety  and  crime  (Lcxis  Ncxis  media  search  of  all  British 
newspapers  from  1984  that  contained  the  words  'community  safety'  and  'crime'). 
45  Writing  in  2003,  one  Labour  MP  described  the  changing  relationship  with  the  electorate:  'What  my 
constituents  see  as  politics  has  changed  out  of  all  recognition  during  the  20  years  or  so  since  I  rust 
became  their  Member  of  Parliament.  From  a  traditional  fare  of  social  security  complaints.  housing 
transfers,  unfair  dismissals,  as  well  as  job  losses,  constituents  now  more  often  than  not,  ask  what  can  be 
done  to  stop  their  lives  being  made  a  miscry  by  the  unacceptable  behaviour  of  some  ncighbours.  or 
more  commonly,  their  neighbours'  children'  (Field  2003:  9). 
46  James  Q.  Wilson's  book  Thinking  about  Crime  (1975),  written  from  a  conservative  perspective.  was 
even  more  influential  in  questioning  the  idea  that  the  'causes'  of  crime  could  be  tackled,  leading  to  a 
pragmatism  and  technical  approach  to  crime  reduction 
47  The  idea  that  the  fear  of  crime  was  irrational  was  advocated  within  the  first  British  Crime  Survey 
(Hough  and  Mayhew  1983).  Developed  in  part  because  of  the  loss  of  statistical  credibility  in  official 
crime  statistics,  the  BCS,  by  discovering  the  'dark  figure'  of  crimcs  that  went  unreported  to  the  police. 
helped  to  develop  a  focus  upon  the  victims  of  crime  and  more  specifically  the  victims  of  minor  and 
middle  range  offences.  Despite  this,  left  realist  and  ferninist  criminologists  argued  that  crimes  against 
women  and  minor  incivilities  against'vulnerable  groups'remained  hidden. 
48  The  term  'vulnerable  groups'  is  telling  in  and  of  itself,  in  that  it  ascribes  the  status  of  vulnerability  to 
an  entire  section  of  society,  the  commonality  between  these  people  being  subsequently  undcrstood 
through  this  label  of  being  vulnerable.  By  the  very  nature  of  being  a  child,  or  elderly,  or  a  woman  you 
ARE  vulnerable  -  regardless  of  how  you  understand  yourself  or  experience  life  -  and  are  therefore  in 
need  of  protection. 
49  Also  see  Simon  Jenkins's  critique  of  the  Conservative  governments  in  Accountable  to  None:  Tory 
Nationalisation  of  Britain  (1995). 
50  This  loss  of  a  sense  of  human  agency  has  been  objectified  and  thcorised  by  Ulrich  Beck's 
understanding  of  a  risk  society  (1992). 
51  The  understanding  of  Thatcherism  for  explaining  the  transformation  within  the  working  class  was 
developed  systematically  within  the  radical  journal,  Marxism  Today,  a  journal  within  which  significant 
individuals  who  went  on  to  influence  the  emergence  of  New  Labour  wrote,  including  Tony  Blair  (if 
infrequently),  Geoff  Mulgan  and  Charles  Leadbcttcr  (Finlayson  2003:  117). 
52  Hayes  and  Hudson  (2001:  11)  described  the  notion  of  Essex  Man  as  a  'crude  lifestyle  caricature', 
which  was  an'implausible  attempt  to  define  a  new  group  of  workers  with  a  7batchcrite  ideology'. 
53  TINA  was  a  term  used  to  describe  the  idea  promoted  by  Margaret  Thatcher  that  71cre  Is  No 
Alternative  to  the  market. 
54  See  for  example  the  NSPCC's  research  Child  Maltreatment  in  the  UK  (20W)  where  this  approach  is 
adopted. 
55  The  promotion  of  individual  freedoms  promoted  by  the  Conservative  government  was  of  course  one- 
sided  and  based  more  upon  the  challenge  to  collectivism  and  union  power  than  to  a  celebration  of  the 
individual  in  and  of  itself,  and  the  realities  of  the  emergence  of  'promcthcan  man'  arc  questionable. 
However,  this  more  libertarian  image  of  the  individual  continued  to  influence  conservative  thinking 
about  crime. 
271 56  The  underwolves  were  the  disconnected,  largely  working-class  young  people,  who  Wilkinson  and 
Mulgan  of  the  left-wing  think  tank  Demos  believed  had  selfish  hedonistic  values  and  were  potentially 
about  to  'bite  back'  (1995). 
57  In  a  sense  what  Mills  was  discussing  was  the  classic  liberal  understanding  of  democracy:  a 
democracy  that  he  recognised  was  problematic  in  terms  of  where  power  lay  in  society  and  the 
subsequent  role  of  public  institutions.  However,  his  discussion  of  a  public  is  nonetheless  a  useful 
starting  point  to  contrast  the  changing  nature  of  politics  in  late  twentieth  century  Britain. 
58  See  New  Statesman  7  July  2003  where  Nick  Cohen  describes  the  '661  new  crimcs'  created  by  the 
Labour  governments  since  1997. 
59  This  transformation  was  not  simply  an  'image'  and  reflected  the  less  active  and  collective  naturc  of 
political  life,  but  was  however  conceptualised  and  to  a  degree  labelled  as  bcing'vulncrable',  a  label  that 
helped  to  create  and  recreate  the  public  self  image. 
60  Indeed  the  move  in  governance  to  the  'community'  and  away  from  the  'national'  or  'intcmational'. 
reflected  this  same  trend  -  away  from  the  'social'. 
61  This  development  also  helps  explain  the  emergence  of  therapeutic  politics,  as  licartficld  notes: 
Where  the  people  are  no  longer  constituted  through  the  political  process  as  a  people,  but  remain  instead 
atornised  individuals,  the  state  cannot  represent  the  general  will.  In  such  conditions  modem  cli(cs  relate 
to  the  electorate  on  a  more  personal  basis,  in  which  circumstance.  the  expression  of  love  is  more 
6 
apTpro  *ate'(Heartfield  2002:  200). 
6  hTnvital  ingredient',  of  'fear  of  crime',  'discovered'  in  the  1980s  (Gilling  1999:  1),  was  one  of  the  key 
developments  which  led  to  a  move  towards  a  more  therapeutically  oriented  approach  to  crime  which 
became  increasingly  central  to  law  and  order  issues  as  the  1990s  progressed.  One  example  of  this,  is  the 
publication  of  Anxieties  about  crime:  findingsfrom  the  1994  British  Crime  Survey  (I  tome  Officc  1995). 
That  the  Home  Office  researchers  decided  to  write  a  specific  paper  on  anxieties  about  crime  rcflccted 
the  growing  centrality  of  emotional  indicators  as  central  to  the  understanding  of  the  social  problem  of 
crime. 
63  A  more  detailed  explanation  of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  will  be  presented  in  the  following  chapter. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  author  at  this  point  in  time  also  set  up  a  youth  research  charity,  with  a 
number  of  like-minded  colleagues,  to  examine  the  issue  of  youth  regulation. 
64  See  research  by  Cahill  (1990),  Hillman,  Adams  and  Whitelcg  (1990),  Barnardos  (1995),  Whcway 
and  Millard  (1997),  Valentine  (1997),  Valentine  and  McKendrick  (1997),  Moorcock  (1998), 
Livingstone  and  Bovill  (1999),  and  Blatchford  (1999). 
65  This  is  a  term  used  by  Best  (1990)  to  explain  the  typical  examples  used  that  express  the  core  elements 
of  a  particular  social  problem. 
66  See  Angrosino  and  Mays  de  Perez  (2000:  674)  for  a  discussion  about  observational  research. 
67  This  observational  work  around  Hillhouse  was  also  supplemented  by  council  statistics  on  the  owner 
occupation,  car  ownership,  and  various  statistics  on  the  population. 
68  As  will  be  explained  in  the  following  chapters,  one  of  the  issues  raised  by  John  Orr,  Strathclyde's 
Chief  of  Police,  in  relation  to  possible  safety  issues  for  parents  was  that  of  pacdophiles. 
69  See  Fontana  and  Frey  (2000:  656)  for  a  discussion  about  unstructured  interviews  and  oral  histories. 
70  As  Christensen  and  James  note  in  terms  of  the  importance  of  context  when  interviewing  children, 
'Me  same  child  could  be  boisterous  and  outspoken  at  home,  but  shy  and  reserved  at  school'  (2000: 
103). 
71  As  the  CSI  specifically  targeted  any  child  'under  the  age  of  16.  nobody  ovcr  this  age  wws 
interviewed. 
72  See  Statement  of  Ethical  Practice  for  the  British  Sociological  Association  (BSA  2004).  In  particular 
note  Point  6  on  being  responsible  to  safeguard  the  proper  interests  of  those  involved  in  or  affected  by 
this  work;  Point  13  on  ensuring  the  physical  and  psychological  well  being  of  those  involved;  Point  16 
on  consent;  Point  17  on  making  interviewees  aware  of  their  right  to  refuse;  Point  34  on  rcspccting 
anonymity  and  Point  36  on  storing  data. 
73  See  Appendix  1  for  the  consent  form  used. 
74  Within  the  writing  up  of  this  research  all  children's  names  have  been  changed. 
75  As  a  Barnardos  document  on  research  ethics  with  children  rightly  points  out,  research  with  children 
can  be  justified  if  the  information  being  gained  does  not  already  exist,  or  is  not  attainable  from  another 
source  (Barnardos  1995b:  2). 
76  See  Appendix  2  and  3  for  details  of  the  questionnaires  used. 
272 77  In  Random  Violence,  Joel  Best  carries  out  a  similar  analysis,  in  examining  specific  'ncwcrimcs  like 
stalking  and  attempting  to  understand  them  within  a  broader  framework  of  the  gcncraliscd  fear  of 
random  violence  in  American  society  (Best  1999). 
78  These  groups  and  individuals  were  analysed  particularly  as  they  were  the  key  'clitc'  claimsmakcrs 
promoting  the  implementation  of  the  CSI. 
9  The  local  newspaper  coverage  of  the  curfewýwas  particularly  useful  for  gaining  access  to'clitc'claims 
and  justifications  for  the  curfew,  largely  because  most  of  the  articles  in  the  Hamilton  Advertiser  were 
generated  by  police  press  releases  and  comments  about  the  progress  of  the  initiative. 
80  This  limited  oppositional  'voice'  was  less  to  do  with  media  bias  than  with  a  lack  of  an  organised,  and 
especially  political,  opposition  to  the  curfew,  which  would  have  resulted  in  a  systematic  oppositional 
voice  being  present. 
81  The  individuals  and  organisations  contacted  were:  Save  the  Children  (Scotland),  Nancy  Ovens  - 
Vice  Chair  of  Play  Scotland,  Gerison  Landsdown  -  Director  of  the  Children's  Rights  Office,  Tim  Gill 
from  the  Children's  Play  Council,  Roger  Smith  of  the  Children's  Society  (who  gave  a  statement  in  a 
Fe  rsonaI  capacity)  and  the  Scottish  Human  Rights  Centre. 
2  Throughout  the  chapter  the  term  curfew  and  the  Child  Safety  Initiative  (CSI)  will  both  be  used  to 
avoid  repetition.  Despite  not  being  a  formal  curfew,  as  we  will  show,  this  was  how  local  adults  and 
ZI  ung  people  alike  understood  the  initiative.  ro 
3  See  also  Gilling  (1999:  2)  where  he  notes  that,  'in  the  course  of  the  1980s  a  vital  and  further 
ingredient  [to  crime  prevention  initiatives]  was  added,  namely  the  fear  of  crime'. 
"  While  the  Hamilton  'curfew'  may  have  been,  to  some  degree,  a  mere  continuation  of  policies 
associated  with  youth  crime,  it  is  worth  noting  that  prior  to  this  development,  and  especially  in  the 
1980s,  curfews  were  generally  discussed  and  understood  as  initiatives  used  only  in  extreme  cases  of 
war,  civil  unrest,  or  in  countries  notorious  for  their  authoritarian  approach  -  particularly  in  the  Eastern 
Block.  See  for  example  the  Times  26  May  1989:  'Verdict  on  Israeli  soldiers  sparks  protests  by  Arabs. 
Richard  Owen. 
85  In  terms  of  the  'grassroots'  support  for  community  safety  type  initiatives  in  the  1990s,  it  is  worth 
noting  that  an  opinion  poll  in  Glasgow  found  that  95%  of  Glaswcgians  were  in  favour  of  the  City 
Watch  CCTV  initiative  developed  in  the  city  centre,  and  only  2%  were  opposed  to  it  (Cummings  1997: 
17). 
86  By  1997  the  discussion  about  zero  tolerance  policing  had  reached  a  high  point,  in  part  because  of  the 
general  election  in  that  year  and  the  ensuing  battle  between  the  Conservative  and  Labour  parties  over 
the  toughness  of  their  crime  policies,  and  also  because  of  the  impact  that  this  form  of  policing  was 
believed  to  be  having  in  the  USA.  Indeed,  it  was  this  year,  the  year  of  the  Hamilton  curfew,  which  saw 
more  newspaper  articles,  at  least  in  the  Guardian,  which  raised  the  issue  of  zero  tolcranct  in  relation  to 
crime,  than  any  previous  or  subsequent  year.  (In  a  Lexis  Nexis  media  search  there  were  over  70  articles 
discussing  'zero  tolerance'  initiatives  in  relation  to  'crime'.  This  was  an  increase  from  II  the  previous 
ý  ear,  and  from  1998  on  there  have  been  around  50  such  articles).  1 
7  In  February  1993,  Strathclyde  police  launched  Operation  Blade,  an  initiative  aimed  at  ridding  the 
streets  of  knives  by  stopping  and  searching  young  men.  In  1993  a  night-club  curfew  was  established  in 
Glasgow's  city  centre.  In  the  winter  of  1994  Glasgow  Development  Agency  launched  City  Watch,  a 
CCTV  scheme  that  covered  the  whole  of  the  city  centre.  In  the  summer  of  1996  Glasgow  District 
Council  banned  street  drinking  -  the  ban  was  not  just  focused  on  the  city  ccntrc,  but  covered  the  whole 
of  the  district.  In  October  1996  Strathclyde  Police  launched  Operation  Spotlight.  an  umbrella  operation 
that  aimed  to  target  both  crime  and  the  fear  of  crime.  Ile  Child  Safety  Initiative  -  or  what  became 
known  as  the  Hamilton  Curfew,  set  up  in  October  1997  -  was  part  of  the  continuing  Operation 
S  otlight. 
8T  .  Instead  of  a  society  wide  system  of  policing  [for  the  past  200  years],  the  British  political 
establishment  pursued  an  ideal  of  solidarity  ...  now,  at  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century.  in  tandem  with 
the  reassertion  of  a  punitive  sovereignty,  threatens  the  eclipse  of  that  project  of  solidarity  which  formed 
the  central  thrust  of  twentieth  century  social  and  penal  politics.  In  its  place.  we  are  witnessing  the 
emergence  of  a  more  divisive,  exclusionary  project  of  punishment  and  police'  (Garland  1996:  466). 
89  Hillhouse,  as  the  largest  of  the  three  targeted  areas,  was  the  one  within  which  the  research  for  this 
thesis  was  carried  and  as  such,  it  is  this  estate  that  will  largely  be  related  to  in  tcrrrLs  of  the 
claimsmaking  process  of  the  CSI. 
90  Information',  South  Lanarkshire  Council,  Child  Safety  Initiative  Launch  23  October  1997. 
91  Sandy  Cameron,  Executive  Director  of  Social  Work,  speaking  on  Sky  Scottish  26  October  1997. 
273 92  See  Appendix  4  for  John  Orr's  full  speech  as  provided  at  the  launch  of  the  CST. 
93  See  Appendix  5  for  Tom  McCabe's  speech  as  provided  at  the  launch  of  the  CSI. 
94  Tom  McCabe,  Labour  Leader  of  South  Lanarkshire  Council,  speaking  on  Sky  Scottish  26  October 
1997. 
95  Sandy  Cameron,  Executive  Director  of  Social  Work,  speaking  on  Sky  Scottish  26  October  1997. 
96  This  aspect  of  the  'at  risk'  young  person  appears  to  have  been  integrated  into  the  CSI  by  the  social 
work  department  themselves,  giving  a  more  'caring'  framework  for  the  initiative.  The  social  work  department,  while  playing  no  role  in  the  enforcement  of  the  initiative,  had  worked  closely  with  the 
police  in  the  development  of  the  curfew  prior  to  its  introduction. 
7,  Two  Sides  to  Every  Story  'Proximity  Conference':  Bridging  the  Gap  Between  Young  and  Old 
Conference,  10  November  1997,  former  Strathclyde  Regional  Council  Headquarters,  Glasgow. 
98  See  Waiton  (2001)  Scared  of  the  Kids  7,  comment  section,  where  a  number  of  those  individuals  and 
groups  opposing  the  curfew  explain  their  concerns.  "9  In  this  respect  -  in  terms  of  social  problem  formation  -  the  basis  for  the  curfew  as  far  as  the 
authorities  were  concerned  was  via  agrassroots'conccm  with  safety.  100  South  Lanarkshire  Council  prior  to  the  curfew  had  hired  the  System  3  survey  company  to  find  out 
what  concerns  and  issues  were  of  relevance  to  local  people  (System  3  1996).  Following  this,  the  Tirst 
Citizens'  Jury  in  Scotland'  was  set  up  to  address  the  issues  of  corrimunity  safety  and  it  was  this  jury  that 
was  later  said  to  have  come  up  with  the  idea  of  the  curfew  (South  Lanarkshirc  1997a).  Subsequently 
research  with  young  people  was  carried  out  in  schools  in  Hamilton  to  assess  the  thoughts  of  young 
people  about  the  curfew.  Also  the  police  hired  researchers  from  Strathclyde  University  to  assess  the 
effectiveness  of  the  curfew  not  simply  in  reducing  crime  but  in  improving  the  public  sense  of  safety 
(MeGallagly  et  al  1998) 
101  A  'phone-in'  opinion  poll  run  by  the  local  Hamilton  Advertiser  16  October  1997  showed  that  95  per 
cent  of  the  public  supported  the  curfew  -  this  was  something  referred  to  by  Chief  Constable  John  Off  in 
his  launch  speech. 
1(ý2  During  the  curfew  the  police  themselves  kept  a  record  of  the  thoughts  of  the  young  people  who  they 
picked  up  on  the  street,  which  showed  that  a  majority  supported  this  initiative.  ne  exact  figurcs  of 
support  by  these  young  people  has  been  questioned  and  the  usefulness  of  statistics  collected  by  the 
police  from  young  people  taken  home  can  be  seriously  questioned  (see  Springharn  1997). 
(3  Part  of  the  reason  for  Robertson  making  this  claim  was  that  he  had  suggested  setting  up  Citizens' 
Juries  to  test  public  opinion  on  local  issues.  Often  projected  as  a  more  democratic  attempt  to  listen  to 
the  people'this  approach  to  social  policy  development  and  the  growth  of  the  use  of  consultants  in  local 
government  also  suggests  a  level  of  disengagement  felt  by  politicians  and  local  authorities  from  the 
public. 
04  The  idea  of  the  public,  here  relates  to  C.  Wright  Mills'  (1967)  understanding  of  active  engaged 
individuals,  discussed  in  Chapter  4. 
105  Allison  McLaughlan  of  the  Daily  Record  summed  up  the  feeling  of  those  promoting  the  curfew 
when  she  described  the  Scottish  Human  Rights  Centre  as  'nutters'.  'It's  OK  for  liberals  to  be  standing 
sayin,  'Oh  aye,  it's  infringing  people's  human  rights",  McLaughlan  said,  'but  what  about  the  rights  of 
rO6  ople  who  are  getting  their  windows  panned  in'(The  Face,  June  1998). 
To  what  degree  young  people  themselves  had  adopted  this  understanding  of  themselves  and  their 
'rights'  will  be  examined  further  in  the  next  chapter. 
107The  dominant  view  that  today's  world  is  structured  around  neo-liberal  policies  and  practices  has  not 
resulted  in  the  rise  of  libertarian  values  and  a  desire  for  individual  freedom.  As  Brook  and  Cape  noted 
in  their  chapter  Libertarianism  in  Retreat  in  the  British  Social  Attitudes  Survey,  all  sections  of  society 
have  become  less  libertarian  in  their  outlook  in  recent  years  (Brook  and  Cape  1995:  204-5). 
log  As  Rose  has  argued,  the  emergence  of  the  governance  through  'community.  predicated  on  a  more 
micro-management  form  of  crime  prevention,  has  over  recent  years  become  understood  as  a  'cure  for  all 
ills'(Rose  1996:  331). 
109  Gilling  also  identified  that  the  move  to  community  safety  developed  under  the  Conservative 
government,  with  the  primary  problem  being  understood  to  be  economic,  'the  Conservative  solution 
being  a  market  one'.  With  the  creation  of  Safer  Cities  it  was  believed,  enterprise,  community  activity 
and  personal  responsibility  could  flourish  (Gilling  1999:  5) 
274 110  Rose  rightly  observes  that  the  process  of  governance  through  the  'community'  developed  as  a  'new 
plane  or  surface  upon  which  micro-moral  relations  among  persons  are  conccptualiscd  and 
administered',  and  where  'a  whole  series  of  issues  are  problematised'  (Rose  1996:  331). 
111  Rose  in  particular  has  a  critical  recognition,  for  example,  of  the  therapeutic  interventionist  element 
of  responsibilisation  and  the  development  of  new  relations  of  governance  through  'community' 
professionals  (Rose  1996:  348;  Rose  1999).  Despite  this  recognition,  however,  to  some  degree  the  idea 
of  responsibilisation  relates  to  the  individual  and  his  behaviour.  Here  it  is  this  aspect  of  the  notion  of 
responsibility  and  responsibilisation  that  is  examined.  112  This  is  not  to  argue  that  a  more  individualised  aspect  of  crime  prevention  has  not  developed  in  a 
technical  sense  -  whereby  individuals  take  more  responsibility  for  private  security  measures.  But  within 
the  realm  of  human  consciousness  and  interpersonal  or  public  action,  rather  than  autonomous  self- 
governing  individuals  developing,  we  see  a  promotion  and  emergence  of  diminished  subjective 
engagement  with  the  community  within  an  ontological  framework  of  the  vulnerable  individual. 
113  Structural  questions,  the  more  heterogeneous  nature  of,  or  at  least  outlook.  amongst  people  in 
Hillhouse,  and  to  some  degree  a  'real'concern  about  especially  drunken  older  unemployed  young  men, 
all  helped  to  legitimise  the  CSI  and  the  action  by  the  police.  However,  despite  this,  what  is  being 
examined  here  is  the  changing  nature  of  what  responsibility  meant  to  the  authorities  when  relating  to 
the  people  of  Hillhouse. 
114  Even  at  the  level  of  intergenerational  communication,  the  'Bridging  the  Gap'confcrcnce,  mentioned 
above,  can  be  seen  as  an  example  of  how  past  informal  relationships  between  the  generations  were 
formalised:  a  mechanism  that  has  increasingly  been  understood  to  be  the  way  forward  for  helping  to 
recreate  a  sense  of  community.  A  number  of  conferences  around  the  UK  have  developed  over  the  past 
seven  years  connected  to  'intergeneration'  reconnecting.  One  such  conference  in  Kccle  explained  that, 
'Participants  took  part  in  a  variety  of  workshops  on  issues  such  as  citizenship.  fear  of  crime, 
reminiscence,  effective  intergenerational  practice,  building  healthy  communities  and  intcrgencrational 
mentoring.  Participants  also  had  the  opportunity  to  see  displays  on  a  wide  variety  of  intcrgcncrational 
initiatives'  (www.  bgop.  org.  uk/pages/events,  _pastO 
19.  html). 
115  This  was  reflected  in  a  Strathclyde  police  advertising  campaign  at  the  time,  which  stated:  'If  you 
think  there  may  be  trouble,  pick  up  a  weapon'.  The  weapon  in  question  was  a  telephone  and  the 
message  not  to  intervene  yourself  was  clear.  Also,  during  the  curfew,  following  complaints  by  adults 
about  rowdy  teenagers  in  another  area  of  Hamilton,  the  police  put  out  a  statement  to  the  public 
commanding  that  people  should,  'Call  us  and  we  will  come  round  and  deal  with  the  situation.  Do  not 
engage  them  yourself,  call  us'  (Hamilton  People  12  December  1997). 
116  See  Labour  MP,  Frank  Field's  book  Neighbours  from  Hell.  7he  Politics  of  Behaviour  (2003)  where 
he  promotes  the  need  for  the  police  to  play  the  role  of  surrogate  parents. 
117  http:  //www.  centre2  l.  org.  uklagenda  /agenda2OOO/articles/tough.  html 
118  As  noted  previously,  this  idea  of  being  streetwise  was  already  seen  to  be  under  threat  with  the 
development  of  what  was  described  as  'cotton  wool  kids'. 
119  Rather  than  with  reference  to  protecting  the  life  and  property  of  the  individual  or  the  moral  values  of 
society. 
120  Ile  specific  activities  of  young  people  were  often  referred  to  -  especially  by  the  tabloid  press  -  as  a 
problem  in  and  of  itself  However,  for  those  promoting  the  curfew,  the  underlying  problem  being 
engaged  with  was  the  more  generalised  concern  about  fear  which  was  understood  to  be  an  almost 
P  ermanent  emotional  state  of  the  adults  living  in  the  targeted  arm. 
21  See  Furedi  (2004:  136)  where  he  notes  that,  7he  'scif  at  risk'  is  a  construction  of  cultural  norms  that 
r gard  people's  fears  as  itself  a  source  of  risk. 
1  In  April  1997,  shadow  Home  Secretary  Jack  Straw  had  described  the  fear  of  crime  as  something  that 
'hangs  like  a  dark  cloud  in  the  air.  Elaborating,  Straw  believed  the  extent  of  this  problem  meant  that 
7wo  thirds  of  women  pensioners  are  scared  to  leave  their  house  at  night.  Our  pensioners  are  prisoners 
in  their  own  homes  who  only  want  to  live  in  peace.  Surely  the  prisoners  should  be  those  who  commit 
the  crimes,  not  those  who  are  the  victims  of  crime.  It  cannot  go  on'(Guardian  26  April  1997). 
123  Here  the  focus  of  the  therapeutic  outlook  has  been  focused  on  the  issue  of  the  fear  of  crime. 
However,  this  was  equally  significant  in  the  attempted  engagement  made  with  young  people  and 
parents,  i.  e.  the  fear  felt  by  these  groups  was  understood  as  the  core  basis  of  connection  and  of  the 
lVitimation  of  the  curfew. 
I  In  terms  of  rhetorical  pronouncements  regarding  the  curfew,  it  was  noticeable  that  national 
politicians  and  the  chief  of  police  were  more  inclined  to  relate  to  the  fear  of  'yobs'  and  the  problem  of 
275 antisocial  behaviour.  Whereas  the  local  police  and  social  work  department  -  possibly  due  to  their  direct 
contact  with  the  community,  the  need  to  develop  practical  solutions,  and  their  desire  to  be  understood 
as  caring  rather  than  authoritarian  -  constantly  described  the  CSI  as  an  initiative  to  make  children  and 
young  people  safe,  as  well  as  adults.  Whereas  the  local  police  systematically  argued  that  the  curfew  was 
about  the  safety  of  young  children,  the  local  MP  George  Robertson  echoed  the  'tough  on  crime'  focus 
of  the  Labour  leadership  and  was  more  inclined  to  emphasise  the  'rights'  of  fearful  adults.  Indeed  as 
later  developments  proved,  the  Labour  leadership  was  more  than  happy  to  introduce  curfew  legislation 
without  concern  about  the  use  of  the  term  curfew.  This  contrasts  with  the  local  council  leader  in 
Hamilton,  who  had  stated  that  a  curfew  has  'no  place  in  a  society  heading  for  the  new  millcrinium'. 
125  With  subsequent  developments  in  parenting  classes  and  the  problematisation  of  parenting  itself,  it 
also  appears  that  parents  themselves  have  become  a  group  who  are  understood  to  need  professional 
support  to  be  good  parents  (Furedi  2001). 
126  While  there  does  appear  to  have  been  a  general  level  of  fear  within  the  curfew  targeted  communities, 
this  does  not  imply  that  all  adults  were  living  in  a  constant  state  of  fear,  nor  that  many  of  these  adults 
did  or  would  engage  with  young  people  if  they  were  encouraged  to  do  so.  Indeed  by  relating  to  the 
general  sense  of  anxiety  and  promoting  behaviour  accordingly,  it  will  be  argued  in  the  following 
chapter  that  the  council  were  relating  to,  but  also  encouraging,  a  more  passive  and  risk-avcrse  approach 
to  community  life. 
127  Note  that  the  definition  of  'safe'  is:  'protected  from  danger  or  risk  [but  also]  cautious  and 
unenterprising'.  See  www.  askoxford.  com 
128  See  Labour  Party  documents  (1993;  1995  and  1996). 
129  See  the  Glasgow  Herald  3  November  1997,  where  the  story  of  a  four-year-old  boy  found  out  on  the 
streets  at  9pm  was  the  basis  for  an  article  about  the  initiative. 
130  The  idea  of  issues,  which  are  more  general  and  to  some  degree  more  political  in  their  make-up,  as 
opposed  to  troubles,  which  are  more  directly  related  to  individual  personal  concerns,  relates  to  C. 
Wright  Mills'  (1967)  work  described  previously. 
131  Despite  this  example  however,  which  had  focused  attention  upon  what  the  police  had  felt  to  be  an 
example  of  'irresponsible  parenting',  it  should  be  noted  more  generally  that  when  highlighting  the 
individual  examples  of  unsafe  children,  the  local  police  in  the  main  did  this  simply  with  reference  to  the 
child  being  unsafe  and  rarely  mentioned  the  irresponsibility  of  the  parent  or  grandparent.  The  message 
of  child  safety,  rather  than  irresponsible  parenting,  appeared  to  be  more  central  for  the  local  police  force 
and  indeed  the  parents  or  grandparents  were  to  a  degree  represented  as  needing  support  rather  than 
Punishment. 
32.  John  Orr  had  mentioned  the  issue  of  paedophiles  as  a  problem  for  children  wandering  the  streets  at 
night  in  his  launch  speech  of  the  CSI.  For  Orr,  that  parents  would  allow  their  children  to  be  out. 
unsupervised  at  night,  'beggared  belief. 
133  See  research  by  Cahill  (1990),  Hillman,  Adams  and  Whiteleg  (1990),  Barnardos  (1995),  Whcway 
and  Millard  (1997),  Valentine  (1997),  Valentine  and  McKendrick  (1997),  Moorcock  (1998), 
Livingstone  and  Bovill  (1999),  and  Blatchford  (1999). 
134  The  myth  of  the  problem  of  under-  10-year-olds  is  of  particular  significance  given  the  later 
development  of  curfew  legislation  across  the  UK  targeting  this  age  group  -  something  that  was  justified 
in  part  with  reference  to  the  success  of  the  Hamilton  curfew. 
135  See  Waiton  (2001),  Chapter  4,  for  a  summary  of  this  research. 
136  There  was  also  a  psychological  footnote  added  in  the  1989  definition  -  Psychiatry  sociopath. 
137  In  the  journal  Sociology  and  Social  Research  in  1916,  for  example,  there  was  an  article  examining 
the  'Antisocial  Behaviour  of  Automobile  Drivers':  see  Ashley,  P.  (1916)  'Antisocial  Behaviour  of 
Automobile  Drivers.  Sociology  and  Social  Research  Vol.  I- 
138  This  figure  shows  the  results  from  the  Times'  own  website  for  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  from 
1984  to  2001,  and  the  term  antisocial  behaviour  in  a  Lexis  Nexis  media  search  of  the  Guardian 
newspaper. 
139'IbiS  latter  rapid  increase  is  not  indicated  in  table  one,  in  part  to  emphasisc  the  constant  increase  of 
the  problem  before  this  more  substantial  increase. 
140  For  example,  ASBOs  were  mentioned  in  142  of  the  544  'antisocial  behaviour'  articles  in  the 
Guardian  in  2004  -a  number  of  these  articles  were  discussing  the  implementation  and  the  impact  of 
these  initiatives 
276 141  See  for  example  the  Queen's  Speeches  by  Tony  Blair  in  2002  and  2004  that  highlighted  problems  of 
antisocial  behaviour  as  central  to  future  government  policy  objectives,  and  the  Queen's  Speech  in  2005 
that  highlighted  the  issue  of  respect  as  key. 
142  The  1998  Act  introduced  curfews  on  children,  and  the  2003  Act  introduced  curfew  zones  that  have 
been  challenged  and  found  to  be  illegal.  Ile  Scottish  Act  enforced  a  requirement  that  Local  Authorities 
and  Chief  Constables  jointly  prepare  an  Antisocial  Behaviour  Strategy  and  contained  much  of  the  new 
developments  in  the  England  and  Wales  version  of  2003.  Other  acts,  such  as  the  Clean  Ncighbourhoods 
Act  and  the  Licensing  Act  have  targeted  underage  drinking  -  or  selling  of  alcohol.  and  littcr.  Laws 
introduced  in  the  Criminal  Justice  and  Police  Act  (2001)  have  also  been  used  to  fine  people  urinating 
and  vomiting  in  public. 
143  This  information  was  gained  via  a  Lexis  Nexis  media  search  of  the  Guardian  for  articles  containing 
the  words  'antisocial  behaviour'andpolitician'or  'minister'  or  'Home  Secretary'. 
144  In  a  Lexis  Nexis  search  of  antisocial  behaviour  and  youth,  children  or  young  people  there  were  245 
articles  in  the  Guardian  in  2004,  and  there  were  261  'antisocial  bchavioue  articles  mentioning 
'community'or  'estates'. 
145  Nuisance  behaviour  -  defined  as  shouting,  swearing,  hanging  around  and  fooling  around  in  groups, 
sometimes  outside  other  people's  homes  -  made  up  between  one  in  ten  and  two  in  ten  phone  calls  to  the 
4 
Folice  as  noted  in  the  Audit  Commission  Report  in  1996  (Waiton  2001:  87):  Also  see  Valentine  (1996). 
46  Antisocial  behaviour  was  understood  to  be  an  issue  at  a  local  level'.  but  also  in  relation  to  %be 
public's  key  education  priorities',  where  'pupil  behaviour/discipline'  was  the  main  issue  that  people  fclt 
the  government  should  be  addressing  in  schools  (MORI  2005). 
147  Also  within  criniinology,  the  growth  of  research  examining  antisocial  behaviour  has  developed  with 
the  increasing  influence  of  psychology.  In  the  British  Journal  of  Criminology  the  increased  use  of  the 
term  antisocial  behaviour  since  2000,  for  example,  has  developed  largely  in  relation  to  articles 
examining  work  by  authors  like  the  Child  Psychiatrist  Michael  Rutter  and  Professor  of  Psychological 
Criminology  David  Farrington. 
148  This  BIDS  search  looked  for  these  terms  in  the  Title/Keyword/Abstract  fields. 
149  The  European  Journal  of  Personality,  for  example,  was  first  published  in  1987,  the  Journal  of 
Forensic  Psychiatry  and  Psychology  in  1989,  The  Journal  of  Social  Distress  and  the  Homeless  in  1991, 
and  the  Journal  of  Child  and  Family  Studies  in  1992  -  all  of  which  contain  articles  about  antisocial 
behaviour. 
150  Ile  increase  in  the  statistics  on  violent  crime,  as  Jon  Simmons  of  the  Home  Office  and  also  a 
spokesperson  for  the  Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers  argued,  was  related  to  recording  and 
reporting  of  offences  and  also  with  the  increasing  targeting  of  certain  'drinking  areas'  by  the  police  on 
Friday  and  Saturday  nights  (Guardian  21  July  2005). 
151  As  a  MORI  Poll  noted,  despite  the  statistical  fall  in  crime,  'Law  and  Order  is  now  the  number  one 
priority  for  the  first  time  in  years'  (MORI  2005),  while  despite  these  falls  in  recent  times  three  quarters 
of  the  public  still  believe  that  the  national  crime  rate  is  rising  (Home  Office  2003:  1). 
152  This  concentration  on  petty  acts  of  incivility  as  being  important  -  indeed  of  being  the  most  important 
thing  to  study  -  to  understand  communities'  sense  of  wellbcing  has  been  discussed  previously  in 
relation  to  feminist  and  new  realist  thinkers.  It  was  also  something  that  the  'New  Laboue  sociologist 
Anthony  Giddens,  in  The  Third  Way  (1998:  86),  uncritically  recognises  as  being  the  case. 
153  For  example,  it  is  the  issue  of  antisocial  behaviour  that  is  more  frequently  understood  today  to  be  the 
problem  that  undermines  communities  -  indeed  this  was  already  reflected  within  the  Hamilton  Child 
Safety  initiative  and  the  focus  upon  issues  related  to  young  people  hanging  around  the  streets.  Noisy 
neighbours  and  rowdy  youngsters  arguably  capture  the  popular  imagination  far  more  than,  say,  burglars 
and  organised  criminals  do  -  reflected  in  programmes  about  'Neighbours  from  Hell'and  the  increasingly 
popular  use  of  terms  like  'neds'  and  'charvers'.  In  general  the  sense  of  a  loss  of  rcspccf  and  of  a  broader 
social  breakdown  relates  more  to  issues  associated  with  antisocial  behaviour  than  to  those  of  serious 
crime  -  reflected  in  the  recent  Queen's  Speeches. 
154  1802  J.  Mackintosh  in  Memoirs  (1835)  1.  Iv.  176  A  collection  of  all  the  rebellious,  antisocial. 
blasphemous..  books..  published  during..  the  Revolution.  1844  Dublin  rev.  Mar.  34  The  dark.  malignant, 
atrocious,  and  utterly  anti-social  character,  which  the  Republican  party  in  its  contest  with  the  new 
F505  vernment  has  exhibited  (Oxford  Dictionary  1885). 
These  additions  to  the  meaning  of  antisocial  behaviour  are  not  a  separate  meaning  from  the  original 
idea  of  'opposing  the  principles  of  society',  but  rather  are  a  continuation  of  this  meaning  and  an  addition 
to  them. 
277 156  Also  see  Furedi  (1992:  90-97). 
157  niS  is  not  to  argue  that  problems  of  behaviour  do  not  exist,  but  rather  that  in  the  past,  like  the  issue 
of  crime,  these  troubles  would  not  have  been  accepted  as  the'social  problem'to  be  addressed  in  society. 
158  In  the  1970s  for  example  the  Birmingham  Centre  for  Contemporary  Cultural  Studies,  'charactcriscd 
routh  subcultures  as  cultures  of  resistance  in  opposition  to  ... 
bourgeois  hcgcmony'(Calcutt  1996:  5  1). 
59  For  example  in  a  MORI  Poll  (2005)  survey  under  the  tide,  'Guardian  readers  like  them  too',  it  was 
noted  that  67%  of  Guardian  readers  support  the  introduction  of  ASBOs. 
160  The  safety  of  children  -  especially  with  regard  to  the  issue  of  child  abuse  -  is  one  of  the  few 
'absolute'  values  that  British  society  feels  confident  to  uphold.  But  this  is  a  particularly  negative  and 
low-level  common  denominator  around  which  to  develop  a  web  of  meaning. 
161  Conservative  moralists  like  Melanie  Philips  have  helped  to  promote  the  problem  of  andsocial 
behaviour.  However  Philips  recognises  that  the  traditional  moral  absolutes  of  the  Victorian  period  that 
she  respects  are  no  longer  relevant  to  the  new  morality  of  the  twcnty-f  irst  century.  Rccognising  her  own 
isolation  from  even  an  agreement  on  what  sort  of  behaviour  is  understood  to  be  antisocial,  Philips  feels 
the  world  has  been  'turned  upside  down',  noting  that:  'The  Victorian  reformers  all  had  one  thing  in 
common.  They  were  absolutely  certain  that  behaviour  such  as  drinking,  sexual  licentiousness  or 
prostitution  were  wrong  in  themselves.  That  iron  belief  prompted  them  to  try  to  curb  what  they  clearly 
understood  as  vice  and  depravity.  But  now,  anyone  who  even  used  such  terms  would  be  considered 
beyond  the  pale.  The  only  thing  now  absolutely  unacceptable  is  to  regard  such  behaviour  as 
unacceptable'(Daily  Mail  17  June  2004,  my  emphasis). 
162  See  the  approach  taken  in  the  Scottish  Office  publication  Children  Young  People  and  Offending  in 
Scotland  (Asquith  1998). 
163  Within  criminology  (as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter),  issues  of  harassment  and  abuse  helped  to 
focus  attention  more  upon  issues  of  behaviour  within  'everyday'  life  that  helped  to  rcpose  the  meaning 
of  crime  away  from  traditional  concerns  with  economic  and  physical  concerns  like  burglary  and  assault 
and  towards  more  minor  forms  of  problem  behaviour. 
164  As  noted  in  Chapter  1,  the  'discovery'  of  violence  and  abuse  against  women  and  children  (Jenkins 
1992:  231)  had  helped  to  elevate  society's  awareness  and  concern  with  the  behaviour  of  particularly 
men. 
165  Binge  drinking  is  a  relatively  modern  term,  the  first  use  of  it  in  the  UK  press  being  1989.  The 
number  of  articles  using  this  term  grew  slowly  through  the  1990s  and  increased  substantially  in  2003, 
and  by  2004  the  Guardian  had  189  articles  on  the  subject  and  there  were  thousands  of  articles  using  the 
term  in  all  UK  papers  (these  results  relate  to  a  Nexis  Lcxis  media  search). 
166  In  a  major  research  document  developed  by  the  Scottish  Office  between  1995-8.  Children,  Young 
People  and  Offending  in  Scotland,  a  document  produced  at  the  same  time  as  the  idea  and 
implementation  of  the  Hamilton  curfew  was  occurring,  David  Farrington's  approach  can  be  seen  to  be 
central  to  the  understanding  of  crime  and  antisocial  behaviour.  Here,  the  use  of  'risk  indicators'of  crime 
and  antisocial  behaviour  are  identified  through  a  'synthesis  of  current  thinking  on  the  social  and 
psychological  processes'  and  an  examination  of  the  'formal  and  informal'  influences  on  young  people: 
this  examination  being  directly  connected  to  developing  'policies  and  practices  most  likely  to  have  a 
positive  impact  on  shaping  the  behaviour  of  young  Scots'  (Asquith  ctal  1998:  1,  my  italics). 
(67  Here,  it  is  the  behaviour  rather  than  the  beliefs  or  moral  values  of  individuals  that  arc  cmphasiscd, 
with  issues  like  binge  drinking  being  understood  not  as  ungodly  but  unhealthy  and  unsafe. 
168  At  a  time  when  the  capacity  for  social  intervention  has  been  diminished,  as  has  the  belief  in  the 
capacity  of  individuals  to  act,  the  grab-bag  approach  of  'psychosocial'  studies  that  fails  cithcr  to 
understand  the  psychology  of  the  individual  or  society  appears  to  be  most  appropriate  (see  Lasch  1979: 
34  for  a  discussion  on  psychoanalysis  and  the  study  of  society). 
169  Note  for  example  the  change  in  the  law  related  to  doli  incapax  discussed  previously. 
170  Note  for  example  the  recent  discussion  about  nursery  provision  and  the  concern  with  the  fact  that 
'antisocial  behaviour'  has  been  found  to  occur  within  3-year-old  children  who  attend  nursery  from  an 
early  age  (Times  16  June  2005). 
171  The  case  of  the  relatively  recently  labelled  'pacdophile'  is  the  best  example  of  this  'type'  of  person 
who  is  largely  understood  to  have  lost  any  capacity  to  'act'  in  any  other  way  than  as  a  socially  defined 
paedophile.  This  is  similarly  represented  in  the  various  discussions  about  'cultures'  of  crime  that  give  a 
sense  of  permanent  distance  between  those  who  belong  to  these  imagined  'cultures'  and  the  rest  of 
society  (see  Calcutt  1996). 
278 172  See  for  example  Frank  Field's  description  of  antisocial  behaviour,  which  he  believes  is  as  significant 
a  threat  as  international  terrorism  (Field  2003). 
173  The  therapeutic  turn  within  the  Catholic  Church  in  the  USA  is  illustrated  in  relation  to  the 
emergence  of  counselling  -  rather  than  moral  castigation  -  given  to  priests  found  to  have  abused 
children.  As  Jenkins  notes,  During  the  1970s  and  1980s,  psychological  values  and  assumptions 
permeated  the  religious  world  no  less  than  the  secular  culture',  the  consequence  being  that  therapeutic 
practices  and  'values'  began  to  over  ride  the  moral/religious  basis  of  the  church  itself  (Sommers  and 
Satel  2005:  82). 
174  An  example  of  this  development  can  be  seen  within  race  and  the  emergence  of  the  idea  of 
institutional  racism  -  and  the  change  in  police  recordings  of  claims  of  racism  (indeed  racism  itself  has 
today  become  just  another  form  of  antisocial  behaviour).  Speaking  on  Radio  4,  cx-Chief  Constable 
David  Westwood  explained  that  all  racist  reporting  needed  to  be  recorded  -  regardless  of  the  evidence. 
As  he  said,  'it's  about  each  individual  respecting  other  individuals',  you 
, 
record  that  people  I)clicvc'thcrc 
was  racism,  and  have  to  'accept  that  someone  feels  aggrieved',  otherwise  you  'turn  them  right  off.  you 
'doubly  traumatise'the  individual  (BBC  Radio  4,  July  26h  2005  On  the  Ropes). 
175  Tony  Blair  described  anti-social  behaviour  such  as  vandalism,  graffiti  and  fly  tipping  as  'probably 
the  biggest  immediate  issue  for  people  in  the  country'.  It  will  be  the  ccntrcpiecc  of  the  Queen's  speech 
on  November  13,  he  added  during  a  visit  to  Newham.  in  east  London  (Guardian  14  November  2002). 
On  November  4th  2002,  Tony  Blair  argued  that  the  clutch  of  bills  to  deal  with  crime  and  antisocial 
disorder  at  the  heart  of  the  Queen's  speech  was  designed  to  create  a  'victim  justice  system'  rather  than 
the  present  'criminal  justice  system'  (Guardian  4  November  2002). 
176  As  an  aside,  but  perhaps  of  significance,  'antisocial  behavioue  had  already  become  a  term  used  by 
the  South  African  state  in  the  late  1980s,  to  describe  the  problems  of  black  youth  who  lacked  the  social 
skills  by  a  very  early  age  to  become  part  of  society.  That  this  was  understood  as  a  problem  of  'antisocial 
behaviour'  caused  by  a  loss  of  'webs  of  authority',  may  reflect  the  disintegration  of  legitimacy  of  the 
South  African  political  elite  and  a  spontaneous  attempt  to  repose  the  problem  of  the  legitimacy  of  the 
state  as  one  of  the  behaviour  of  black  youth.  The  question  of  political  leadership  was  recast  as  one  of  an 
individual's  learned  behaviour  (Guardian  8  May  1990). 
177  For  Anthony  Giddens,  the  question  of  the  need  for  social  order  is  unproblcmatic  and  central  to  cvcry 
issue:  the  social  arrangement  of  society  and  the  development  of  social  policies  being  seen  as  positive 
not  in  terms  of  their  moral  or  political  content,  but  simply  in  relation  to  the  degree  to  which  they 
reinforce  social  order  (Giddens  1998:  102). 
178  The  Dictionary  of  Psychology  defines  psychosocial  as  'generally  a  grab-bag  term  used  freely  to 
cover  any  situation  where  both  psychological  and  social  factors  are  assumed  to  play  a  role  (Dictionary 
of  Psychology  1985). 
179  See  Furedi  (1992)  for  an  historical  analysis  of  the  role  of  ideology  in  the  20'h  century. 
180  See  Scottish  Executive  Publications  (2005). 
181  Disclosure  Scotland  is  the  latest  vetting  procedure  that  has  been  introduced  in  Scotland. 
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Parents  Consent  Form 
The  Child  Safety  Initiative  Stuart  Waiton 
A  proposed  research  project  is  planned  to  interview  young  people  in  and  around  the  Hillhouse 
area  to  understand  what  the  children  and  young  people  of  the  area  think  about  the  Child  Safety 
Initiative  being  launched  in  the  Hillhouse  area. 
Your  child  has  been  chosen  to  be  interviewed  for  this  research.  The  children  and  young 
people  have  been  chosen  simply  by  their  position  on  their  class  register.  The  interview  is 
voluntary  and  the  participants  are  free  to  withdraw  their  consent  at  any  time.  This  will  be 
explained  to  the  young  people  themselves  at  the  time  of  interview. 
The  interview  will  be  carried  out  in  the  school  during  school  time  and  will  take 
approximately  20  -  30  minutes.  71be  interview  will  be  based  on  a  questionnaire  and  notes 
of  the  interview  will  be  taken  by  the  researcher.  No  personal  details  of  the  young  people 
will  be  used  in  any  publication  or  written  work  and  the  interview  will  be  confidential. 
Any  written  work  will  use  changed  names. 
If  you  do  not  wish  to  consent  simply  ignore  this  form. 
a.  I  confirm  that  I  have  read  the  above  and  give  consent  for  my  child  to  be 
,  interviewed. 
Name  of  Child/  Young  Person 
Name  of  Person  giving  consent  Date  Signature 
Researcher  Date  Signature 
310 AppendiX  2 
Children's  Questionnaire 
What  is  your  first  name? 
...................................................................................................................... 
2.  Which  estate  do  you  live  on?  (If  unsure,  get  the  name  of  the  road) 
...................................................................................................................... 
3.  How  old  are  you? 
....................................................................................................................... 
4.  What  year  of  school  is  that? 
................................  :  ...................................................................................... 
5.  Are  they  male  of  female? 
6.  Are  they  White  Black  Asian  Chinese  or  other? 
Get  them  chatting  about  what  they  like  to  do  at  night.  Suss  out  why  they  like  doing  the 
things  they  do,  what  they  would  like  to  be  able  to  do  more  of,  and  what  they  don't  like 
doing.  Then  get  them  to  go  through  their  last  week  -  what  did  they  do  each  night  +  the 
weekends. 
7.  Who  do  you  travel  home  from  school  with  in  the  evening?  71ck  one  of  the 
answers  below. 
Parents  or  some  other  adult  Priends  By  myself 
8.  When  you  go  to  a  friend's  house  at  night  how  do  you  get  there? 
By  themselves  taken  never  go 
If  taken  by  an  adult  -  why  is  this  ............................................................................. 
If  they  go  by  themselves,  do  they  feel  safe?  YIN 
If  not,  why  not? 
..................................................................................................................................... 
9.  Do  you  ever  go  to  the  shops  for  your  parents?  YIN 
If  not  why  not?  .......................................................................................................... 
10.  Do  you  play  out  in  the  streets  in  the  evening?  YIN 
If  you  do  not  play  out  in  the  streets  at  night,  why  is  this? 
11.  Is  it  different  in  the  summer? 
311 ....................................................................................................................................... 
12.  Do  you  play  out  in  the  street  at  the  weekend?  Y/N 
If  not,  why  not?  ................................................................................................ 
13.  Have  you  heard  of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative?  Y/N 
If  not,  try  Curfew?  Y/N 
14.  If  you  play  out  in  the  street  at  night,  what  time  do  you  have  to  be  in  by? 
.................................................... 
15.  Has  this  time  changed  since  the  introduction  of  the  curfew?  Yes  or  No 
16.  What  time  did  you  have  to  be  in  by  before  the  curfew?  .................................. 
17.  When  you  played  out  on  ........  were  you  allowed  to  go  out  of  the  sight  of  your 
parents?  Yes  or  No 
If  not,  why  not?  .............................................................................................................. 
......................................................................................................................................... 
M  What  time  does  the  curfew  start  in  Hillhouse? 
19.  Do  you  think  the  curfew  is  a  good  idea?  Yes  or  No 
Explain  why  you  think  this  ................................................................................. 
,  20.  Do  you  know  what  time  the  police  start  taldng  people  home?  Y/N 
What  time  is  this?  .............................................................................................. 
21.  When  you  are  out:  -  by  yourself  at  night  in  your  area  do  you  feel  safe? 
Yes  or  No  or  I've  never  been  out  alone  (do  they  mean  they're  with  friends 
etc) 
If  not,  why  not?  ................................................................................................... 
22.  If  you  were  out  alone  at  night  and  felt  unsafe  or  scared,  what  would  you  do? 
.............................................................................................................................. If  say  go  home,  ask  if  there  was  no-one  at  home,  what  would  you  do? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
23.  If  you  were  out  alone  at  night  and  needed  to  know  the  time  would  you  ask  an 
adult  you  don't  know  who  was  passing  by?  Yes  or  No 
If  you  answered  no,  why  is  this?  .......................................................................... 
24.  Would  you  feel  happy  about  asIdng  a  teenager  you  don't  know?  Yes  or  No 
If  you  answered  no,  why  is  this?  ......................................................................... 
25-  Would  you  feel  happy  about  asldng  a  police  officer?  Yes  or  No 
312 If  you  answered  no,  why  is  this?  ......................................................................... 
26.  Did  an  adult  speak  to  you  (other  than  parents  or  relatives)  from  your  street 
last  week?  Y/N 
If  yes,  who  was  it?  ............................................................................................... 
What  was  it  about?  ............................................................................................. 
27.  Did  you  talk  to  any  other  adults  on  your  estate?  YIN 
Who?  .................................................................................................................... 
What  about?  ..................................................................................................  * 
28.  When  out  on  your  estate  - 
Have  you  ever  been  told  off;  been  asked  to  move  on;  been  questioned  about 
what  you  are  doing?  Yes  or  No 
If  yes  -  who  normally  does  this?  Police 
Parents 
Tick  one  answer  Friends  parents 
Other  adults 
other  young  people 
29.  Have  adults  you  don't  know  ver  y  well  ever  told  you  off,  moved  you  on  or 
questioned  you?  YIN 
What  for? 
.......................................................................................................... 
30.  Have  you  ever  been  told  off,  been  moved  on;  or  been  questioned  about  what 
you  were  doing  by  the  police?  Y/N 
What  for?  ............................................................................................................. 
If  they  answered  yes  to  both  the  above,  which  happens  more  often? 
Police  or  Other  Adults 
If  they  have  been  spoken  to  by  the  police,  find  out  if  there  had  been  a  complaint 
about  them  and  whether  or  not  an  adult  had  already  complained  to  their  face? 
31.  Do  you  think  the  police  should  be  phoned  if  a  young  person  is:  - 
(tick  which  answers  you  agree  with) 
a)  sitting  on  a  strangers'wall 
b)  running  in  someone's  garden 
C)  knocIcing  on  someone's  door  and  running  away 
d)  smashing  a  bottle 
e)  fighting 
313 f)  playing  football  in  the  street 
g)  being  noisy 
h)  drinIdng  under  age 
D  being  out  after  the  curfew  time 
Any  comments  why  ............................................................................................... 
32.  Have  you  ever  visited  or  called  on  the  house  of  someone  you  didn't  know  very 
well  on  your  estate?  YIN 
(e.  g.  for  Halloween,  to  raise  money  etc)  Ask  who  it  was  to  assess  if  they  or  their 
parents  knew  them. 
Who  was  it,  why  visit? 
.............................................................................................................................. 
33.  Do  you  think  talking  to  adults  on  your  estate  is  a  good  thing  to  do?  YIN 
Why? 
............................................................................................................. 
34.  Would  you  like  to  see  more  police  on  your  streets  at  night?  More 
Less 
No  change 
35.  Would  y6u  like  to  see  more  young  people  out  at  night?  More 
Less 
No  change 
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Young  People's  Questionnaire 
1.  What  is  your  first  name?  ..................................................................... 
2.  Which  estate  do  you  live  on?  (If  unsure  get  name  of  the  road) 
.................................................................................................... 
3.  How  old  are  you?  .............................................................................. 
4.  What  year  of  school  is  that?  ................................................................. 
5.  Are  they  male  or  female? 
..................................................................... 
6.  Are  they  White  Black  Asian  Chinese  or  other? 
7.  Who  do  you  travel  home  from  school  with  in  the  evening?  Tick  one  answer  below 
Parents  or  some  other  adult  Friends  By  myself 
If  parentsladult  THEN  -  Why  is  this? 
....................................................................................................... If  parents/adults  THEN  -  Would  you  rather  go  by  yourself  or  with  friends?  Y/N 
WHY? 
.............................................................................................. 
7a.  Do  you  or  would  you  feel  safe  walking  home  alone?  Y/N 
WHY? 
.............................................................................................. 
7b.  When  you  go  to  a  friend's  house  at  night  how  do  you  get  there?  By  themselves  or  taken 
or  never  go 
If  taken  by  an  adult  -  why  is  this?  ........................................................... 
8.  Generally,  do  you  consider  the  area  you  live  in  to  be  safe?  Safe  Unsafe 
If  unsafe  -  why  is  this?  .......................................................................... 
8a.  In  general  how  safe  do  you  feel  when: 
Out  with  hiends  at  night?  Safe  Unsafe  Never  go  out 
Out  alone  at  night?  Safe  Unsafe  Never  go  out  alone 
In  your  own  home?  Safe  Unsafe 
In  Hamilton?  Safe  Unsafe  Never  go 
In  Glasgow?  Safe  Unsafe  Never  go 
8b.  What  if  anything  could  the  council  or  other  organisation  do  to  make  you  feel  safe? 
........................................................................................................ 
8c.  What  if  anything  could  young  people  do  to  make  communities  safer? 
........................................................................................................ 
317 8d.  What  if  anything  could  adults  do  to  make  communities  safer? 
........................................................................................................ 
9.  Do  you  and  your  fziends  ever  just  hang  about  doing  nothing  in  particular  during  the 
evenings  or  weekends?  No 
-  Yes,  once  in  a  while 
Yes,  nearly  every  day 
IF  NO,  why  not?  ................................................................................. 
9a.  Where  do  you  usually  go? 
....................................................................................................... 
9b.  What  do  you  usually  do? 
....................................................................................................... 
10.  Do/Would  you  feel  safe  going  out  at  night?  YIN 
Why? 
.............................................................................................. 
11.  Do  you  play  out  more  in  the  summer?  Y/N 
12.  What  time  do  you  play  out  till  in  the  summer?  .............................................. 
13.  Do  you  ever  travel  outside  your  estate  (say  to  Hamilton)  independently  (without  an 
adult?  )  Y/N 
If  YES  -  are  your  parents  happy  about  you  doing  this?  YIN 
If  parents  are  not  happy  -  Why  not?  .........................................................  If  parents  are  happy  -  Why? 
.................................................................  If  NO  (they  don't  travel  to  Hamilton  independently)  -  WHY  is  this? 
....................................................................................................... 
14.  Do  you  belong  to  any  club?  Y/N 
If  YES  -  why  do  you  prefer  being  in  a  club  to  being  out  with  your  friends? 
15.  Who  do  you  spend  most  of  your  spare  time  with?  (Number  1"  and  2d) 
Mum/dad  Brother/sister  by  yourself 
Best  friend  boy/girl  friend  group  of  friends 
Adults  who  aren't  in  my  family 
16.  Have  you  heard  of  the  Child  Safety  Initiative?  YIN 
16a.  Have  you  heard  of  the  Curfew?  Y/N 
l6b.  Which  do  you  use?  Curfew/CSI 
17.  Are  your  parents  more  worried  when  you  play  out  since  the  introduction  of  the 
Curfew/CSI?  YIN 
WHY? 
............................................................................................ 
18.  Do  you  feel  safer  when  you're  out  since  the  introduction  of  the  curfew? 
Y/N/No  different 
WHY? 
............................................................................................ 
318 19.  If  you  go  out  in  the  streets,  what  time  do  you  have  to  be  in  by? 
........................... 
20.  Has  this  time  changed  since  the  introduction  of  the  curfew?  Yes  or  No 
21.  What  time  did  you  have  to  be  in  before  the  curfew?  ........................................ 
22.  When  you  go  out  at  night  are  you  allowed  to  go  out  of  the  sight  of  your  parents? 
Y/N/I  never  go  out 
If  no,  why?  ........................................................................................ 
23.  Would  you  like  more  freedom  to  go  wherever  you  wanted?  Y/N 
If  yes,  where  would  they  like  to  go  and  what  would  they  like  to  do? 
....................................................................................................... 
If  no,  why  not?  .................................................................................... 
24.  Are  you  happy  to  go  places  where  there  are  no  adults  around?  Y/N 
If  not,  why  not?  ...................................................................................  If  yes,  why?  ........................................................................................ 
25.  What  time  does  the  curfew  start  in  Hillhouse? 
................................................ 
26.  Do  you  think  the  curfew  is  a  good  idea?  Yes  or  No 
Explain  why  you  think  this. 
....................................................................................................... 
If  they  say  NO  -  ask  "but  do  you  think  the  police  need  some  other  powers  to  deal  with 
the  young  people  in  your  area?  "  Y/N 
If  no,  why  not? 
If  yes,  What  power/why  think  this? 
...................................................................................................... 
27.  Do  you  know  what  time  the  police  start  taking  people  home?  Y/N/Don't  know 
What  time  is  this?  ................................................................................ 
28.  If  you  were  REALLY  scared  when  out  at  night,  and  you  weren't  near  your  house  or  a 
house  of  someone  you  knew,  would  you  be  prepared  to  call  on  a  house  you  didn't  know? 
Y/N 
If  no,  why  not?  ................................................................................... 
29.  If  you  were  out  alone  at  night  and  needed  to  know  the  time  would  you  ask  an 
adult  you  don't  know  who  was  passing  by?  Yes  or  No 
Wily? 
............................................................................................ 
30.  Would  you  feel  happy  about  asking  a  teenager  you  didn't  know?  YesorNo 
WHY? 
............................................................................................ 
30a.  If  you  had  to  ask  either  an  adult  or  a  teenager,  which  would  you  ask? 
Adult/Teenager 
31.  Would  you  feel  happy  about  asking  a  police  officer?  Yes  or  No 
319 WHY? 
............................................................................................ 
32.  What  adults  do  you  know  and  talk  to  on  your  estate? 
Most  in  Hillhouse 
Most  in  my  street 
Some  on  my  street 
A  few  neighbours  and  parents  friends 
Other 
(Elaborate  if  necessary  on  who  these  adults  are  they  know) 
33.  Do  adults  offer  them  adviceldo  they  respect  them/do  they  feel  they  have  things  in 
common  with  them? 
EXPLAIN 
....................................................................................... 
34.  Have  you  ever  made  an  effort  to  talk  to  an  adult  you  didn't  know  very  well  who  lives  ncar 
you?  Y/N 
WHY? 
........................................................................................ 
35.  Generally,  do  you  trust  the  adults  on  your  estate?  YIN 
WHY? 
............................................................................................. 
36.  Generally,  do  you  think  adults  trust  you?  Y/N 
WHY? 
.............................................................................................. 
37.  Are  there  any  adults  you  think  are  scare  of  you  when  you're  playing  out  at  night? 
Y/N 
(Elaborate) 
........................................................................................ 
38.  When  out  on  your  estate  have  you  ever  been  told  off,  been  asked  to  move  on,  been 
questioned  about  what  You  are  doing?  YIN 
If  yes  -  who  normally  does  this?  Police 
Parents 
(Number  1  and  2)  Friends  parents 
Other  adults 
Other  young  people 
39.  Have  adults  you  don't  know  very  well  ever  told  you  off,  moved  you  on  or  questioned 
you?  YIN 
What  for? 
........................................................................................... 
. 
40.  Have  you  ever  been  told  off;  been  moved  on;  been  questioned  about  what  you  arc  doing 
by  the  police?  Yes  or  No 
How  often  and  what  for? 
........................................................................ 
41.  Who  talks  to  you  most  often  in  the  street  at  night?  Adults/Police 
42.  If  they  have  been  spoken  to  by  the  police  -  find  out  if  there  had  been  a  complaint  about 
them  and  whether  or  not  an  adult  had  already  complained  to  their  face. 
320 43.  Do  you  think  the  police  should  be  phoned  if  a  young  person  is: 
(Tick  which  answers  you  agree  with)  Wily 
a)  sitting  on  a  strangers'  wall  Y/N 
b)  running  someone's  garden  Y/N 
C)  knocking  on  someone's  door  and  running  away  YIN 
d)  smashing  a  bottle  YIN 
e)  fighting  Y/N 
f)  playing  footbaH  in  street  Y/N 
g)  being  noisy  YIN 
h)  drinking  under  age  Y/N 
(If  yes,  ask  -  surely  they're  not  harming  anybody,  would  it  not  be  better  to  tell  their 
parents  etc) 
i) 
- 
being  out  after  the  curfew  time  YIN 
(If  yes,  ask  -  is  this  not  up  to  the  parents?  )  Y/N 
43g)  If  they  say  YES  to  noisy  -  ask  do  you  think  it  is fair  enough  for  someone  to  phone  the 
police  on  kids  playing  noisily  in  the  street,  rather  than  coming  out  to  talk  to  the  young 
people  themselves  Y/N 
(Comment) 
....................................................................................... 
43ga  Then  ask  -  If  it  was  you  being  noisy  -just  having  a  laugh  with  your  friends,  not  doing 
anything  in  particular  and  the  person  in  the  house  was  scared,  do  you  think  it  is  ok  for 
them  to  call  the  police  rather  than  talk  to  you  themselves?  YIN 
(Comment) 
.........................................................................................  43gb  Then  ask  -  Do  you  think  it  is fair  to  restrict  young  people's  freedom  if  adults  are  scared 
of  them  -  even  if  the  young  people  are  not  committing  any  crimes?  Y/N 
(Comment) 
...................................................................................... 
44.  Have  you  ever  visited  or  called  on  the  house  of  someone  you  didn't  know  very  well  on 
your  estate?  Y/N 
(e.  g.  for  Halloween,  to  raise  money  etc)  Ask  who  it  was  to  assess  if  they  or  their  parents 
knew  them.  Who  was  it,  why  visit? 
....................................................................................................... 
45.  Do  you  think  talking  to  adults  on  your  estate  is  a  good  thing  to  do?  Yes  or  No 
Why? 
............................................................................................... 
46.  Would  you  like  to  see  more  police  on  your  streets  at  night?  More/Uss/No  change  WI  IY? 
47.  Would  you  like  to  see  more  young  people  out  at  night?  MoreAxss/No  change 
WHY? 
............................................................................................ 
48.  Is  there  much  bother  in  your  street?  YIN 
48a  Is  there  much  bother  in  Hillhouse?  Y/N 
What? 
............................................................................................. 
49.  Has  this  changed  since  the  curfew?  Y/N  - 
How? 
............................................................................................. 
321 50.  Have  you  personally  ever  had  any  bother?  Y/N 
What? 
........................................................................................... 
51.  Has  this  changed  since  the  curfew?  Y/N 
How? 
............................................................................................. 
52.  Do  the  people  who  drink  in  the  street  give  you  much  bother?  Y/N 
Elaborate 
........................................................................................ 
53.  Do  busy  roads  stop  you  going  out/hanging  out  at  night?  Y/N 
Elaborate 
........................................................................................ 
If  Yes,  what  does  it  stop  you  doing? 
........................................................... 
....................................................................................................... 
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Speech  by  John  Orr  Strathclyde  Chief  Constable  (in  the  form  It 
was  handed  out)  at  the  launch  of  the  South  Lanarkshire 
, 
Council  and  Strathclyde  Police  Children  and  Young  People's 
Safety  Initiative  -  Thursday  23  October  1997. 
LAUNCH  OF  CHILD  SAFETY  INITIATIVE 
HAMILTON 
23.10.97 
CHIEF  CONSTABLE  JOHN  ORR 
LADIES  AND  GENTLEMEN, 
THE  TWIN  CONCERNS  OF  CHILD  WELFARE 
AND  JUVENILE  CRIME  HAVE  LONG  BEEN 
CLOSELY  ASSOCIATED. 
INDEED,  THE  ENLIGHTENED  APPROACH  OF 
THE  CHILDREN'S  HEARINGS  SYSTEM  IN 
SCOTLAND  -  IN  WHICH  THE  EMPHASIS  IS  ON 
PROTECTING  THE  WELFARE  OF  THE  CHILD 
RATHER  THAN  PUNISHING  HIS  OR  HER 
CRIMINALITY  -  IS  SAID  TO  BE  THE  ENVY  OF 
MANY  OTHER  JUVENILE  JUSTICE  SYSTEMS 
AROUND  THE  WORLD. 
323 TODAY  IN  HAMILTON,  STRATHCLYDE  POLICE 
AND  SOUTH  LANARKSHIRE  COUNCIL  ARE 
LAUNCHING  A  JOINT  PIONEERING  INITIATIVE 
WHICH  WE  HOPE  WILL  BUILD  ON  THE 
PRINCIPLES  OF  THAT  DISTINCTIVE  SCOTTISH 
APPROACH  TO  THE  CARE  AND  WELFARE  OF 
OUR  YOUNG  PEOPLE. 
THE  HAMILTON  CHILD  SAFETYINITIATIVE  IS  A 
PILOT  PROJECT  WHICH  AIMS  - 
SIMULTANEOUSLY  -  TO  PROTECT  THE  SAFETY 
OF  YOUNG  PEOPLE,  DECREASE  THE 
OPPORTUNITIES  FOR  THEM  TO  BECOME 
INVOLVED  IN  JUVENILE  CRIME  AND  REDUCE 
THE  FEAR  OF  CRIME  AMONG  THE  PUBLIC. 
FROM  TODAY,  3  NEIGHBOURING  AREAS  IN 
HAMILTON  -  WHITEHILL,  HILLHOUSE  AND 
FAIRHILL  -  WILL  BE  THE  FOCUS  OF  A  SPECIAL 
6-MONTHS-LONG  PILOT  PROJECT  WHICH 
'SEEKS  TO  HIGHLIGHT  THE  DANGERS  FACED 
_BY 
YOUNGSTERS  ALLOWED  OUT  AFTER  DARK 
WITHOUT  ADULT  SUPERVISION  -  RISKS 
WHICH  CAN  LEAD  TO  CHILDREN  FALLING 
PREY  TO  POSSIBLE  DANGER,  BECOMING 
INVOLVED  IN  COMMITTING  CRIME  OR 
CREATING  A  NUISANCE  TO  OTHERS. 
324 TljIS  INITIATIVE  -  THE  RESULT  OF 
. 
UNPRECEDENTED  COLLABORATION 
BETWEEN  STRATHCLYDE  POLICE  AND  SOUTH 
LANARKSHIRE  COUNCIL  -  WAS  DRAWN  UP  IN 
RESPONSE  TO  THE  CONCERNS  AND  WISHES 
OF  LOCAL  HOUSEHOLDERS  AND  YOUNG 
PEOPLE  ABOUT  NUISANCE  CRIME,  SUCH  AS 
VANDALISM  AND  THE  PRESENCE  OF 
UNSUPERVISED  OR  UNRULY  CHILDREN  ON 
THE  STREET  AFTER  DARK. 
A  KEY  ELEMENT  OF  THE  INITIATIVE,  AND  ONE 
WHICH  HAD  ALREADY  RECEIVED 
OVERWHELMING  SUPPORT  FROM  LOCAL 
RESIDENTS,  WILL  BE  HIGH-PROFILE  AFTER.  - 
DARK  COMMUNITY'POLICE  PATROLS  IN  LOCAL 
STREETS. 
THE  PRINCIPAL  AIM  OF  THE  PATROLS  IS  TO 
ENSURE  THAT  VULNERABLE  YOUNGSTERS 
'AGED  UNDER  16  -  AND  PARTICULARLY  THOSE 
AGED  12  OR  LESS  -  ARE  NOT  EXPOSED  TO 
DANGERS  OR  TEMPTED  TO  BECOME 
EMBROILED  IN  CRIMES  ASSOCIATED  WITH 
BEING  OUT  ALONE  TOO  LATE  IN  THE  DARK 
OR  WITH  EQUALLY  VULNERABLE 
COMPANY 
........ 
CRIMES  SUCH  AS  VANDALISM, 
CREATING  DISTURBANCES  AND  MINOR 
VIOLENCE. 
325 POLICE  OFFICERS  WHO  COME  UPON 
UNACCOMPANIED  CHILDREN  DURING  THE 
EVENING  PATROLS  AND  WHO  BELIEVE  THE 
CHILDREN  ARE  AT  RISK  WILL  RETURN  THE 
YOUNGSTERS  TO  THEIR  HOMES.  PARENTS 
OR  CARERS  WILL  BE  REMINDED  OF  THE 
DANGERS  FACING  CHILDREN  OUT  ALONG  IN 
THE  DARK. 
IF  THERE  IS  NO  SUITABLE  ADULT 
SUPERVISION  AT  HOME,  THE  CHILDREN  WILL 
BE  TAKEN  TO  A  SAFE  ROOM  IN  HAMILTON 
POLICE  OFFICE,  UNTIL  THEIR  PARENTS  OR 
CARERS  COLLECT  THEM. 
IF  POLICE  BELIEVE  THE  CIRCUMSTANCES 
GIVE  RISE  TO  FURTHER  CAUSE  FOR 
CONCERN,  THE  COUNCIL'S  SOCIAL  WORK 
DEPARTMENT  WILL  BE  INFORMED. 
IN  CASES  OF  IMMEDIATE  EMERGENCY,  THE 
DUTY'STANDBY  SOCIAL  WORKER  WILL 
ATrEND  THE  POLICE  OFFICE. 
THE  POLICE  PATROLS  WILL  BE  UNDERTAKEN 
BY  A  POOL  OF  COMMUNITY  POLICE  OFFICERS 
WHO  HAVE  BEEN  SPECIALLY  SELECTED  FOR 
THEIR  ENPERIENCE,  SKILL  AND  EMPATHY 
WHEN  IT  COMES  TO  DEALING  WITH  YOUNG 
326 PEOPLE.  SOME  OF  THE  OFFICERS  ARE 
PARENTS  THEMSELVES. 
EACH  PATROL  WILL  SPEND  TIME  ON  LOCAL 
STREETS  FOR  A  FEW  HOURS  AS  REQUIRED  - 
USUALLY  ON  THURSDAY,  FRIDAY  AND 
SATURDAY  EVENING,  THE  TIMES  IDENTIFIED 
BY  POLICE  AND  LOCALS  AS  MOST 
PROBLEMATIC. 
THEY  WILL  SPEAK  TO  THE  YOUNG  PEOPLE, 
REMIND  THEM  OF  THE  NEED  TO  CONSIDER 
THE  REST  OF  THE  COMMUNITY  WITH  THEIR 
ACTIVITIES  ON  THE  STREET  AND  TAKE 
FURTHER  ACTION  (THAT  IS  RETURN  THEM 
HOME/ISSUE  WARNINGS/FORMALLY  DETAIN 
THEM  ON  CRIMINAL  CHARGES)  ONLY  WHEN 
NECESSARY. 
THE  RESULTS  WILL  BE  EVALUATED  BY  THE 
FORCE  AT  THE  END  OF  THE  TRIAL  PERIOD  TO 
MEASURE  THEIR  IMPACT  ON  LOCAL  CHILD 
WELFARE  AND  CRIME. 
IN  TRUTH,  THE  POLICE  HAVE  ALWAYS  HAD 
POWERS  TO  RETURN  CHILDREN  HOME  IF 
THEY  HAVE  CONCERNS  ABOUT  THEIR 
VVELLBEING. 
327 IT  IS  JUST  THAT  WITH  THIS  PARTICULAR 
PROJECT,  VVE  ARE  FORMALISING  THIS 
APPROACH  AND  GIVING  A  MODERN  SLANT  TO 
OLD-FASHIONED  COMMUNITYPOLICING. 
VVE  DO  NOT  ALLOW  YOUNG  PEOPLE  TO  BE  IN 
DANGER  IN  THE  HOME  SO  WE  SHOULDN'T 
PERMIT  IT  IN  THE  STREET. 
OUR  HOPE  IS  THAT  BY  TAKING  VULNERABLE 
AND  IMPRESSIONABLE  YOUNGSTERS  OUT  OF 
HARM"S  WAY,  THERE  WILL  BE  A  DOUBLE  SPIN- 
OFF 
...... 
;...  THEY  WILL  BE  SAFER  AND  THEY  WON'T 
BE  TEMPTED  TO  GET  CAUGHT  UP  IN 
NUSCHIEF-MAKING  OR  WORSE. 
THAT  WAY  THE  WHOLE  COMMUNITY  WILL 
BENEFIT. 
SOME  OF  THE  SITUATIONS  MY  OFFICERS 
COME  ACROSS  BEGGAR  BELIEF.  A  9-YEAR- 
OLD  GIRL  WAS  FOUND  IN  A  CLOSE  AT  NIGHT 
EARLIER  THIS  YEAR  IN  THIS  POLICE  SUB- 
DIVISION,  DRESSED  ONLY  IN  HER 
UNDERVVTEAR  AND  DRESSING-GOWN. 
THIS  LITrLE  GIRL  WAS  UPSET  AND  TOLD  THE 
OFFICERS  THAT  HER  MOTHER  WAS  DEAD. 
328 WHEN  MY  OFFICERS  TOOK  HER  HOME  THEY 
FOUND  HER  MOTHER  "DEAD".  ALRIGHT  - 
DEAD  DRUNK. 
ANOTHER  9-YEAR-OLD,  A  BOY,  WAS  ALSO 
FOUND  IN  SIMILAR  CIRCUMSTANCES  FAIRLY 
RECENTLY.  HIS  PARENTS  WERE  NOT  AT 
HOME  -  HIS  MUM  WAS  TRACED  AT  THE 
BINGO  AND  HIS  DAD  WAS  AT  THE  PUB. 
THESE  TYPES  OF  SCENARIOS  ARE  NOT 
UNCOMMON  ACROSS  THE  FORCE  AREA. 
VVE  COME  ACROSS  YOUNG  PEOPLE  OUT  OF 
DOORS  WAY  AFTER  NIGHTFALL  AND  THEY 
ARE  NEGLECTED,  BADLY  CLOTHED  AND  IN 
NEED  OF  CARE. 
YET  -  AND  WHAT  A  PRADOX  -  PAEDOPHILE 
COURT  CASES  HIS  THE  HEADLINES 
REGULARLY  AND  THERE  IS  CONTROVERSY 
ABOUT  THE  ISSUE  OF  THE  RIGHTS  OF 
COMMUNITIES  TO  KNOW  EHERE  CONVICTED 
OFFENDERS  ARE  LIVING. 
VVHAT,  THEN,  CAN  PARENTS  OF  THE 
CHILDREN  WITH  WHOM  WE  COME  INTO 
CONTACT  POSSIBLY  BE  THINKING  ABOUT? 
329 THE  FIGURES  FOR  CRIME  IN.  THE  HAMILTON 
AREA  ARE  DOWN  CONSIDERABLY  SO  FAR 
THIS  YEAR,  DUE  TO  THE  HARD  WORK  OF  THE 
LOCAL  POLICE  FOR  THE  FORCE"S  ANTI-CRIME 
CAMPAIGN,  THE  SPOTLIGHT  INITIATIVE. 
BUT  IF  PEOPLE  REMAIN  ANXIOUS  AND 
CONCERNED,  THEN  WE  MUST  RESPOND  - 
AND  DECISIVELY. 
THIS  INITIATIVE  IS  NO  DRACONIAN  CURFEW. 
STRATHCLYDE  POLICE  DO  NOT  THINK 
YOUNG  PEOPLE  ARE  PUBLIC  ENEMY  NO.  I 
AND  THIS  FORCE  IS  NOT  ANTI  YOUNG 
PEOPLE. 
ON  THE  CONTRARY,  VIE  ARE  TAKING  THIS 
APPROACH  BECAUSE  VVE  REALLY  CARE 
THAT  OUR  YOUNG  PEOPLE  LIVE  A  SAFE  AND 
CRIME-FREE  LIFE. 
IT'S  CERTAINLY  NO  CRIME  FOR  YOUNGSTERS  TO 
STAND  IN  THE  STREET  CHATTING  TO  THEIR 
FRIENDS. 
MY  OFFICERS  WILL  NOT  HARASS  LAW- 
ABIDING  YOUNG  PEOPLE  WHO  ARE  NOT 
COMMITrING  OR  HAVE  NO  INTENTION  OF 
COMMITrING  CRIME  OR  PUBLIC  NUISANCE. 
330 UNFORTUNATELY,  THE  MOST  COMMON 
REQUEST  WE  RECEIVED  ACROSS  THE  FORCE 
AREA  IS  FROM  MEMBERS  OF  THE  PUBLIC 
ASKING  FOR  OFFICERS  TO  DEAL  WITH 
YOUNGSTERS  DISTURBING  THE  PEACE, 
FRIGHTENING  RESIDENTS  OR  DESTROYING 
THE  NEIGHBOURHOOD  IN  SOME  WAY. 
WE  HAVE  SEEN  YOUNGSTERS  AS  YOUNG  AS  8  TO 
10  YEARS  OLD  BECOME  INVOLVED  IN  GANG 
FIGHTS. 
LOCAL  COMMUNITIES  HAVE  EVERY  RIGHT  TO 
DEMAND  THE  BEST  POSSIBLE  SERVICE  FROM 
THE  POLICE  AND  THEIR  COUNCILS  WHEN 
THEY  CANNOT  LIVE  THEIR  LIVES  TO  THE 
FULLEST,  FREE  FROM  PETIY  CRIME  AND 
ANNOYANCE. 
THE  COMMUNITIES  OF  VVHITEHILL,  HILLHOUSE 
AND  FAIRHILL  HAVE  BEEN  SELECTED  AS  THE 
LOCATIONS  FOR  THE  PILOT  PROJECT  ...... 
......  NOT  BECAUSE  THEY  HAVE  MORE 
PRIBLEMS  THAN  OTHER  COMMUNITIES  BUT 
BECAUSE  THEY  HAVE  CALLED  FOR  AND 
SUPPORT  FIRM  ACTION. 
AND  INDEPENDENT  OPINION  POLLS  PROVE  IT. 
331 A  SURVEY  PUBLISHED  BY  THE  HAMILTON 
ADVERTISER  NEWSPAPER  AFTER  THE 
INITIATIVE  BECAME  PUBLIC  KNOWLEDGE 
SHOWED  95%  OR  972  WERE  IN  FAVOUR  OF 
THE  COMMUNI'I`Y  POLICE  PATROLS  WITH 
ONLY  5%  OR  55  PEOPLE,  AGAINST. 
AND  IT  SEEMS  THAT  THIS  PARTICULAR 
APPROACH  TO  AN  ALL-TOO-COMMON 
SITUATION  FOR  MANY  COMMUNITIES  HAS 
TOUCHED  A  CHORD  WITH  THE  PUBLIC. 
ANOTHER  TELEPHONE  POLL,  THIS  TIME 
CONDUCTED  ON  THE  ITV  TELETEXT  FOR 
CENTRAL  SCOTLAND,  SHOWED  THAT  96%  OR 
1846  OF  THE  1918  CALLERS  WANTED  THE 
INITIATIVE  EXTENDED  TO  THE  REST  OF 
SCOTLAND. 
ONLY  72  PEOPLE,  OR  4%,  WERE  AGAINST. 
THAT  IS  WHY  THIS  PILOT  PROJECT  WILL  BE 
THOROUGHLY  EVALUATED  BY  THE  FORCE  TO 
MEASURE  THE  IMPACT  ON  COMMUNITY 
SAFETY. 
VIEWS  ON  PEOPLE'S  RIGHTS  ARE  MANY  AND 
VARIED  BUT  THERE  CAN  BE  NO  ARGUMENT 
SURELY  AGAINST  THE  RIGHT  OF  ALL  PEOPLE 
332 -  INCLUDING  AND  PERHAPS  EVEN 
ESPECIALLY  THE  YOUNG  -  TO  LIVE  IN  SAFETY 
IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
......  SAFE  FROM  CRIME 
AND  NEGLECT  TOO. 
PEOPLE  HAVE  RESPONSIBILITIES,  AS  WELL 
AS  RIGHTS. 
ALL-IN-ALL,  WHAT  STRATHCLYDE  POLICE  AND 
SOUTH  LANARKSHIRE  COUNCIL  WANT  THIS 
INITIATIVE  TO  DO  IS  TO  REMIND  EVERYONE 
OF  THEIR  RESPONSIBILITIES  TO  OTHERS..... 
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Speech  by  Councillor  Tom  McCabe,  Leader  of 
South  Lanarkshire  Council  (in  the  form  it  was 
handed  out)  at  the  launch  of  the  South 
Lanarkshire  Council  and  Strathclyde  Police 
Children  and  Young  People's  Safety  Initiative  - 
Thursday  23  October.  1997. 
Can  I  echo  the  comments  of  the  Chief 
Constable,  for  this  is  a  partnership  -a 
partnership  of  the  local  authority,  the  police 
and,  perhaps  most  importantly,  the 
community. 
I  want  to  stress  the  reality  of  the  joint  South 
Lanarkshire  Council  and  Strathclyde  Police 
Children  and  Young  People's  Safety 
Initiative. 
I  want  to  right  away  ask  you  to  -  please  - 
press  the  delete  button  on  those  headlines 
that  have  wrongly  dubbed  this  unique 
initiative  a  curfew. 
That  is  a  nonsense  notionl 
334 Such  a  notion  has  no  place  in  Hamilton,  no 
place  in  South  Lanarkshire. 
It  has  no  place  in  a  society  heading  for  the 
new  millennium. 
The  Hamilton  child  safety  initiative  is  about 
improving  the  quality  of  life  for  the  people  of 
Whitehill,  Hillhouse  and  Fairhill. 
It  is  about  the  safety  and  the  protection  of 
our  children  -  today,  how  -  and  in  the 
future. 
It  is  about  responsibility. 
It  is  about  civil  liberties  and  freedom  -  the 
freedom  of  everyone  in  the  community  to 
live  without  fear  or  intimidation. 
Each  of  us  has  responsibilities  to  other 
people  within  our  communities. 
We  have  to  recognise  that  when  some 
people  chose  to  ignore  their  responsibilities 
-  to  their  children,  to  their  neighbours,  to 
335 their  community  -  to  society  -  it  leads  to  an 
erosion  of  community. 
It  leads  to  people  becoming  fearful  and 
distrustful  of  each  other. 
Let  me  ask  those  civil  libertarians  whose 
gut  reaction  has  been  to  hit  out  at  this 
initiative  to  take  a  step  back  and  consider 
what  the  council,  the  police  and  the 
community  are  trying  to  achieve. 
Let  me  ask  them  to  come  and  talk  with  us. 
They  will  find  that  the  initiative  we  are 
launching  today  is  not  about  an  increase  in 
powers  at  the  expense  of  the  freedom  of 
children  and  young  people. 
It  is  not  about  giving  the  police  the  power  to 
whisk  off  the  streets  young  people  who  are 
simply  there  enjoying  themselves. 
It  is  in  fact  about  returning  civil  liberties  to 
communities  -  about  removing  fear. 
336 The  truth  is  that  our  children  and  young 
people's  safety  initiative  has  at  its  core  the 
rights  of  children. 
But  is  also  seeks  to  highlight  the 
responsibilities  that  young  people 
themselves  have  -  and  perhaps  more 
importantly,  the  responsibility  that  parents 
have. 
And  of  course  it  is  in  the  home  that  those 
lessons  are  first  learned.  It  is  there  that  we 
learn  that  we  are  part  of  the  community. 
The  Hamilton  child  safety  initiative  is  in 
actual  fact  about  the  civil  liberty  that 
recognises  the  rights  of  young  people  and 
the  community  as  a  whole. 
It  is  about  saying  no  to  those  who  throw 
away  the  rules  and  ignore  the  rights  of 
others. 
It's  about  the  responsibility  of  parents 
realising  and  recognising  it  is  in  their 
interest  to  know  where  their  children  are 
and  what  they  are  doing. 
337 But  it's  also  about  the  responsibility  of  local 
authorities  to  realise  that  they  have  to 
listen  to  what  young  people  are  saying, 
about  recognising  that  councils  - 
government  -  do  not  have  all  the  answers. 
It's  about  realising  that  young  people  are 
worth  listening  to,  about  accepting  that 
young  people  have  views  and  ideas  worth 
not  only  evaluating,  but  taking  on  board. 
We  do  no  favour  for  children  by  excusing 
behaviour  which  can  lead  them  into 
regrettable  situations. 
In  essence  we  are  seeking  to  create  an 
environment  where  everyone  -  young  and 
old  -  can  feel  safe  and  secure. 
And  what's  so  wrong  about  spelling  out  to 
those  who  discard  the  rules  and  Ignore  the 
rights  of  others  that  their  actions  will  not  be 
tolerated. 
338 The  decision  to  launch  a  safety  initiative 
pilot  scheme  comes  in  response  to  concerns 
directly  raised  by  the  community. 
A  number  of  surveys  carried  out  by  the 
council  in  recent  months  -a  System  Three 
poll,  a  Youth  Survey  and  Scotland's  first 
Citizens'Jury  here  in  Hamilton  -  showed 
that  for  all  ages  the  number  one  priority 
was  community  safety. 
Let  me  stress  that  the  pilot  areas  involved 
in  the  initiative  have  been  chosen  not 
because  they  have  any  more  problems  than 
any  other  communities  throughout  the 
countiry  -  but  because  the  community  itself 
has  called  for  action. 
When  we  looked  at  the  evidence  from  the 
surveys  and  from  the  recommendations  of 
the  Hillhouse  Citizens'Jury  -  the  message 
came  over  loud  and  clear  -  safety  issues 
were  a  top  priority. 
And  that  includes  the  safety  of  young 
people,  particularly  at  night. 
339 And  so  it  is  right  that  we  should  be 
concerned  about  the  safety  of  young 
children  on  the  streets  at  night  and  tackle 
the  issue  of  their  vulnerability. 
The  community  has  raised  genuine 
concems. 
Today  we  are  demonstrating  our 
commitment  to  respond  to  those  concerns. 
And  we  are  doing  that  by  working  in 
partnership  with  the  community  and  by 
consulting  our  young  people  on  what  they 
want. 
I  can  tell  you  that  part  of  our  wider 
consultation  process  includes  providing 
integrated  youth  facilities  which  are  being 
designed  by  young  people  in  partnership 
with  the  council. 
It  will  have  a  one-stop  shop  approach  to 
youth  issues  and  they  will  be  especially 
relevant  to  youngsters  in  their  mid  to  late 
teens. 
340 These  will  be  both  social  and  educational 
using  internet  cafes,  which  it  is  hoped  will 
open  up  training  opportunities. 
Infonnation  and  advice  on  a  range  of  issues 
will  be  available  and  will  be  presented  in  a 
way  which  is  acceptable  to  young  people. 
Our  youth  will  have  a  day-to-day 
management  role  in  the  running  of  the 
facilities  which  initially  will  be  set  up  in 
Hamilton,  East  Kilbride,  Larkhall  and 
Lanark. 
The  Chief  Constable  has  spoken  of  the 
support  that  has  come  from  the  community 
through  the  various  telephone  polls  that 
have  been  conducted. 
I  believe  the  support  that  they  have  already 
shown  will  be  repaid  in  giving  them  a 
community  in  which  they  can  have 
justifiable  pride. 
ENDS 
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